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1		-Part 1 is observations
2		-
3		-Nuclear power is defined by Merriam Webster as
4		-Energy that is created by splitting apart the nuclei of atoms
5		-AND, even if they win their definition is better, the AC will only advocate for prohibiting this form of nuclear power
6		-
7		-Part 2 is the ROB
8		-1st, the judge is an educator, 3 warrants
9		-Debate is an educational setting; we represent schools in a school
10		-
11		-B. the ballot endorses a truth claim, such as ‘I affirm’, thus the judge endorses a frame of truth, educating students with it
12		-
13		-C. The TFA defines it's purpose as to ‘create a means of educating’, the judge is confined by the rules of the tournament thus the judge must be an educator THEORY SPIKE- constitutive and tournament
14		-
15		-
16		-Thus, the judge has the primary obligation to deconstruct oppressive regimes. Schooling institutions, like this debate round, are especially important in this role.
17		-Robinson, Kerry, and Cristyn Davies. "Docile bodies and heteronormative moral subjects: Constructing the child and sexual knowledge in schooling." Sexuality and Culture 12.4 (2008): 221-239.
18		-Schools, as a discursive field, are sites where technologies of power produce ‘regimes of truth’ that uphold the hegemonic social, political and moral values of dominant and powerful groups (Foucault 1977). This is obvious within the syllabi that we examine in this discussion, in which children are constructed as heteronormative subjects. Schooling as a disciplining state apparatus has a compulsory captive audience––docile bodies––through which to constructs knowledge and discipline heternormative moral subjects. Foucault’s concept of the powerknowledge nexus operates through hegemonic discourses that are perpetuated through curricula, rules and regulations, philosophies, policies, and pedagogical practices that prevail in schooling (Foucault 1977). The regulative and repetitive practices of schooling become part of children’s habitus as they tap into the cultural, social and economic capital valued in schooling (Bourdieu 1991). Habitus refers to the dispositions, perceptions, and attitudes generated throughout an individuals’ cultural history that can enable or prohibit effective exchange or accumulation of one’s capital (Robinson and Jones-Diaz 2006). However, it is important to point out that part of the way that education is transformed is through teachers’ critical approach towards pedagogy and the curriculum. Some teachers question what constitutes ‘official knowledge’ within the mainstream curriculum to reshape and contest the power of dominant groups. Syllabi are also interpreted by individual teachers, who can include perspectives that challenge regimes of truth operating in schools. So despite our critique of educational syllabi in this paper, we need to acknowledge that some teachers would have challenged the representation of knowledge about health and its presentation. It is also important to acknowledge that even though we critique the lack of specific Docile Bodies and Heteronormative Moral Subjects 123 detail in the syllabi on sexual identity, we do so with an awareness that some teachers may have used this space (marked by an absence of definition around sexual identity) to address issues of non-heterosexuality. However, this potential ‘queer space’ may also be counteracted by other forms of regulation, including students’ surveillance of heteronormative values, or the introduction of additional policies, such as the Controversial Issues Policy that has operated along side the syllabi in NSW schools since the 1970’s.
19		-Implication; There’s an infinite number of ways we could structure the burdens such that both debaters have equal access to the ballot. HOW we choose to structure the rules means some goal we wish to attain through fairness. Only the ROB provides an external standard to why we debate.
20		-
21		-And-specifically on topics of nuclear power, academics have a duty to critically challenge the myth of nuclear safety
22		-Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
23		-
24		-of Fukushima. Rather, I count myself as culpable for allowing the existence of nuclear power plants, complying with a framework that excludes certain lives, and letting the Fukushima accident continue to cause humansuffering and environmental damage. Being in a relatively protected place as a tenured 9 professor in academia, teaching Fukushima is one way, however modest it might be, for me to be responsible and even atone for this unprecedented disaster, by bringing to critical visibility the mythic framework within which the precariousness of some lives are overlooked.
25		-
26		-Part 3 is framework
27		-The value is morality derived from ought, which functions as the evaluative term in the resolution.
28		-Section A is ontology
29		-1st Ontology is social. We are born into society and society sustains us- agents are socially constructed and the recognition of the social is constitutive to us being agents.
