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++Part 1 is the ROB
++1st, the judge is an educator, 2 warrants
++Debate is an educational setting; we represent schools in a school
++
++the ballot endorses a truth claim, such as ‘I affirm’, thus the judge endorses a frame of truth, educating students with it
++2nd- the ballot
++1st- dromology defined
++Wood    	Considered - the Faculty of Education blog at Canterbury Christ Church University Should education policy have a speed limit? Slowing down the process of change by Phil Wood on Thursday, 11 April 2013 in Education Policy Phil Wood is a lecturer in education at the University of Leicester. His research interests focus on understanding and developing learning and teaching through participatory research. In this piece he considers the extent to which the pace of change is damaging education. http://www.consider-ed.org.uk/should-education-policy-have-a-speed-limit/
++
++Over the past 15 years policy development in English education has seen an ever more acute acceleration. This acceleration was first identifiable under New Labour and ‘deliverology’ which demanded ever faster increases in examination outcomes. Driven by a need for higher and ever more improbable targets, faster and more complex policy initiatives were developed, self-evaluation forms, personalised learning, learning styles, curriculum innovation, and diplomas. Since the Coalition government has taken power, this need for accelerated policy development has continued. Much of the educational landscape is seeing radical change, sometimes untried and untested, sometimes not even seeing initial implementation before being abandoned or changed. Paul Virilio, urbanist and cultural theorist, defines social and political acceleration, particularly relating to technology, as ‘dromology’, the compression of time as a consequence of geopolitics, technology and the media leading to an emerging process of velocity and acceleration. Rather than leading to better, more efficient social systems acceleration can lead to detrimental impacts.
++2nd- the political- Status qou politics construct truth through dromology- a prerequisite to engage in ethics, the political or debate itself is to deconstruct dromology
++Wood    	Considered - the Faculty of Education blog at Canterbury Christ Church University Should education policy have a speed limit? Slowing down the process of change by Phil Wood on Thursday, 11 April 2013 in Education Policy Phil Wood is a lecturer in education at the University of Leicester. His research interests focus on understanding and developing learning and teaching through participatory research. In this piece he considers the extent to which the pace of change is damaging education. http://www.consider-ed.org.uk/should-education-policy-have-a-speed-limit/
++ Neoliberal policies have brought greater volumes of data and information often identified as some form of analytic ‘truth’. Virilio, however, sees greater information and data as a recipe for disinformation and confusion. Politicians are able to hide, embed and control, ‘speed is power itself’ (Virilio, 1999, 15). As policy generation accelerates, those outside of government are in a constant state of reaction attempting to understand and analyse new sets of ideas as the next policy is already being announced. By instigating reform at a very fast pace, a Secretary of State essentially creates a ‘power-grab’, the sheer velocity and acceleration of change eroding debate, ensuring less resistance and short-circuiting the democratic process. In addition, the media become the dromological troops of politicians (Eriksen, 2001). Eriksen (see Levy’s associated lecture) focuses on the dromological impact of modern society, arguing that ‘fast’ time increasingly drives out ‘slow’ time. Slow time is important as it allows for deliberation, thought, debate, and considered ways of working which are important in all facets of the educative process. But society and the commercial world eradicates slow time; fast time is becoming dominant in society at large, and in education. Eriksen identifies six problems with this change: speed is an addictive drug speed leads to simplification speed creates an assembly line (Taylorist) effect speed leads to a loss of precision speed demands space (it fills gaps in the lives of others, just consider your e-mail in box!) speed is contagious, spreading and killing off slow
++
++Thus the role of the ballot is to reject systems of dromology
