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+The standard is national sovereignty. |
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+The actor in the resolution is countries not individuals. Individuals transfer their will to their governments who then act on their behalf. Individual morality cannot resolve cosmopolitan duties, only governments obligations can, Jack Goldsmith writes, Jack Goldsmith, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, May, 2003 “Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty,” STANFORD LAW REVIEW. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1667 |
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+“we cannot properly attribute cosmopolitan duties to individuals. He reaches this conclusion on the basis that "commonsense morality" n18 in the global context is impeded by the "phenomenological features of individual agency." n19 Three important features of commonsense morality are that individuals, and not *1672 groups, are the "primary bearers of responsibility"; that individuals have greater duties with respect to acts than omissions; and that individuals have "special obligations" and thus give priority to the near over the remote. n20 The commonsense conception of morality is a restrictive one that precludes the ascription of responsibility to individuals for the problems of global injustice.” |
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+The government guarantees a space for individuals to exercise morality. Without such a space, people would be in anarchy and morality would be meaningless, Pichler explains: Pichler, Hans. “The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics.” Review of International Studies. Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 185-200. Cambridge University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097517.“Morgenthau believes in the existence of universal moral values and argues that 'it is the moral duty of people of the mind today to preserve the eternal moral ethical values in a clear conceptual order'.68 Yet, in the anarchic and violent international system dominated by the struggle for power, there is no room for altruistic action and a moral life. Such a life is only possible within the state, where sanctions guarantee the respect of moral norms and laws. Through the existential security it offers the individual and society, the state thus constitutes the only moral space in an amoral world. If the state perishes, however, this moral realm also disappears. It follows that the preservation of the state is a moral act in itself. Indeed, for Morgenthau the state is not allowed to pursue any other end than its own self-preservation, even if this can be achieved only by immoral means. |
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+Denuclearization is an imperialist strategy imposed by hegemonic states. They assert that all other countries are irrational and dangerous. The goal of imperialism is ideological colonization. Biswas 14 Biswas, Shampa. Prof of PoliSci @ Whitman, Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order. Minneapolis, US: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 8 August 2016. Premier How does this international community enforce its will? The military option— the willingness by the United States and Israel to preemptively strike Iran’s nuclear facilities— has not been used but has remained on the table. But the United States and Israel have already successfully collaborated on more clandestine forms of intrusion— he t smuggled computer virus Stuxnet brought Iran’s centrifuges to a halt in 2010, and five nuclear scientists were assassinated in broad daylight on Tehran’s streets between 2009 and 2011. Even more forcefully, sanctions imposed by the international community have been steadily expanded to virtually paralyze the Iranian economy, with devastating consequences for ordinary Iranian citizens. Iran, it is fair to say, is truly desperate. The P-5 plus 1 has offered to begin loosening the noose of these sanctions ever so slightly, if Iran is willing to halt its ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. This is a minimal easing, President Obama has assured all, and easily reversible; the United States is willing to ratchet up the pressure in the future if need be. We are reminded time and again by reasonable, thoughtful, concerned interlocuters that “we are all safer in a world with a denuclearized Iran.” But who is this “we”— this mythical international community that speaks of peace and well- being for all made possible by reigning in this nuclear upstart? What kinds of questions about nuclear order and disorder are precluded when we invoke this “we”? Iran’s current ability to produce even a single missile- deliverable nuclear weapon is fairly limited. Every single member of the P-5 (and Israel) has a sizeable nuclear weapons stockpile and considerable ability to deliver weapons. Each considers nuclear \ weapons as essential to its security, and none has ever engaged in any serious negotiations to eliminate its own nuclear ambitions. Nobody may be better off with Iranian nuclear weapons, but from what kinds of questions about the global nuclear order does this exaggerated attention to the disorderly conduct of Iran deflects attention? But also, who is the “we” that talks in the form of the state at these international negotiations? For whom do the “well- mannered, Western- educated” representatives speak when they speak to each other? The current accord places certain limitations on Iran’s ability to make and possess uranium enriched to a capacity more easily translated into weapons. But during the negotiations, Iran stood adamantly on demanding recognition from the international community of its “right to enrich uranium.” This demand has been put on hold for now; at least on this question, the United States has been willing to agree to disagree. But what kind of right is the right to uranium enrichment, and who gains from that right— whether it be for the unremarkable case of the United States or for a so- called rogue state such as Iran? If sanctions are finally lifted, and Iran resumes its “peaceful” nuclear program with international approval, who will profit and who may be damaged from those pursuits? |
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+Fossil Fuels are an imperialist strategy—nuclear power plants provide countries with energy sovereignty. Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384Premier Launching or expanding national nuclear energy programs may also be viewed as a sovereignty strategy. Although few states can build and manage a nuclear power plant and the related nuclear fuel cycle on their own, they typically feel that there are fewer uncertainties beyond their control once the facility is up and running. Nuclear power can also be considered a diversification strategy for states relying on fossil fuels. For example, several Gulf States are import-independent but excessively relying on oil and gas for their electricity generation (Jewell, 2010 ). Another example is Belarus, whose electricity sector almost entirely depends on imported Russian natural gas. Belarus’ planned nuclear power plant will be manufactured from Russian parts and most likely use Russian fuel and expertise, thus not reducing the country’s dependency on its neighbor. However, it will provide the much-needed diversity in terms of related technologies, markets, and institutions so that disruptions of natural gas supply will not necessarily be devastating for the country’s electricity sector. |