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1 +Part 1 is Framing
2 +Structural violence excludes people from our decision calculus, causing separatism based on arbitrary differences that is not chosen by the victim. Winter and Leighton 99
3 +Winter, Deborah Winter and Leighton, Dana. |Winter is a Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton is a PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5
4 +Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.
5 +The 1AC critiques the normalcy that is the starting point for other forms of oppression
6 +Shlasko 05 G. D. Shlasko, University of. Massachusetts Amherst, Social Justice Education Program, Hills South, "Queer (v.) pedagogy." Equity and Excellence in Education 38.2 (2005): 123-134.
7 +Finally, Greene (1996) suggests reading “queer the-ory’’ with queer as a verb that acts on theory. Hence the phrase is an imperative to queer one’s theory, to look at it from a different perspective such that its shortcomings, underlying assumptions, and possibilities become visi- ble. Morris’s (1998) concept of a queer aesthetic is useful here. A queer theorist might take a theory that does not explicitly define itself as queer or politically radical, and interrogate it through the lens of queer sensibility, ask- ing, “How might this theory have radical implications?’’ Davis and Sumara’s (2000) queer reading of the complex- ity theory in physics, which I discuss later, is an excellent example. Given permission to view any theory in terms of its queerness, we can again use queer as an adjective to describe theories in which we discover queer character- istics or implications. For example, a theory that centers a usually marginal subject position or that challenges normalcy could be described as queer.¶ Queer theory emerges from a study of and from the viewpoint of people who are outsiders in terms of gender and sexuality—those against whom the word “queer’’ first became a violent epithet. Yet it does not limit itself to theorizing about gender and sexuality. Queer theory problematizes gender and sexual identities, and also the very concept of identity (Britzman, 1998; Green, 1996; Morris, 2000). It critiques the enforced norms of gender and sexuality, and also all claims of normalcy, and the processes by which the borders of the normal are de- fined and policed (Britzman, 1998; Green, 1996; Morris, 2000). By interrogating the implicit assumptions of het- eronormativity, queer theory it “offers a critique of reigning ideologies of subjectivity, power, and meaning’’ (Greene, 1996, p. 326) that can be extended to shed light on many forms of difference, categorization, and inequality.¶ Sullivan’s (2003) chapter, “Queer Race,’’ reviews litera- ture on intersections and conflicts between academic and political discourses centered on race and those centered on sexuality, and presents several examples of how queer theoretical inquiries can help to shed light on manifesta- tions of racism. Sullivan demonstrates that heteronormativity is not premised on homophobia alone, but rather on a vast “coincidence’’ between racism, sexism, and homophobia. An extreme example is the case of laws that prohibit interracial marriage. The overt purpose of such laws was to define and maintain boundaries between racial groups (so as to justify unequal and inhumane treatment of people of color), and to maintain racial “pu- rity’’ for Whites (Sullivan, 2003). By implication, the laws also served to define white womanhood very narrowly in terms of marriage and procreation. White women who were sexually active outside of marriage, and white peo- ple of whatever gender and sexual orientation who did not marry, were defined as practically criminal in their refusal to participate in the racist/sexist/homophobic project of reproducing the normal white family (Sullivan, 2003). Racism, sexism, and homophobia together seek to¶ regulate people’s sexuality in specific ways that make meaning not only for sexuality as such but also for gender and race. Given this entanglement, Sullivan argues that queer theory not only allows for a queer critique of sexism and racism (and I would add class-, ability-, and age-based oppressions as well), but actually requires it.
8 +We should use the academic setting to challenge the heteronormative structures that pervade society – judge as an educator should disrupt heteronormativity.
