Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[41]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[47]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[41]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-10 00:08:12.939
	1	+2016-12-10 00:08:12.0

Caselist.CitesClass[47]

Cites

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	1	+the LINK-Rights are based on an inscription of life in birth. This inevitably inscribes the power of the nation state, barring life to those outside. The functionality of rights also kills solvency of the ac, because It is contingent on the continued goodwill of the state
	2	+Giorgio Agamben Beyond Human Rights, This English translation of the original Italian text (1993) was first published in: Giorgio Agamben, ‘Means without End. Notes on Politics’ in: Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. 20 (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
	3	+anitarian organizations and to the police. The reasons for such impotence lie not only in the selfishness and blindness of bureaucratic apparatuses, but also in the very ambiguity of the fundamental notions regulating the inscription of the native (that is, of life) in the juridical order of the nation-state. Hannah Arendt titled the chapter of her book Imperialism that concerns the refugee problem ‘The Decline of the NationState and the End of the Rights of Man’.2 One should try to take seriously this formulation, 2. Hannah Arendt, Imperialism which indissolubly of Totalitarianism, Part II of The Origins (New links the fate of the York: Harcourt Brace, 1951), 266-298. Rights of Man with the fate of the modern nation-state in such a way that the waning of the latter necessarily implies the obsolescence of the former. Here the paradox is that precisely the figure that should have embodied human rights more than any other – namely, the refugee – marked instead the radical crisis of the concept. The conception of human rights based on the supposed existence of a human being as such, Arendt tells us, proves to be untenable as soon as those who profess it find themselves confronted for the first time with people who have really lost every quality and every specific relation except for the pure fact of being human.3 In the system of the nation-state, so- 3. Ibid., 290-295. called sacred and inalienable human rights are revealed to be without any protection precisely when it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights of the citizens of a state. This is implicit, after all, in the ambiguity of the very title of the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, in which it is unclear whether the two terms are to name two distinct realities or whether they are to form, instead, a hendiadys in which the first term is actually always already
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	7	+impact-this barring of life detracts from the realization of Naked Life- a form of persistent dehumanization. The only way to escape is by embracing a denationalized subject in the REFUGEE
	8	+Giorgio Agamben Beyond Human Rights, This English translation of the original Italian text (1993) was first published in: Giorgio Agamben, ‘Means without End. Notes on Politics’ in: Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. 20 (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
	9	+contained in the second. That there is no autonomous space in the political order of the nation-state for something like the pure human in itself is evident at the very least from the fact that, even in the best of cases, the status of refugee has always been considered a temporary condition that ought to lead either to naturalization or to repatriation. A stable statute for the human in itself is inconceivable in the law of the nation-state. It is time to cease to look at all the declarations of rights from 1789 to the present day as proclamations of eternal metajuridical values aimed at binding the legislator to the respect of such values; it is time, rather, to understand them according to their real function in the modern state. Human rights, in fact, represent first of all the originary 2008/No. figure for the inscription of natural naked life in the political-juridical order of the nation-state. Naked life (the human being), which in antiquity belonged to God and in the classical world was clearly distinct (as zoe) from political life (bios), comes to the forefront in the management of the state and becomes, so to speak, its earthly foundation. Nation-state means a state that makes nativity or birth nascita (that is, naked human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty. This is the meaning (and it is not even a hidden one) of the first three articles of the 1789 Declaration: it is only because this declaration inscribed (in articles 1 and 2) the native element in the heart of any political organization that it can firmly bind (in article 3) the principle of sovereignty to the nation (in conformity with its etymon, native natío originally meant simply ‘birth’ nascita. The fiction that is implicit here is that birth nascita comes into being immediately as nation, so that there may not be any difference between the two moments. Rights, in other words, are attributed to the human being only to the degree to which he or she is the immediately vanishing presupposition (and, in fact, the presupposition that must never come to light as such) of the citizen. If the refugee represents such a disquieting element in the order of the nation-state, this is so primarily because, by breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis. Single exceptions to such a principle, of course, have always existed. What is new in our time is that growing sections of humankind are no longer representable inside the nation-state – and this novelty threatens the very foundations of the latter. Inasmuch as the refugee, an apparently marginal figure, unhinges the old trinity of state-nation-territory, it deserves instead to be regarded as the central figure of our political history. We should not forget that the first camps were built in Europe as spaces for controlling refugees, and that the succession of internment campsconcentration camps-extermination camps represents a perfectly real filiation. One of the few rules the Nazis constantly obeyed throughout the course of the ‘final solution’ was that Jews and Gypsies could be sent to extermination camps only after having been fully denationalized (that is, after they had been stripped of even that second-class citizenship to which they had been relegated after the Nuremberg Laws). When their rights are no longer the rights of the citizen, that is when human beings are truly sacred, in the sense that this term used to have in the Roman law of the archaic period: doomed to death. The concept of refugee must be resolutely separated from the concept of the ‘human rights’, and the right of asylum (which in any case is by now in the process of being drastically restricted in the legislation of the European states) must no longer be considered as the conceptual category in which to inscribe the phenomenon of refugees. (One needs only to look at Agnes H
