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1 +Framework
2 + First, in order to value our own humanity, we must value it in others. The standard is the practice of a solidarity grounded on common humanity.
3 +Reichlin, Massimo, “The role of solidarity in social responsibility for health”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Nov 2011. DM
4 +Human solidarity thus encompasses a concern for equal rights and fair equality of opportunity, but cannot be reduced to it. It adds a sense of belonging together that does not build on any particular identity of interests by the members of different social groups, but on the basic value of human dignity; it adds a sense of unity that does not aim at levelling the differences between different members, but incorporates the differences, not devaluing the individuality of particular cultures and histories. To the extent that it builds on the ‘naked’ humanity of the other, human solidarity acknowledges the rich diversity of individuals and of cultures, empathising with the several different paths along which human beings pursue their well-being and the meaning of their lives by constructing cultures and social traditions. Human solidarity is a disposition to feel and to act towards others that does not remove nor undervalues their otherness, but rather preserves it and promotes it.¶ In this perspective, solidarity is itself an element and a condition of the universalistic morality of justice; for the protection of individual rights calls for the defence of the soil in which such rights take their roots, of the form of life in which relationships of mutual recognition can flourish and human dignity can be respected. In this sense, the notion of solidarity can be conceived of as the connecting link between equal individual rights and the notion of common good; it is the ‘warm side’ of the Enlightenment insistence on individual rights, and the clearest denial of any purely negative and ‘cold’ interpretation of universal human rights. In fact, as already mentioned, while falling short of sentimental love or sympathy for humanity, human solidarity has a basic emotive component, being grounded on a sense of empathy and felt participation with the predicament of other human beings (Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2003). This emotive component, however, must not be emphasised to the point of reducing the justification of solidarity to the historical and contingent fact of feeling some kind of empathy towards fellow human beings. It is not just that we happen to have developed human solidarity, nor that we just happen to have come to believe in human rights, owing to the development of certain predispositions to feel about our brothers in humanity.4 The justification of solidarity rather lies in the fact that it singles out certain general features of being human that are valued throughout the different cultures and ways of life. Human solidarity is not based on immediate feelings; rather on the reflection—which emerged progressively, fighting against contrary feelings and perceptions—that human dignity is grounded on general features inherent in the human condition, not on traits that are specific to certain cultures and ways of life. It is based on the recognition that valuing humanity in ourselves implies valuing it in others, and that our own humanity and dignity is not quite safe, unless the humanity and dignity of our fellow humans is protected as well.
5 +
6 +Second, spatial identity is fundamental to human functioning – The human need for familiar places is common to all because such places represent the accumulated history of our experiences and relationships and are the sites of our hopes and aspirations.
7 +Fried, Marc Research Professor and Director, Institute of Human Sciences, Boston College, “ Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation”, The Urban Condition, 1963. DM
8 +In stressing the importance of places and access to local facilities, we wish only to redress the almost total neglect of spatial dimensions in dealing with human behavior. We certainly do not mean thereby to give too little emphasis to the fundamental importance of interpersonal relationships and social organization in defining the meaning of the area. Nor do we wish to underestimate the significance of cultural orientations and social organization in defining the character and importance of spatial dimensions. However, the crisis of loss of a residential area brings to the fore the importance of the local spatial region and alerts us to the greater generality of spatial conceptions as determinants of behavior. In fact, we might say that a sense of spatial identity is fundamental to human functioning. It represents a phenomenal or ideational integration of important experiences concerning environmental arrangements and contacts in relation to the individual's conception of his own body in space. It is based on spatial memories, spatial imagery, the spatial framework of current activity, and the implicit spatial components of ideals and aspirations.
9 +
10 +Plan
11 +Plan Text: The member states of the European Union will ban the production of commercial land-based nuclear electricity and phase out all nuclear power plants by 2025.
12 +INFORSE, International Network for Sustainable Energy- Europe, “ECOs for a Nuclear-Free Europe.” nd. Acc 17 sep 2016. MO. http://www.inforse.org/europe/nucefree.htm
13 +The phase-out of nuclear power in Europe is an important part in the development of an energy sector without adverse effects or special risks to the environment and to human health. A number of environmental ministers agreed upon this in Sofia in 1995. We call upon all countries to join this effort, and to set a time-frame for the phase-out. ¶Further, we call upon the countries to transform into actions the agreements made in Sofia and Luzern to phase out the most dangerous nuclear power plants. Concrete plans and timetables for the phase-out are absolutely necessary. The plans must be backed up by international cooperation as well as by support from other countries and international organisations like the EU and EBRD. This support should include a safe phase-out as well as the development of alternative supplies and energy conservation to meet the demand. ¶Finally, we call upon all countries and international organisations to stop the planning, funding, and construction of new nuclear power plants immediately. The present preferential treatment of nuclear power plant in the EU and elsewhere should be stopped immediately.