9 +Elias 3 John Elias, Professor at San Francisco University, Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 45, no. 2/3/4, p. 64, 2003
10 +Akin to organized religion and the biomedical field, the educational system has been a major offender. Wedded to disseminating the idea that heterosexuality is the ultimate and best form of sexuality, “Schools have maintained, by social custom and with reinforcement from the law, the promotion of the heterosexual family as predominant, and therefore the essence of normal. From having been presumed to be ‘normal,’ heterosexual behavior has gained status as the right, good, and ideal lifestyle” (Leck, 1999, p. 259). School culture in general is fraught with heteronormativity. Our society has long viewed queer sexualities as “. . . deviant, sinful, or both, and our schools are populated by adolescent peers and adult educators who share these heterosexual values” (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 55). Simply put, heteronormativity and sexual prejudice pervade the curriculum at the elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels (for examples of this and ways of intervening, see: Adams, Bell, and Griffin, 1997; Letts and Sears, 1999; Lovaas, Baroudi, and Collins, 2002; Yep, 2002). Besides the hegemonic hold schools have had regarding a heterosexual bias, school culture continues to devote much energy to maintaining “. . . the status quo of our dominant social institutions, which are hierarchical, authoritarian, and unequal, competitive, racist, sexist, and homophobic” (Arnstine, 1995, p. 183). While there has been modest success in addressing various forms of prejudice in schools (Kumashiro, 2001), what is sorely lacking is serious attention to how the intersections of race, class, sexuality and gender are interwoven and dialectically create prejudice (e.g., racism, classism, and heterosexism). Schools would be an ideal site to interrogate, and begin to erode, the kind of hegemony upon which heterosexism rests and is supported. To date, not much is being done in a systematic fashion to disrupt the ways in which U.S. schooling has perpetuated such hierarchies. It seems to me that sexuality education is ripe for the opportunity to challenge heterosexism in school culture; however, public school-based sexuality education is presently in serious crisis, as it has turned mostly to the business of pushing for abstinence- only sexuality education. According to federal legislation, states that accept funding for this form of sexuality education require that young people are taught to abstain from sexual activity until they get married. This has numerous implications for relationship construction; a more in-depth description and analysis of this form of sexuality education will follow later in this essay.
11 +Ethical theories that create moral rules without having referents in the current social context fail to analyze asymmetries in treatment. Mills 09:
12 +Charles Mills explains using the example of discrimination against blacks:
13 +Mills, C. W. (2009), Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 47: 161–184 “Now how can…ever did arrive.”
14 +Now how can this ideal ideal—a society not merely without a past history of racism but without races themselves—serve to adjudicate the merits of competing policies aimed at correcting for a long history of white supremacy manifest in Native American expropriation, African slavery, residential and educational segregation, large differentials in income and huge differentials in wealth, nonwhite underrepresentation in high-prestige occupations and overrepresentation in the prison system, contested national narratives and cultural representations, widespread white evasion and bad faith on issues of their racial privilege, and a corresponding hostile white backlash against (what remains of) those mild corrective measures already implemented? Obviously, it cannot. As Thomas Nagel concedes: “Ideal theory enables you to say when a society is unjust, because it falls short of the ideal. But it does not tell you what to do. if, as is almost always the case, you find yourself in an unjust society, and want to correct that injustice” (2003a, 82). Ideal theory represents an unattainable target that would require us to roll back the clock and start over. So in a sense it is an ideal with little or no practical worth. What is required is the nonideal (rectificatory) ideal that starts from the reality of these injustices and then seeks some fair means of correctsing for them, recognizing that in most cases the original prediscrimination situation (even if it can be intelligibly characterized and stipulated) cannot be restored. Trying to rectify systemic black disadvantage through affirmative action is not the equivalent of not discriminating against blacks, especially when there are no blacks to be discriminated against. Far from being indispensable to the elaboration of non- ideal theory, ideal theory would have been revealed to be largely useless for it. But the situation is worse than that. As the example just given illustrates, it is not merely a matter of an ideal with problems of operationalization and relevance, but of an ideal likely to lend itself more readily to retrograde political agendas. If the ideal ideal rather than the rectificatory ideal is to guide us, then a world without races and any kind of distinction- drawing by race may seem to be an attractive. goal. One takes the ideal to be colorblind nondiscrimination, as appropriate for a society beginning from the state of nature, and then—completely ignoresing the nonideal history that has given whites a systemic illicit advantage and so over people of color—conflates together as “discrimination” all attempts to draw racial distinctions for public policy goals, no matter what their motivation, on the grounds that this perpetuates race and invidious differential treatment by race. In the magisterial judgment of Chief Justice John Roberts in the June 2007 Supreme Court decision on the Seattle and Louisville cases where schools were using race as a factor to maintain diversity, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”6 a statement achieving the remarkable feat of depicting not merely as true, but as tautologically true, the equating of Jim Crow segregation and the attempt to remedy Jim Crow segregation! So what is ideally called for under ideal circumstances is not, or at least is not necessarily, what is ideally called for under nonideal circumstances. Claiming that all we need to do is to cease (what is here characterized as) discrimination ignores the differential advantages and privileges that have accumulated in the white population because of the past history of discrimination.
