Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[36]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[34]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[36]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-29 23:35:57.817
	1	+2016-11-29 23:35:57.0

Caselist.CitesClass[34]

Cites

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	1	+JK its abolish QU lol
	2	+Part one is the counterplan:
	3	+ The United States federal government should fully replace qualified immunity with the strict liability standard.
	4	+Bernick 15 explains the plan-strict liability is the standard for every other form of processional.
	5	+Evan Bernick (Assistant Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the Institute for Justice). “To Hold Police Accountable, Don’t Give Them Immunity.” Foundation for Economic Education.
	6	+6 May 2015. https://fee.org/articles/to-hold-police-accountable-dont-give-them-immunity/
	7	+Simply put, qualified immunity has to go. It should be replaced with a rule of strict liability for bona fide constitutional violations. There are a variety of possible rules. First, police officers could be held personally liable for any rights violations. They’d need to carry personal malpractice insurance, just like lawyers, doctors, and other professionals. Insurance companies are qualified and motivated judges of risk, and they would provide another reasonable level of scrutiny on police conduct, policies, and training. Second, police departments could be held liable for any rights violations by officers and punitive damages could be assessed against individual officers for particularly outrageous conduct. Third, police departments could be required to insure officers up to a certain amount — officers would have to purchase insurance to cover any costs in excess of that amount. As ambitious as these reforms might seem, never underestimate the power of widespreadpublicoutrage. InthecaseofKelo, theCourt’s cavalier treatmentofpropertyrightsled to a number of laws protecting citizens from eminent domain abuse in states across the country. Here, too, the public can force legislators to respond. The question of how to ensure that officers exercise the authority delegated to them with the proper vigor, while also keeping them within the limits of that authority, should be left in the first instance to elected officials — subject to constitutional limits and the requirements of valid federal laws (like Section 1983). Qualified immunity enables officers to flout those limits and those laws. We must replace the judicially invented impunity that police officers currently enjoy with a realistic avenue for the vindication of constitutional rights.
	8	+
	9	+Part two is net benefits-
	10	+Solves the whole aff better- we ban qualified immunity completely, giving more accountability.
	11	+We demand police be treated equally to the public- this is key to break the reliance on the state. Any legal distinction between members of the state and the public is unjust because it places unequal moral worth on the ones in control, this functions as the root cause of violence as power structures are able to justify atrocities.
	12	+Only the counterplan solves- Studies show officers are never held financially liable in the status quo due to indemnification-liability is shifted to the police department, incentivizing future abuses. The CP is absolutely key to stop this- it demands direct, personal liabillity for officers.
	13	+Joanna Schwartz (Law Professor at UCLA); interview with Paul Rosenberg (California-based writer/activist, senior editor for Random Lengths News, and a columnist for Al Jazeera English). “We must make the police pay: When cops go too far, they must feel the pain too.” Salon. 9 May 2015. http://www.salon.com/2015/05/09/we_must_make_the_police_pay_when_cops_go_too_far_they_must_feel_t
	14	+So, what was the scope of your investigation in terms of timeframe and the jurisdictions you looked at? I began this project in 2012, and sent out public records requests to the 70 largest law enforcement agencies, including both municipal agencies and county and state agencies. My public records request essentially asked for information about the amounts spent, in civil rights claims, over six years—from 2006 to 2011—and the frequency with which punitive damage judgments were awarded, and any instances in which officers were required to personally pay, in part, any of those awards. There was, as you might imagine, a lot of runaround with a lot of jurisdictions to get the information. I would say 80 percent of jurisdictions to 20 percent of my time, and the final 20 percent of the jurisdictions took 80 percent of my time. Sometime in about 2013, after about a year and a half, or almost two years, I tracked down information from 44 of those 70 departments, and then I presented the paper at Berkeley, at Boalt Law School, and someone asked a very good question: they said, “These are the 70 largest agencies. How do you know what happens is smaller agencies?” That was a very good question, because there are 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country, and many of those are very small, so I decided to then submit public records requests to a randomly selected group of 70 smaller law enforcement agencies, and got responses from 37 of those 70. So that is how I got the 81. The results you found were sort of what I expected, only more so, I would say personally, but I don’t know about the general public. And certainly it didn’t match the expectations out there in the legal literature. So what did you find? I found that indemnification of officers is virtually certain and universal. During the six year period across the 81 jurisdictions, there were over 9,200 civil rights cases in which plaintiffs received payments. The total awarded was over $730 million, but there were just 37 to 39 cases in which officers contributed something. When they contributed, it was a rather small amount. The median payment was just over $2,000 by officers per case. And those could be cases where there were five- or six-figure settlements for the plaintiffs in most cases. So the officers really contributed, when they contributed—which was very infrequent—they contributed a rather small amount. No officer paid more than $25,000 in any case. The next-highest amount was $16,500, and the next amount was $12,000. And most of the amounts in most cases were far smaller. So, as you said, it was sort of what I imagined, but more. Those findings amazed me, but what I found particularly amazing was jurisdictions indemnified officers for punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in cases in which officers are found by a jury to have engaged in reckless conduct, intentional misconduct; and punitive damages are intended not compensate victims, but to punish wrongdoers. I found 20 cases in that six-year period, in those 81 jurisdictions, in which a jury had awarded punitive damages against one or more defendants, and the jurors awarded over $9.3 million in punitive damages in those 20 cases. In many instances those awards were reduced by the courts, often based on argument by defense counsel that the punitive damages awarded would be a financial hardship for the individual officer–but not one officer paid a nickel toward any of those punitive damages. They were either indemnified, paid by the cities and counties that employed them, or the cities and counties entered into some post-trial settlement that waived the punitive damages judgment, and essentially the city paid the entirety of the settlement—which was a settlement in the shadow of the punitive damages judgment. The other thing that I suppose really shocked me, there has been an assumption, even with people who believe that officers are usually indemnified, there’s usually some sort of caveat, that of course officers wouldn’t be indemnified if they were fired, if they were criminally prosecuted, if they were criminally convicted. What I found during my study was that in multiple instances in which officers were terminated, when they were indicted, when they were criminally prosecuted, even when they went to prison, they did not suffer these financial consequences of the suits. They were nonetheless indemnified.
	15	+
	16	+Part 3 is competition
	17	+analytic

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-11-29 23:36:00.0

Judge

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	1	+Lay

Opponent

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	1	+Pembrook Pines SS

ParentRound

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	1	+36

Round

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	1	+5

Team

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	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

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	1	+3-totally-unique-cp-that-you-have-never-heard-before

Tournament

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	1	+Cypress bae