Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[46]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[55]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[46]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-17 23:52:07.132
	1	+2016-12-17 23:52:07.0

Caselist.CitesClass[55]

Cites

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	1	+First- the link- freedom-of-speech discourses, especially those of counterspeech force dehumanization on marginalized bodies
	2	+KENT GREENFIELD MAR 13, 2015 , The Limits of Free Speech, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-limits-of-free-speech/387718/
	3	+Those not targeted by the speech can sit back and recite how distasteful such racism or sexism is, and isn’t it too bad so little can be done. Meanwhile, those targeted by the speech are forced to speak out, yet again, to reassert their right to be treated equally, to be free to learn or work or live in an environment that does not threaten them with violence. The First Amendment’s reliance on counterspeech as remedy forces the most marginalized among us to bear the costs of the bigots’ speech. Counterspeech is exhausting and distracting, but if you are the target of hatred you have little choice. “Speak up! Remind us why you should not be lynched.” “Speak up! Remind us why you should not be raped.” You can stay silent, but that internalizes the taunt. The First Amendment tells us the government cannot force us either to remain silent or to speak, but its reliance on counterspeech effectively forces that very choice onto victims of hate speech.
	4	+
	5	+2nd- The protection of the AC cannot be functionally accessed by these marginalized bodies. This A. kills solvency of the Ac and B. means that you prop up a false narrative of inclusion with your politics. This allows dominant powers in society to silence the oppressed.
	6	+Downing, John DH. "Hate Speech'andFirst Amendment Absolutism'Discourses in the US." Discourse and Society 10.2 (1999): 175-189.
	7	+enforced throughout US history in favor of free public speech. Indeed, the evidence suggests quite the opposite. Linfield (1990) offers a mass of supporting evidence in the same direction during wartime periods. The First Amendment does not guarantee a right to communicate, it only prohibits government from passing certain types of legislation, and even this prohibition has to be interpreted, ultimately, by a given Supreme Court. What then is the First Amendment’s actual force? There is no way of offering a comprehensive answer to that question here. But it is important to consider the position put forward by Jensen and Arriola (1995), who argue that the First Amendment offers illusory protections. The ideology that in the USA anyone can constitutionally say anything, bypasses the social factors inhibiting the free and full expression of grievances and problems: ‘. . . the vast majority of survivors of sexual violence are ignored, blamed, pathologized, threatened, disbelieved, and otherwise revictimized when they protest the violation and try to hold their offenders accountable’ (pp. 195–6). Thus women or ethnic minority groups with important stories to tell who do not tell them, are subject to what Jensen and Arriola sum up as ‘oppressive silencing’ (pp. 199–203) – yet can comfortably be presumed by the public to have nothing of substance straitjacketing them because there is a talismanic First Amendment in existence. In reality that Amendment in no way protects their freedom to communicate, or their right to freedom from hate-based communication that does indeed straitjacket them. Hostile power in society is far from being only governmental, and the suppression of rights goes far beyond what has been legislated to that end. 2 IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT PECULIARLY AMERICAN? On one level, yes. There is no exact equivalent, not least because of its interrelation with the whole corpus of US legislation, constitutional and otherwise. Some would go further, however, and claim it is part of a distinctively American constitutional genius, one of the features of the USA that citizens of other nations should envy and aspire to reproduce, if they are up to it. Often lurking in this second claim is the assumption that no country enjoys more freedom of expression than the USA, almost as though in all other nations the citizens were constantly hedged about with blockages on public speech. With some degree of justice, the atrociously written British libel laws are the example of choice for those arguing this position, but even in Britain it is hardly the case that citizens are cowering in case they will be carted off to court for communicating freely. This viewpoint almost seems to squidge dictatorships and liberal democracies into a single bag, and thereby to trumpet American glory and exceptionalism (see Smith, 1995: 228). Downing: ‘Hate speech’ and ‘First Amendment absolutism’ 179 At this point it is probably appropriate to dispel some typical American illusions about European laws that ban incitement to racial hatred. Far from muzzling all free speech, as the rather apocalyptic First Amendment essentialist would claim, these laws are very rarely used. And in British experience, they have mostly been used against Black nationalist and Black racist speakers, rather than across the board. Nor is
	8	+Thus- the alternative is to make whiteness unsafe as a dominant frame of discourse. This is the only way to disrupt false narratives of diversity and inclusion- this is a pre-requisite to resist structural violence- the alternative is a question of methodology, if we don’t understand whiteness and the voices of the oppressed we cant actualize change.
