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-First, definitions |
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- ‘public colleges and universities’ is defined by |
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-Every Kind of College and University Defined, Published by Jessica Velasco, https://www.collegeraptor.com/college-guide/college-search/every-kind-of-college-and-university-defined/ |
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-Public colleges and universities are funded by local and state governments. They typically offer lower tuition rates to residents of the states in which they are located. Out-of-state students can also attend public institutions, but rates are usually higher than the resident tuition rate. There are two-year colleges, also know as community colleges, and four-year public universities. Every state in the U.S. has at least one public college or university within their borders. Private colleges and universities are funded by tuition, fees, and other private sources. Most private institutions have higher “sticker” prices than public institutions, although they also often offer significant discounts for almost all students. Student populations at private colleges and universities vary from a few hundred students to over 30,000. |
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-College is defined by- |
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-Merriam Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/college, |
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-college noun, often attributive col·lege \ˈkä-lij\. Definition of college 1 : a body of clergy living together and supported by a foundation 2 : a building used for an educational or religious purpose 3 a : a self-governing constituent body of a university offering living quarters and sometimes instruction but not granting degrees Balliol and Magdalen Colleges at Oxford —called also residential college b : a preparatory or high school c : an independent institution of higher learning offering a course of general studies leading to a bachelor's degree; also : a university division offering this d : a part of a university offering a specialized group of courses e : an institution offering instruction usually in a professional, vocational, or technical field business college 4 : company, group; specifically : an organized body of persons engaged in a common pursuit or having common interests or duties 5 a : a group of persons considered by law to be a unit b : a body of electors — compare electoral college 6 : the faculty, students, or administration of a college |
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-second, Framework |
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-First, I value morality, derived of ought in the resolution, which is defined to mean a moral obligation. Any other value is nonsensical, as we could always ask why that value is important, causing infinite regress until we arrive at morality. |
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-Second, Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics universal and free of difference will inevitably fail: |
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-There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing. Your political opponent’s identity is necessary to construct your own. |
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-Butler 1, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy” |
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-, on a broader sociality, and this dependency is the basis of our endurance and survivability. When we assert our “right,” as we do and we must, we are not carving out a place for our autonomy—if by autonomy we mean a state of individuation, taken as self-persisting prior to and apart from any relations of dependency on the world of others. We do not negotiate with norms or with Others subsequent to our coming into the world. We come into the world on the condition that the social world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence: the sense of possibility pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive, and in order to enter into the realm of the possible. To assert sexual rights, then, takes on a specific meaning against this background. It means, for instance, that when we struggle for rights, we are not simply struggling for rights that attach to my person, but we are struggling to be conceived as persons. And there is a difference between the former and the latter. If we are struggling for rights that attach, or should attach, to my personhood, then we assume that personhood as already constituted. But if we are struggling not only to be conceived as persons, but to create a social transformation of 32 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 32 the very meaning of personhood, then the assertion of rights becomes a way of intervening into the social and political process by which the human is articulated. International human rights is always in the process of subjecting the human to redefinition and renegotiation. It mobilizes the human in the service of rights, but also rewrites the human and rearticulates the human when it comes up against the cultural limits of its working conception of the human, as it does and must. Lesbian and gay human rights takes sexuality, in some sense, to be its issue. Sexuality is not simply an attribute one has or a disposition or patterned set of inclinations. It is a mode of being disposed toward others, including in the mode of fantasy, and sometimes only in the mode of fantasy. If we are outside of ourselves as sexual beings, given over from the start, crafted in part through primary relations of dependency and attachment, then it would seem that our being beside ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself, where sexuality is not this or that dimension of our existence, not the key or bedrock of our existence, but, rather, as coextensive with existence, as Merleau-Ponty once aptly suggested.6 I have tried here to argue that our very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for recognition, and that desire places us outside ourselves, in a realm of social norms that we do not fully choose, but that provides the horizon and the resource for any sense of choice that we have. This means that the ec-static character of our existence is essential to the possibility of persisting as human. In this sense, we can see how sexual rights brings together two related domains of ec-stasy, two connected ways of being outside of ourselves. As sexual, we are dependent on a world of others, vulnerable to need, violence, betrayal, compulsion, fantasy; we project desire, and we have it projected onto us. To be part of a sexual minority means, most emphatically, that we are also dependent on the protection of public and private spaces, on legal sanctions that protect us from violence, on safeguards of various institutional kinds against unwanted aggression imposed upon us, and the violent actions they sometimes instigate. In this sense, our very lives, and the persistence of our desire, depend on there being norms of recognition that produce and sustain our viability as human. Thus, when we speak about sexual rights, we are not merely talking about rights that pertain to our individual desires but to the norms on which our very individuality depends. That means that the discourse of rights Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 33 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 33 avows our dependency, the mode of our being in the hands of others, a mode of being with and for others without which we cannot be |
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-2. Second, discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because they all require a distinction between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in difference. |