++Wood    	Considered - the Faculty of Education blog at Canterbury Christ Church University Should education policy have a speed limit? Slowing down the process of change by Phil Wood on Thursday, 11 April 2013 in Education Policy Phil Wood is a lecturer in education at the University of Leicester. His research interests focus on understanding and developing learning and teaching through participatory research. In this piece he considers the extent to which the pace of change is damaging education. http://www.consider-ed.org.uk/should-education-policy-have-a-speed-limit/
++time In education, these effects are all too obvious. Recourse to ever more complex data systems allows rapid generation of targets and tracking sheets which become regarded as ‘truth’. Learning must be ‘measured’ in every lesson, and progress assessed- sometimes not even every 50 minutes, but every 15! The illusion persists that we can ‘know’ the extent of the learning of every child at the end of every lesson. As a result, the desired speed for learning and progress has indeed demanded the space of professional dialogue and reflection. Data systems are ‘fast’ processes – they give the illusion of progress, of learning – and so the acceleration of education has in part gone hand in hand with ever greater reliance on numeric data, both internal and external (league tables for example). The dromological impact of social and political change might lead us to believe that we need to make faster, better decisions and changes. The mantra of fast time leads to perpetual revolution and a chimera of perfection constantly found just ahead of us. But I argue that this is (self-) destructive. Kahneman (2011) highlights that acceleration in decision-making and change is based on gut reactions, emotions and biased perceptions. Decisions become based on associating new information with old rather than synthesising information to bring new insights. The constant speeding up of reform, demands for progress and an increasing focus on the short-term have served to blunt critical capacities, to surrender professional and community debate to ever more rapid production and enslavement to numeric data. This is what Hargreaves and Fullan (2012) describe as the ‘business capital’ model of education. An alternative view of the process of education, both in school and at policy level is the notion of ‘professional capital’ again outlined by Hargreaves and Fullan. This approach to education is based on seeing teachers as valued professionals who require time and resources to develop and perfect their professional skills and thinking. They argue that this is best achieved in groups, through collaborative endeavour. However, this is not to be a top-down model driven by senior leaders, fulfilling their own agendas or those of government, but driven by teacher groups who are given the space to exercise their own professional judgement – in short it is a dialogic approach. Data is still important, but it acts as the starting point for discussion and development, not as a numeric yoke under which teachers are expected to toil. A dialogic approach may be criticised as ‘soft’, ‘cosy’, a system where individuals can hide and be left to do as they wish. Nothing could be further from the truth; for example, the Finns understood in the 1980s that they needed to improve their education system but it was only thirty years later that they felt in any definable way they had achieved what they set out to do. No quick fixes, no acceleration in policy change, but a reasoned, debated and consensus driven approach, where honest dialogue about educational processes, theory and practice built strong foundations to aid in the emergence of the system as it stands today. Hardly a rulebook for standing still, more one of considered and transformatory change. Education in England has been under an increasing dromological pressure over the past 15 to 20 years, with more and more policy used as a lever to bring faster and faster change. However, how far has this brought us? Gains in academic achievement are questioned by many; ever greater incursion of private finance into education has started to break the system apart, both organisationally and increasingly professionally and politically. We are accelerating into an uncertain future, with little reasoned debate or consensus building. Dialogue may not feed an event hungry news-media, it may not promise increased examination outcomes in a matter of weeks. However, if developed professionally, if used to engage with local communities, and used to forge strong foundations for sustained development and professional capital, surely dialogue is a better basis for our country’s education system than that of dromology?
++
++Part 2 is framing
++Dromology institutes itself in technological militarism- preventing access to politics and resistance. Thus the standard is to reduce technological militarism.