14 +INFORSE 2 clarifies the details of the plan
15 +INFORSE, International Network for Sustainable Energy- Europe, “Sustainable Energy Vision for the EU-27 – Phase out of Fossil and Nuclear Energy Until 2040.” July 2011. Acc 17 sep 2016. MO. http://www.inforse.org/europe/VisionEU27.htm
16 +The European Sustainable Energy Vision includes a vision for the transition of the energy supply and demand for the 27 EU countries to 100 renewable energy together with phase-out of fossil and nuclear energy until 2040. With the vision and the underlying scenario is a reduction of CO2 emissions from energy use of just above 40 until 2020 and just above 70 until 2030 from the 1990 level for all energy use except aviation and international navigation that are not included in the scenario and vision.¶ The new EU-countries already had large reductions since 1990, so the reductions proposed are larger than for the 15 "old" countries from 1990, but smaller from 2000. The scenario is based on technical and economic realistic developments of energy efficiency, renewable energy, interactive ("smart") grids, and social developments. Since the developments are technical and economical feasible, the main question for their realisation is the political will in the 27 EU countries.¶ The INFORSE vision for the EU is based on a scenario made with INFORSE's spreadsheet tool that describes the possible development of energy flows decade by decade, with 5 year steps. The current Sustainable Energy Vision for EU-27 is made in 2010 and is based on earlier versions from 2008, 2007 and 2004. Economic assessments are made for some of the EU countries.¶ The Need to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions As we already experience problems of changing climate, it is no longer possible to avoid harmful climate change; but by reducing emissions we can reduce the frequency of larger climate catastrophes that deprives larger populations of their homes, livelihoods, or even lives. The EU has agreed to reduce global warming to 2'C; but that might no even be enough to avoid major negative climate effects. Reductions of the 27 EU countries of 40 in 2020 and 70 in 2030 on the way to phase out fossil fuels and similar sharp reductions in other countries (developing countries emissions should peak until 2017), will give 70-85 certainty that the global average temperature will remain below 2'C.¶ Read more about the needs to limit greenhouse gases. Factor 4 for Energy Efficiency Until 2050, Starting With Ecodesign and then Factor 2 Until 2030 In line with the global vision, the European Vision is based on rapid growth of energy efficiency to reach an average level in 2050 similar to best available technologies today. Most energy consuming equipment will be changed several times until 2050, and if new generations of equipment are made with optimal energy performance, and markets are made to promote the most efficient technology, it will not be a problem to reach today's best available technology, even though the efficiency gains required are very large, - in the order of 4 times, similar to an annual increase of efficiency of over 2 per year from 2010. This will not happen by itself, given that the "natural" technological development has been 1 per year or less. It will require concerted action from all stakeholders involved, but indications are that if the market is large enough for each new generation of efficient equipment, it will be a cost-effective development - the extra equipment costs will be off-set by energy savings. It will also benefit equipment manufacturers that will get better products, also for the world market.¶ The EU countries are already increasing their energy efficiency with an increasing rate compared with the period before 2005, when the EU Ecodesign Directive entered into force. If the currently planned Ecodesign regulation and energy efficiency labelling is passed, and it is followed by national energy efficiency promotion, the energy efficiency can increase 25 until 2020 from 2005. If the current best available technology on the market becomes the norm by 2030, the energy efficiency increase can be 45 for the sector covered by Ecodesign regulation. If the development continues toward the factor four energy efficiency, by 2040 the energy efficiency increase can be 60 or maybe more. ¶ These increase in energy efficiency do not mean that the consumption is reduced with 25, 45 or 60, as the demand for energy services will increase, but substantial energy demand reductions are indeed possible, if ambitious energy efficiency policies are combined with policies to limit the growth of energy services. The sectors covered by Ecodesign is electricity consuming products for household, service sector and to some degree productive sectors. Regulation of energy efficiency in industry, and a higher effective energy price, can lead to the same savings in industry, and even slightly higher savings in industrial heating. For agriculture a slower introduction of energy efficiency is expected.