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-3. The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. The question of ethics is to deal with this inevitability. The most productive way to do this is with an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy. All that agonism means is a free relationship- we must embrace every viewpoint and conflict, and not attempt to eliminate democratic clash |
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-MOUFFE: |
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-“The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000 DD |
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-"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104) |
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-And, Aiming toward consensus is a false goal because consensus is impossible, difference in inevitable. Contestation is key. Dividing people up and treating them as enemies is also a false goal because it denies that the existence of their opposing identity is what constructs yours. |
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-Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, the standard is concerned with the procedures of agonistic pluralism, not ends. Prefer additionally: |
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-, educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism because the teacher is telling the student what to think rather than how to think. Agonistic democracy is uniquely key for the debate space because it allows for contestation |
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- double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict: |
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-A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors. |
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-B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief. |
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-Advocacy |
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-Thus, I affirm the the resolution as an agonistic commitment to free speech. |
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-The AC doesn’t defend hate speech, as defined by individual colleges, as constitutionally protected- |
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-Hate speech isn’t constitutionally protected anyway- multiple warrents |
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-KENT GREENFIELD MAR 13, 2015 , The Limits of Free Speech, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-limits-of-free-speech/387718/ |
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-No one with a frontal lobe would mistake this drunken anthem for part of an uninhibited and robust debate about race relations. The chant was a spew of hatred, a promise to discriminate, a celebration of privilege, and an assertion of the right to violence–all wrapped up in a catchy ditty. If the First Amendment has become so bloated, so ham-fisted, that it cannot distinguish between such filth and earnest public debate about race, then it is time we rethink what it means. The way we interpret the First Amendment need not be simplistic and empty of nuance, and was not always so. The Supreme Court unanimously held over eighty years ago that “those words which by their very utterance inflict injury … are no essential part of any exposition of ideas.” And in 1952 the Court upheld an Illinois statute punishing “false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups.” These rulings, while never officially reversed, have shrunk to historical trinkets. But they mark a range of the possible, where one can be a staunch defender of full-throated discourse but still recognize the difference between dialogue and vomitus. |
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-Topicality is a constraint on my advocacy |
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-Next, the offence- |
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-Contention 3- Democratic Agonsism mandates a free space of discussion- this is key to accessing multiple perspectives on the good life. |
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-Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism. Princeton University Press, 1994. |
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-Dignity is associated less with any particular understanding of the good life, such that someone’s departure from this would detract from his or her own dignity, than with the power to consider and espouse for oneself some view or other. We are not respecting this power equally in all subjects, it is claimed, if we raise the outcome of some people’s deliberations officially over that of others. A liberal society must remain neutral on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens deal fairly with each other and the state deals equally with all. The popularity of this view of the human agent as primarily a subject of self-determining or self-expressive choice helps to explain why this model of liberalism is so strong. But we must also consider that it has been urged with great force and intelligence by liberal thinkers in the United States, 57 C H A R L E S T A Y L O R and precisely in the context of constitutional doctrines of judicial review.33 Thus it is not surprising that the idea has become widespread, well beyond those who might subscribe to a specific Kantian philosophy, that a liberal society cannot accommodate publicly espoused notions of the good. This is the conception, as Michael Sandel has noted, of the “procedural republic,” which has a very strong hold on the political agenda in the United States, and which has helped to place increasing emphasis on judicial review on the basis of constitutional texts at the expense of the ordinary political process of building majorities with a view to legislative action.34 But a society with collective goals like Quebec’s violates this model. It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good. Political society is not neutral between those who value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development. It might be argued that one could after all capture a goal like survivance for a proceduralist liberal society. One could consider the French language, for instance, as a collective resource that individuals might want to make use of, and act for its preservation, just as one does for clean air or green spaces. But this can’t capture the full thrust of policies designed for cultural survival. It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those who might choose it. |
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-Contention 2-And, if some objective good did exist- it would still be founded in democratic decision making (that’s Mouffee), and most students want free speech, so this affirms |
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-Gallup, 2016 data gathered feb 29- march 15 with the Knight foundation, Free Expression on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults, http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf |
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-Methodology This study includes a sample of U.S. college students, a sample of U.S. adults and a sample of U.S. Muslims. Results for the college student sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 3,072 U.S. college students, aged 18 to 24, who are currently enrolled as full-time students at four-year colleges. Gallup selected a random sample of 240 U.S. four-year colleges, drawn from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), that were stratified by college enrollment size, public or private affiliation, and region of the country. Gallup then contacted each sampled college in an attempt to obtain a sample of their students. Thirty-two colleges agreed to participate. The participating colleges were University of California, Merced; Culver-Stockton College; Duke University; East Georgia State College; Georgia Institute of Technology; Green River College; Harrisburg University of Science and Technology; James Madison University; Keuka College; Kentucky State University; LaGrange College; University of Louisiana at Monroe; Lourdes University; Martin Luther College; Morehouse College; Minnesota State University Moorhead; University of North Alabama; University of North Carolina at Pembroke; Northwestern University; University of Oregon; University of the Ozarks; Pace University; Rocky Mountain College; Saint Francis University; The University of Scranton; Southeastern Baptist College; Southwest Minnesota State University; Spalding University; Tabor College; Texas Christian University; Trinity Baptist College; and Troy University. Gallup used random samples of 40 of each college’s student body, with one school providing a 32 sample, for its sample frame. The sample frame consisted of 54,806 college students from the 32 colleges. Gallup then emailed each sampled student to complete an Internet survey to confirm his or her eligibility for the study and to request a phone number where the student could be reached for a telephone interview. A total of 6,928 college students completed the Web survey, for a response rate of 13. Of these, 6,814 students were eligible and provided a working phone number. Telephone interviews were conducted Feb. 29-March 15, 2016. The response rate for the phone survey was 49 using the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s RR-III calculation. The combined response rate for the Web recruit and telephone surveys was 6. The college student sample was weighted to correct for unequal selection probability and nonresponse. It was also weighted to match the demographics of U.S. colleges on enrollment, public or private affiliation, and region of the country, based on statistics from the IPEDS database, to ensure the sample is nationally representative of U.S. college students. For results based on this sample of college students, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. Copyright © 2016 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. 32 FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS Results for the U.S. adult sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 2,031 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. Interviews were conducted March 5-8, 2016, as part of the Gallup Daily tracking survey, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. The sample of U.S. adults included a minimum quota of 60 cellphone respondents and 40 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers were selected using random-digit-dial methods. Landline respondents were chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member has the next birthday. The response rate for the Gallup Daily tracking survey was 9. Samples were weighted to correct for unequal selection probability, nonresponse and double coverage of landline and cell users in the two sample frames. They were also weighted to match the national demographics of gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, population density and phone status (cellphone only, landline only, both, and cellphone mostly). Demographic weighting targets were based on the March 2015 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older U.S. population. Phone status targets were based on the January-June 2015 National Health Interview Survey. Population density targets were based on the 2010 census. For results based on this sample of U.S. adults, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. Results for the U.S. Muslim sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 250 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older, who identified their religion as Muslim. All respondents had previously been interviewed for the Gallup Daily tracking survey in 2014 and 2015. Re-contact interviews were conducted March 4-10, 2016. The sample was weighted on region, gender and education to ensure it is representative of U.S. Muslims, based on Gallup Daily tracking estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. For results based on this sample of U.S. Muslims, the margin of sampling error is ±8 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. The response rate for the Muslim sample was 22. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls. The full questionnaire, topline results, detailed crosstabulations and raw data may be obtained upon request. |
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-A key aspect of recent debate has been a perceived conflict between encouraging free expression and fostering a learning environment where students feel safe, respected and included. College students strongly believe that creating an open learning environment should take precedence over creating a positive learning environment that attempts to protect students from hearing offensive or biased speech. When asked to choose, 78 of college students believe colleges should strive to create an open learning environment that exposes students to all types of speech and viewpoints, even some that are biased or offensive toward certain groups of people. Just 22 believe colleges should create a positive learning environment for all students that would be achieved in part by prohibiting certain speech or the expression of views that are offensive or biased against certain groups of people. Large majorities of all college student subgroups say openness should take precedence, but certain student segments are more inclined to hold that view, including men, whites, Republicans and independents. Students at private (80) and public institutions (77) differ little in their preference for an open college environment. |
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-Contention 3- Censorship is inherently exclusionary |
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-Rosenberg 91, David Rosenberg, Racist Speech the First Amendment and Public Universities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality , 76 Cornell L. Rev. 549. (1991). |
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-http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol76/iss2/6 |
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-Certainly, the presence of one-sided racist speech harms the goal of inclusion. But the underlying philosophy that compels the university to allow racist speech is one whose primary values are tolerance and inclusion. While the immediate message the outsider student receives is one of hate, the overall message is one in which he should take comfort: that he too has the opportunity to think and to say whatever he wants with absolutely no fear of official condemnation. The university’s value of inclusion is truly all-encompassing. Matsuda’s proposal, although it means to protect racism’s victims, is actually one of exclusion. Contrary to Matsuda’s assertion, allowing racist speech does not ultimately hinder the development of ethics. Even if we argue that racist speech has no discernible content, we cannot deny that it exists and that it will not disappear in the near future.212 When the Supreme Court in Sweezy argued that free speech must reign at universities in order to allow students to “gain new maturity and understanding,” 213 it had difficult questions of ethics in mind. To ignore the ethical problem of the existence of racism by suppressing its expression hides from the real problem. |
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-underview- it existed, util is bad, counterspeech good, presume aff, all analytic |