++Kellner 8 – Professor, George F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair, Social Sciences and Comparative Education, UCLA (8/31/2008, Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, Illuminations: The Critical Theory Website, http://intermedios.geografias.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/virilioilluminationskellner.pdf
++In addition, for Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current¶ era designates “a double movement of implosion and explosion,” so that “the new war machine¶ combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the¶ disappearance of places in vehicular extermination“ (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased speed of¶ destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and¶ computer-controlled weapons systems constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer¶ geo-strategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, producing what¶ Virilio calls “a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe”¶ (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, “strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day,” with¶ microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing¶ the way for what Virilio calls “pure war,” a situation in which military technologies and an¶ accompanying technocratic system come to control every aspect of life.¶ In Virilio’s view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological development and an ultimate¶ threat to humanity, producing “a state of emergency” in which nuclear holocaust threatens the very¶ survival of the human species. This involves a shift from a “geo-politics” to a “chrono-politics,” from¶ a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever controls the means of instant information,¶ communication, and destruction is a dominant socio-political force. For Virilio, every technological¶ system contains its speciﬁc for of accident and a nuclear accident would, of course, be catastrophic.¶ Hence, in the contemporary nuclear era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant¶ world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency that enables the nuclear state to¶ impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life.¶ Politics too succumbs to the logic of speed and potential holocaust as increased speed in military¶ violence, instantaneous information and communication, and the ﬂow of events diminishes the time¶ and space of deliberation, discussion, and the building of consensus that is the work of politics. Speed¶ and war thus undermine politics, with technology replacing democratic participation and the¶ complexity and rapidity of historical events rendering human understanding and control ever more¶ problematical. Ubiquitous and instantaneous media communication in turn makes spin-control and¶ media manipulation difﬁcult, but essential, to political governance. Moreover, the need for fast spin¶ control and effective media politics further diminishes the space and role of democratic political¶ participation and interaction.
++And, the squo erases subjectivity through the imperial gaze-the aff is needed to a. restore subjectivity b. eliminate unjust domination- precondition to any framework.
++Harris 6 — Chad Vincent Harris, Lecturer at the University of California-San Diego and Adjunct Professor in the School of Journalism and Media Studies at San Diego State University, holds a Ph.D. in Communication from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“The Omniscient Eye: Satellite Imagery, ‘Battlespace Awareness,’ and the Structures of the Imperial Gaze,” Surveillance and Society, Volume 4, Issue 1/2, Available Online at http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/viewFile/3457/3420, Accessed 10-05-2011, p. 101-103)
++located at the center of military command structures, where surveillance, control, and organized state violence come together in a set of abstracted and routine social and technical practices. It is where surveillance is most directly attached to concrete purposive action: the precise application of force and violence for organized warfare, perhaps the ultimate act of purposive agency. In this article, I explore, in close detail and with some deep description, a specific historical instance of the use of aerial and satellite imagery in a military C4I (command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence) system during combat operations. The focus on a warfare scenario provides an extreme example of what is at stake with systems of overhead surveillance that are deployed in the larger society, systems seemingly as mundane as commercial observation satellites or Google Earth. Ultimately what is at stake is the creation of a specific kind of subjectivity, an attempt to create an omniscient or imperial gaze by connecting what Sturken and Cartwright (2001) call “practices of looking” directly to the technologies and practices of state administrative control. Large satellite imagery and intelligence architectures are what Donald MacKenzie calls “technologies of power” (MacKenzie, 1990: 28, 34-36), deployed by nation states for the administrative control of space and territory. In warfare these systems are deployed for the precise application of force and violence. Large intelligence and weapons systems in the US military and their interoperation as system architectures provide a rich context for exploring how satellite imagery surveillance and reconnaissance systems not only detect objects and people, but also produce both objects on the ground and surveillant subjects. These ideas may have relevance to other civilian surveillance systems like closed circuit television (CCTV) systems, police command and control centers, and publicly-available satellite imagery databases like Google EarthÔ.2 They produce objectivity, a techno-discursive distance between the observer and the observed, and a particular kind of modern surveillant subject. This subjectivity is structured by an omniscient, imperial gaze, a particular kind of subjectivity that signifies dominance over what is being observed. In order to illustrate this process, I will discuss how violence can be rendered everyday, bureaucratic, and even mundane by the technologies and practices of imagery production. Technologically, distance is produced by layers of systems that combine surveillance with weapons control, referred to in the US military as “C4I” systems that combine the practices and technologies of “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.” The targeting cycle in Operation Instant Thunder was a feedback system that transformed data into targets and then back into data, a center through which information and commands generated by the entire U.S. war effort had to pass through on their way towards the destruction of these targets. The personnel who ran this center were never actually required to be in direct proximity to the carnage of combat, but they were nevertheless central to its organization. It is where extreme forms of violence and normal bureaucratic practices are co-extensive, because we must step back from this series of mundane translations (images into data, data and images into targets, targets turned back into data, and thus back again to images), in order to see the destruction that these activities were committing. It is this distance that creates an isolated and dominant subjectivity: isolated from the violence on the ground, but interpellated in a dominant imperial gaze.
