Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[21]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[21]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[21]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-02-04 17:02:58.977
	1	+2017-02-04 17:02:58.0

Caselist.CitesClass[21]

Cites

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	1	+CP
	2	+
	3	+CP Text: Public colleges and universities will implement new hate speech codes following Byrne 90’s recommendations:
	4	+Byrne, J. Peter. Faculty Director; Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute; Faculty Director, Georgetown State-Federal Climate Resource Center, John Hampton Baumgartner, Jr. Professor of Real Property Law B.A., Northwestern; M.A., J.D., University of Virginia "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399. MC
	5	+A central argument of this article has been that the university can be trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it has the proper moral basis and adequate expertise to do so. It is not surprising, therefore, that I believe that vagueness concerns about such university rules are largely misplaced. This is not to deny that a university should adopt safeguards to protect accused students from the concerns that the courts have highlighted. First, the rules should state explicitly that no one may be disciplined for the good faith statement of any proposition susceptible to reasoned response, no matter how offensive. The possibility that punishment is precluded by this limitation should be addressed at every stage of the disciplinary process. Second, some response between punishment and acquittal should be available when the university concludes that the speaker was subjectively unaware of the offensive character of his speech; these cases seem to present mainly educational concerns. Third, all controversial issues of interpretation of the rules should be entrusted to a panel of faculty and students who are representative of the institution. Rules furthering primarily academic concerns about the quality of speech and the development of students should be given meaning by those most directly concerned with the academic enterprise rather than by administrators who may register more precisely external political pressures on the university. Given these safeguards and a comprehensible definition of an unacceptable insult, such as the one ventured in the introduction to this article,179 a court which accepts the underlying proposition that a university has the constitutional authority to regulate racial insults should not be troubled independently by vagueness.
	6	+
	7	+Competition
	8	+A. Mutual exclusivity: The aff must reject all restrictions on constitutionally protected speech. If the aff tries to perm the CP, it would be severance. The First Amendment protects hate speech. Cross apply to his Ruane card and prefer mine because it has empirical warrants and talk specifically about whether hate speech can be censored. The answer is a resounding no.
	9	+Eko ‘06 - Lyombe Eko Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Iowa, “New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological Foundations of French and American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic Expression on the Internet,” 28 Loy. L.A. Int’l and Comp. L. Rev. 69 (2006). AT
	10	+Under American jurisprudence, speech and communicative acts-including symbolic speech and expressive conduct-cannot be regulated on the basis of the content of the message.264 The American First Amendment regime is based on what Don Pember and Clay Calvert call "a preferred position balancing theory" whereby courts give freedom of expression a preferred position and "presume that the limitation on freedom of speech or freedom of the press is illegal., 265 This makes the United States unique in matters of freedom of speech and expression.¶ In contrast to French law, which bans the display of swastikas and other insignia of groups found guilty of crimes against S266 humanity, the First Amendment protects the public or private display of flags, emblems, insignia, and other indicia of unpopular, discredited, or even genocidal groups such as the Nazi party. Indeed, over the years the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated several attempts to ban emblems and other indicia of political affiliation.267 As early as 1931, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute which criminalized the display of flags, badges, banners, or other devices that symbolized opposition to organized government.268¶ Furthermore, on appeal after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld displaying the swastika (the symbol of Hitler's National Socialist (Nazi) Party and its American progeny, the National Socialist (Nazi) Party of America) as protected symbolic political speech intended to convey to the public the political beliefs of those who displayed it in a controversial march.269 This decision followed after the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Nazi Party of America had a right to due process as well as a right to be free from government-imposed prior restraints.2 As Rodney Smolla aptly put it, "the Supreme Court did not say that the Nazis had a constitutional right to march in Skokie, but only that they had a constitutional right to be free of "prior restraints" against such a march., 271¶ These decisions are rooted in the fundamental principle under the First Amendment that the U.S. is a marketplace of ideas in which more speech and less regulation is favored.272 This free speech jurisprudence permits all speech except obscenity, 273 fighting words,274 and deceptive and misleading advertisements.275 In thes eUat.Str.la dt ho ef conc2e7p1t of hate crime has recently become a more settled area of law. Many American courts have noted that the motive for criminal behavior is often relevant in the sentencing of criminal conduct.2 77 Fighting words are not considered to be speech, and thus not within First Amendment protection.278 In contrast, restrictions on bias-motivated utterances must still satisfy the requirements of First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech.279 Bias-motivated utterances can be criminalized, however, if they are associated with acts of violence or hate crimes.280¶ A number of American court cases show that even vile, repugnant and hateful speech, absent violence or threatening behavior, is protected. In Near v. Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme Court held that pre-publication censorship of repugnant anti- Semitic material defies First Amendment guarantees.281 In Rockwell v. Morris, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that refusing to issue a permit to a "self-styled American Nazi and... a rabid racist" constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.282 The court explained, "The unpopularity of his views, their shocking quality, their obnoxiousness, and even their alarming impact was not enough" to warrant prior restraint. 281¶ In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press do not permit states to forbid or ban mere advocacy of the use of force or violation of the law unless such advocacy is designed to incite or produce imminent lawless action'8 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas suggested that racial animus and bias could be considered a type of belief system that the government had no business regulating.285¶ In R.A.V. v. The City of St. Paul, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment bars the government from silencing speech "because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. '' 286 In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the KKK had a constitutional right to place a cross in a public square.287 The Court found that even speakers or writers S 288 motivated by hatred, and ill-will are protected. Thus, when it comes to bias-motivated or hate speech and expressive conduct, the posture of the U.S. Supreme Court is that: "under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 9 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's posture contrasts sharply with France's content-based regulatory regime.