15 +Thus the standard is rejecting heteronormativity
16 +Part 2: The Topic
17 +
18 +Advocacy: The Supreme Court of the United States should hold the United States federal government's domestic strip searches are unconstitutional, thereby limiting qualified immunity for police officers in cases of the Fourth Amendment.
19 +
20 +Qualified Immunity protects police officers who out and kill queer teens Knight 14’ Natalie Knight, 2014, “Keeping Closets in our Classrooms: How the Qualified Immunity Test is failing LGBT Students” Natalie Knight is a Joint J.D and M.P.P candidate at UCLA Law School
21 +Sadly, Wyatt is not the first case of its kind. Three years before the Supreme Court's ruling in Lawrence v. Texas the Third Circuit held in Sterling v. Minersville that a police officer violated an eighteen-year-old’ Constitutional right to privacy by threatening to disclose his sexual orientation to the teen's family. The officer had first questioned the teen and his friend who were parked in a lot at night near a business that had recently been burglarized. Though the officer did not find any indication that the teens were planning a burglary, he continued to question them since they appeared to be drinking. The officer searched the car, found two condoms, and arrested the two teens. At the police station, the officer lectured them about the immorality of homosexuality and threatened to tell the eighteen-year-old's grandfather that the young man was gay. The teen committed suicide shortly after he was released from the police station. Wyatt is factually similar to Nguon, but it is the first case in which a court granted qualified immunity to the defendant. This means that the student-plaintiff could not even proceed to trial to show that her privacy had been violated.20 Qualified immunity protects government employees like teachers and coaches from liability even when they violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.21 A plaintiff can only overcome this protection by proving that the right the government official violated is “clearly established.”22 This initial hurdle deprives LGBT students of their rights by giving them the impossible task of providing a precedent which does not exist. There is no precedent specifically stating that LGBT students have a right to not be outed by school officials. There might also never be such a precedent because qualified immunity can be used to preclude a case from proceeding to trial to establish such a precedent. Thus, qualified immunity puts LGBT students in a catch-22, a paradoxical set of rules that precludes students from constitutional protection. This Comment will demonstrate that the qualified immunity test can be used to deprive LGBT students of their privacy by its paradox of requirements. Part I will discuss the importance of privacy in one’s sexual orientation, especially between an adolescent and her parent(s), and provide background on cases illuminating the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II will provide background on the qualified immunity doctrine as it relates to privacy interests, and discuss the extent to which existing precedents may or may not protect LGBT students. Part III will show that existing precedents do not explicitly protect: 1) privacy of sexual orientation, 2) privacy in the school environment, 3) privacy of minors, and 4) privacy in the parent-child relationship. Part IV will use Wyatt to demonstrate how courts can exploit the qualified immunity doctrine to avoid recognizing LGBT student privacy.23 Part V will discuss possible interventions and also address counterarguments from those who would defend the continued use of qualified immunity in this context. This Comment concludes that while LGBT students’ privacy rights are jeopardized and perhaps non- existent under some judges’ applications of the qualified immunity doctrine, advocates for LGBT student privacy should pursue state legislation and keep a watchful eye out for claims that may serve as test cases in more favorable circuits.