++
++
++
++*slower* Part 3 is the plan- Countries should to prohibit the production of nuclear power in orbit.
++To clarify- countries only ban space based nuclear power within earth orbit.
++The next two Aftergood explain the plan and some of its effects
++Aftergood Chicago Tribune It`s Time To Ban The Use Of Nuclear Power In Orbit May 25, 1988|By Steven Aftergood, executive director of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based public interest research organization. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-05-25/news/8801020099_1_space-reactors-nuclear-reactors-nuclear-power
++`there are serious risks, and I regard it as inappropriate to havenuclear reactors orbiting the Earth.``  A ban on space nuclear power would eliminate these serious risks, disable the Soviet reconnaissance satellite program and create a major obstacle to future deployment of weapons in space. (The peaceful use of nuclear power in deep-space scientific and exploratory missions would not be affected.)As the development of new types of space weapons continues, newconstraints may become necessary if their deployment is to be prevented. A ban on nuclear power in orbit would be a simple yet effective way to ``pull the plug`` on a space-based weapons system.
++Aftergood et al SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN _  Nuclear Power in Space  The best course for space-borne  reactors? Ban them from .barth orbit and  use them in deep space, the authors say  by Steven Aftergood, David W. Hafemeister, Oleg F. Prilutsky, Joel R. Primack and Stanislav N. Roclionov june 1991
++In view of the various dangers they present, we favor an international agreement to ban nuclear reactors and RTGs from Earth orbit. Thlis readily verifiable measure would elinlinate many environmental hazards, enhance international stability and help to pra-also preserve the possibility of using nuclear power for scientific and exploratory missions in deep space. Since space nuclear reactors possess a variety of distinguishing characteristics, an international agreement to prohibit them in orbit could be verified with confidence. In the first place, space reactors necessarily radiate large amounts of waste heat. They therefore give off a strong infrared signal that can be easily detected. Soviet RORSATs have been observed with a satellite-watching telescope at the Air Force Maui Optical Station on Mount Haleaka-la. An operating SP-lOO reactor would be readily detectable at geosynchro-nous orbit or even beyond. Operating reactors also emit strong gamma and neutron radiation signals that are easy to spot. Indeed, the type of gamma-ray interference that has dis-rupted scientific missions is Uniquely produced by orbiting reactors and is a highly reliable, though unwelcome, sign of their presence. "break out" of an arms-control treaty could conceivably place reactors in or-bit without activating them, thus mak-ing the violation much more difficult to detect. But until large reactors have been thoroughly tested in space, they are unlikely to be covertly deployed. Nuclear power has greatly enhanced space exploration. But it has also dem-onstrated the potential to produce sig-nificant environmental damage. Even if it is wisely controlled, nuclear power in space is likely to remain a challenging and costly technology.
