Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[2]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[2]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[2]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-30 03:49:59.992
	1	+2016-11-30 03:49:59.0

Caselist.CitesClass[2]

Cites

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	1	+====First, the limits of the political sphere guarantee that the issues of the 1AC can never be solved. Graham 16,====
	2	+**Graham, David A. "What Can the U.S. Do to Improve Police Accountability?" The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 8 Mar. 16ADAD, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/police-accountability/472524/.**
	3	+How much real ability do district attorneys and prosecutors have to solve the problem?
	4	+AND
	5	+resulted in a hung jury, and the rest are currently in limbo.
	6	+
	7	+
	8	+====Second, Judicial review produces divide and conquer, weakening social movements and preventing meaningful change. **Becker 93====**
	9	+** (Mary, Prof of Law @ University of Chicago Law School; 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 ln)**
	10	+Binding judicial review can impede political movements even when the Supreme Court does not actually
	11	+AND
	12	+Judicial review is, therefore, a "divide and conquer" strategy.
	13	+
	14	+
	15	+====Third, State action can never be moral- the best we can do is explore answers to ethical controversies independent of state power politics. Luard 16====
	16	+**Luard, Evan. "The Nature of States." Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas about International Society. New York: Springer, 2016. 273-74. Print.**
	17	+Another implication of most of these writings is that "morality" has little or
	18	+AND
	19	+on to the minds of many who exercised power in the postwar age.
	20	+
	21	+
	22	+====Fourth, Even though nations have deliberative bodies and enact policy, they do not have intentionality, so they cannot be moral agents. Gerson 02,====
	23	+Having said this, I still think that the argument that seeks to include nations within the class of moral agents on the basis of intentionality is a weak one. Here is why. There is an ambiguity in the term "intentionality" that this argument exploits. In the sense in which nations have intentionality, the attribution of moral agency does not follow. In the sense of intentionality according to which moral agency does follow, this argument does not show that nations have that. Intentionality in the first sense can characterize any goal-directed behavior and can also be applied to any behavior that is understandable in the light of that goal. For example, it is perfectly reasonable to say that a squirrel is gathering nuts for the purpose of eating throughout the winter, or that the rattle of the snake's tail shows that it intends to strike, or that the field mouse is trying to get into the house in the autumn in order to keep warm, or that the chess-playing robot is trying to pin down my knight. But the sense of intentionality that applies to such goal-directed behavior by agents obviously does not indicate moral agency. Intentionality in the second sense, the sense according to which its applicability does imply moral agency, is something else. In this sense, intentionality refers first and foremost to the self-awareness of the presence of the purpose and the self-awareness of the mental states leading to its realization. That is, of course, precisely why we refrain from claiming that someone is responsible for her ~~their~~ actions when she is ~~they are~~ unaware of what she ~~they are~~ is doing, especially when she could not have been aware. The acknowledgement of self-awareness is necessary for the attribution of moral agency. I would in fact argue that all and only nondefective human beings have this ability to be self-aware. But that is not my point here. There may be agents other than human beings that are moral agents. My present point is that a group of human beings, such as the group that comprise a nation, cannot be self-aware in this way and therefore cannot be a moral agent.
	24	+
	25	+
	26	+====While individual members of a nation's deliberative body can possess self-awareness about their own and their group's actions, the group itself cannot. Just because all members of the group are self-aware does not mean that the group is self-aware- this means that ethics is inapplicable to the state and the only way we can engage in morality is on personal basis. Gerson 04,====
	27	+Another way to look at this point is to consider that in cases of genuine self-awareness, the subject who has the intentional object, say, a purpose must be identical with the subject who is aware of having that intentional object. But when the nation has a purpose, as expressed, say, in a resolution of a governing body, it is not the nation that is self-aware but the persons who comprise it. And that self-awareness is not of each individual's own purpose, since one's own purposes may be in conflict with those of the nation. Even if they are not in conflict, that is, even if there is 100 percent support for a motion, the awareness of the nation's purpose as expressed in the motion occurs in the individual persons and not in the nation. Unless you can put purpose and self-awareness of purpose in the identical subject, you cannot have a moral agent. And in the case of group action, you can never have the identical subject that both has the purpose and is self-aware of having it. Knowing that my nation has declared war is different from the act of declaring war and occurs in a different subject. Indeed, the nation or the nonmoral agent that declares war cannot know that it declares war anymore than the chess-playing robot can know that it won (Rovane 1994; Rovane 1998).
	28	+
	29	+
	30	+**====Thus The standard is Political Exteriority, challenging the limits of the legal and political spheres is search of alternate solutions to issues, which must be done outside the political. Newman 11** ====
	31	+**(Saul, associate professor in the Department of Government in the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, "Postanarchism: a politics of anti-politics" (October 2011), Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 16 no. 3)**
	32	+At the same time, this aporetic moment of tension central to classical anarchism generates
	33	+AND
	34	+ongoing elaboration of new practices of freedom within the context of power relations.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-11-30 03:50:01.907

Judge

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	1	+Brock Estep

Opponent

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	1	+Greenhill MR

ParentRound

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	1	+2

Round

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	1	+4

Team

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	1	+Murphy Middle Gera Neg

Title

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	1	+NOVDEC Political Exterior NC

Tournament

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	1	+Hockaday