¶ The Challenge of Reducing Heat Consumption For buildings, the situation is different from equipment because buildings often have lifetimes of 100 years or more. Most of the houses to be heated in 2050 are probably already built. In this vision the target heat consumption is 66 kWh/m2 as average in 2040. This will require about a 58 reduction compared with year 2000 EU-27 average, but "only" 53 compared with the 2010 level as the specific heat consumption did reduce considerably in the decade since 2000. (in 2000 the EU average heat consumption in dwellings was 158 kWh/m2 according to the Odysee database, while in 2008 it was only 139 kWh/m2, a reduction of 12. If this is corrected for weather differences between the two years, the reduction was 9. Therefore we expect an 11 reduction 2000 - 2010). If energy-efficiency measures are included in renovations, such a change is possible. The increase in efficiency is estimated to be 2.5/year from 2010, on top of the 11 total 2000-2010. This could be realised by: • raising building-codes to current low-energy housing levels within 1-3 years, • require that all major renovations include a major energy-renovation, • increase energy renovations with financing, advice, campaigns, etc., and • embark on a major program for passive-houses to achieve that the majority of new buildings are built as passive houses, as required before 2020 by the Energy Performance of Building's Directive.¶ Passive houses" are buildings where internal energy sources and passive solar energy supply close to 100 of the demand for space heating, also called "near zero energy houses".¶ Efficient Transport There are very large potentials for energy efficiency in the transport sector. For the first decade the EU agreement to decrease CO2 emissions to 95 g/km in 2020 will increase energy efficiency of new cars with 41 from 2000, where the average emission was 160 g/km. For the car fleet average we therefore expect a 19 reduction 2000 - 2020. From 2020 the vision includes a large-scale shift to electric cars that are 4 times as efficient as cars with combustion engines. After 2030 is also expected a massive shift to hydrogen and hydrogen-electric cars. With the expected transition to electric and hydrogen cars, the energy efficiency increase be 54 until 2030 and 67 by 2040, compared with 2000. The efficiency increase until 2050 will be 75 compared with 2000, so the cars will then be 4 times as efficient. This is made by a combination of the shift to electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, the more efficient technologies, as planned until 2020, and use of break-energy recovering. The biofuel is only expected to play a minor role, fuelling about 3 of the cars in 2050, as it is an inefficient technology similar to traditional petrol-fuelled cars.¶ For rail and navigation is "only" included increase in efficiency gains of 46, and 32 respectively, but trains will remain more efficient than cars for both personal and freight transport, and they are expected to take over substantial transport from roads in the vision.¶ Will Higher Efficiencies Be Possible? There is not doubt that higher efficiencies will be possible than the factor 2-4 increases included in this vision; but given the current difficulties with realisation of efficiency potentials in many European countries, the efficiency increases proposed in this vision have been limited to the factor 2-4. It is proven that for individual industrial companies and houses, factor 4-10 is possible as increase in efficiency. The challenge is to realise the efficiency on national and international levels.¶ Decoupling Growth The growth of energy services, i.e. heated floor space, transported goods and people, energy consuming production, is expected to reach saturation levels during the 50-year period of the vision. This is in line with the perception that the average Western Europeans have reached a sufficient level of material consumption to satisfy needs, and that material growth should gradually be stopped leaving environmental space for the poorer parts of the world. The new EU countries are expected to have higher material growth in the first decades and then gradually lower growth as they approach EU-average. If the gradual reduction of growth of energy services is to be realised, it will require that the growth of energy services does not follow the expected economic growth, i.e. that the economic growth is decoupled from growth in material consumption such as energy services. Alternatively the economic growth should reduce, as it has in recent years. If economic growth continues with 2.5 per year, GDP will double every 30 year, and will have increased 3.4 times in 50 years. A 2.5 economic growth is a normal growth rate that economists typically expect (or hope) for Western European countries. If this level of economic growth is to continue, the challenge for realisation of the sustainable development described with this vision is to triple the economic value expressed as GDP compared with energy consuming structures and activities. Assumed average EU growth in energy services until 2040:¶ Floor space, household: 30 increase 2000 - 2040 with 11 in the first decade and 5/decade after 2010.¶ Electric appliances in households: higher growth than floor space, i.e. 36 in the period 2000 - 2040 ¶ Industry: no growth in physical production volume, i.e. 0 in growth 2000 - 2050, but substantial growth in electrification. The value of the products are also expected to grow.¶ Service sector: 55 growth in physical activities 2000 - 2040 and in addition increased electrification, so the energy demand level for electrification will increase 64 in the period. Physical activity level increased about 30 2000 - 2010.