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	11	+And, even if I lose FW, dehumanization comes first because __________
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	14	+The alt: to create an extraterritorial space in the debate round: one that we create refugees out of debaters in the rejection of birthed rights and duties. This functionally and representationally exclusive with the aff because this space excludes the state and its arbitrary categories, as well as the affs rights based advocacy
	15	+Giorgio Agamben Beyond Human Rights, This English translation of the original Italian text (1993) was first published in: Giorgio Agamben, ‘Means without End. Notes on Politics’ in: Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. 20 (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
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	17	+eller’s recent Theses on the Right of Asylum to realize that this cannot but lead today to awkward confusions.) The refugee should be considered for what it is, namely, nothing less than a limit-concept that at once brings a radical crisis to the principles of the nation-state and clears the way for a renewal of categories that can no longer be delayed. Meanwhile, in fact, the phenomenon of so-called illegal immigration into the countries of the European Union has reached (and shall increasingly reach in the coming years, given the estimated twenty million immigrants from Central European countries) characteristics and proportions such that this reversal of perspective is fully justified. What industrialized countries face today is a permanently resident mass of noncitizens that do not want to be and cannot be either naturalized or repatriated. These noncitizens often have nationalities of origin, but, inasmuch as they prefer not to benefit from their own states’ protection, they find themselves, as refugees, in a condition of de facto statelessness. Tomas Hammar has created the neologism of ‘denizens’ for these noncitizen residents, a neologism that has the merit of showing how the concept of ‘citizen’ is no longer adequate for describing the social-political reality of modern states.4 On the other hand, the citizens 4.Tomas Hammar, Democof advanced indus- rAacliensy and the Nation State, Denizens, and : trial states (in the Citizens in a World of International Migration (Brook- United States as field, Vt.: Gower, 1990). well as Europe) demonstrate, through an increasing desertion of the codified instances of political participation, an evident propensity to turn into denizens, into noncitizen permanent residents, so that citizens and denizens – at least in certain social strata – are entering an area of potential indistinction. In a parallel way, xenophobic reactions and defensive mobilizations are on the rise, in conformity with the well-known principle according to which substantial assimilation in the presence of formal differences exacerbates hatred and intolerance. Before extermination camps are reopened in Europe (something that is already starting to happen), it is necessary that the nation-states find the courage to question the very principle of the inscription of nativity as well as the trinity of state-nation-territory that is founded on that principle. It is not easy to indicate right now the ways in which all this may concretely happen. One of the options taken into consideration for solving the problem of Jerusalem is that it become – simultaneously and without any territorial partition – the capital of two different states. The paradoxical condition of reciprocal extraterritoriality (or, better yet, aterritoriality) that would thus be implied could be generalized as a model of new international relations. Instead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening boundaries, it might be possible to imagine two political communities existing on the same region and in a condition of exodus from each other – communities 2008/No. that would articulate each other via a series of reciprocal extraterritorialities in which the guiding concept would no longer be the ius (right) of the citizen but rather the refugium (refuge) of the singular. In an analogous way, we could conceive of Europe not as an impossible ‘Europe of the nations’, whose catastrophe one can already foresee in the short run, but rather as an aterritorial or extraterritorial space in which all the (citizen and noncitizen) residents of the European states would be in a position of exodus or refuge; the status of European would then mean the being-in-exodus of the citizen (a condition that obviously could also be one of immobility). European space would thus mark an irreducible difference between birth nascita and nation in which the old concept of people (which, as is well known, is always a minority) could again find a political meaning, thus decidedly opposing itself to the concept of nation (which has so far unduly usurped it). This space would coincide neither with any of the homogeneous national territories nor with their topographical sum, but would rather act on them by articulating and perforating them topologically as in the Klein bottle or in the Möbius strip, where exterior and interior in-determine each other. In this new space, European cities would rediscover their ancient vocation of cities of the world by entering into a relation of reciprocal extraterritoriality. As I write this essay, 425 Palestinians expelled by the state of Israel find themselves in a sort of no-man’s-land. These men certainly constitute, according to Hannah Arendt’s suggestion, ‘the vanguard of their people’. But that is so not necessarily or not merely in the sense that they might form the originary nucleus of a future national state, or in the sense that they might solve the Palestinian question in a way just as insufficient as the way in which Israel has solved the Jewish question. Rather, the no-man’s-land in which they are refugees has already started from this very moment to act back onto the territory of the state of Israel by perforating it and altering it in such a way that the image of that snowy mountain has become more internal to it than any other region of Eretz Israel. Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus perforated and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today thinkable.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-10 00:08:15.912

Judge

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	1	+Nikunj Patel

Opponent

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	1	+Edmond North DA

ParentRound

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	1	+41

Round

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	1	+4

Team

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	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

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	1	+3-Agamban K

Tournament

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	1	+UT