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Caselist.RoundClass[1]

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1		-2016-09-24 02:26:14.495
	1	+2016-09-24 02:26:14.0

Caselist.CitesClass[1]

Cites

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	1	+Part 1 is Framework
	2	+Prefer a pragmatic conception of truth – we don’t verify every truth, just use what’s useful for us. James ¶ You and I consider the object on the wall to be a “clock.” Although no one of us has seen the hidden works that make it one. We let our notion pass for true without attempting to verify.If truths mean verification-process essentially, ought we then to call such unverified truths as this abortive? No, for they form the overwhelmingly large number of the truths we live by. Indirect as well as direct verifications pass muster. Where circumstantial evidence is sufficient, we can go without eye-witnessing. Just as Wehereassume Japan to exist without ever having been there, because it works to do so.everything we know conspiring with the belief, and nothing interfering, so we assume that thing to be a clock. We use it as a clock, regulating the length of our lecture by it. The verification of the assumption here means its leading to no frustration or contradiction. Verifiability of wheels and weights and pendulum is as good as verification. For one truth-process completed there are a million in our lives that function in this state of nascency.They turn us towards direct verification; lead us into the surroundings of the objects they envisage; and then, if everything runs on harmoniously,We are so surethatverification is possible that we omit it.¶ Pragmatism implies utilitarianism. To prove the resolution true, we have to show its general usefulness or practical value as a true statement. Util is the only theory that stems from taking into account the general pragmatic implications of our beliefs.
	3	+
	4	+Some judgments are irrefutably normative- only revisionary intuitionism meets. Parfit:
	5	+On What Matters V2, 2011 books.google.com/books?isbn=0191613452
	6	+To introduce this argument, I shall sum up some of my claims. (A) There are some irreducibly normative reason-involving truths, some of which are moral truths. (B) Since these truths are not about natural properties, our knowledge of these truths cannot be based on perception, or on evidence provided by empirical facts. (C) Positive substantive normative truths cannot be analytic, in the sense that their truth follows from their meaning. Therefore (D) Our normative beliefs cannot be justified unless we are able to recognize in some other way that these beliefs are true. We do, I believe, have this ability. We have reasons to have certain normative beliefs, and we can respond to these reasons. Normative beliefs can also be self-evident, and intrinsically credible. One such belief is (E) Torturing children merely for fun is wrong. There are similar non-normative beliefs, such as (F) No statement can be both wholly true and wholly false. Since our normative beliefs are neither caused by what we believe, nor based on empirical evidence, we need another word to refer to our way of forming these beliefs. On the view that I have called Intuitionism: We have intuitive abilities to respond to reasons and to recognize some normative truths. Though it is intuitively clear that certain acts are wrong, most of our moral beliefs cannot depend only on such separate intuitions. We must also assess the strength of various conflicting reasons, and the plausibility of various principles and arguments, trying to reach what Rawls calls reflective equilibrium. This kind of intuitively-based reflective thinking is not only, as Scanlon writes, the only defensible best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters . . . it is the only defensible method. We have similar abilities to recognize truths about what is rational, and about what we have reasons to believe, and want, and do. Many recent writers reject such claims. Schiffer, for example, doubts that moral intuitions are worth discussing, and Field and Boghossian call the idea of rational intuition ‘obscurantist’ and ‘a mystery’. But these criticisms are aimed at the view that intuition is a special quasi-perceptual faculty. That is not the view that I am defending here. When I use the word ‘intuitive’, I mean what Boghossian means when he describes one of his claims as ‘intuitively plausible’ and ‘intuitively quite clear’. Intuitionism can also be challenged with claims about disagreement. When Boghossian denies that beliefs can be intrinsically credible, or self-evident, he points out that (G) different people might find conflicting beliefs self-evident. If we claim that we have some ability, however, it is no objection that we might have lacked this ability. Different people might have conflicting visual experiences, which were like dreams and hallucinations, and were not a source of knowledge. But that is not in fact true. Different people’s visual experiences seldom conflict, and believing what we seem to see is a fairly reliable way of reaching the truth. It may be similarly true that, after careful reflection, different people would seldom find conflicting beliefs self-evident. Believing what seems self- evident, after such reflection, may be another fairly reliable way of reaching the truth. When Schiffer argues that there are no moral truths, he claims that (H) even in ideal conditions, when everyone knows the relevant facts and is reasoning equally well, we and others could rationally disagree about any moral question. For example, Schiffer claims that, though we could rationally believe that (E) torturing children merely for fun is wrong, it would be equally rational to reject this belief. This claim assumes that we cannot have decisive reasons to have our moral beliefs. If we had such reasons to believe (E), it would not be equally rational either to have or to reject this belief. What Schiffer calls his error theory might be true, since we might never have decisive reasons to have any moral belief. But Schiffer cannot support this theory by claiming that we and others could rationally disagree about any moral question, since this claim assumes that we have no such reasons. Nor could we reject Schiffer’s theory merely by claiming that we and others could not rationally disagree. When we are trying to decide whether we have decisive reasons to have certain beliefs, we cannot usefully appeal to claims about whether, when considering these beliefs, we and others could rationally disagree.
	7	+That implies consequentialism. Sinnot-Armstrong:
	8	+Walter Sinnott-Armstrong http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
	9	+Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the best explanation of our moral intuitions. This argument might surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intuitions that trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits outweigh the costs (including any bad side effects). If consequentialists can better explain more common moral intuitions, then consequentialism might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, Chap. III.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker 2000).
	10	+
	11	+Part 2 is the Plan Text
	12	+The Parliament of India will ban all domestic nuclear production. I reserve the right to clarify.
	13	+Parameswaran 11 is the solvency advocate
	14	+India does not need nuclear energy: Top scientist. Interview with Dr. M. P. Parameswaran, former lead scientist of the Indian AEC and India’s first phd in nuclear science. 11-7-11
	15	+http://www.dianuke.org/india-does-not-need-nuclear-energy-top-scientist/
	16	+One of the pioneer nuclear scientists in the country says that India can very well suspend its entire nuclear programme. “It is true that we have spent thousands of croresof rupees to set up nuclear power plants. But we will be forced to spend thousand times more than that in the eventuality of a nuclear disaster,” said Dr MP Parameswaran,former scientist of the Atomic Energy Commission. Referring to the agitation by the Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Energy demanding the closure of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, Dr Parameswaran, India’s first PhD in nuclear science, said the country is not that hard-pressed for nuclear power. “Of the 750,000 MW power projected for 2030, fossil fuels will account for 400,000 MW. A ten per cent energy increase in this can offset the shortage produced by the suspension of the nuclear energy programme. We have all the expertise and production capacity to do this,” he said. According to this scientist, nuclear energy will become viable only with the development of a foolproof mechanism for radio active waste disposal and radiation damage. “What they should do is to redesign the reactors at Kudankulam so that they could be operated either with coal or natural gas. Yes, there are costs involved in it. But the real cost of continuing with the nuclear programme is much higher,” he said. Dr Parameswaran, much senior to Dr Sreekumar Banerjee, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, took strong exception to the latter’s comment that a nuclear power plant is not acar factory where you can switch off the system. “That is exactly the problem. You cannot switch off the system and close gates for decades and even centuries after the plant has stopped generating energy. There are several reactors in USA and France which produce no more power but cannot be switched off. These reactors require most of the system like cooling, radiation monitoring security and so on to keep working,” he said. The nuclear science veteran pointed out that the Fukushima disaster was caused not by the working reactor but by the spent fuel tank. He also refuted the claims of the AEC chairman that the country’s scientists has all answers on radiation, safety and other aspects. “Has the issue of final disposal of radio active waste been solved? Has the possibility of nuclear accidents either due to human or mechanical or natural causes been totally prevented? The answer is no,” he said. Dr Parameswaran asked the AEC chairman to convincingly clarify the reason behind the pressure exerted on India by the Nuclear suppliers Group to sign the non-liability accord. “If the nuclear reactors are so safe, why they are forcing India to sign this treaty?. The manufacturers themselves are notconvinced about the durability and safety of the reactors,” he said. He pointed out that the agitation against the KNPP was therefrom the beginning itself. “It became intensive after Fukushima. The NPCIL should not have gone for hot run at all once the opposition flared up. They thought that the opposition could be steamrolled,” said Dr Parameswaran.
	17	+