30		- Butler 1, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
31		-, on a broader sociality, and this dependency is the basis of our endurance and survivability. When we assert our “right,” as we do and we must, we are not carving out a place for our autonomy—if by autonomy we mean a state of individuation, taken as self-persisting prior to and apart from any relations of dependency on the world of others. We do not negotiate with norms or with Others subsequent to our coming into the world. We come into the world on the condition that the social world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence: the sense of possibility pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive, and in order to enter into the realm of the possible. To assert sexual rights, then, takes on a specific meaning against this background. It means, for instance, that when we struggle for rights, we are not simply struggling for rights that attach to my person, but we are struggling to be conceived as persons. And there is a difference between the former and the latter. If we are struggling for rights that attach, or should attach, to my personhood, then we assume that personhood as already constituted. But if we are struggling not only to be conceived as persons, but to create a social transformation of 32 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 32 the very meaning of personhood, then the assertion of rights becomes a way of intervening into the social and political process by which the human is articulated. International human rights is always in the process of subjecting the human to redefinition and renegotiation. It mobilizes the human in the service of rights, but also rewrites the human and rearticulates the human when it comes up against the cultural limits of its working conception of the human, as it does and must. Lesbian and gay human rights takes sexuality, in some sense, to be its issue. Sexuality is not simply an attribute one has or a disposition or patterned set of inclinations. It is a mode of being disposed toward others, including in the mode of fantasy, and sometimes only in the mode of fantasy. If we are outside of ourselves as sexual beings, given over from the start, crafted in part through primary relations of dependency and attachment, then it would seem that our being beside ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself, where sexuality is not this or that dimension of our existence, not the key or bedrock of our existence, but, rather, as coextensive with existence, as Merleau-Ponty once aptly suggested.6 I have tried here to argue that our very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for recognition, and that desire places us outside ourselves, in a realm of social norms that we do not fully choose, but that provides the horizon and the resource for any sense of choice that we have. This means that the ec-static character of our existence is essential to the possibility of persisting as human. In this sense, we can see how sexual rights brings together two related domains of ec-stasy, two connected ways of being outside of ourselves. As sexual, we are dependent on a world of others, vulnerable to need, violence, betrayal, compulsion, fantasy; we project desire, and we have it projected onto us. To be part of a sexual minority means, most emphatically, that we are also dependent on the protection of public and private spaces, on legal sanctions that protect us from violence, on safeguards of various institutional kinds against unwanted aggression imposed upon us, and the violent actions they sometimes instigate. In this sense, our very lives, and the persistence of our desire, depend on there being norms of recognition that produce and sustain our viability as human. Thus, when we speak about sexual rights, we are not merely talking about rights that pertain to our individual desires but to the norms on which our very individuality depends. That means that the discourse of rights Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 33 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 33 avows our dependency, the mode of our being in the hands of others, a mode of being with and for others without which we cannot be
32		-
33		-2rd, Our relationship to the Other is inescapable, the distinction between the social and the self is non-existent.
34		-Butler 2, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
35		-eeks to tell the story is stopped in the midst of the telling. The very “I” is called into question by its relation to the one to whom I address myself. This relation to the Other does not precisely ruin my story or reduce me to speechlessness, but it does, invariably, clutter(s) my speech with signs of its undoing. Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something. If this seems so clearly the case with grief, it is only because it was already the case with desire. One does not always stay intact. It may be that one wants to, or does, but it may also be that despite one’s best efforts one is undone, in the face of the other, , by the touch, by the scent, by the feel, by the prospect of the touch, by the memory of the feel. And so when we speak about my sexuality or my gender, as we do (and as we must) we mean something complicated by it. Neither of these is precisely a possession, but both are to be understood as modes of being dispossessed, ways of being for another or, indeed, by virtue of another. It does not suffice to say that I am promoting a relational view of the self over an autonomous one, or trying to redescribe autonomy in terms of relationality. The term “relationality” sutures the rupture in the relation we seek to describe, a rupture that is constitutive of identity itself. This means that we will have to approach the problem of conceptualizing dispossession with circumspection. One way of doing this is through the notion of ecstasy. We tend to narrate the history of the broader movement for sexual freedom in such a way that ecstasy figures in the 60s and 70s and Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 19 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 19 persists midway through the 80s. But maybe ecstasy is more historically persistent than that, maybe it is with us all along. To be ec-static means, literally, to be outside oneself, and this can have several meanings: to be transported beyond oneself by a passion, but also to be beside oneself with rage or grief. I think that if I can still speak to a “we,” and include myself within its terms, I am speaking to those of us who are living in certain ways beside ourselves, whether it is in sexual passion, or emotional grief, or political rage. In a sense, the predicament is to understand what kind of community is composed of those who are beside themselves. We have an interesting political predicament, since most of the time when we hear about “rights,” we understand them as pertaining to individuals, or when we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or a class. And in that language and in that context, we have to present ourselves as bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by sameness. Indeed, we had better be able to use that language to secure legal protections and entitlements. But perhaps we make a mistake if we take the definitions of who we are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about. Although this language might well establish our legitimacy within a legal framework ensconced in liberal versions of human ontology, it fails to do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, and implicate us in lives that are not are own, sometimes fatally, irreversibly. It is not easy to understand how a political community is wrought from such ties. One speaks, and one speaks for another, to another, and yet there is no way to collapse the distinction between the other and myself. When we say “we” we do nothing more than designate this as very problematic. We do not solve it. And perhaps it is, and ought to be, insoluble. We ask that the state, for instance, keep its laws off our bodies, and we call for principles of bodily self-defense and bodily integrity to be accepted as political goods. Yet, it is through the body that gender and sexuality become exposed to others, implicated in social processes, inscribed by cultural norms, and apprehended in their social meanings. In a sense, to be a body is to be given over to others even as a body is, emphatically, “one’s own,” that over which we must claim rights of autonomy. This is as true for the claims made 20 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 20 by lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in favor of sexual freedom as it is for transsexual and transgender claims to self-determination; as it is for intersex claims to be free of coerced medical, surgical, and psychiatric interventions; as it is for all claims to be free from racist attacks, physical and verbal; and as it is for feminism’s claim to reproductive freedom. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make these claims without recourse to autonomy and, specifically, a sense of bodily autonomy. Bodily autonomy, however, is a lively paradox. I am not suggesting, though, that we cease to make these claims. We have to, we must. And I’m not saying that we have to make these claims reluctantly or strategically. They are part of the normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities, of women, defined with the
36		-
37		-THUS without mutual recognition the possibility of life becomes impossible. This means their framework is derived from a flawed starting point, social recognition is a precondition to their framework. This also means that ideal theory makes no sense, as it abstracts from ontology of agents.
