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+White feminists do not understand that their issues vary and impact them differently than Chicana or Black women. Castillo.et.al 2004 |
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+Castillo, Anna , Heldke, Lisa M, and Peg O'Connor. Oppression, Privilege, and Resistance: Theoretical Perspectives on Racism, Sexism, and Heterosexism. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Print. MC |
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+Analysis of the social status of la Chicana was already underway by early feministas, who maintained that racism, sexism, and sexist racism were the mechanisms that socially and economically oppressed them. But, for reasons explained here, they were virtually censored. The early history of la feminist was documented in a paper entitled, “ La Feminista,” by Anna Nieto Gomez and published in Encuentro Feinil: The First Chicana Feminist Journal, which may now be consider both article and journal, archival material. ¶ The early feminsta who actively participated in the woman’s movement had to educate white feminist groups on their political, cultural, and philosophical differences. Issues that specifically concerned the feminist of that period were directly related to her status as a non-Anglo, culturally different, often Spanish-speaking woman of lower income. Early white feminism compared sexism (as experienced by white middle-class women) to the racism as those of the Rio Combahee Collective, pointed out that this was not only an inaccurate comparison but revealed an inherent racist attitude on the part of white feminists who did not understand what it was to be a woman and black in America. ¶ By the same token, brown women were forced into a position in which we had to point out similar differences as well as continuously struggle against a prevalent condescension on the part of white middle-class women toward women of color, poor women, and women whose first language is Spanish and whose culture is not mainstream America. This Bridge Called My Back, first published in 1981, as well as other texts by feminists of color that followed serve as excellent testimonies regarding these issues and the experiences of feminists of color in the 1970s. |
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+Identity politics ignores the differences of people who are marginalized and excludes those from the movement that are different. Crenshaw 1991 Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color." Stanford law review (1991): 1241-1299. MC |
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+The embrace of identity politics, however, has been in tension with dominant conceptions of social justice. Race, gender, and other identity categories are most often. The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite - that it frequently conflates or ignores intra group differences. In the context of violence against women, this elision of difference is problematic, fundamentally because the violence that many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and class. Moreover, ignoring differences within groups frequently contributes to tension among groups, another problem of identity politics that politicize violence against women. Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women, and antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color' have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they leach detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the. practices expound identity as 'woman' or 'person of color' as an either/or proposition, they regulate the identity of women of color to a location that re- treated in mainstream liberal discourse as vestiges of bias or domination - that is, as intrinsically negative frameworks in which social power works to exclude or marginalize those who are different. |
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+Lack of intersectionality prevents effective change by not allowing for a comprehensive understanding of an issue. Utt.et.al 2011 |
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+Uwujaren, Jarune, and Jamie Utt. “Why Our Feminism Must Be Intersectional (And 3 Ways to Practice It).” Everyday Feminism. Why Our Feminism Must Be Intersectional (And 3 Ways to Practice It), 11 Jan. 2011. Web. 06 Sept. 2016. AG |
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+One misconception about intersectionality is that it encourages division and exclusion in the feminist movement. By including race, class, sexuality, and other identity markers in feminist analysis, some say, intersectional feminists are spreading the movement thin and undermining its unity. The trouble with this line of thinking is that a one-size-fits-all feminist movement that focuses only on the common ground between women is erasing rather than inclusive. Even if all women deal with sexism, not all women deal with racialized sexism, or transmisogyny, or cissexism. Glossing over the issues faced by specific groups of women for the sake of unity centers the feminist movement on those who have the most privilege and visibility. It allows those who already take up a disproportionate amount of space in the movement to look as if they’re making room for others without giving up any themselves. One-size-fits-all feminism is to intersectional feminism what #AllLivesMatter is to #BlackLivesMatter. The former’s attempt at inclusiveness can actually erase the latuse of birtter’s acknowledgment of a unique issue that disproportionately affects a specific group of people. |
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+Without intersectionality women of color cannot link their experiences to others in the feminist movement. Crenshaw 1991 Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color." Stanford law review (1991): 1241-1299. MC |
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+This article has presented intersectionality as a way of framing the various interactions of race and gender in the context of violence against women of color. I have used intersectionality as a way to articulate the interaction of racism and patriarchy generally. I have also used intersectionality to de- scribe the location of women of color both within overlapping systems of subordination and at the margins of feminism and anti-racism. The effort to politicize violence against women will do little to ad- dress the experiences of nonwhite women until the ramifications of racial stratification among women are acknowledged. At the same time, the antiracist agenda will not be furthered by suppressing the reality of intraracial violence against women of color. The effect of both these marginalizations is that women of color have no ready means to link their experiences with those of other women. This sense of isolation compounds efforts to politicize gender violence within communities of color, and permits the deadly silence surrounding these issues to continue. |
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+An intersectional approach is a useful tool in mediating between identities in group politics and serves as a necessary critique to social construction. Crenshaw 1991 |
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+Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color." Stanford law review (1991): 1241-1299. MC |
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+This article has presented intersectionality as a way of framing the vari-ous interactions of race and gender in the context of violence against women of color. Yet intersectionality might be more broadly useful as a way of mediating the tension between assertions of multiple identity and the ongo-ing necessity of group politics. It is helpful in this regard to distinguish in-tersectionality from the closely related perspective of antiessentialism, from which women of color have critically engaged white feminism for the ab-sence of women of color on the one hand, and for speaking for women of color on the other. One rendition of this antiessentialist critique-that femi-nism essentializes the category woman-owes a great deal to the postmodernist idea that categories we consider natural or merely representa-tional are actually socially constructed in a linguistic economy of differ-ence.179 While the descriptive project of postmodernism of questioning the ways in which meaning is socially constructed is generally sound, this cri-tique sometimes misreads the meaning of social construction and distorts its political relevance. ¶ One version of antiessentialism, embodying what might be called the vul-garized social construction thesis, is that since all categories are socially con-structed, there is no such thing as, say, Blacks or women, and thus it makes no sense to continue reproducing those categories by organizing around them.180 Even the Supreme Court has gotten into this act. In Metro Broad-casting, Inc. v. FCC, 81 the Court conservatives, in rhetoric that oozes vulgar constructionist smugness, proclaimed that any set-aside designed to increase the voices of minorities on the air waves was itself based on a racist assump-tion that skin color is in some way connected to the likely content of one's broadcast. 18 |