	18	+India has been expanding its uranium mining, which displaces indigenous peoples in an act of violent colonization
	19	+Bhadra 11¶ “INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEM” Cairo Review. Monamie Bhadra phd Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes (CSPO). She is currently a junior fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies¶ After the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the central government set its sights on the West Khasi Hills in the state of Meghalaya to open a new uranium mine believed to contain some two hundred and seventy-five thousand tons of uranium. If the project does go through, as many as thirty thousand Khasi adivasi, or tribal people, may be displaced, and 351 hectares of land will be acquired from seventy-two villages. The Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL), a public sector arm of the Department of Atomic Energy, built the first open cast uranium mine in Jadugoda in Jharkhand in 1967. (Jharkhand became India’s first tribal state in 2000, carved from the state of Bihar.) The Khasi opposition to uranium mining must be taken in the context of an ambivalent colonial and post-colonial tribal policy. Colonization was a force of economic, political, and cultural transformation that displaced and dispossessed adivasi communities. After an early history of violent and brutal repression, the British created protective enclaves for tribal groups, which were adopted by the post-colonial government after Independence, and are governed by the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Indian Constitution. The Schedules allow tribal regions to create self-governing, autonomous districts, to give tribes jurisdiction over land use, property inheritance, marriage, and social customs. The Khasis are protected under the Sixth Schedule. The Khasi Students’ Union (KSU), formed in 1978, has a slogan: “We are Khasi by blood, Indian by accident.” The KSU’s opposition to uranium mining stems partly from its history of xenophobic activities. Alleged KSU members killed a bus-load of non-tribals in 1979. The group has sought to ban non-tribals from the local economy unless they joined adivasi business partners. They have opposed the construction of railroads in the fear it would facilitate the influx of outsiders. In opposing uranium mining, the KSU’s primary target is the intrusion of foreign technicians, engineers, and cheap labor.7 A KSU letter written to the state of Meghalaya’s chief minister in 2004 stated: “We will not part with even an inch of our ancestral land to the foreigners who we consider our enemies.”8 A member of the Meghalaya People’s Human Rights Council presents a more measured but no less alarmist view of the threat mining poses to the Khasi: “The illiterate and semi-literate indigenous Khasi will be forced to move out of their homes and landholdings to be supplanted by technologically advanced communities from outside the state. The mining township will become like military cantonment prohibited to all local people. This will upset the demographic structure of the areas, and ultimately of the entire state, thus not only rendering us a minority but also reducing us to the level of unwanted outsiders in our own land.”9 Other Khasi complaints derive from the rhetoric of identity politics. Khasis question why adivasis should be sacrificed for the greater good of India, an entity they see as a colonizing force. Why should the Khasis, activists ask, be forced to forfeit their rights to their land, subject themselves to grave health hazards, and face displacement to make room for uranium mines that will supply fuel for remote nuclear plants and a national nuclear weapons program? Furthermore, uranium mining exposes fault lines within Meghalaya, pitting landowners who want uranium mining for jobs and economic growth, against villagers who refuse to relinquish commonly-owned land, to which they have cultural, economic, and emotional attachments.
	20	+
	21	+To acquire land, Indian government forcibly evicts entire villages, raping women and homes as they do so
	22	+Bhadra 11¶ “INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEM” Cairo Review. Monamie Bhadra phd Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes (CSPO). She is currently a junior fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies¶ The neo-liberal policies that brought wealth to technopolises like Bangalore and Chennai sidestepped West Bengal, leaving it impoverished and economically stagnant. West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya defied the party line and attempted to usher in liberalization and industrialization through strong-arm tactics. In 2006, the state forcibly acquired land—via the colonial Land Acquisitions Act from 1894—in order to establish SEZs. These industrial enclaves bypass bureaucratic red tape and cumbersome legal technicalities, including labor laws, to rapidly create products for export and service markets. Public uproar ensued. Anger boiled over when the West Bengal government sought to acquire the villages of Singur in 2006, and Nandigram in 2007, for a Tata Nano car plant and a chemical factory, respectively. The villages are located near Haripur in an area with a history of bloody violence around land rights during colonial rule. One morning in January 2007, without warning, the government posted public eviction notices in Nandigram. Thousands of villagers swarmed to the state police department in protest. West Bengal police and CPI-M thugs alike fired on a group of around four thousand villagers. Official estimates say that fourteen people were killed, but villagers place the number in the hundreds. Reports said that countless women and girls were raped, and hundreds of village homes were burnt although atrocities were committed on both sides. In the previous year, the state government suspended democratic rights in Singur amid bloodshed that included the rape and murder of an eighteen-year-old activist.