¶ Personal transport: the vision includes a 19 reduction in private car use from 2000 to 2040 and a doubling in train and tram use as well an increase in bus use of 20. As car use is expected to grow 9 2000 - 2010, the proposed reduction from 2010 to 2040 is 25, which is expected to happen gradually from 2020, when the new public transport is available. This is a vision of a more human and sustainable transport. ¶ Freight transport: the vision includes a 26 reduction in road freight combined with 2.25 times increase in rail freight from 2000 to 2040. Given the expected increase in road freight of 24 from 2000 to 2010, the reduction with 2010 as basis will be about 40. In addition to modal shift, this large reduction is expected by applying a real cost on road transport and thereby avoiding long-distance transport of low-value goods where the transport generates little economic or societal benefits.¶ For the 12 "new" EU countries is expected higher growth than for EU average, mainly for the service sector and in road transport. For both these sectors is expected a 2 - 2.5 times increase above the 2000-level of activities, even more for some countries.¶ The developments of energy services in electricity consumption and transport is below current trends, and require new policies to be realised. For electricity consumption the policies can be to discourage the very inefficient use of direct electric heating, consumer information on total energy demand rather than energy efficiency, and product taxation based on total energy consumption. For transport the measures include, among others, environmental taxes on transport including road pricing and increased petrol taxes, land-use planning to reduce transport, stop of tax breaks to increase transport, stop for subsidizing road construction. See also INFORSE-Europe Energy Sufficiency Page.¶ Renewable Energy Targets The vision follows the target proposed by a large number of NGOs and the European Parliament of 25 renewable energy in 2020. The target for 2030 is 57 and in 2040 above 98.¶ Windpower The growth in windpower have been strong in recent years, with capacities added of about 9000 MW/year in recent years for the EU. This growth is expected to continue with growth of 10000 MW/year until 2020 and then 14,000 MW/year until 2040. The European wind industry has the capacity to develop windpower much faster, but the siting etc. seems to be the limiting factor. Then there will be 460,000 MW of windpower in the EU, including off-shore turbines. This will give a windpower production of of 1150 TWh/year, similar to the potential used in the European Renewable Energy Council's (EREC's) "Rethining2050" report from 2010. The figures correspond well with previous figures from the Windforce'10 report made by European Wind Energy Association, Greenpeace and Forum for Energy and Development and later updated by INFORSE-Europe for Europe. See Windforce-text.¶ Solar Solar heating as well as solar electricity are expected to play large roles. Solar heating can cover at 10-30 of the heating demand, and more if seasonal storage is introduced. The development is expected to continue from current trends. The solar heating development is expected to start with the current large expansion that was 2.7 times in the period 2005 - 2010 and then continue with the same increase rate until 2020, when there will be 360 mill. m2 solar collectors. Then we expect a slightly slower large-scale increase leading to 1 billion m2 in 2030 and about 2 billion m2 by 2040 equal to 4.1 m2/person by 2040. The development after 2010 is considerably stronger than forecasted by EREC. The development after 2030 will require some energy storages of 1-3 months in some (Northern) parts of EU, to reach the expected solar coverage of 1/3 of buildings demand for space heating and hot water.¶ The installed capacity for solar electric generation was 16,000 MW by the end of 2009 and is expected to take off as costs are reaching grid parity in more and more parts of EU. The expectations are for all solar electric capacity (PV and solar thermal electric) the following development: - 150,000 MW in 2020, 180 TWh, - 400,000 MW in 2030, 480 TWh, and - 700,000 MW in 2040, 840 TWh This is in line with forecasts by EREC in the "Rethining2050" report from 2010.¶ Biomass While the biomass growth has been lower than expected for instance in the EU White Paper for Renewable Energy from 1997, use of solid biomass has grown substantially from a level of 2100 PJ in 2000 for the EU-15, and is expected to grow further to 4100 PJ in 2020 in the EU-15, a limit proposed by the German Advisory Council on Global Change in 2003. The limit for the 12 new countries is set to 1800 PJ, following other estimates, and a total for EU of 5900 PJ.¶ In addition to solid biomass is included use of biogas of 750 PJ (210 TWh gas), 8 times the level in 2000 for EU-15 and 125 PJ for the 12 "new" countries, in total 875 PJ. The increase in biogas use is based on an estimation of a total biogas potential in EU-15 of 209 TWh from Biogas in Europe: A General Overview by Jens Bo Holm-Nielsen, MSc. and Teodorita AI Seadi, Sc, Southern Danish University.