38		-Butler 3, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
39		-Is the problem that we have no norm to distinguish among kinds of possibility, or does that only appear to be a problem if we fail to comprehend “possibility” itself as a norm? Possibility is an aspiration, something we might hope will be equitably distributed, something that might be socially secured, something that cannot be taken for granted, especially if it is apprehended phenomenologically. The point is not to prescribe new gender norms, as if one were under an obligation to supply a measure, gauge, or norm for the adjudication of competing gender presentations. The normative aspiration at work here has to do with the ability to live and breathe and move and would no doubt belong somewhere in what is called a philosophy of freedom. The thought of a possible life is only an indulgence for those who already know themselves to be possible. For those who are still looking to become possible, possibility is a necessity. It was Spinoza who claimed that every human being seeks to persist in his own being, and he made this principle of self-persistence, the conatus, into the basis of his ethics and, indeed, his politics. When Hegel made the claim that desire is always a desire for recognition, he was, in a way, extrapolating upon this Spinozistic point, telling us, effectively, that to persist in one’s own being is only possible on the condition that we are engaged in receiving and offering recognition. If we are not recognizable, if there are no norms of recognition by which we are recognizable, then it is not possible to persist in one’s own being, and we are not possible beings; we have been foreclosed from possibility. We think of norms of recognition perhaps as residing already in a cultural world into which we are born, but these norms change, and with the changes in these norms come changes in what does and does not count as recognizably human. To twist the Hegelian argument in a Foucaultian direction: norms of recognition function to Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 31 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 31 produce and to deproduce the notion of the human. This is made true in a specific way when we consider how international norms work in the context of lesbian and gay human rights, especially as they insist that certain kinds of violences are impermissable, that certain lives are vulnerable and worthy of protection, that certain deaths are grievable and worthy of public recognition. To say that the desire to persist in one’s own being depends on norms of recognition is to say that the basis of one’s autonomy, one’s persistence as an “I” through time, depends fundamentally on a social norm that exceeds that “I,” that positions that “I” ec-statically, outside of itself in a world of complex and historically changing norms. In effect, our lives, our very persistence, depend upon such norms or, at least, on the possibility that we will be able to negotiate within them, derive our agency from the field of their operation. In our very ability to persist, we are dependent on what is outside of us
40		-
41		-
42		-
43		-
44		-Part two is the death of being
45		-1st Grievability is defined as the capacity to mourn a person’s death- when an agent dies they are connected to the social in a way that changes others.
46		-
47		-2nd Certain forms of marginalization have been rendered some agents ungrievable because of oppressive power structures- lives do not matter, not considered to be agents.
