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  • Caselist.CitesClass[50]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[51]

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Caselist.CitesClass[50]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-16 22:25:21.533
	1	+2016-12-16 22:25:21.0

Caselist.CitesClass[51]

Cites

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	1	+Part one, links-
	2	+Your specific aff is only true to constitutionally protected porn
	3	+Free speech is bullshit, a mindless social construction we use to endorse preferred verbal behaviors. There’s no natural meaning to this idea, this allows ‘free speech’ to magnify biopolitical control under the guise of resisting the state
	4	+Fish, Stanley. There's no such thing as free speech: And it's a good thing, too. Oxford University Press, 1994.
	5	+Lately, many on the liberal and progressive left have been disconcerted to find that words, phrases, and concepts thought to be their property and generative of their politics have been appropriated by the forces of neo-conservatism. This is particularly true of the concept of free speech, for in recent years First Amendment rhetoric has been used to justify policies and actions the left finds problematical if not abhorrent: pornography, sexist language, campus hate speech. How has this happened? The answer I shall give in this essay is that abstract concepts like free speech do not have any “natural” content but are filled with whatever content and direction one can manage to put into them. “Free speech” is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance; and we give our preferred verbal behaviors that name when we can, when we have the power to do so, because in the rhetoric of American life, the label “free speech” is the one you want your favorites to wear. Free speech, in short, is not an independent value but a political prize, and if that prize has been captured by a politics opposed to yours, it can no longer be invoked in ways that further your purposes, for it is now an obstacle to those purposes. This is something that the liberal left has yet to understand, and what follows is an attempt to pry its members loose from a vocabulary that may now be a disservice to them. Not far from the end of his Areopagitica, and after having celebrated the virtues of toleration and unregulated publication in passages that find their way into every discussion of free speech and the First Amendment, John Milton catches himself up short and says, of course I didn’t mean Catholics, them we exterminate: “I mean not tolerated popery, and open superstition, which as it extirpates all religious and civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate . . . that also which is impious or evil absolutely against faith or manners no law can possibly permit that intends not to unlaw itself.” Notice that Milton is not simply stipulating a single exception to a rule generally in place; the kinds of utterance that might be regulated and even prohibited on pain of trial and punishment constitute an open set; popery is named only as a particularly perspicuous instance of the advocacy that can-not be tolerated. No doubt there are other forms of speech and action that might be categorized as “open superstitions” or as subversive of piety, faith, and manners, and presumably these too would be candidates for
	6	+- the very structure of constitutional protections is internally contradictory; it functions as a document that paradoxally affirms censorship. Independently, the framework you use to justify the Ac contradicts this purpose of the document- constitutional protections provide the strongest ability to censor, as they legitimize demarcation of legitimate discourse
	7	+Fish, Stanley. There's no such thing as free speech: And it's a good thing, too. Oxford University Press, 1994.
	8	+It is a counsel that follows from the thesis that there is no such thing as free speech, which is not, after all, a thesis as startling or corrosive as may first have seemed. It merely says that there is no class of utterances separable from the world of conduct and that therefore the identification of some utterances as members of that nonexistent class will always be evidence that a political line has been drawn rather than a line that denies politics entry into the forum of public discourse. It is the job of the First Amendment to mark out an area in which competing views can be considered without state interference; but if the very marking out of that area is itself an interference (as it always will be), First Amendment jurisprudence is inevitably self-defeating and subversive of its own aspirations. That’s the bad news. The good news is that precisely because speech is never “free” in the two senses required— free of consequences and free from state pressure—speech always matters, is always doing work; because everything we say impinges on the world in ways indistinguishable from the effects of physical action, we must take responsibility for our verbal performances—all of them—and not assume that they are being taken cares of by a clause in the Constitution. Of course, with responsibility comes risks, but they have always been our risks, and no doctrine of free speech has ever insulated us from them. They are the risks, respectively, of permitting speech that does obvious harm and of shutting off speech in ways that might deny us the benefit of Joyce’s Ulysses or Lawrence’s Lady Chatterly’s Lover or Titian’s paintings. Nothing, I repeat, can insulate us from those risks. (If there is no normative guidance in determining when and what speech to protect, there is no normative guidance in determining what is art—like free speech a category that includes everything and nothing—and what is obscenity.)Moreover, nothing can provide us with a principle for deciding which risk in the long run is the best to take. I am persuaded that at the present moment, right now, the risk of not attending to hate speech is greater than the risk that by regulating it we will deprive ourselves of valuable voices and insights or slide down the slippery slope toward tyranny. This is a judgment for which I can offer reasons but no guarantees. All I am saying is that the judgments of those who would come down on the other side carry no guarantees either. They urge us to put our faith in apolitical abstractions, but the abstractions they invoke—the marketplace of ideas, speech alone, speech itself—only come in political guises, and therefore in trusting to them we fall (unwittingly) under the sway of the very forces we wish to keep at bay. It is not that there are no choices to make or means of making them; it is just that the choices as well as the means are inextricable from the din and confusion of partisan struggle. There is no safe place.
	9	+analytic
	10	+analytic
	11	+Part two is the impact-
	12	+deon/freedom
	13	+We no solve the aff- if the government can alter the definition of protection there is none
	14	+
	15	+Governmentalization constructs and constrains the individual dimensions of life.
	16	+Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p .8, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)