¶ Energy forests are expected to be used after 2010, in addition to the solid biomass from existing sources, and to reach a level of about 7 of present agricultural land by 2020 and 9 by 2040. This is expected to give a total energy input of 2600 PJ in 2040.¶ In addition to this is included liquid biofuels, to be used in transportation, construction and other sectors. The use of biofuels is expected to reach about 500 PJ. This can be produced with use of about 7 of the agricultural land extensively, i.e. with crops that also produce fodder and without extra demand for agricultural inputs. This will fuel about 3 of transport demand for land transport, but will provide about 10 of the energy input as biofuel vehicles are much less efficient than electric transport. With this ,the 10 renewables in transport target by 2020 will not be reached with biofuels, but with the expected transition to 10 electric and hydrogen vehicles in 2020, the target can be reached in this way.¶ Hydropower For hydropower is expected a 20 growth for EU-15. This is similar to the growth expected in the EU White Paper for Renewable Energy, but it is only expected to be realised by 2020. For the "new" countries is expected about 65 growth in average, including renovation of many smaller hydropower plants that were abandoned 1945-1990. The total potential in the new countries is substantially bigger than that, but many of the proposed large-scale hydropower projects are not included because of their problematic environmental effects.¶ Geothermal Energy and Others The use of geothermal energy for heating and electricity is expected to produce 1400 PJ of energy in 2040 for all EU countries, primarily for heating. This is lower than the potential identified by EREC in its "Rethining2050" report from 2010, because in the INFORSE-Europe vision is only included about 1/3 of the additional long-term potential in "Rethinking2050", as this is somewhat undertain, such as the use of heat from hot dry rock.¶ In addition to geothermal energy that is energy from the earth, comes contributions from heat pumps that collects ambient heat which from the soil, water, air, etc. Heat pumps are are expected to play a role to balance the electricity load, primarily for the EU-15 that have the highest fraction of intermittent electricity production.The heat pumps are expected to collect about 1500 PJ in 2040 including more than 500 PJ for heat pumps in district heating and 600 PJ for heat pumps in dwellings. Heat pumps can give some new flexible electricity demand, as explained below.¶ Other renewables, such as wave-power can also play a large role in the future, but have not been assessed for this vision. They could give a considerable contribution after 2020.¶ Nuclear and Fossil Energy Nuclear energy is expected to be phased out as the current nuclear reactors are stopped because of age, safety problems etc. This is expected to happen mainly 2015-2025. For fossil fuels are expected a gradual phase-out until 2040. A change from coal to gas is expected in the period 2010 - 2020, and a closure of primarily coal fired power plants 2010 - 2030.For space heating is expected a rapid phase out of oil and coal heating followed by a replacement of gas heating with district heating and heat pumps.
17 +
18 +Advantage One is Nuclear Disaster
19 +Toss out the perception of nuclear plants humming away in the middle of empty fields. That exists in North America but not in Europe, where there are no such open spaces. The countryside is dominated by small towns that will inevitably be destroyed by even the smallest nuclear mishap. The population is six times more dense than in the USA. Europe is populated too densely to ensure the safety of its people in case of an accident. It doesn’t need to be Fukushima; it just needs to be inevitable.
20 +Petrangeli, Gianni. Consultant to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) and researcher for nuclear safety for the European Commission; member of the Faculty Council for the Doctorate in Nuclear and Industrial Safety, University of Pisa, Italy Nuclear Safety. Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006. Google Books. MO. Pp5
21 +In Europe, the need to take account of the specific plant features for the evaluation of the acceptability of the site arises from the much higher population density in Europe in comparison with that of the USA (approximately 200 inhabitants per square kilometre and 30 per square kilometre, respectively). It is therefore much more difficult to find low population sites in Europe.¶ The different population densities in Europe and the USA has also brought about differences in accident emergency plans: in the USA, the provision of a complete evacuation of the population within 16 km of the plant in a Few hours is adopted, while in Europe the maximum comparable distance is equal to 10 km. It is indeed difficult to assure the evacuation of population centres with tens, hundreds or thousands of inhabitants. Here too, the countries’ differences in demographic conditions has to be compensated by additional plant features (generally, the use of double containment provided with inter- mediate filtration systems and the use of elevated stacks).
22 +People can be evacuated – the major risk of nuclear power isn’t cancer. It’s the disruption of everyday life and loss of community. Any risk is an unacceptable risk when people’s homes and communities are at stake.