22 +
23 +
24 +Judges fail to protect gay rights in applying QI
Wagner 14 Robin B. Wagner, (J.D. Candidate 2014, DePaul University College of Law.) Are Gay Rights Clearly Established?: The Problems with the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 63 DePaul L. Rev. 869 (2014) Available at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol63/iss3/7 Premier
25 +Therefore, when three cases on facts that easily sufficed for allegations¶ of equal protection violations came before three courts in three¶ different circuits in the same year and resulted in three different outcomes,¶ it is clear that there is a problem with the qualified immunity¶ doctrine. Under the Roberts Court, the qualified immunity doctrine¶ has become more generous to defendants with an increasing requirement¶ for circuit unanimity and an emerging approach to rational-basis¶ review that protects decision makers’ discretion. The problems arising¶ in qualified immunity doctrine are particularly apparent when evaluating¶ constitutional rights related to sexual orientation, because the key Supreme Court cases did not rely wholly on the established methodologies¶ for equal protection and due process analysis.¶ In the hands of judges who unconscientiously apply precedent or¶ wish to avoid hot-button social policy topics, the qualified immunity¶ doctrine can prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights and further¶ weaken the “private attorney general” approach to rights claims.¶ During the civil rights era, the courts played a leading role in recognizing¶ and expanding civil rights for people of color. In this era of gay¶ civil rights, the courts should not be the slower and less reliable vehicle¶ for recognizing implicit rights. If courts were to more regularly¶ apply the prong-one analysis of qualified immunity and faithfully adhere¶ to the actual holdings of Supreme Court precedent, the law related¶ to civil rights violations under § 1983 could provide both parties¶ with the predictability they need and deserve from the law. In Nguon v. Wolf, a teen sued for violations of her First Amendment rights and privacy rights after a principal outed her to her mother.15 The district court held that the student had a reasonable expectation that she would not be outed to her mother, but that the principal had not violated the student’s privacy rights under the First Amendment because the principal had made the disclosure in the context of reasonable disciplinary actions.16 The court also ruled in favor of school officials on the freedom of expression claim.17 It reasoned that the officials disciplined disruptive conduct but allowed non-disruptive conduct that expressed the students’ sexuality, such as holding hands with her girlfriend.18 Thus, the student had not been singled-out for discipline on the basis of her sexuality.19
26 +Policing structures perpetuate and re-enforce heteronormative values that oppress and destroy the queer body Dwyer 08’ Angela Dwyer, Associate Professor in Police Studies and Emergency Management, Senior Researcher at the University of Tasmania, Occupier of Room 534 on the Sandy Bay Campus, “Policing Queer Bodies: Focusing on Queer Embodiment in Policing Research as an ethical question” 2008
27 +In contrast to ‘queering’ heteronormative subjectivity, policing is a social practice constituted around heteronormative ways of doing sexuality and gender. This is unmistakable in research by Herbert who argues that policing processes are rigidly constructed around heterosexual masculinity, with officers ignoring community-oriented modes of policing space as ‘effeminate’: The desire to become a hard charger, to enact the masculinist form of policing, motivates officers to define and approach the spaces of patrol with the aim of ensuring tactical control. The hard charger ideal denigrates such activities as public meetings or idle chatter with neighborhood residents, and discourages officers from reconciling their view of the spaces of patrol with the views of the people who inhabit them. The spatial strategies of community policing are simply too effeminate to win broad support from those officers who seek cultural refuge in images of the triumphant warrior. Many officers therefore use their discretionary authority to ignore the mandates of community policing. 34 Producing proper policing subjectivity involves reifying and embodying discursive ideas about gender and sexuality that are masculine and heterosexual. For example, being a gay or lesbian police officer has been identified in international research as fraught with difficulties, 35 particularly if you are a gay male in the police force. 