	17	+The example of smoking also suggests that deeply-embedded and widely- accepted social practices related to lifestyle can, and do, change over time, albeit not via the much-vaunted market and its concern with prices and internalization. Although we tend to regard lifestyles as a matter of “freedom of choice,”23 they are, in fact, heavily- regulated in terms of what we are permitted to do, what we are encouraged to consume, and what happens if we “violate” the rules and regulations that constrain our “freedom.” The governmentalization of lifestyle thus becomes a set of internalized norms and practices through which individual members of specified populations shape themselves so as to comport with their statistical placement in specific categories of consumers. Data on these practices can be collected to generate statistical norms about group “preferences” that, in turn, can be applied to further shape and stimulate the biopolitics of consumers. All of this serves the imperative of economic growth and accumulation, although it would be inaccurate to say that there is strong intentionality present in this process.24 A further point here is that the processes, practices and effects of governmentality serve as much to create those populations as they do to keep them contained within normative limits.
	18	+
	19	+Part three is the alt-
	20	+Vote negative as an act of criticism – exposing fissures in the affirmative’s analysis creates new spaces for freedom, only exposing entrenched social formations can produce spaces for alternative models of living. We preform the alternative- you can’t say we don’t solve as we expose and problematize biopolitical control
	21	+May 11 (Todd, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Clemson, “A New Neo-Pragmatism: From James and Dewey to Foucault,” 2011, Foucault Studies, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3205/3399, Pg. 60-62, JS)
	22	+I believe we can answer this question in the affirmative. The claim is not that all prac-tices have the same level of depth or influence when it comes to relations of power and know-ledge. If that were the case, then it would have been just as expedient for Foucault to study baseball as psychotherapeutic practice. Rather, the idea is that, to one extent or another, power and knowledge, and particularly their relationship, arises within practices. So in the case of baseball one might find it operating, at least at the margins—indeed it is not difficult to imagine such a case. Think, for instance, of a baseball player who is about to give a public speech being told that he is ‚on deck.‛ The implication here is that the person is about to en-gage in a competitive activity whose goal is to win something, whether that be audience’s respect, other speaking engagements, or something else. Inasmuch as this person understands himself through the game of baseball, transferring the image of being on deck to other activities promotes a competitive self-understanding, which generates beliefs and actions en-gaged with the world in a competitive mode. It might be pointed out here that not only baseball players, but other people as well are subject to the locution of being on deck. This is true. It is also true that people who are not in psychotherapy are subject to influences from that practice. Practices do not exist in isolation. They are intertwined and pervade our culture and society in different ways and to different extents. Moreover, an individual’s immersion in different practices can cause cross-fertiliza-tion of the power/knowledge effects of those practices within his or her beliefs, actions, and engagements. What Foucault offers in focusing on the level of practices as his unit of histo-rical and genealogical inquiry is not a specialized or narrow analytic, but instead a way of understanding ourselves and how we got to be who we are through the most common and pervasive ways in which we engage with the world. The addition I have made to Foucault’s own claim about practices is that it is in the practices that the power/knowledge relationships May: A New Neo-Pragmatism 61 are to be found. Even this is not an addition so much as a clarification that allows us to see more straightforwardly the relationship between his work and pragmatism. Having made this clarification, though, we must ask about that relationship. What is the implication of all this for pragmatism? It lies in introducing a complexity that appears to have escaped James and, to a lesser extent, Dewey, for whom the success of a practice lay in its ability to help us navigate the world. If Foucault’s genealogical approach is helpful, the con-cept of success must itself be investigated rather than being a sort of ‚unexplained ex-plainer.‛17 Successful navigation of the world seems to be a matter of accomplishing one’s goals better or more efficiently or more meaningfully. This being said, we might ask, what are the self-understandings tied up with particular senses of success? If, for instance, we are pro-duced to one extent or another to be psychological beings with personalities of the type that psychotherapy promotes, then success will be defined in psychotherapeutic terms. This, in turn, has its own political effects, effects Foucault has traced in Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. These effects are not always ones we would, on reflec-tion, seek to ratify. Some of them, for example the making-docile of human bodies, are, in Foucault’s term, intolerable. We cannot, then, take the notion of success or the idea of navi-gating the world more successfully at face value. We must see it as the name of a problem to be investigated rather than a solution to be attained. This, it seems to me, is a point that would deepen pragmatism without violating any of its central commitments. It would, instead, offer a historical dimension to pragmatist thought. Success in navigating the world is not a given. Rather, one is successful within parti-cular parameters, and those parameters have political inflections. It is not only that the para-meters provide territorial borders within which one can have more or less success in one’s navigation. The problem is deeper: what counts as success as well as what is encouraged or discouraged (or even prohibited) in the name of that success are political matters. They are matters of whom we have been shaped to be and what our understanding and self-under-standing consists in. We might, from another angle, locate the difference between Foucault and the prag-matists and neo-pragmatists this way. For the latter, pragmatism is a matter of what is prac-tical; while for Foucault, pragmatism is a matter of taking our practices as the unit of analysis. What gives Foucault’s work its force, and what makes it relevant for pragmatism, is that it is through our practices what is considered practical arises for us. We cannot take the practical, or successful within it, as a given. That is the lesson of his genealogies.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-16 22:25:22.917

Judge

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	1	+Rodrigo

Opponent

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	1	+Montgomery

ParentRound

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	1	+43

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

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	1	+4- Biopower K

Tournament

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	1	+Strake