48		-Butler 4, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
49		-given over to nothing, or to brutality, or to no sustenance. No matter what the valence of that scene is, however, the fact remains that infancy constitutes a necessary dependency, one that we never fully leave behind. Bodies still must be apprehended as given over. Part of understanding the oppression of lives is precisely to understand that there is no way to argue away this condition of a primary vulnerability, of being given over to the touch of the other, even if, or precisely when, there is no other there, and no support for our lives. To counter oppression requires that one understand that lives are supported and maintained differentially, that there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. And other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable.” What are the cultural contours of the notion of the human at work here? And how do the contours that we accept as the cultural frame for the human limit the extent to which we can avow loss as loss? This is surely a question that Lesbian, gay, and bi-studies has asked in relation to violence against sexual minorities, and that transgendered people have asked as they have been singled out for harassment and sometimes murder, and that intersexed people have asked, whose formative years have so often been marked by an unwanted violence against their bodies in the name of a normative notion of human morphology. This is no doubt as well the basis of a profound affinity between movements centered on gender and sexuality with efforts to counter the normative human morphologies and capacities that condemn or efface those who are physically challenged. It must, as well, also be part of the affinity with antiracist struggles, given the racial differential that undergirds the culturally viable notions of the human—ones that we see acted out in dramatic and terrifying ways in the global arena at the present time. So what is the relation between violence and what is “unreal,” between violence and unreality that attends to those who become the victims of violence, and where does the notion of the ungrievable life 24 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 24 come in? On the level of discourse, certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized; they fit no dominant frame for the human, and their dehumanization occurs first, at this level. This level then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization which is already at work in the culture. So it is not just that a discourse exists in which there is no frame and no story and no name for such a life,
50		-This implies that the aff framework is the only way to interrogate oppression as it fights the root cause of violence. ROOT CASUSE K SPIKE
51		-
52		-
53		-
54		-And, quiet is violent-representational and media silence coupled with social power structures creates a hegemonic truth, preventing access to agency
55		-Butler 5, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
56		- or that violence might be said to realize or apply this discourse. Violence against those who are already not quite lives, who are living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. If there is a discourse, it is a silent and melancholic writing in which there have been no lives, and no losses, there has been no common physical condition, no vulnerability that serves as the basis for an apprehension of our commonality, and there has been no sundering of that commonality. None of this takes place on the order of the event. None of this takes place. How many lives have been lost from AIDS in Africa in the last few years? Where are the media representations of this loss, the discursive elaborations of what these losses mean for communities there? I began this chapter with a suggestion that perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations, one value to realize when we ask ourselves, in what direction ought we to proceed, and what kinds of values ought we to be realizing? I suggested as well that the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for the otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary, given over to others, finding oneself in a trajectory of desire in which one is taken out of oneself, and resituated irreversibly in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center. The particular sociality that belongs to bodily life, to sexual life, and to becoming gendered (which is always, to a certain extent, becoming gendered for others) establishes a field of ethical enmeshment with others and a sense of disorientation for the first-person, that is, the perspective of the ego. As bodies, we are always for something more than, and other than, ourselves. To articulate this as an entitlement is not always easy, but perhaps not impossible. It suggests, for instance, that “association” Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 25 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 25 is not a luxury, but one of the very conditions and prerogatives of freedom. Indeed, the kinds of associations we maintain importantly take many forms. It will not do to extol the marriage norm as the new ideal for this movement, as the Human Rights Campaign has erroneously done.1 No doubt, marriage and same-sex domestic partnerships should certainly be available as options, but to install either as a model for sexual legitimacy is precisely to constrain the sociality of the body in acceptable ways. In light of seriously damaging judicial decisions against second parent adoptions in recent years, it is crucial to expand our notions of kinship beyond the heterosexual frame. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce kinship to family, or to assume that all sustaining community and friendship ties are extrapolations of kin relations. I make the argument in “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual” in this volume that kinship ties that bind persons to one another may well be no more or less than the intensification of community ties, may or may not be based on enduring or exclusive sexual relations, may well consist of ex-lovers, nonlovers, friends, and community members. The relations of kinship cross the boundaries between community and family and sometimes redefine the meaning of friendship as well. When these modes of intimate association produce sustaining webs of relationships, they constitute a “breakdown” of traditional kinship that displaces the presumption that biological and sexual relations structure kinship centrally. In addition, the incest taboo that governs kinship ties, producing a necessary exogamy, does not necessarily operate among friends in the same way or, for that matter, in networks of communities. Within these frames, sexuality is no longer exclusively regulated by the rules of kinship at the same time that the durable tie can be situated outside of the conjugal frame. Sexuality becomes open to a number of social articulations that do not always imply binding relations or conjugal ties. That not all of our relations last or are meant to, however, does not mean that we are immune to grief. On the contrary, sexuality outside the field of monogamy well may open us to a different sense of community, intensifying the question of where one finds enduring ties, and so become the condition for an attunement to losses that exceed a discretely private realm. Nevertheless, those who live outside the conjugal frame or maintain modes of social organization for sexuality that are neither monogamous nor quasi-marital are more and more considered unreal, and their loves 26 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 26 and losses less than “true” loves and “true” losses. The derealization of this domain of human intimacy and sociality works by denying reality and truth to the relations at issue. The question of who and what is considered real and true is apparently a question of knowledge. But it is also, as Michel Foucault makes plain, a question of power. Having or bearing “truth” and “reality” is an enormously powerful prerogative within the social world, one way that power dissimulates as ontology. According to Foucault, one of the first tasks of a radical critique is to discern the relation “between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge.”2 Here we are confronted with the limits of what is knowable, limits that exercise a certain force, but are not grounded in any necessity, limits that can only be tread or interrogated by risking a certain security through departing from an established ontology: “Nothing can exist as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it . . . does not conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given period, and if, on the other hand, it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally accepted, etc.”3 Knowledge and power are not finally separable but work together to establish a set of subtle and explicit criteria for thinking the world: “It is therefore not a matter of describing what knowledge is and what power is and how one would repress the other or how the other would abuse the one, but rather, a nexus of knowledge-power has to be described so that we can grasp what constitutes the acceptability of a system . . . .”4 What this means is that one looks both for the conditions by which the object field is constituted, and for the limits of those conditions. The limits are to be found where the reproducibility of the conditions is not secure, the site where conditions are contingent, transformable. In Foucault’s terms, “schematically speaking, we have perpetual mobility, essential fragility or rather the complex interplay between what replicates the same process and what transforms it.”5 To intervene in the name of transformation means precisely to disrupt what has become settled knowledge and knowable reality, and to use, as it were, one’s unreality to make an otherwise impossible or illegible claim. I think that when the unreal lays claim to reality, or enters into its domain,
57		-AND, this comes first-their ethical system and ideal theory justifications might account for oppression, but they do not account for this specific annihilation of the subject, which means that A. their system fails to guide action as some are outside their notion of subjectivity and B. their system cannot access the subject.