	23	+
	24	+Advantage 2 is Radiation
	25	+Mining towns turn people into radiated bodies – thousands dying from cancer and disease¶ Bhadra 11¶ “INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEM” Cairo Review. Monamie Bhadra phd Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes (CSPO). She is currently a junior fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies¶ The Jharkhand Organization Against Radiation (JOAR) in Jadugoda frames its grievances quite differently. Although almost all of the Jadugoda uranium miners belong to the Santhal and Ho tribes, JOAR does not pitch the struggle in terms of identity politics, but as a shared experience of suffering related to health and occupational hazards. Those working and living in mining towns Jadugoda want to be seen as “radiated bodies” suffering at the hands of the nuclear economy. A villager tells a reporter from Tehelka magazine, “We have seen too many deaths due to cancer and tuberculosis, too many deformed children, too many miscarriages among women. Too much sorrow. Our lives are governed by radiation. There is no escape from it.”10 The origins of uranium mining in Jadugoda are murky. No one seems to know exactly how land in the village, protected under the Fifth Schedule, was transferred from the state to central government. Anecdotal accounts are infused with a sense of betrayal, loss of autonomy, and intrusion. Radiation awareness came gradually, only when people began to notice that “rashes, deformities on fellow beings, cows were born without tails, fish with unknown skin diseases were being discovered, small animals, including mice, monkeys and rabbits were disappearing from the area.”11
	26	+
	27	+Advantage 3 is Meltdowns
	28	+Ending nuclear production avoids all risk of a meltdown and spurs transition to other energies¶ Parameswaran 11¶ India does not need nuclear energy: Top scientist. Interview with Dr. M. P. Parameswaran, former lead scientist of the Indian AEC and India’s first phd in nuclear science. 11-7-11¶ http://www.dianuke.org/india-does-not-need-nuclear-energy-top-scientist/¶ One of the pioneer nuclear scientists in the country says that India can very well suspend its entire nuclear programme. “It is true that we have spent thousands of croresof rupees to set up nuclear power plants. But we will be forced to spend thousand times more than that in the eventuality of a nuclear disaster,” said Dr MP Parameswaran,former scientist of the Atomic Energy Commission. Referring to the agitation by the Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Energy demanding the closure of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, Dr Parameswaran, India’s first PhD in nuclear science, said the country is not that hard-pressed for nuclear power. “Of the 750,000 MW power projected for 2030, fossil fuels will account for 400,000 MW. A ten per cent energy increase in this can offset the shortage produced by the suspension of the nuclear energy programme. We have all the expertise and production capacity to do this,” he said. According to this scientist, nuclear energy will become viable only with the development of a foolproof mechanism for radio active waste disposal and radiation damage. “What they should do is to redesign the reactors at Kudankulam so that they could be operated either with coal or natural gas. Yes, there are costs involved in it. But the real cost of continuing with the nuclear programme is much higher,” he said. Dr Parameswaran, much senior to Dr Sreekumar Banerjee, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, took strong exception to the latter’s comment that a nuclear power plant is not acar factory where you can switch off the system. “That is exactly the problem. You cannot switch off the system and close gates for decades and even centuries after the plant has stopped generating energy. There are several reactors in USA and France which produce no more power but cannot be switched off. These reactors require most of the system like cooling, radiation monitoring security and so on to keep working,” he said. The nuclear science veteran pointed out that the Fukushima disaster was caused not by the working reactor but by the spent fuel tank. He also refuted the claims of the AEC chairman that the country’s scientists has all answers on radiation, safety and other aspects. “Has the issue of final disposal of radio active waste been solved? Has the possibility of nuclear accidents either due to human or mechanical or natural causes been totally prevented? The answer is no,” he said. Dr Parameswaran asked the AEC chairman to convincingly clarify the reason behind the pressure exerted on India by the Nuclear suppliers Group to sign the non-liability accord. “If the nuclear reactors are so safe, why they are forcing India to sign this treaty?. The manufacturers themselves are notconvinced about the durability and safety of the reactors,” he said. He pointed out that the agitation against the KNPP was therefrom the beginning itself. “It became intensive after Fukushima. The NPCIL should not have gone for hot run at all once the opposition flared up. They thought that the opposition could be steamrolled,” said Dr Parameswaran.¶