23 +Buongiorno, J., et al., “Technical Lessons Learned from the Fukushima-Daichii Accident and Possible Corrective Actions for the Nuclear Industry: An Initial Evaluation”, MIT Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems, May 2011. DM
24 +Permanent and long-term relocation can reduce exposure to radiation to essentially zero levels above natural background. What is gained is the elimination of a tiny additional risk of cancer (maximum risk of 42.2 instead of 42.0 at 20 mSv). This cancer, if it appears, will be diagnosed many years, perhaps decades, in the future. But this gain comes with very significant costs. The costs include loss of home or farm (48,000 homes and over 400 livestock or dairy-farming households are in the evacuation region), loss of privacy (shelters are crowded and residence time is expected to be measured in months before alternative temporary housing will be available), and loss of community (whole towns and villages have been evacuated). Prohibition against consuming contaminated food and water results in no additional internal dose but, for a country already facing food shortages following a devastating earthquake and tsunami, the loss of valuable foodstuffs and interdiction of farmlands are a significant price to pay.
25 +The best data suggests that the possibility of another accident in the next 50 years at least as bad as Fukushima is a coin-toss.
26 +MIT Technology Review, “The Chances of Another Chernobyl Before 2050? 50, Say Safety Specialists’” April 17, 2015. DM
27 +However, the largest accidents appear to follow an entirely different statistical distribution, probably because they occur as a result of set of entirely unforeseen combinations of circumstances.¶ These kinds of large unexpected events are known as dragon king events and particularly difficult to analyse because they follow this different distribution, have unforeseen causes, and are few in number.¶ Nevertheless, Wheatley and co say their data suggests that the nuclear industry remains vulnerable dragon king events. “There is a 50 chance that a Fukushima event (or larger) occurs in the next 50 years,” they say.¶ Fukushima was by far the most expensive accident in history at a cost of $166 billion. That’s 60 per cent of the total cost of all other nuclear accidents added together.¶ The team calculate that a Chernobyl-scale event, the most severe in terms of radiation release, is as likely as not in the next 27 years. And they say a Three Mile Island event in the next 10 years has a probability of 50 percent.
28 +Also, nuclear plants are so complicated that we cannot safeguard against any substantial proportion of possible accidents. Another accident will occur, even if we don’t know when.
29 +Perrow, Charles. Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Yale University “Fukushima and the inevitability of accidents.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67.6 (2011): 44-52. MO.
30 +This litany of regulatory failures, failures to heed warnings, and commonplace failures is independent of normal accident theory. That theory says that even if we had excellent regulation and everyone played it safe, there would still be accidents in systems that are highly Òinteractively complex,Ó and if the systems are tightly coupled, even small failures will cascade through them. The theory is useful for its emphasis on system complexity and tight coupling; these concepts play a huge role in analyzing the failures of any source in risky systems. In the financial meltdown, for example, the mounting complexity of the overall system allowed fraud and self-dealing to go undetected, and the tight coupling of many systems allowed the failures to cascade. ¶In my work on Ònormal accidents,Ó I have argued that some complex organizationsÑsuch as chemical plants, nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons systems, and, to a more limited extent, air transport networksÑhave so many nonlinear system properties that eventually the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures may create an accident that no designer could have anticipated and no operator can understand.¶ Everything is subject to failureÑ designs, procedures, supplies and equipment, operators, and the environment. The government and businesses know this and design safety devices with multiple redundancies and all kinds of bells and whistles. But nonlinear, unexpected interactions of even small failures can defeat these safety systems. If the system is also tightly coupled, no intervention can prevent a cascade of failures that brings it down.¶ I use the term ÒnormalÓ because these characteristics are built into the systems; there is nothing one can do about them other than to initiate massive system redesigns to reduce interactive complexity and to loosen coupling. Companies and governments can modularize integrated designs and deconcentrate hazardous material. Actually, though, compared with the prosaic cases previously mentioned, normal accidents are rare. (Three Mile Island is the only accident in my list that qualifies.) It is much more common for systems with catastrophic potential to fail because of poor regulation, ignored warnings, production pressures, cost cutting, poor training, and so on.
31 +The mental health effects of nuclear catastrophe are a second disaster. At the very least, the aff plan ameliorates the fear that another disaster will happen.