++
++
++
++
++Part 4 is case
++Advantage 1 is survallience
++The number of nuclear powered satellites is increasing, and existing satellites function as both dromologic surveillance apparatuses and forms of threat construction
++Aftergood2  Chicago Tribune It`s Time To Ban The Use Of Nuclear Power In Orbit May 25, 1988|By Steven Aftergood, executive director of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based public interest research organization. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-05-25/news/8801020099_1_space-reactors-nuclear-reactors-nuclear-power
++A fully deployed space-based weapons system could require ``perhaps ahundred or more`` space reactors, according to the landmark Report of theAmerican Physical Society Study Group on Directed Energy Weapons. Theauthors explained that the need for even ``a few tens of kilowatts of electrical power necessitates nuclear power reactors`` because of the irrelative survivability against offensive and natural threats. Similar conclusions have been expressed by Soviet scientists, who wrote in1986 that ``space power engineering for military purposes is likely to rely upon nuclear reactors with various energy converters.`` It is commonlyagreed that the ``weaponization`` of space will entail, and depend upon,the placement of many nuclear reactors in orbit. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have space nuclear power programs underway. The Strategic Defense Initiative, with its projectedneeds for electrically powered directed-energy weapons in orbit, is thedriving force behind the U.S. programs. Currently, the Soviet Union is the only nation that uses nuclear reactors in space. Compact reactors are required to power the Soviet reconnaissance satellites that track and target U.S. shipping. These satellites, which have no exact equivalent among American space systems, are regarded as particularly threatening to our national security, and have been cited by Air Force officials as justification for an anti-satellite program. Meanwhile, there are indications that the Soviet Union, like the U.S., is developing a new generation of space reactors.
++
++And, satellite surveillance is always already an extension of biopolicital control.
++Harris 11 — Chad Vincent Harris, Lecturer at the University of California-San Diego and Adjunct Professor in the School of Journalism and Media Studies at San Diego State University, holds a Ph.D. in Communication from the University of California-San Diego, 2011 (“Technology and Transparency as Realist Narrative,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, Volume 36, Number 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 97-98)
++In the controversy over the availability and popular use of satellite imagery, debates about transparency are important, because transparency is not just a technical outcome but a political idea that has a long history in debates about the normative structures of power in democratic systems. Satellite imagery is one of the latest technologies to fit into and affect this debate. As a tool of the unprecedented administrative control of territory and boundaries that is part of the evolving history of modern nation-states, satellite imagery is powerful because it can convey information that states can use materially. Satellite imagery is also more than a single technological artifact but constitutes a whole set of technological systems, architectures, and professional practices that can only be developed in any comprehensive way by the largest power structures; that is, at the level of nation-state or very large corporations dependent on state contracts. However, satellite imagery is also powerful as a form of evidence because of components of technological objectivity and distancing that lend images the authority of scientific truth, an implicit authority that is useful in international diplomacy and negotiations over military power.23 If satellite imagery is analyzed in this way, I believe it becomes necessary to rethink the relationship between administrative control and democratic access to the mechanisms of the administrative functions of state. That is, while being a concept associated with popular scrutiny of state power, satellite-produced transparency is always already, and quite fundamentally, about the administrative power of the nation-state. This should be kept in mind in any discussions about satellite imagery data as a new form of democratic access to state power structures.
++Implications-
++the aff is negative state action as only states can create nuclear power in the first place. This link turns the K and means their state bad responses aren’t responsive
++satellite surveillance outweighs- allows states to influence both material conditions and is inherently dromologetic
++
++
++From its inception, the logistics of perception was the battlefield logic of informational domination from an elevated position. Satellites are simply the next technological step in this ever expanding tactic of warfare resulting in the scale of every conflict being raised to a global one.
++Der Derian and Virilio 76 (Paul Virilio and James Der Derian. Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Switzerland and research professor with a focus on global security and media studies respectively. Transcription of an interview of Virilio by Der Derian in Paris. 1976. http://asrudiancenter.wordpress.com/2008/11/26/interview-with-paul-virilio/.)