	9	+
	10	+Yancy’12 {George; Prof at Duquesne University; “How Can You Teach Me if You Don’t Know Me? Embedded Racism and White Opacity”; Philosophy of Education Archive; http://ojs.ed.uiuc.edu/index.php/pes/article/view/3600/1221}AvP
	11	+So, I decided to talk about diversity in a way that would create risk, something that Odysseus failed to do. In other words, diversity, within the context of white North America, requires something more radical than Odysseus was willing to do. Hence, I think that it is important that I deploy one central pedagogical value that I hold dear, one that will shape the spirit of this talk: parrhesia (or fearless speech). Fearless or courageous speech involves genuine risk and vulnerability. Fearless or courageous speech, however, also involves fearless or courageous listening, which is a form of listening that does not leave us intact, unmoved, and dogmatic. One must be willing to listen to what is often most difficult and painful to hear about oneself and our society. So, I decided to talk about what I see as part of the problem for genuine diversity to take place: namely, the problem of whiteness. My talk then is not designed to leave us feeling “good” about ourselves; it is not designed to make us feel that my presence here — the fact that you see before you a Black philosopher talking about diversity — is a sign of your progress, and your liberal political sensibilities, your openness to dialogue. After all, if whiteness is the problem, then it is important that we avoid reinforcing the centrality of that problem. So, my contention is that instances of diversity where whiteness remains the center of privilege, invisibility, and power are not genuine instances of diversity at all. If diversity-talk is to be more robust, and if diversity at the level of lived experience is to be more fruitful and vivacious, then it is necessary that we engage in the process of un-concealing whiteness, revealing its subtle dynamism and structure. After all, without this pre-conditional critical work of naming whiteness, of critically engaging whiteness, “diversity” might simply function to serve the hidden values of whites as a group; diversity might function as a way of feeding white moral narcissism; and, diversity might function as a way of making whites comfortable, giving them a false sense of post-racial and post-racist arrival. What we really want to do, then, is to make whiteness “unsafe” as a normative category. Therefore, it is important to put whiteness at risk. Otherwise, whiteness can maintain its stability precisely through the rhetoric of self-congratulatory processes as it constructs its own safe vision of diversity. What is necessary is a discussion about diversity that raises the stakes, like walking from Jerusalem to Jericho, where something is “lost,” where we disorient ourselves, were we “dwell near” others in a transformative way, where we do not simply walk by and notice that which is different from us, but where we “dwell near” differences, where we tarry with differences. So, before we can talk about happy stories of diversity, we must, as Sara Ahmed would say, hear unhappy stories about racism,1 specifically the way in which the Black body constitutes not a site of difference as the human other, but difference as the problematic other, the other who is only allowed a voice so long as that voice does not disrupt whiteness as usual. The title of this essay — “How Can You Teach Me if You Don’t Know Me?” — suggests the idea that to know me as an embodied Black person it is necessary that I am actually heard, that is, that I am not occluded by white voices from speaking from my own embodied experiences. Indeed, it is also important that my voice is not simply rearticulated through a prism of white discourse that can and often does obfuscate the voices of people of color. Another way of thinking about the critique of whiteness as implied within the title of this essay is to ask: How can you critically engage the theme of diversity if you don’t know yourself? This question gives the problem back to whites, signifying their own cognitive and emotive distortion vis-à-vis themselves. Indeed, the heart of this question posed to whites involves a powerful act of transposition: How does it feel to be a white problem? Rethinking the term “nigger” through the process of reversal, James Baldwin asks, “But if I am not the ‘nigger’ and if it is true that your invention reveals you, then who is the nigger?” Baldwin goes on to say, “I give you your problem back. You’re the nigger, baby, it isn’t me.” As long as whites see themselves as normative, and I am different qua “nigger,” diversity will function as a cover, a political maneuver, a mere empty gesture. Baldwin’s point forces us to ask: Will the real “nigger” please stand up?

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-17 23:52:10.636

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	1	+Panal

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	1	+Mac

ParentRound

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	1	+46

Round

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	1	+Quarters

Team

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	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

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	1	+4- Opp K

Tournament

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	1	+Strake