32 +Worland, Justin. “This May Be the Biggest Health Threat From Fukushima—And It’s Still Ongoing,” Time, March 11, 2016. DM
33 +The 2011 earthquake that struck in Japan killed more than 15,000 people as buildings crumbled and tsunami surged. The meltdown at a local nuclear power plant led to lasting adverse health effects and the relocation of half a million area residents.¶ Now, five years after the incident, the lasting effects of the earthquake continue to threaten tens of thousands of residents of affected communities as survivors battle a mental health crisis of untold proportions.¶ “This is an ongoing disaster in a literal sense—not just rhetorically,” says Irwin Redlener, a professor at Columbia University who studies natural disasters. “The challenges they’re experiencing now are really overwhelming.”¶ The lingering chaos of the disaster represents perhaps the biggest contributor to ongoing mental health issues. Research published this week in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health this week shows that two thirds of residents who lived in the evacuation zone have moved more than three times since the disaster, suggesting they have been unable to resettle in a stable location. Nearly 40 of families had been separated by relocation.¶ A lack of trust in government authorities charged with protecting community health has also contributed to mental health problems. The country has continued to source huge portions of its power from nuclear plants and has not backed off plans to increase their use. Many residents live in fear that another disaster may be just around the corner. This overarching environment of suspicion and mistrust of the government carries over to other personal relationships. Some also experience stigma from those who think they may suffer from radiation. Others worry that their food may be affected by radiation.¶ Instability and distrust both contribute to a number of conditions faced by disaster survivors—from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to depression. The new research attributes a spike in the regional suicide rate to the ongoing consequences of the disaster. The suicide rate in affected regions in Japan ranged from 110 to 138 deaths per 100,000 people in 2014, compared with just below 20 deaths per 100,000 people nationwide.¶ The disaster’s continuing mental health effects can be particularly devastating for children who have been displaced. Many have jumped between schools and have been separated from family members.¶ And the problem only worsens with each move or school swap.¶ “Their ability to be resilient is eroded over time,” says Redlener. “Children are very susceptible to the family dynamic, in addition to whatever trauma they may have experienced themselves.”
34 +Advantage two is Grid Modernization
35 +Reliance on nuclear leads to overcapacity that is costly. It pushes us to increase consumption rather than improve efficiency.
36 +Cooper 2010 - Mark Cooper Senior Fellow For Economic Analysis Institute For Energy And The Environment Vermont Law School, “Policy Challenges Of Nuclear Reactor Construction: Cost Escalation And Crowding Out Alternatives Lessons From The U.S. And France for the Effort To Revive The U.S. Industry With Loan Guarantees And Tax Subsidies,” Physicians for Social Responsibility (September 2010). Accessed October 7, 2016. http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/policy-challenges-of.pdf AT
37 +A costly technology suffering from severe cost escalation puts pressure on those involved in developing and deploying it. With large commitments of financial and institutional resources to the construction of reactors, there is a tendency to press projects ahead in spite of adverse economics. We have already seen an indication of this in the failure of price projection to reflect reality. The dysfunction of the system had other substantial impacts, especially on the choice of alternatives.¶ FRANCE¶ The French program suffered from demand reduction brought on by the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Much like the industry in the U.S., it did not adjust rapidly or well, instead building up excess capacity. Grubler notes the tension between the stimulus for more capacity to reduce dependence on oil and the demand reduction induced by the oil price shock, not unlike the tensions between climate change policy and the current recession-induced demand reduction.¶ This period is overshadowed by the unfolding of the consequences of the two "oil shocks" that reinforced the political legitimacy of the ambitious nuclear investment program. The oil shocks also paved the way for the subsequent nuclear overcapacity, as slackening demand growth remained unreflected in the bullish demand and capacity expansion projections and orders.¶ Thus the French PWR program remained at full throttle regardless of external circumstances. Orders of 5-6 reactors per year, supplemented by grid-connections of the first reactors commissioned in the previous period, and first operating experiences from initial reactors became available in the late 1970s.55¶ The PEON Commission report in 1973 projected France‘s electricity demand as 400 TWh in 1985 and 750 TWh in 2000, compared to actual numbers of 300 and 430 TWh respectively (G-M-T, 2000:373). These over-projections of demand growth led subsequently to substantial (and costly) overcapacity in orders and construction, requiring not un-painful adjustments.56¶ The highly centralized French state monopoly was able to force projects through to completion.57The ability of the centralized system to force reactors online also had the effect of justifying policies to promote wasteful use of electricity to absorb the surplus. These difficulties cascade and distort policy choices. The result was excess capacity that placed a burden on taxpayers and consumers. Schneider argues that as many as one-fifth to one-quarter of the reactors was not needed. The push to absorb the large excess of baseload capacity caused the abandonment of efficiency and conservation and created a peak load problem.