58		-Butler 6, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
59		-a reality, and to insist that these are lives worthy of protection in Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 29 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 29 their specificity and commonality; but it is quite another to insist that the very public assertion of gayness calls into question what counts as reality and what counts as a human life. Indeed, the task of international lesbian and gay politics is no less than a remaking of reality, a reconstituting of the human, and a brokering of the question, what is and is not livable? So what is the injustice opposed by such work? I would put it this way: to be called unreal and to have that call, as it were, institutionalized as a form of differential treatment, is to become the other against whom (or against which) the human is made. It is the inhuman, the beyond the human, the less than human, the border that secures the human in its ostensible reality. To be called a copy, to be called unreal, is one way in which one can be oppressed, but consider that it is more fundamental than that. To be oppressed means that you already exist as a subject of some kind, you are there as the visible and oppressed other for the master subject, as a possible or potential subject, but to be unreal is something else again. To be oppressed you must first become intelligible. To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of culture and of language find(s) you to be an impossibility) is to find that you have not yet achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only and always as if you were human, but with the sense that you are not, to find that your language is hollow, that no recognition is forthcoming because the norms by which recognition takes place are not in your favor. We might think that the question of how one does one’s gender is a merely cultural question, or an indulgence on the part of those who insist on exercising bourgeois freedom in excessive dimensions. To say, however, that gender is performative is not simply to insist on a right to produce a pleasurable and subversive spectacle but to allegorize the spectacular and consequential ways in which reality is both reproduced and contested.
60		-
61		-Thus the standard is reducing frames of ungreivabillity
62		-To clarify, this is an intents based famework- impacts relate to a frame of agency, not material conditions
63		-And, prohibition is key. Norms of grievability depend upon the reproduction of their existance through frames. Our stance must impede upon the reproduction of this frame, which requires we recognize that nuclear power is inseparable from its norms of usage.
64		-
65		-Part 4 is the advocacy
66		-I advocate banning land based fission Reactors-I will spek in CX to meet your interp.
67		-This is A JUSTIFIED advocacy- all of my authors are specific to this form of power
68		-Part 5 is case
69		-Advantage one- the nuclear myth
70		-First- the nuclear myth functions as a social frame in line with Butlers notion of ontology
71		-Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
72		-Judith Butler illuminates this issue. According to Butler, “there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame ” 12 — in this case, the framework of the nuclear myth. In other words, the framework that organizes and orders our worldview makes people visible or invisible within the public realm. The lives of those excluded from the frame are unrecognized, and therefore more vulnerable, more precarious than the lives of those within the frame. Those within the framework are notnecessarily malevolent or inhumane. Rather, they do not question or challenge the framework that is making certain lives more precarious than others. Concealment is therefore an issue of epistemology and ontology. As Butler claims, “The epistemological capacity to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being produced according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life. ” 13 But this epistemological problem also raises ethical concerns. “ In this way, ” continues Butler, “ the normative production of ontology thus produces the epistemological problem of apprehending a life, and this in turn gives rise to the ethical problem of what it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard against injury and violence.” 14 That is to say, when one‟s suffering is unrecognized, un-apprehended, and therefore concealed from the public eye, injury and violence are also unacknowledged. When such violence
73		-second-nuclear power plants create a sacrificial system where lives near the plant are rendered ungreivable
74		-Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
75		- But perhaps the most palpable harm caused by this invisible radiation is whatnuclear waste. “Typically uranium concentrat ions can be as high as 0.7 in mined ore, 5meaning that well over 99 of what is mined is rejected after processing .” 