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Caselist.CitesClass[19]

Cites

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1		-The meta-ethic is practical reason.
2		-
3		-1) To deny reason is to use reason – it is inescapable
4		-
5		-David Velleman, 2006, Self To Self, Cambridge University Press.
6		-As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external sources of authority are turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “Why should I act on this desire?” or “Why should I obey the U.S. Government?” or even “Why should I obey God?” And as we observed in the case of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” let us now ask “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to questions—namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? If we really didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn’t help. So there It is something self-defeating about to asking for a reason to act for reasons. The foregoing argument doesn't show that the requirement to act for reasons is inescapable. All it shows is that this requirement cannot be escaped in a particular way: we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons by insisting on reasons for obeying it. For all that, we still may not be required to act for reasons. Yet the argument does more than close off one avenue of escape from the requirement to act for reasons. It shows that we are subject to this requirement if we are subject to any requirements at all. The requirement to act for reasons is the fundamental requirement, from which the authority of all other requirements is derived, since the authority of other requirements just consists in there being reasons for us to obey them. There may be nothing that is required of us; but if anything is required of us, then acting for reasons is required. Hence the foregoing argument, though possibly unable to foreclose escape from the requirement to act for reasons, does succeed in raising the stakes. It shows that we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons without escaping the force of requirements altogether.
7		-
8		-Reasons must be universizable.
9		-Stephen Engstrom, Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge, Manuscript, Pgs. 8-9
10		-2. As I mentioned, however, there is another sense in which rational cognition can be said to be universal. All cognition, be it theoretical or practical, has what Kant calls subjective universal validity: if a certain judgment counts as knowledge, then it must be valid for every knowing subject, so that all such subjects could agree in the matter and share the same judgment, the same cognition. If I know that the next hurricane to hit Florida will rotate in a counterclockwise direction, then all subjects who share the cognitive capacity I exercise in this judgment will necessarily agree, provided, of course, that this capacity in them is not in some way defective, that they are exercising it properly, and that they are sufficiently acquainted with hurricanes, the location of Florida, and so forth, to form such a judgment. And since this judgment, as rational cognition, is cognition, not just of the particular, but of the particular in the universal and hence is a judgment that depends on a universal judgment, the possibility that all subjects capable of rational cognition can share this judgment about the next hurricane to hit Florida likewise depends on the possibility that they can all share the universal judgment about tropical storms in the northern hemisphere on which the particular judgment is based.Thus a principle of reason, being itself a cognition, is universally valid in two respects: in addition to being valid of every object falling under its subject concept, it’s valid and for every subject capable of rational cognition. This double universal validity is characteristic of principles of both theoretical and practical knowledge.3. In the case of practical cognition, however, these two sorts of universality are identical in respect of their extension. For unlike theoretical cognition, which is of independently existing objects distinct from the cognizing subject and given to it from elsewhere by means of the senses, practical cognition, as practical, works to bring its object into existence, or to make it actual, and therefore is essentially efficacious, indeed self-consciously so, hence always knowledge subjects have that they themselves, as practically cognizing subjects, should act in a certain way, and so always cognition of the very subjects who have such cognition.8 Therefore in the case of a principle of practical cognition the two sorts of universal validity necessarily coincide in the sense that the principle is valid for the very subjects of which it’s valid: the principle applies to the will of every practically cognizing rational being, and every such being can recognize this universal applicability. This is as much as to say that a principle of practical cognition is necessarily such that every subject can agree to every subject’s acting on it. Now such agreement would actually be achieved if all subjects were jointly to legislate this principle for themselves. Kant thus gives expression to calls this necessary feature of all principles of practical knowledge by speaking, in the Critique of Practical Reason, of “the mere form of a universal legislation”, the form that distinctively characterizes practical, as opposed to theoretical, laws (KpV 27). Such universal legislation must therefore be possible if, for example, the shopkeeper’s practical judgment that where there is much trade one should keep a fixed general price for everyone can rightly be said to be practical knowledge.
11		-
12		-A maxim that limits freedom is a contradiction.
13		-
14		-Engstrom Stephen, Professor of Ethics at UPitt “Universal Legislation as the form of Practical Knowledge” http://www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem/engstrom_vortrag.pdf
15		-Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.
16		-Humanity is only respected by non-violations. OTSUKA:
17		- Kamm's own the justification of constraints focuses on facts about the status of the potential victims of rights violations rather than facts about the agent who would-violate the constraint. Her view is that constraints are justified because they reflect our elevated moral status as persons who are inviolable insofar as it is impermissible to sacrifice any one of us in order to realize the greater good of minimizing the violation of constraints. Our moral status as inviolable beings is greater than it would have been if it were legitimate to sacrifice any one of us for the sake of minimizing evil. Kamm emphasizes that because the impermissibility of violating one person's constraint for the sake of preventing more of the same type of constraint from being violated does not imply the permissibility of the constraint violations that one is not permitted to prevent. Hence, even if we are, statistically speaking, more likely to be killed as a means when there are constraints against minimizing constraint violations, we are, morally speaking, less violable insofar as there are fewer constraints that it is permissible to violate
