Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[0]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[0]

Details

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EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-06 15:46:16.932
	1	+2016-11-06 15:46:16.0

Caselist.CitesClass[0]

Cites

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	1	+Limited Indemnification CP
	2	+
	3	+Plan
	4	+Text: The aff actor will adopt limited indemnification in which officers are required to pay a percentage of any damages awarded and cities will pay the rest depending upon the culpability of the officer and their ability to pay.
	5	+Emery and Maazel 2002 describe the plan - Richard Emery J.D. Columbia, 1970; B.A. Brown University, 1967; senior partner at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and has represented victims of police misconduct throughout the country, arguing cases before the highest courts at both the state and federal level and Ilann Margalit Maazel J.D. University of Michigan, 1997; B.A. Harvard University, 1993; is a lawyer at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and is the former law clerk to the Hon. John M. Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.. "Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution." Fordham Urb. LJ 28 (2000): 587. MC
	6	+A better solution compensates and deters. That can be achieved by the following: After the jury's verdict as to liability and dam- ages, the judge presiding over the civil rights case should determine what portion of the judgment the city must indemnify. The court's decision should be informed by a number of factors targeted towards deterrence. An officer who is more culpable, who commits intentional wrongdoing, or who acts brutally or with particular disregard for a victim's constitutional rights, or whose behavior could not have been anticipated or controlled by the city, should pay a greater percentage of the judgment. This would provide the greatest deterrent for the most egregious constitutional violations. The court also should examine the officer's prior disciplinary history. If an officer has a history of misconduct, and received little, no, or inadequate prior discipline from the NYPD, then the city should indemnify a greater part of the judgment. This would put the city on notice that its disciplinary procedures are inadequate, and provide financial incentives to improve them. Conversely, if an officer has a history of police misconduct, and received proper and adequate discipline by the city, then the officer should be required to pay more of the judgment himself. This would reward the city for instituting internal disciplinary measures to deter police misconduct, and deter problem officers from committing misconduct yet again. Similarly, if the city did not adequately discipline the officer for the misconduct at issue in the instant lawsuit, then the city should be required to indemnify a greater part of the judgment. And if an officer was properly disciplined by the city for the misconduct at issue in the lawsuit, then the officer would be required to pay more of the judgment himself. This again encourages the city to mete out appropriate discipline to officers who violate the law.
	7	+
	8	+Solvency
	9	+Current indemnification policy does not deter police offers and the public is forced to should the monetary burden.
	10	+Emery and Maazel 2002 - Richard Emery J.D. Columbia, 1970; B.A. Brown University, 1967; senior partner at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and has represented victims of police misconduct throughout the country, arguing cases before the highest courts at both the state and federal level and Ilann Margalit Maazel J.D. University of Michigan, 1997; B.A. Harvard University, 1993; is a lawyer at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and is the former law clerk to the Hon. John M. Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.. "Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution." Fordham Urb. LJ 28 (2000): 587. MC
	11	+New York City represents and indemnifies police officers in the overwhelming majority of civil rights cases. 2 The city regularly indemnifies police officers regardless of whether they acted intentionally, recklessly, or brutally; whether or not they violated federal or state law; or whether or not they violated the rules and regulations of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). Basic political realities explain this practice. Police officers organ- ize in very powerful unions, most notably the Patrolmen's Benevo- lent Association in New York, which in turn exert pressure on the mayor and the city's lawyer, the "Corporation Counsel," 3 to re- present and indemnify the officers. And the mayor, of course, de- pends on his police force to preserve the low crime rate that remains the perceived crown jewel of this administration. When the city errs on the side of indemnifying every officer, no one complains. The unions are satisfied-they successfully protect their members. The police officers are satisfied-they avoid per- sonal liability for their wrongdoing. The victims, for the most part, are satisfied-they recover, relatively quickly, from a deep-pocket municipal defendant that, unlike most police officers, can actually pay the judgment or settlement. There is simply no one with a voice in the process with any interest in disturbing the status quo. Not everyone wins, of course. The taxpayers lose. They pay millions of dollars to fund these judgments and settlements. The community loses, because this system perpetuates and protects police misconduct. And the victims who care more about principle than money lose, because the law gives the city near absolute discretion to defend and pay for police wrongdoing, but little incentive to investigate or discipline officers who violate the law.
	12	+
	13	+The plan would solve better than the aff because police officers would be liable for more damages.
	14	+Emery and Maazel 2002 - Richard Emery J.D. Columbia, 1970; B.A. Brown University, 1967; senior partner at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and has represented victims of police misconduct throughout the country, arguing cases before the highest courts at both the state and federal level and Ilann Margalit Maazel J.D. University of Michigan, 1997; B.A. Harvard University, 1993; is a lawyer at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and is the former law clerk to the Hon. John M. Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.. "Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution." Fordham Urb. LJ 28 (2000): 587. MC