6 This meansthat to secure 70 tons of uranium from a mine, 22,500 steel barrels of low-levelradioactive waste will be produced. slide #11 Once uranium is enriched and is used atthe reactors, spent or irradiated high-level radioactive material is accumulated. Neither the US nor Japan has settled on a final storage site for the waste. At one point, bothcountries inquired into whether the Mongol ian People‟s Republic would accept it in their land. Meanwhile, Finland slide #12 continues its long-standing project of constructing amassive underground repository, called onkalo , whose projected completion date issometime in the 22 nd century. Even more unbelievable is the idea — or fantasy — that thefacility will remain integral, securing the toxic and highly hazardous poison for the next100,000 years. Some experts are therefore concerned about how the message of danger will be communicated to whatever beings, human or otherwise, are inhabiting this land before the waste is no longer dangerous.Another hazardous emission is radiation. Recent scientific research has established a correlation between the presence of nuclear power plants and elevated leukemia rates, especially among children living in proximity to the plants slide #13.Studies in Germany in 2007 and France in 2012 respectively revealed that among children living near nuclear plants leukemia rates are twice as high as elsewhere. Thoughfurther studies on the connection between cancer rates and proximity to nuclear power plants are certainly needed, the indications, as I see them, belie the myth of nuclear safety. Ethical Implications of Subverting Power 6Thus far, I have tried to call into question and debunk the nuclear myth. Althoughmy expertise is not in scientific, economic, or environmental study, I see Fukushima asan urgent call to deepen my own and my students‟ understanding of our social structures.To this end, I believe, further research into environmental studies, economics, politicalscience, and literature, to name a few, in collaboration with my colleagues on and off campus, is necessary. Meanwhile, as someone trained in ethics, I want to argue thatteaching about Fukushima is itself an ethical task.Born and raised in Fukushima, philosopher Takahashi Tetsuya describes the nuclear industry as a “gisei no shisutemu” or “sacrificial system.” “In this sacrificial system, ” he writes, “one‟s benefits are made possible and maintained at the expense of others ‟ lives — whether life itself, health, everyday life, property, dignity, hope, and so on.” 7 In stating so, Takahashi is aware that some would argue that sacrifice on behalf of one‟s society is, though perhaps unfortunate, also unavoidable for the collective life of human beings. It is for this reason that Takahashi emphasizes the differences between inevitable sacrifice for collective life on the one hand, and the kind of sacrifice forced upon people by nuclear energy. What I am criticizing here writes Takahashi are those more serious cases in which this sacrifice violates human rights. Given the potential risk of severe accidents and the enforcement of labor conditions that inevitably expose workers to radiation, nuclear power plants threaten and violate fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and the right to the pursuit of happiness. (…) Althoug h nuclear power plants are built andoperated as the result of the formal procedures of a democratic society,once this violates human rights, imputing responsibility for such aviolation is a necessary consequence. 8 Takahashi claims that this system of sacrifice , in fact, is coextensive with a “ system of irresponsibility, ” an idea borrowed from Mar
76		-
77		-Third- These lives are rendered ungreivable through concealment
78		-Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
79		-uyama Masao. In securing the benefits and interests of some, rather than maintaining a community for all, the sacrificial system and the system of irresponsibility go hand in hand. According to Takahashi, a “sacrifice made in this system is usually concealed from the public. If it is not, the sacrifice is glorified and justified by being labeled as toutoi gisei, or „ sacred sacrifice. ‟” 9 The familiar rhetoric of the “sacred sacrifice” that purportedly contributes to the “ common good ” of the community functions to cast anysort of counter-argument or form of resistance as anti-social or anti-institutional, as can be seen in regard to the anti-nuclear movement in Japan, which has been characterized in just this manner. Such characterizations, however, generally take no real account of whatconstitutes the common good. Since I have already expressed my thoughts on the rhetoricof sacred sacrifice elsewhere, 10 today I would like to focus on the concealment of sacrifice, and to reveal the ethical problems of such concealment.Takahashi is convinced that nuclear power requires workers ‟ exposure to radiation, and that their sickness and diseases too often remain concealed. 11 Such concealment stems from the fact that a correlation between radiation exposure and a given sickness have yet to be scientifically verified. But I would emphasize that just because such scientific verification has not yet been established does not mean, as some would seem to suggest, that these cases are nonexistent. What clearly does exist is an absence of attention to such illnesses beneath the veil of the nuclear myth. Thus, the phrase “scientifically unproven” functions as an instance of rhetorical concealment and diversion. Systemic concealment of this sort also contributes to a normative structure thatcomes to be taken for granted
80		-
81		-Advantage two-natives
82		-
83		-The nuclear industry is fueled by racism and colonialism.
84		-Green 7 Jim; “RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA”; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016 Premier
85		-The nuclear industry feeds off, profits from, and reinforces racism. The industry and its political allies have a long history of forcing uranium mines, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste dumps, and weapons tests on the land of Indigenous peoples. The industry also feeds off and reinforces imperialist, colonial patterns: colonies and Third World countries are generally home to the filthiest uranium mines, they have often been used for weapons testing, and are sometimes used as radioactive waste dumping grounds. This paper details some aspects of 'radioactive racism' in Australia. The final section also includes some articles about radioactive racism in the US and other countries.