++
++Virilio:Cinema interested me enormously for its kinematic roots; all my work is dromological. After having treated metabolic speed, the role of the cavalry in history, the speed of the human body, the athletic body, I became interested in technological speed. It goes without saying that after relative speed (the railroad, aviation) there was inevitably absolute speed, the transition to the limit of electromagnetic waves. In fact, cinema interested me as a stage, up to the point of the advent of electromagnetic speed. I was interested in cinema as cinematisme, that is the putting into movement of images. We are approaching the limit that is the speed of light. Der Derian: This is a significant historical event. Has this changed the nature of war? -Of course. It changes with the logistics of perception. The logistics of perception began by encompassing immediate perception, which is to say that of elevated sites, of the tower, of the telescope. War is waged from high points. The logistics of perception was from the start the geographic logistics of domination from an elevated site. Thus the “field of battle” which is also a “field of perception” – a theater of operation – will develop on the level of perception of the tower, of the fortified castle or on the level of perception of the bombardier. Such is the Second World War and the bombings over Europe. The battlefield is at first local, then it becomes worldwide and finally global; which is to say expanded to the level of orbit with the invention of video and with reconnaissance satellites. Thus we have a development of the battlefield corresponding to the development of the field of perception made possible by technical advancements, successively through the technologies of geometrical optics: that of the telescope, of wave-optics, of electro-optics; that of the electro-magnetic transmission of a signal in video; and, of course, computer graphics, that is to say the new multi-media. Henceforth the battlefield is global. It is no longer “worldwide” mondialisÈe in the sense of the First or Second World Wars. It is global in the sense of the planet. For every war implicates the “rotundity” rotonditÈ of the earth, the sphere, the geosphere.
++
++
++Advantage 2 is millitarization
++Space militarization and spying require space nukes, other sources of power fail. Space nukes are unique- dromologizing space requires nuclear energy
++Aftergood Chicago Tribune It`s Time To Ban The Use Of Nuclear Power In Orbit May 25, 1988|By Steven Aftergood, executive director of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based public interest research organization. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-05-25/news/8801020099_1_space-reactors-nuclear-reactors-nuclear-power
++A Soviet satellite now orbiting the Earth is steadily losing altitude and will re-enter the atmosphere in several months. What makes this a troubling prospect is that the Cosmos 1900 is powered by a nuclear reactor. When it re- enters, the reactor will break up and release radioactivity into the environment. There is apparently nothing that can be done to reverse the fall of the reactor, which resulted from a loss of radio contact. But now is an opportune time to consider a ban on the use of nuclear power in orbit, particularly because its use for military space applications is likely to increase dramatically otherwise.For many types of space weapons, including Star Wars systems, orbitingnuclear reactors would be necessary to provide power, and advancedreactors much larger than Cosmos 1900 are being developed for thispurpose. A negotiated ban on nuclear power in orbit could help restrain thedeployment of weapons in space, while averting a significantenvironmental hazard.  A fully deployed space-based weapons system could require ``perhaps a hundred or more`` space reactors, according to the landmark Report of theAmerican Physical Society Study Group on Directed Energy Weapons. Theauthors explained that the need for even ``a few tens of kilowatts of electrical power necessitates nuclear power reactors`` because of the irrelative survivability against offensive and natural threats. Similar conclusions have been expressed by Soviet scientists, who wrote in1986 that ``space power engineering for military purposes is likely to rely upon nuclear reactors with various energy converters.`` It is commonlyagreed that the ``weaponization`` of space will entail, and depend upon,the placement of many nuclear reactors in orbit.Both the United States and the Soviet Union have space nuclear powerprograms underway. The Strategic Defense Initiative, with its projectedneeds for electrically powered directed-energy weapons in orbit, is thedriving force behind the U.S. programs.Currently, the Soviet Union is the only nation that uses nuclear reactors inspace. Compact reactors are required to power the Soviet reconnaissancesatellites that track and target U.S. shipping. These satellites, which haveno exact equivalent among American space systems, are regarded asparticularly threatening to our national security, and have been cited by AirForce officials as justification for an anti-satellite program. Meanwhile, there are indications that the Soviet Union, like the U.S., is developing anew generation of space reactors.