	15	+
	16	+Such an indemnification scheme has many immediate advan- tages. It places the indemnification decision in the hands of courts, not the municipality itself, ostensibly removing political pressure from the indemnification decision. 3 9 Most importantly, such a law would say loudly and clearly to every officer: "You are not insured; you have no security that your misconduct will cost you nothing." With the indemnification decision in the hands of courts, not city lawyers, no officer could be at all sure that the city and the tax-payer will foot the entire bill for violations of clearly established constitutional law. That decision would be made-after the evidence is presented, after trial, and after the jury's verdict-by a fair and neutral arbiter. Deprived of near absolute impunity from the financial consequences of their unconstitutional acts, police officers will, finally, be and feel accountable for their conduct in some tangible way.
	17	+
	18	+This system has worked empirically in New York and Cleveland. It solves the Aff through multiple mechanisms:
	19	+Schwartz ’14 - Joanna C. Schwartz Assistant Prof. of Law, UCLA Law School "Police indemnification." New York University Law Review, Vol. 89:885 (June2014). MC
	20	+Yet the obvious alternative—eliminating indemnification and imposing the full force of financial liability for civil rights damages actions on individual officers—also seems to be the wrong tool for deterrence. Even with the protections of qualified immunity, officers in my study would have been personally responsible for over $730 million in payouts over six years. In New York, the median payout for plaintiffs during my six-year study period was $20,000, a significant but payable sum given officers’ salaries.326 But in twenty-six civil rights damages cases resolved in New York between 2006 and 2011, plaintiffs received over $1 million, and plaintiffs’ recoveries in another 595 cases were in the six figures. Given the inevitable inaccuracies of litigation outcomes,327 an officer could be bankrupted if he committed a relatively minor error that resulted in significant injuries to the plaintiff.328 Although widespread indemnification likely lessens the deterrent effect of lawsuits on individual officers, it does spread risk in a way that makes some sense.329 The practices in place in New York City and Cleveland offer a promising middle ground. In New York and Cleveland, officers paid¶ between $250 and $25,000 in thirty-six cases during the study period.330 One might believe that the financial sanctions on officers should be higher (or lower), or that they should be imposed more (or less) frequently. But the general idea—imposing financial sanctions on officers as part of settlements and judgments—could, in theory, accommodate § 1983’s somewhat conflicting compensation and deterrence goals. Requiring officers to pay thousands, or even tens of thousands, of dollars (calculated, ideally, based on their culpability and resources)331 could punish the involved officers and send a message to others.332 Yet, because the government would pay the bulk of any award, wronged plaintiffs would still be compensated for the violations of their constitutional rights. Refusing to indemnify officers’ punitive damages awards is another way to punish officers found to have engaged in reckless or malicious conduct.333 This adjustment would not, however, punish officer wrongdoing in the vast majority of cases that are resolved before trial.
	21	+
	22	+And, the system ensures that victims are compensated and have incentive to bring suits that deter civil rights violations.
	23	+Emery and Maazel 2002 - Richard Emery J.D. Columbia, 1970; B.A. Brown University, 1967; senior partner at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and has represented victims of police misconduct throughout the country, arguing cases before the highest courts at both the state and federal level and Ilann Margalit Maazel J.D. University of Michigan, 1997; B.A. Harvard University, 1993; is a lawyer at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff and Abady PC, and is the former law clerk to the Hon. John M. Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.. "Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution." Fordham Urb. LJ 28 (2000): 587. MC
	24	+Finally, prevailing plaintiffs should always be compensated. Not- withstanding the above factors, it should be the rare case (if any) where the city will not indemnify a police officer at all. To guarantee real compensation, the city must pay at least some portion of the judgment. Compensation is not only a central purpose of the civil rights laws; it induces plaintiffs to bring the very lawsuits that deter (or should deter) the police from committing unconstitutional conduct in the first instance. If, for example, a plaintiff were the subject of particularly brutal and outrageous misconduct, 3 6 resulting in the NYPD's termination of the perpetrating officer, the above factors (the horrible nature of the misconduct and the NYPD's appropriate disciplinary response) would otherwise counsel against indemnification. This would be unfair and cruelly ironic-since the severe nature of the police misconduct caused the plaintiff unusually severe damage. This final factor-the plaintiff's right to actual compensation-would help prevent such an unfair and unintended result. In addition, a legislative presumption favoring the city's indemnification of at least fifty percent of the judgment would all but ensure that plaintiffs are fairly compensated.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-11-06 15:46:19.47

Judge

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	1	+Tim McHugh

Opponent

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	1	+Brentwood KM

ParentRound

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	1	+0

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Marlborough Danielpour Real Neg

Title

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	1	+Limited Indemnification CP

Tournament

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	1	+Damus