36 In addition to this, very rigid forms of heterosexual masculinity are reified in police culture, with feminised identities and bodily practices marginalised as counterproductive to and unsuitable for policing work. Prokos and Padavic found a ‘hidden curriculum’ being instructed to police recruits in the United States. The training centre taught recruits that dominant masculinity is necessary to performing their duties as cops… male students learned that it is acceptable to exclude women, that women are naturally very different from men and thus can be treated differently, that denigrating and objectifying women is commonplace and expected, and that they can disregard women in authority. 37 This demonstrates that to be a proper police officer means doing embodiment in thoroughly masculine and heterosexual ways, and marginalising those bodies that fail to align with these norms. Part of reinforcing these forms of ‘macho’ masculinities involves the denigration of bodies that ‘queer’ heteronormative ways of doing masculinity and sexuality. Myers, Forest and Miller notes that ‘people who are seen as outsiders in the heterosexual hypermasculine context of policing (including straight women, lesbians, and gay men)may feel pressure to conceptualize gender in such a way that conforms to the ideal’. 38 The denigration of these ‘outsiders’ is made evident in recent research conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom that has found that police practice homophobic ways of thinking about gay, lesbian, and transgender people. 39 For example, Phillip Lyons et al found that their sample of 152 Texan police officers overwhelmingly endorsed homophobic attitudes. 40 In fact, 32 of officers agreed and strongly agreed with the statement that ‘I think male homosexuals are disgusting’. In a further articlereporting about the same study, Lyons, DeValve and Garner noted that among the 747 police chiefs in Texas, 62 believed that homosexuality is akin to ‘moral turpitude’ and56 identify homosexuality as a form of perversion. 41 Recent qualitative research conducted by Amnesty International also highlights some of these attitudes: ‘I know we are supposed to be tolerant but that’s a bunch of bull, they should all be killed’ (SanAntonio police officer responding to a same sex domestic violence call). 42 Some researchers have even investigated the attitudes of criminal justice undergraduate and law enforcement undergraduate students in the United States and have found that they too are homophobic, 43 more so even than other disciplines within university settings. 44
28 +The AC ‘s instance of ‘queering’ heteronormative discourses opens room for further critique and development Dwyer 08’ Angela Dwyer, Associate Professor in Police Studies and Emergency Management, Senior Researcher at the University of Tasmania, Occupier of Room 534 on the Sandy Bay Campus, “Policing Queer Bodies: Focusing on Queer Embodiment in Policing Research as an ethical question” 2008
29 +This paper argues that overlooking the role of embodiment and ‘queering’ properly gendered, heterosexual embodiment in criminological and social research into policing practices is unethical and unhelpful. Working through Foucault’s idea of an ethics of discomfort, 3 this paper takes up a precarious position by posing the importance of exploring how embodying diverse sexual subjectivities lead to certain types of policing practices. This position is ‘uncomfortable’ because it challenges the idea that policing is impartial and argues that more could be done for queer communities. While existing literature suggests that the police have improved their relationship with marginalized communities, 4 this paper insists that more work needs to be done. It attempts to demonstrate how a highly complex, competing range of issues and ‘categories of difference’ intersect 5 in ways that make this an issue warranting further attention: ‘queering’ heteronormativity, sexuality, gender, visibility, embodiment, victimisation, subcultural spectacle, homelessness. These issues are examined below by firstly addressing what the paper means by ‘queering’ heteronormative expectations about sexuality and gender. It then draws on literature about how policing is itself a practice defined by heteronormative expectations about sexuality and gender. Following this is a discussion of literature demonstrating how ‘reading’ bodies as ‘queering’ heteronormative embodiment is fundamental to hate crime and some forms of policing work, and how this is an issue that requires further examination in relation to young people specifically. The paper concludes with a call for embodied research about policing queer communities that elucidates how the ‘queering’ body matters 6 in policing processes in contemporary Western culture.