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	12	+B. The Hate Speech DA is a net benefit.
	13	+
	14	+Solvency
	15	+A. Deterrence – The threat of punishment deters people from engaging in prohibited conduct. Hate speech restrictions on college campuses have been used to punish those that perpetrate hate speech. Wisconsin’s codes proves.
	16	+Hodulik ’91 - Patricia UW JD. "Racist Speech on Campus." Wayne Law Review 37.3 (1991): 1433-1450. GK
	17	+The most serious concerns about adopting a rule restricting discriminatory harassment or hate speech were those involving legal questions as to whether any sort of restriction on expressive behavior could be accepted in a university setting. The Wisconsin cases, however, provide little evidence to suggest that free expression has been deterred or suppressed as a result of enforcement of the university's antiharassment regulation. ¶ In the eighteen months in which it has been in force, a total of thirty-two complaints have been filed alleging violations of the Wisconsin rule.14 Of these, thirteen were dismissed because they were found not to violate the rule;35 two were dismissed following a hearing; and in ten cases, discipline was imposed. 36 The disciplinary sanctions imposed included one written apology, one warning letter, seven disciplinary probations and one suspension. 37 All cases resulting in probation or suspension also involved conduct which violated some other provision of the student conduct codean assault, a threat, or disorderly conduct, for example.38 In no case was discipline imposed in connection with a classroom discussion or expression of opinion.3 9 In most of the cases leading to discipline, the rule violation involved the use of a discriminatory epithet rather than "other expressive behavior." 4¶ As the controversy over speech rules has continued in the press and other media, they have been cited as evidence of a trend toward thought control, "politically correct" thinking, and other repressive evils. 41 There is, however, little in these cases to suggest that the Wisconsin regulation has had the effect of cutting off debate within the university community, or that a narrow restriction on discriminatory, harassing speech creates a threat to free expression. Rather, the practical experiences with the Wisconsin rule indicate that the risk of a "chilling effect" on speech from a narrowly applicable rule is minimal or nonexistent.
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	19	+B. Speech codes successfully challenge the words we use which are inexplicably linked to our thoughts. Therefore, they are able to target the deep rooted racism that usually goes unaddressed. Yun and Delgado ‘94
	20	+Yun, David H. Member of the Colorado bar. J.D., University of Colorado and Richard Delgado Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U.C.- Berkeley. "The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech Regulation—Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd." Vanderbilt Law Review 47 (1994). MC
	21	+A second reason why even neoconservatives ought to pause before throwing their weight against hate-speech rules has to do with the nature of latter-day racism. Most neoconservatives, like many white people, think that acts of out-and-out discrimination are rare today. The racism that remains is subtle, "institutional," or "latter- day."4 It lies in the arena of unarticulated feelings, practices, and patterns of behavior (like promotions policy) on the part of institutions as well as individuals. A forthright focus on speech and language may be one of the few means of addressing and curing this kind of racism. Thought and language are inextricably connected. A speaker who is asked to reconsider his or her use of language may begin to reflect on the way he or she thinks about a subject. Words, external manifestations of thought, supply a window into the unconscious. Our choice of word, metaphor, or image gives signs of the attitudes we have about a person or subject. No readier or more effective tool than a focus on language exists to deal with subtle or latter-day racism. Since neoconservatives are among the prime pro- ponents of the notion that this form of racism is the only (or the main) one that remains, they should think carefully before taking a stand in opposition to measures that might make inroads into it. Of course, speech codes would not reach every form of demeaning speech or depiction. But a tool's unsuitability to redress every aspect of a prob- lem is surely no reason for refusing to employ it where it is effective.
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	23	+C. Hate speech codes take a symbolic stand. The University communicates to those inclined to engage in hate speech that the community will not silently acquiesce to their hateful ideology, and communicates to the targets of hate speech that the University will support and protect them. Nozick ’89 describes the expressive function of state action.
	24	+Robert Nozick Prof., Harvard University, The Examined Life: Philosophical Mediations, New York: Simon and Schuster (1989), p. 286-288
	25	+We want our individual lives to express our conceptions of reality (and of responsiveness to that); so too we want the institutions demarcating our lives together to express and saliently symbolize our desired mutual relations. Democratic institutions and the liberties coordinate with them are not simply effective means toward controlling the powers of government and directing these toward matters of joint concern; they themselves express and symbolize, in a pointed and official way, our equal human dignity, our autonomy and powers of self-direction. We vote, although we are cognizant of the minuscule probability that our own actual vote will have some decisive effect on the outcome, in part as an expression and symbolic affirmation of our status as autonomous and self-governing beings whose considered judgments or even opinions have to be given weight equal to those of others. That symbolism is important to us. Within the operation of democratic institutions, too, we want expressions of the values that concern us and bind us together. The libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit the humane considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely into its fabric. It neglected the symbolic importance of an official political concern with issues or problems, as a way of marking their importance or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, channeling, encouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward them. Joint goals that the government ignores completely – it is different with private or family goals – tend to appear unworthy of our joint attention and hence to receive little. There are some things we choose to do together through government in solemn marking of our human solidarity, served by the fact that we do them together in this official fashion and often also by the content of the action itself.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-02-04 17:03:03.307

Judge

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	1	+Calen Smith

Opponent

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	1	+Harker KK

ParentRound

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	1	+21

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Marlborough Coates Neg

Title

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	1	+Jan-Feb CP v2

Tournament

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	1	+Golden Desert