	29	+
	30	+The newest plants are going to be bigger and more dangerous
	31	+Jain 12 Neeraj Jain, convenor of Lokayat, a social activist group in Pune, Maharashtra, that is part of the all-India National Alliance of Anti-Nuclea¶ Movements (NAAM). Jain, who trained in electrical engineering, is the author of Nuclear Energy: Technology from Hell (Aakar Books, Delhi 2012). India: ‘Nuclear energy is not a national issue – it is a global issue’ ~-~- anti-nuclear movement gains momentum http://links.org.au/node/3049¶ Additionally, there are several new factors that are contributing to the growing intensity of the anti-nuclear movement all over the country. These include the scale of the proposed plants along the Indian coast, which are massive even by international standards, and where the reactors are five to eight times larger than current Indian reactors; the controversial nature of the foreign companies concerned, such as Areva; and the safety record of those companies is questionable. For example, even pro-nuclear countries such as Britain and the United States have expressed serious reservations about the design of Areva's EPR reactor, and have not given it clearance to construct such reactors in their countries. The Russian VVER-1000 reactors being constructed in Koodankulam are no better. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is a cheerleader for the nuclear industry, has expressed concerns that these reactors don't meet Western safety standards (which is not to say that Western standards are very good). Due to the huge size of these reactors, they are far more dangerous; and the consequence of a nuclear accident would be devastating and of unimaginable proportions.
	32	+
	33	+Earthquakes/Tsunamis
	34	+India’s building on earthquake-prone ground¶ DNA 11¶ Should India go ahead with the Jaitapur nuclear power plant after Japan's nuclear reactor meltdown? Saturday, Mar 12, 2011, 19:32 IST¶ In the aftermath of the earthquake of magnitude 8.9 in Japan, the Fukushima nuclear reactor, 250 kilometres north of Tokyo, exploded on March 12, leading to massive radiation leaks. Nearly 45,000 people living within a 10km radius of the plant were evacuated and a nationwide atomic alert was issued. The explosion has raised questions over the safety of the nuclear power plants in general and the proposed Jaitapur nuclear power plant in Maharashtra in particular. The site and its surrounding areas in the Konkan region are said to be earthquake-prone and experienced 91 tremors over 20 years between 1985 and 2005 ranging in intensity from 2.9 to 6.3 on the Richter scale.
	35	+
	36	+And tsunami risks
	37	+Ehtisham 13¶ Is India’s nuclear arsenal safe? By Hasan Ehtisham (MSc in Defence and Strategic studies) ¶ In India, nuclear facilities on coastlines are exposed to natural disasters like the monstrous tsunamis of 2004. Beside the damage to the environment, there are numerous cases where workers were exposed to high radiation doses. There are 350 documented cases of radiation exposure that were reported at Tarapur, which is India’s first nuclear station.
	38	+
	39	+A big meltdown would kill millions
	40	+Wasserman ’02 (Harvey, Senior Editor – Free Press, Earth Island Journal, Spring, www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new_articles.cfm?articleID=457andjournalID=63)
	41	+The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.
	42	+
	43	+Advantage 4 is Nuke War
	44	+India is expanding their nuclear weapons arsenal. Pillalamarri 15
	45	+Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. (Pillalamarri is a graduate at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, is a columnist at the Diplomat and the National Interest.) "India's Nuclear-Weapons Program: 5 Things You Need to Know." The National Interest. N.p., 22 Apr. 2015. Web. 13 Sept. 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indias-nuclear-weapons-program-5-things-you-need-know-12697?page=show. BS
	46	+India is expanding its stock of nuclear weapons, but not as fast as Pakistan is, since India’s has met the minimum needed for deterrent purposes while Pakistan may intend to use its nuclear weapons for offensive or battlefield purposes. India’s industrial base also enables it to build more and different types of nuclear weapons at shorter notice than Pakistan so it does not necessarily need to redirect its energies to building more weapons unless it feels them necessary.¶ India is also less reliant on nuclear weapons for its security as Pakistan and is focused on improving its military capabilities elsewhere, especially naval and Himalayan-based land capabilities. Additionally, India’s largest focus remains economic development and it does not feel existentially threatened.¶ Nonetheless, India is developing its nuclear capabilities and expanding its weapons, enriching uranium in addition to plutonium. India’s nuclear deal with the United States and the granting of a waiver for importing nuclear materials (which must be for non-military purposes) allows it to use more of its indigenously produced nuclear material for weapons. India is has also heavily invested in research on using thorium in reactors (or even potentially weapons), which will free up its other nuclear material for weapons. India hopes to soon operate thorium reactors.
