Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[52]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[53]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[52]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-17 00:15:04.889
	1	+2016-12-17 00:15:04.0

Caselist.CitesClass[53]

Cites

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	1	+Levinas hijack-
	2	+Thus, the ethical subject is heteronomous, not autonomous, from the very moment of self-consciousness. The notion of ethical responsibility is being obligated to the Other. It is in responsibility for the Other that the self can have an actual encounter with ethics.
	3	+
	4	+Beavers 2 concludes:
	5	+
	6	+Furthermore, "the tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility “as well. Thus, responsibility is the link between the subject and the other person, or, in more general terms, the source of the moral "ought" and the appearance of the other person as person and not as thing are one and the same. There is no authentic sociality apart from ethics, and there is no ethics apart from sociality. To say that responsibility is foundational for ethics and interpersonal relations is to say then not only that responsibility it is what relates one subject to another, but it is to go on to say that the meaning of the otherness of the other person is given in responsibility, and not in my interpretation of the other person. The very meaning of being another person is "the one to whom I am responsible." Thus, the contact with the real other person that I spoke of at the beginning of this lecture as something presupposed by the very meaning of ethics turns out to be, in Levinas' account, the source of the moral "ought."
	7	+Thus allow totalization impacts under u
	8	+Freedom of speech totalizes the other because it offers an illusion of accessibility that is often denied in practice. Additionally, our hegemonic understanding of speech totalizes other cultures via narratives of American exceptionalism.
	9	+Downing, John DH. "Hate Speech'andFirst Amendment Absolutism'Discourses in the US." Discourse and Society 10.2 (1999): 175-189.
	10	+enforced throughout US history in favor of free public speech. Indeed, the evidence suggests quite the opposite. Linfield (1990) offers a mass of supporting evidence in the same direction during wartime periods. The First Amendment does not guarantee a right to communicate, it only prohibits government from passing certain types of legislation, and even this prohibition has to be interpreted, ultimately, by a given Supreme Court. What then is the First Amendment’s actual force? There is no way of offering a comprehensive answer to that question here. But it is important to consider the position put forward by Jensen and Arriola (1995), who argue that the First Amendment offers illusory protections. The ideology that in the USA anyone can constitutionally say anything, bypasses the social factors inhibiting the free and full expression of grievances and problems: ‘. . . the vast majority of survivors of sexual violence are ignored, blamed, pathologized, threatened, disbelieved, and otherwise revictimized when they protest the violation and try to hold their offenders accountable’ (pp. 195–6). Thus women or ethnic minority groups with important stories to tell who do not tell them, are subject to what Jensen and Arriola sum up as ‘oppressive silencing’ (pp. 199–203) – yet can comfortably be presumed by the public to have nothing of substance straitjacketing them because there is a talismanic First Amendment in existence. In reality that Amendment in no way protects their freedom to communicate, or their right to freedom from hate-based communication that does indeed straitjacket them. Hostile power in society is far from being only governmental, and the suppression of rights goes far beyond what has been legislated to that end. 2 IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT PECULIARLY AMERICAN? On one level, yes. There is no exact equivalent, not least because of its interrelation with the whole corpus of US legislation, constitutional and otherwise. Some would go further, however, and claim it is part of a distinctively American constitutional genius, one of the features of the USA that citizens of other nations should envy and aspire to reproduce, if they are up to it. Often lurking in this second claim is the assumption that no country enjoys more freedom of expression than the USA, almost as though in all other nations the citizens were constantly hedged about with blockages on public speech. With some degree of justice, the atrociously written British libel laws are the example of choice for those arguing this position, but even in Britain it is hardly the case that citizens are cowering in case they will be carted off to court for communicating freely. This viewpoint almost seems to squidge dictatorships and liberal democracies into a single bag, and thereby to trumpet American glory and exceptionalism (see Smith, 1995: 228). Downing: ‘Hate speech’ and ‘First Amendment absolutism’ 179 At this point it is probably appropriate to dispel some typical American illusions about European laws that ban incitement to racial hatred. Far from muzzling all free speech, as the rather apocalyptic First Amendment essentialist would claim, these laws are very rarely used. And in British experience, they have mostly been used against Black nationalist and Black racist speakers, rather than across the board.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-17 00:15:06.668

Judge

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	1	+JP

Opponent

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	1	+Lake Highland RS

ParentRound

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	1	+44

Round

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	1	+3

Team

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	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

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	1	+4- Levinas Hijack

Tournament

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	1	+Strake