86		-Native Americans are disproportionately affected by nuclear waste.
87		-Earth Talk 10 "Reservations About Toxic Waste: Native American Tribes Encouraged To Turn Down Lucrative Hazardous Disposal Deals". March 31, 2010. Scientific American. Accessed August 8 2016. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-talk-reservationsabout-toxic-waste/.Premier
88		-Native tribes across the American West have been and continue to be subjected to significant amounts of radioactive and otherwise hazardous waste as a result of living near nuclear test sites, uranium mines, power plants and toxic waste dumps. And in some cases tribes are actually hosting hazardous waste on their sovereign reservations—which are not subject to the same environmental and health standards as U.S. land—in order to generate revenues. Native American advocates argue that siting such waste on or near reservations is an “environmental justice” problem, given that twice as many Native families live below the poverty line than other sectors of U.S. society and often have few if any options for generating income. “In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery,” says Bayley Lopez of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He cites example after example of the government and private companies taking advantage of the “overwhelming poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.”
89		-
90		-This form of nuclear racism creates ungreivability- colonized lives are rendered ungrievable by the nuclear model
91		-WISE 93 Environmental Racism and Nuclear Development By the WISE-Amsterdam Collective WISE News Communique; 387-388; March
92		-28, 1993; www.antenna.nlwise; Accessed August 8 2016 Premier
93		-With its specialization and compartmentalization, the current model pushes us to be nuclear and racist, or anti-nuclear, or anti-racist. By accepting its divisions, we find ourselves still caught within its confines. In this way we play the game of those enforcing this model, of those in power. We need to be creative and change the rules. We must redefine power and reshape it. We must see that it becomes something shared with others, something empowering, and not something exercised over them or used against them. And we need to link these two movements, now separated under the current model, and move together to create a healthy society, based on justice, equality and sustainability, where people are no longer afraid of differences in others, or afraid to be different. But to do that, we first have to make the connections between all systems of domination. And we must recognize that the dominant culture is willing ~-~- to a frightening extent ~-~- to write off the lives and interests of those groups of people it considers of low value.
94		- Part 6 is the underview
95		-analytic
96		-Neg has a 3 side bias this year according to vbriefly
97		-Analytic
98		-(vbriefly, http://vbriefly.com/side-bias/, LD Side Bias, full article avalible)
99		-The state is inevitable – we recognize it can be bad, but we can use it for good, to change thought patterns. This turns the K, they aff is needed to change the thought that can produce the alt. –AND- the aff is try or die, we must try for change
100		-
101		-Sotiris 15. Nov. 13; Panagiotis Sotiris; Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, and Communication and Media @ University of Athens, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies @ University of Crete, Department of Psychology @ Panteion University, Department of Sociology @ University of the Aegean; “The Realism of Audacity: Rethinking Revolutionary Strategy Today”; http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/the-realism-of-audacity-rethinking-revolutionary-strategy-today //YS 11.14.15
102		-
103		-Unfortunately, historical experience shows both the catalytic and indispensable aspect of the insurrectionary sequence and the difficulty to initiate a process of transformation afterwards: mass civil unrest can lead to a regime crisis, but then the question is what comes next. Nor is the answer the imaginary ‘October’ of a supposedly Leninist insurrectionary sequence, which is the definition many tendencies of the anticapitalist Left propose for a revolution for which conditions are is never ripe enough. Here, strategy is replaced by an anti-capitalist verbalism that feels more comfortable with failure, since this justifies the position that from the beginning it was determined that nothing could change. Of course, enumerating problems is not a substitute for an answer to open questions. This can only be a collective process of reflection and self-criticism. However, we can discuss some starting points for a rethinking of revolutionary strategy today. We need a fresh conceptualisation that combines the question of government with something close to a permanent dual power strategy. Dual power in this reading is not a question of catastrophic equilibrium and antagonistic coexistence of two competing state forms. Rather, it refers to the new forms of popular power, self-management, worker’s control, and solidarity and coordination that are resisting the counterattacks of state apparatuses and capital even after the arrival of the left to government. A war of position is necessary both before and after the seizure of power, as a continuous process of struggles, collective experimentation, forms of power from below, new social configurations, along with deep institutional changes, in the form of a Constituent Process. In this reading dual power is not only about worker’s councils or soviets. It is also about self-managed enterprises, and solidarity clinics and popular assemblies. It is about looking carefully at the new forms of organisation that have emerged in movements like 15M or the ‘Squares’ as collective political forms that in certain aspects transcend the social/political division. In such a perspective there is no ‘moment’ of passage from ‘radical governance’ to ‘socialist transformation’, only an uneven and contradictory process that will face counter attacks and perhaps also what Georges Labica called the ‘impossibility of ‘non-violence’. We need a new practice of politics. Any attempt towards radical transformation must base itself upon the short-circuit between politics and economics that Etienne Balibar suggests is at the heart of the Marxian project, treating the economy as terrain of political intervention and experimentation, insisting that