30 +
31 +Discussion of legal issues is the only way to give concrete change to the queer body, all other focuses obfuscate solutions and lead to more oppression
32 +Davies 03(Margaret Davies teaches law at Flinders University 2003 "Legal theory and law reform SOME MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL APPROACHES" http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AltLawJl/2003/61.pdf, RLA)
33 +
34 +A third strategy involves a pragmatic extension, in a¶ sense, of the second, and has been endorsed by a number of¶ feminist writers. It is essentially the view that it is not¶ possible simply to reject or accept engagement with law: we¶ cannot have a single position, but must both engage and¶ critique. Although we know that law is not separate from¶ prevailing moral standards and political divisions in society,¶ it is structured around a powerful discourse that naturalises¶ this separation. We cannot pretend that the separation does¶ not exist because it has extremely powerful effects -¶ therefore we should work with it, but continue to critique it.¶ This approach was expressed a number of years ago by Mari¶ Matsuda:¶ There are times to stand outside the courtroom door and say 'this¶ procedure is a farce, the legal system is corrupt, justice will¶ never prevail in this land as long as privilege rules in the¶ courtroom'. There are times to stand inside the courtroom and¶ say 'this is a nation of laws, laws recognising fundamental¶ values of rights, equality, and personhood'.I8¶ The argument is essentially that we can and should be¶ working to achieve change along at least two fronts, one¶ 'internal' to law and accepting (however conditionally) its¶ power to define and redefine; the second from a position of¶ scepticism and critique of law. Taken in a context of¶ acknowledging the limitations of law - that is, that we¶ should not expect mere legal reform to effect significant¶ social change - such an argument provides a practical path¶ for theorists who remain critical of law's role in enhancing¶ and legitimising social division.¶ The radical feminism of Catharine MacKinnon provides¶ one example of a seemingly contradictory, and in all¶ probability highly strategic and localised, approach to¶ characterising law and its ability to intervene in distributions¶ of power. As Mary Heath explains, MacKinnon characterises¶ law as masculine in its totality, yet appears to place faith inlaw as a site for social change: MacKinnon's view of the¶ state as 'always . . . the willing servant of the male power¶ which it institutionalises' is at odds with her involvement in¶ major law reform initiatives, such as the Pornography¶ Ordinance and the Violence Against Women Act.19 Put 'd¶ bluntly, how can MacKinnon argue that the state and its law¶ represents a totalistic institutionalisation of male power over¶ women which holds no promise for fundamental change,¶ while at the same time t¶ urning - to that law as an avenue for¶ improvement in the situation of women? How can law¶ promote feminist change, when it is so universal and total in¶ its expression ofpatriarchy? Thert: are various ways in which¶ this apparent contradiction can be: reconciledZ0 (for instance¶ by reference to the two-pronged strategy of Matsuda). What¶ it does illustrate very powerfully is the tension between¶ theories critical of law's institutionalised power, and the¶ demand for practical legal solutions to social problems.