¶ In the 1980s significant overcapacities were built up in the power sectors as well as in refineries and nuclear fuel industries and most of the energy intelligence initiatives based on efficiency and conservation were abandoned. … ¶ Rather than downsizing its nuclear extension program, EDF develop a very aggressive two-front policy: long-term baseload power export contracts and dumping of electricity into competitive markets like space heating and hot water generation…¶ France increasingly lacks peak load power whose consumption skyrocketed in the 1980s and 1990s in particular as a consequence of massive introduction of electric space heating…¶ Today, per capita electricity consumption in France is almost a quarter higher than in Italy (that phased out nuclear energy after the Chernobyl accident in 1986) and 15 higher than the EU27 average.58¶ The dysfunctionalities of the system in France may be somewhat less apparent than in the U.S. (discussed below), but they are just as real.¶ The system is entirely exempt from influential corrective elements. Once a decision is taken, there is no way back or out. Examples include the large overbuilding of nuclear capacity… By the middle of the 1980s, it was perfectly clear that the nuclear program was vastly oversized by some 12 to 16 units. But while 138 reactor orders were cancelled in the U.S. at various stages of implementation, absolutely no changes were made to the planning, even when electricity consumption did not even nearly follow forecasts. The reaction was to develop power export for dumping prices and to stimulate electricity consumption by any possible means (in particular thermal uses like heating, hot water production and cooking).59¶ The drive for policies that would increase consumption to absorb excess capacity had a side effect. There was little inclination to pursue alternative sources of generation. Consequently, ―the energy efficiency + renewables efforts in France have remained severely underdeveloped…. In 2008 Spain added more wind power capacity (4,600 MW) than France had installed in total by 2007 (4,060 MW).60
38 +Nuclear focus directly trades off with grid modernization efforts and prevents development of renewables.
39 +Froggatt and Schneider 2010 – Antony Froggatt Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House; For over 20 years he has worked extensively on EU energy policy for NGOs and think tanks and as a consultant to European governments, the European Commission and Parliament and commercial bodies and Mycle Schneider Independent international consultant on energy and nuclear policy. He is currently advising the USAID funded program ECO-Asia on energy efficiency and renewable energy policy., “Systems for Change: Nuclear Power vs. Energy Efficiency + Renewables?” Brussels: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Green European Foundation (March 2010) pp. 46-47. https://pl.boell.org/sites/default/files/froggatt-schneider_systems_for_change.pdf AT
40 +Global experience of nuclear construction shows a tendency of cost overruns and delays. The history of the world’s two largest construction programs, that of the United States and France, shows a five and threefold increase in construction costs respectively. This cannot be put down to first of a kind costs or teething problems, but systemic problems associated with such large, political and complicated projects. Recent experience, in Olkiluoto in Finland and the Flamanville project in France, highlight the fact that this remains a problem. The increased costs and delays with nuclear construction not only absorb greater and greater amounts of investment, but the delays increase the emissions from the sector. From a systemic point of view the nuclear and energy efficiency+renewable energy approaches clearly mutually exclude each other, not only in investment terms. This is becoming increasingly transparent in countries or regions where renewable energy is taking a large share of electricity generation, i.e., in Germany and Spain. The main reasons are as follows. • Competition for limited investment funds. A euro, dollar or yuan can only be spent once and it should be spent for the options that provide the largest emission reductions the fastest. Nuclear power is not only one of the most expensive but also the slowest option. • Overcapacity kills efficiency incentives. Centralized, large, power‐generation units tend to lead to structural overcapacities. Overcapacities leave no room for efficiency. • Flexible complementary capacity needed. Increasing levels of renewable electricity sources will need flexible, medium‐load complementary facilities and not inflexible, large, baseload power plants. • Future grids go both ways. Smart metering and smart grids are on their way. The logic is an entirely redesigned system where the user gets also a generation and storage function. This is radically different from the top‐down centralized approach. For future planning purposes, in particular for developing countries, it is crucial that the contradictory systemic characteristics of the nuclear versus the energy efficiency+renewable energy strategies are clearly identified. There are numerous system effects that have so far been insufficiently documented or even understood. Future research and analysis in this area is urgently needed. This is particularly important at the current time because the next decade will be vital in determining the sustainability, security and financial viability of the energy sector for at least a generation. Three key policy drivers and considerations have come together that must transform the way in which energy services are provided and energy carriers (electricity, hydrogen…) and fuels are generated, transported and used. These are:
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1 +Meadows

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