movements representing the working classes have a say in politics, initiating novel forms of democracy from below. This also includes what Lenin described as a Cultural Revolution, or Gramsci as ethico-political reform, the emergence of new forms of mass political intellectuality and a new collective ethos of participation. Again, we can start by the formative and learning experiences in the movements, the ways they have facilitated the emergence of new forms of thinking and new ethics of solidarity and resistance. Rebuilding the United Front cannot be a repetition. Nor can it be simply a regroupment. We need an ‘epistemological break’ in our thinking of both the front and party. The Modern Prince can only be the result of a process of recomposition and profound transformation, learning also from the experiences of political self-organisation in contemporary movements. We have to learn from our mistakes and be profoundly self-critical avoiding all forms of arrogant know-all mentality, bureaucratic thinking, and theoretical laziness. So far, we have failed to create the kind of laboratory of a new politics that was needed, that kind of democratic political process, non-sectarian dialogue, collective experimentation, creative militancy. Regarding the Greek case, we can see the beginning of the problem in the inability of the forces of the Left that realised the necessity of rupture regarding debt and the Eurozone, to initiate in 2010-11 a process of a new front incorporating the new forms of organisation emerging from the movement. We must confront this task of recomposition, transformation and experimentation because otherwise the elements, practices, experiences that could be part of potential new historical block will remain dispersed and disintegrated. Antonio Gramsci has always insisted that historical changes take the form also of molecular changes. The notion of the ‘molecular’ refers to the multifarious, complex, over-determined, non-teleological and non-deterministic character of historical process. Gramsci’s famous ‘Autobiographical Note’ from Notebook 15, is not only a personal meditation on molecular transformation –contemplating his own life in prison, the choice he made not to flee the country, and how disaster can affect one person – but also a small treatise on molecular changes in periods of defeat, shows the small changes that in the end lead to a new relation of forces. His observations have, I think, a certain resonance in countries like Greece: the truth is that the person of the fifth year is not the same as in the fourth, the third, the second, the first and so on; one has a new personality, completely new, in which the years that have passed have in fact demolished one’s moral braking system, the resistive forces that characterised the person during the first year.2 This means that any process of recomposition of the radical Left must be attentive to this molecular aspect. New forms of movement for organisations, especially in relation to social strata that lack any form of representation (unemployed, precarious etc), new democratic practices in movements, forms of political self-organisation, new forms of coordination and solidarity, expanding the experimentation with forms of self-management, creating alternatives forms of (counter)information, organising new forms of militant research are more urgent than ever. They also enable us to rethink political organisation under this prism of a necessary molecular recomposition, of collective democratic processes for the elaboration of alternatives, of a collective new practice of politics. Communist or revolutionary politics are in the last instance about subterranean currents that came to the surface only in critical moments, because they are dispersed, fragmented, ruptured, the results of encounters that did not last. The challenge is exactly to have the ‘slow impatience’ to learn from defeat, to regroup, to experiment, to rethink all aspects of the conjuncture, from the molecular to the ‘integral’, to ‘organise good encounters’ (Deleuze) and bring these subterranean currents to the surface. The tragic defeat of the Greek Left, opens a period of necessary self-criticism, reflexion and experimentation with new forms of political fronts, organisations and coordination along with all the necessary effort to rebuild the resistance to the new wave of neoliberal reforms, fight collective despair and resignation and bring back confidence to the ability to change things. It is will not be easy and it will be like trying to build a ship when you are already out in rough sea. However, it is the only way to continue to say NO. No to pessimism, no to surrender, no to defeat.
104		-Neg must explicitly propose all T interpretations about my advocacy such as specification and implementation as well as theoretical concerns and give me the chance to comply to prevent norm creation based on ambiguity and allow the aff to rectify possible abuse to encourage better substantive debate else assume I meet.
105		-
106		-
107		-
108		-Extensions/Extra Cards
109		-The role of the ballot is to challenge dominant epistemologies- vote for the debater who provides the best challenge to oppressive social practices
110		-Owen 94
111		-David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton, 1994 (Maturity and Modernity, pp 209-210)
112		-
113		-The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g.. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic forms of this type of intellectual practice is the central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154)This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s points if intelligence if we recognize his concerns to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident as one believed to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposting of the question ‘ who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-14 17:24:41.0

Judge

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1		-Sean Hilzendeger

Opponent

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1		-Harker KS

ParentRound

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1		-5

Round

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1		-1

Team

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1		-North Crowley Reed Aff

Title

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1		-Butler AC 10

Tournament

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1		-Valley