++
++
++
++Advantage 3 is disruption- our obsession with speed has blinded us to the harms caused by nuclear satilites-they damage other non-dromologetic tec in orbit
++Aftergood et al SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN _  Nuclear Power in Space  The best course for space-borne  reactors? Ban them from .barth orbit and  use them in deep space, the authors say  by Steven Aftergood, David W. Hafemeister, Oleg F. Prilutsky, Joel R. Primack and Stanislav N. Roclionov june 1991
++ Furthermore, even while they are op-erating safely, reactors can disrupt the operation of other satellites. To mini-mize mass and cost, orbiting reactors are largely unshielded. They thus pro-duce strong emissions of radiation that can make it difficult for astronomical satellites. This phenomenon (which was kept secret by the U.S. government un-til 1988) has already significantly inter-fered with the work of orbiting gamma-ray detection systems such as that on board the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Solar Maximum Mission. The gamma rays emitted by orbiting reactors do not just outshine distant supernovas or black holes; in addition, the more energetic gamma rays interact with the outer shell of the reactor to produces streams of electrons and positrons. These charged particles are trapped in the earth's magnetic field, forming a temporary radiation belt. When another spacecraft passes through such a cloud, the positrons annihilate electrons in the spacecraft's skin, producing penetrating gamma rays that can overload the spacecraft's detectors. These brief interruptions of astro-nomical observations afflicted the Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft an aver-age of eight times a day for much of 1987 and early 1988, when the Topaz reactors were operating. Similar inter-ference with the gamma-ray burst de-tector on board the Japanese Ginga sat-ellite effectively blinded it during about a fifth of the same period. NASA is endeavoring to limit the threat from orbiting reactors to its $500-million Gamma Ray Observatory mission, launched in April of this year. One proposed safeguard involves sim-ply shutting off the gamma-ray burst trigger at times when it might be sub-ject to interference. This strategy as-sumes, however, that only one or two low-power reactors, in predictable orbits, will be operating at any given time. If the number and operating pow-er of orbiting reactors increase, the abil-ity to conduct X-and gamma-ray ob-servations from near-Earth platforms will be severely restricted.
++
++
++Advantage 4 is total vision
++Total vision and high speed information transmissions require the chaos of death and the domination of life in order to secure ocular dominance.
++Featherstone 03 (Mark Featherstone. “The Eye of War: Images of Destruction in Virilio and Bataille”. Journal for Cultural Research, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2003, 433–447. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=89ad8900-11a6-40b1-ae14 a2bb1e2db3b840sessionmgr12andvid=1andhid=21andbdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=aphandAN=11985206)
++Reading this thesis it is clear that the obstacles of the world and the slowness of the body are necessarily expendable as war becomes a military assault on both the land and civilian population of the enemy power. Therefore, we can see that what lies beneath this battle for total vision, through the shock of high-speed information transmissions, is the chaos of death that is required to secure ocular dominance. Like  Bentham’s panopticon, famously described by Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977), Virilio’s version of total vision refers to the progress of a machine that dominates life by imposing a system of suffocating idealism: sense as abstract theory. Moreover, as with Bentham’s mechanical terror, that relied on the light of a lantern to create the silhouette of an omniscient observer (Bo˘zovi˘c 2000), Virilio’s fatal system requires total light, or frontality, to disciplines its object of scrutiny. Here, world and body become criminal elements that require technological correction. Such contingencies must be over-written by abstract sight. The gaze must freeze chance because total vision is impossible without the monstrosity of shock, the speed of light that illuminates everything through the instantaneity of a global flash.
++Underview

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	1	+2016-10-15 09:57:05.629

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	1	+Sean Fahey

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	1	+Harvard-Westlake JN

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	1	+North Crowley Reed Aff

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	1	+2- Virilio AC

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	1	+Holy Cross

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