	47	+
	48	+Indo-Pak War
	49	+Expansion of weapons is already causing an arms race between India and Pakistan; it’s likely to escalate. Barno and Bensahel 15¶ Barno, David, and Nora Bensahel. (Barno is a distinguished practitioner in residence at the School of International Service at American University. Bensahel, Ph.D. is a distinguished scholar in residence at the School of International Service at American University They are both nonresident senior fellows at the Brent Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council.)"A Nuclear War between India and Pakistan Is a Very Real Possibility." Quartz. N.p., 04 Nov. 2015. Web. 14 Sept. 2016. http://qz.com/541502/a-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-is-a-very-real-possibility/. BS¶ These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today.¶ Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armoured assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilise half a million troops in less than 72 hours.¶ The problem is, unlike its neighbours India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start and help to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons programme—and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons. Some observers now judge this nuclear programme to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheads—more than the UK plans to have by that time.¶ It is not simply the pace of the build-up that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons—on its own soil if necessary—to counter Cold Start’s plan for sudden Indian armoured thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers and increases the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis.¶ Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons programme also brings a wide array of other destabilising characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signalling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralised control of the weapons—a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armoured offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increase the risk that some will falling into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spin-offs of the current arms race.¶ Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the US and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.¶ The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states—last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.¶
	50	+
	51	+China-India War
	52	+India’s expanding arsenal is influencing more aggressive foreign policy with China which caues border disputes that would escalate. Ahmed 14¶ Ahmed, Ali. (Ahmed, PhD is a freelance analyst) "China and India: Nationalism and Nuclear Risk." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 14 Sept. 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/china-and-india-nationalism-and-nuclear-risk/. BS¶ To be sure, the two states have considerable depth in both territory and forces, thus precluding the ready or early resort to nuclear weapons. However, nationalism is growing stronger in the politics of both states. Chinese nationalism is being fanned by the nationalist turns in Japan, and this year India elected a nationalist government.¶ The impact of nationalism on strategic rationality is to force everything towards the hard option. During crises or conflicts, there are also media-induced nationalist pulls and pressures magnifying this force. Of course, this force is further strengthened by both states being on the cusp of rising to the next echelon in power, with China poised to become a superpower and India a great power. The adverse effect of downward movement by either will be taken as impacting its standing. In India’s case this would include its regional salience in relation to Pakistan. Finally, while nationalism in both states can prove fatal, it is bad enough in just one as that would suffice to ensure a mirroring in the other.¶ The net effect of this is the escalation of the several border incidents in the recent past between the two states, such as the most recent, which coincided with the Chinese premier’s visit to Delhi. Clearly, there is nothing positive to be found here. A nudge is more liable to end up as a push, and a push more liable to transform into a shove. Nationalism and the cultural need to save face at this stage will likely kick in with greater gusto. The side that perceives itself to be on the losing end can be expected to escalate to escape disadvantage.¶ To be sure, escalation can very well occur. Indeed, directions in the military preparedness of both states betray as much. Even though there is only a border dispute between them, an incipient rivalry in the Indian Ocean is being played out. This horizontal escalation is building in scope. Coupled with the nationalist impulse in strategic thinking, vertical escalation is becoming a certainty where otherwise it would have remained a mere possibility.