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+1st- The Affirmative’s call for state action fails to achieve its desired goals while directly reinforcing state power, increasing the legitimacy of State violence. |
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+Martin 1990, associate professor at the University of Wollongong, Australia, Brian, Uprooting War |
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+What should be done to help transform the state system in the direction of self-reliance and self-management? The problem can seem overwhelming. What difference can the actions of an individual or small group make? Actually quite a lot. The state system is strong because the actions of many people and groups support it. Most social activists see state intervention as a solution, often the solution to social problems. What can be done about poverty? More state welfare. What about racial discrimination? Laws and enforcement to stop it. What about environmental degradation? State regulation What about sexual discrimination? Anti-discrimination legislation. What about corporate irresponsibility or excess profit? Added government controls and taxation, or nationalization. What about unemployment? State regulation of the economy: investment incentives, job creation schemes, tariffs What about crime? More police, more prisons, more counselors What about enemy attack? More military spending What about too much military spending? Convince or pressure the government to cut back The obvious point is the most social activists look constantly to the state for solutions to social problems. This point bears laboring, because the orientation of most social action groups tends to reinforce state power. This applies to most antiwar action too. Many of the goals and methods of peace movements have been oriented around action by the state, such as appealing to state elites and advocating neutralism and unilateralism. Indeed, peace movements spend a lot of effort debate which demand to make on the state: nuclear freeze, unilateral or multilateral disarmament nuclear-free zones, or removal of military bases. By appealing to the state, activists indirectly strengthen the roots of many social problems the problem of war in particular. To help transform the state system action groups need to develop strategies which, at a minimum, do mot reinforce state power. This means ending the incessant appeals for state intervention, and promoting solutions to social problems which strengthen local self-reliance and initiative. What can be done about poverty? Promote worker and community control over economic resources, and local self-reliance in skills and resources What about racial discrimination? Promote discussion, interaction and nonviolent action at a grassroots level. What about sexual discrimination? Build grassroots campaigns against rape and the gender division of labour, and mount challenges to hierarchical structures which help sustain patriarchy What about corporate irresponsibility or excess profits? Promote worker and community control over production. What about unemployment? Promote community control of community resources for equitable distribution of work and the economic product, and develop worker cooperatives as an alternative to hobs as gifts of employers. What about crime? Work against unequal power and privilege and for meaningful ways of living to undercut the motivation for crime, and promote local community solidarity as a defense against crime. What about enemy attack? Social Defense What about too much military spending? Build local alternatives to the state, use these alternatives to withdraw support from the state and undermine the economic foundation of military spending These grassroots, self-managing solutions to social problems are in many cases no more than suggestive directions. Detailed grassroots strategies in most cases have not been developed, partly because so little attention has been devoted to them compared to the strategies relying on state intervention. But the direction should be clear in developing strategies to address problems, aim at building local self-reliance and withdrawing support from the state rather than appealing for state intervention and thereby reinforcing state power. |
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+Minarchy |
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+Alt; I defend a minarchist framework in which states are limited to preventing direct physical aggression and enforce contracts made between citizens. |
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+And C-the alt solves the aff: without government subsidies, nuclear power would not be competitive and would not exist. Minarchy removes these subsidies. |
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+Koplow, Douglas N. Nuclear power: Still not viable without subsidies. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011. |
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+to be integrated into the price of electricity. But water use in electricity generation has yet to be integrated in this way—and nuclear reactors are the most intense water users per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced. This amounts to a large subsidy to all thermal electric plants; the value to nuclear reactors is estimated to be nearly 0.2 ¢/kWh. Additional research is needed to further refine 106 Union of Concerned Scientists individual-reactor estimates; actual values are likely to vary widely by reactor location and be a more important factor in reactor siting than at present. • Tax breaks for decommissioning. Special reduced tax rates for decommissioning trust funds are the final major subsidy to existing reactors. With an estimated worth of 0.1 to 0.2 ¢/kWh ($450 million per year to $1.1 billion per year), the tax savings on trust-fund earnings are often as large as the new contributions that companies make to the funds. While ongoing subsidies to reactors remain a critical element in the competitiveness of nuclear power, legacy subsidies to capital formation and other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle were also important. If legacy subsidies are added to subsidies that reduce the cost of ongoing operations, this support amounts to between 8 ¢/kWh and 12 ¢/kWh for POUs—a staggering 150 to 220 percent of the value of the power produced. While this level of support has not been available every year, it is reflective of capital and operating support that subsidized the development of our existing reactor fleet. Even at the low end of our calculations, this support is well above the value of the power produced. Among the findings of interest: • Stranded nuclear costs. Despite large subsidies to capital formation, nuclear plants remained high-cost suppliers when they had to recover capital as well as operating costs. When power markets were deregulated, nuclear reactors constituted the largest share of uneconomic (or “stranded”) generating plants, at nearly $110 billion (2007$)—or more than 1 ¢/kWh on average, based on all nuclear electricity generated from the inception of the industry through 1997, when the estimate was made. Subsidies to specific reactors could be much higher. • Regulatory oversight. Although nuclear power plants require more complex regulatory oversight than virtually any other energy source, taxpayers were still paying for most of it prior to 1991. The $11 billion in taxpayer-financed oversight of civilian nuclear power amounted to roughly 0.2 ¢/kWh during the period—a subsidy that exceeds utility funding for nuclear waste disposal at the federal repository. • Compensation to injured workers. Nuclear workers at mining, milling, enrichment, and other fuel-cycle facilities incurred a variety of occupational injuries and illnesses associated with their work. Federal payments to workers of record prior to 1971 (under RECA) and 1992 (under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act) supported both the civilian and military sectors. The civilian share of payments was roughly $1.1 billion, or nearly 0.3 ¢/kWh of nuclear power produced during the period of occupational claims under the programs. Later occupational injuries are not covered in these statutes. |