18		-This also moots aggregation based arguments
19		-a. The only constraint on agency is non-contradiction—what is contradictory, like a round triangle, cannot be thought. You cannot aggregate since actions when universalized cannot result in a world that is more of a contradiction than others.
20		-b. Humanity begins from a starting point of perfection – it cannot be added to, only violated.
21		-
22		-First, Prohibiting nuclear power production would require government confiscation of power plants owned by private companies, which directly violates their ownership rights of the reactors.
23		-World Nuclear 16
24		-“World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power” June 2016 AT
25		-Government policy is central to any discussion of nuclear power in the USA. The development of nuclear power began as a government program in 1945 following on from the Manhattan Project to develop the wartime atomic bomb. The first nuclear reactor to produce electricity did so at the National Reactor Testing Station (NRTS) in Idaho in December 1951, as the US government reoriented significant resources to the development of civilian use of nuclear power. In the mid-1950s, production of electricity from nuclear power was opened up to private industry. The world's first large-scale nuclear power plant at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was owned by the US Atomic Energy Commission, but built and operated by the Duquesne Light and Power Company on a site owned by the utility company near Pittsburgh. Today, almost all the commercial reactors in the USA are owned by private companies, and nuclear industry as a whole has far greater private participation, and less concentration, than any other country. Yet, the government remains more involved in commercial nuclear power than in any other industry in the USA. There are lengthy, detailed requirements for the construction and operation of all reactors and conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, mining and milling facilities. The review process preceding the construction of new reactors can take 3-5 years. The US government, through its own national research laboratories and projects at university and industry facilities, is the main source of funding for advanced reactor and fuel cycle research. It also promises to provide incentives for building new plants through loan guarantees and tax credits, although owners have to raise their own capital. US domestic energy policy is also closely linked to foreign, trade and defence policy on such matters as mitigating climate change and nuclear non-proliferation (of weapons).As of late 2013, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was reviewing nine applications for combined construction and operating licences (COLs) to build 14 new nuclear reactors, as well as three design certification applications for new reactor types (EPR, ESBWR and APWR) and two design certification renewals (both ABWR). The NRC’s FY 2014 budget for oversight of the 100 operating power reactors was $1055 million, including six reviews of extended power uprate requests (and eight others) and 10 licence renewal applications. The budget includes nuclear materials and waste safety.State and local governments also have a major impact on the framework and economics of the US nuclear power industry. Deregulation of electricity prices in some states in the 1990s led to greater concentration in nuclear power production. In 1976, a voter referendum in California led to a law that prohibited the construction of new nuclear plants in the nation's largest state and the prohibition still remains in effect. Opposition in the state of Nevada was a key factor in the decision by the new Democratic administration of Barack Obama in early 2009 to abandon the government's long-standing plans for a 70,000 tonne geological repository in that state for disposal of the high-level nuclear waste that has accumulated at reactor sites across the nation.
26		-Second, because wronging someone entails using them to pursue your ends, the mere possession of nuclear power cannot wrong anyone – only wrongful uses of nuclear reactors. Prohibiting actions that entail harm, but do not wrong is ITSELF a wrong. Ripstein:
27		-Each person’s entitlement to decide how his or her powers will be used precludes prohibiting many of the setbacks people suffer as effects of other people’s nondominating conduct. People always exercise their powers in a particular context, but that context is normally the result of other people’s exercises of their own freedom. To protect me against the harms that I suffer as you go about your legitimate business, perhaps because you set a bad example for others, or deprive me of their custom, would be inconsistent with your freedom, because it would require you to use your powers in the way that most suited my wishes or vulnerabilities. You do not dominate me by failing to provide me with a suitable context in which to pursue my favored purposes. To the contrary, I would dominate you if I could call upon the law to force you to provide me with my preferred context for those purposes. That would just be requiring you to act on my behalf, to advance purposes I had set. That is, it would empower me to use force to turn you into my means. Refusing to provide me with a favorable context to exercise my powers is an exercise of your freedom, not a violation of mine, no matter how badly the refusal reflects on your character.25 Indifference to harm that is suffered as a result of one person’s failure to provide another with a favorable context is just the generalization of the protections the right to freedom provides. That is the precise sense in which it articulates reciprocal limits on freedom: you would be wronged if I could prohibit you from doing something that doesn’t wrong me. You can be prohibited from dominating me, but the basis for that prohibition is also the basis for prohibiting me from calling on the state to make you provide me with favorable background conditions to use my own powers.26

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-09 06:41:22.0

Judge

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1		-Fife

Opponent

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1		-Cupertino EQ

ParentRound

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1		-11

Round

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1		-1

Team

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1		-Lynbrook Venkatesh Neg

Title

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1		-SEPTOCT- Kant NC

Tournament

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1		-Voices