¶ What will vertical escalation look like? Nationalism-inspired strategies will place a premium on territory. With forces available and mobile thanks to increased investment in infrastructure and aerial transport fleets, the rapid concentration of forces can be foreseen. This might potentially set the stage for de-escalation, since neither would be able to claim an easy victory. In fact, precedence does favor this in that China withdrew after its earlier forays into India and Vietnam, and India has restricted its actions against Pakistan in Kargil to that theater itself. However, nationalism, with its effects on strategy, is the wildcard, making it difficult to rule out escalation.¶ Traditional nuclear strategists would claim that India currently lacks strategic deterrence, since its Agni series is not yet complete and the K series has not yet been tested from the nuclear submarine. Even so, India will likely have enough deterrence elements to please such strategists by the end of the decade. In the interim, it is exercising minimal deterrence, the effect of which cannot be discounted, as China values its economic trajectory. However, this can, at best, only ensure deterrence stability at the upper reaches of city busting levels.¶ As Kampani notes in his warning of military pushes in both states towards the operational – instead of political – utility of nuclear weapons, there will also likely be military pushes in both states for operational level leverage with nuclear weapons. Kampani admits to both militaries being capable of nuclear use from demonstration shots to shots across the bow.¶ A nationalist strategy, coupled with a military need to recuperate from a bad bargain, may foreshadows the operational use of nuclear weapons. Use of nuclear weapons will not necessarily bring about a doomsday scenario in that the choice of nuclear first use and its response will be in areas marginal to the territorial and socio-political heartland of both states. Nuclear first use of this kind would likely invoke the strategic benefit in the deterrence logic of the “threat that leaves something to chance.”
	53	+Underview
	54	+
	55	+Solutions to critical issues must be discussed through pragmatic approaches within hegemonic power structures. Kapoor ‘08
	56	+Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 138-139) There are perhaps several other social movement campaigns that could be cited as examples of a ‘hybridizing strategy’.5 But what emerges as important from the Chipko and NBA campaigns is the way in which they treat laws and policies, institutional practices, and ideological apparatuses as deconstructible. That is, they refuse to take dominant authority at face value, and proceed to reveal its contingencies. Sometimes, they expose what the hegemon is trying to disavow or hide (exclusion of affected communities in project design and implementation, faulty information gathering and dissemination). Sometimes, they problematize dominant or naturalized truths (‘development = unlimited economic growth = capitalism’, ‘big is better’, ‘technology can save the environment’). In either case, by contesting, publicizing, and politicizing accepted or hidden truths, they hybridize power, challenging its smugness and triumphalism, revealing its impurities. They show power to be, literally and figuratively, a bastard. While speaking truth to power, a hybridizing strategy also exploits the instabilities of power. In part, this involves showing up and taking advantage of the equivocations of power — conflicting laws, contradictory policies, unfulfilled promises. A lot has to do here with publicly shaming the hegemon, forcing it to remedy injustices and live up to stated commitments in a more accountable and transparent manner. And, in part, this involves nurturing or manipulating the splits and strains within institutions. Such maneuvering can take the form of cultivating allies, forging alliances, or throwing doubt on prevailing orthodoxy. Note, lastly, the way in which a hybridizing strategy works with the dominant discourse. This reflects the negotiative aspect of Bhabha’s performativity. The strategy may outwit the hegemon, but it does so from the interstices of the hegemony. The master may be paralyzed, but his paralysis is induced using his own poison/medicine. It is for this reason that cultivating allies in the adversarial camp is possible: when you speak their language and appeal to their own ethical horizons, you are building a modicum of common ground. It is for this reason also that the master cannot easily dismiss or crush you. Observing his rules and playing his game makes it difficult for him not to take you seriously or grant you a certain legitimacy. The use of non-violent tactics may be crucial in this regard: state repression is easily justified against violent adversaries, but it is vulnerable to public criticism when used against non-violence. Thus, the fact that Chipko and the NBA deployed civil disobedience — pioneered, it must be pointed out, by the ‘father of the nation’ (i.e. Gandhi) — made it difficult for the state to quash them or deflect their claims.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-09-24 02:26:16.323

Judge

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	1	+Erik Berdugo

Opponent

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	1	+Klein Oak AG

ParentRound

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	1	+1

Round

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	1	+6

Team

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	1	+Loyola Wickham Aff

Title

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	1	+India AC

Tournament

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	1	+Greenhill