35 +
36 +Part 3: The World
37 +
38 +Discourse and pedagogy must engage the existing institution – wishing away policy discussion fails because oppression is institutionally entrenched
39 +Jones and Spicer ‘9
40 +(Campbell, Senior Lecturer in the School of Management at U of Leicester, Andre, Associate Professor in the Dept of Industrial Relations @ Warwick Business School U of Warwick, Unmasking the Entrepreneur, pgs. 22-23)
41 +
42 +The third strand in our proposed critical theory of entrepreneurship involves questions of the 'extra-discursive' factors that structure the context in which these discourses appear. The result of privileging language often results in losing sight of political and economic relations, and for this reason, a turn to language and a concomitant disavowal of things extra-discursive have been roundly criticised (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Armstrong, 2001; Reed, 1998,2000,2009). An analysis of discourse cannot alone account for the enduring social structures such as the state or capitalism. Mike Reed has argued that a discursive approach to power relations effectively blinds critical theorists to issues of social structures: Foucauldian discourse analysis is largely restricted to a tactical and localised view of power, as constituted and expressed through situational-specific 'negotiated orders', which seriously underestimates the structural reality of more permanent and hierarchal power relations. It finds it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with institutionalised stabilities and continuities in power relations because it cannot get at the higher levels of social organisation in which micro-level processes and practices are embedded. (Reed, 2000: 526-7) These institutional stabilities may include market relations, the power of the state, relations like colonialism, kinship and patriarchy. These are the 'generative properties' that Reed (1998: 210) understands as 'mak(ing) social practices and forms - such as discursive formations - what they are and equip(ing) them with what they do'. Equally Thompson and Ackroyd also argue that in discourse analysis 'workers are not disciplined by the market, or sanctions actually or potentially invoked by capital, but their own subjectivities' (1995: 627). The inability to examine structures such as capitalism means that some basic forms of power are thus uninvestigated. Focusing solely on entrepreneurship discourse within organisations and the workplace would lead to a situation where pertinent relations that do not enter into discourse are taken to not exist. Such oversights in discursive analyses are that often structural relations such as class and the state have become so reified in social and mental worlds that they disappear. An ironic outcome indeed. Even when this structural context is considered, it is often examined in broad, oversimplified, and underspecified manners. This attention to social structure can be an important part of developing a critical theory of entrepreneurship, as we remember that the existing structural arrangements at any point are not inevitable, but can be subjected to criticism and change. In order to deal with these problems, we need to revive the concept of social structure. Thus we are arguing that 'there exist in the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.) objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations' (Bourdieu, 1990: 122). Objective still means socially constructed, but social constructions that have become solidified as structures external to individual subjects. Examples of these structures may include basic 'organising principals' which are relatively stable and spatially and historically situated such as capitalism, kinship, patriarchy and the state. Some entrepreneurship researchers, particularly those drawing on sociology and political science, have shown the importance of social structure for understanding entrepreneurship (see for example Swedberg, 2000).
43 +
44 +
45 +Ideal theory obfuscates us from focusing on material change for queers in society
46 +Moore 11, visiting scholar in the Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality @ NYU
47 +Darnell-active in the queer of color organizing community in Newark, NJ; paper presented at the Feminism for the Planet: 5th Annual Rutgers Newark, Women’s Studies Symposium in March 2009; “An Interrogation of the Black Presence in the Queer Project;” TRANS-SCRIPTS 1 (2011); accessed online; pp. 160-163. http://www.humanities.uci.edu/collective/hctr/trans-scripts/2011_01_11.pdf
48 +Finally, Johnson has noted that queer theorists tend to ground critiques in the realm of discourse (7). As stated previously, queer studies is influenced by the work of Foucault; therefore it is governed by the imperative to counter the power relations that seek to construct discourses. The discursive realm, then, takes center stage in queer studies/theory for it is within the realm of discourse where power is transmitted, produced, and reinforced (Foucault 101). As such, it seems that this Foucauldian notion drives the queer studies project. Gunther has argued that the goal to defy the “social and historical construction of categories of sexuality and gender” is central to the project of American queers specifically (23). Thus, the ethos of queer studies is one that is characterized by its attention to discourse, theorizing, and intellectualizing, and not to the material, on-the-ground activism that once propelled the queer movement. Historian Allan Berube made a similar charge when he stated that some queer scholarship is “so abstract, text-based, career-oriented, concerned with developing insider jargon that it just doesn’t hold my attention.” As a result, Berube goes on to assert that he feels like an “outsider” because of this seeming disconnect between theory and practice (qtd. In Maynard 58). Johnson also questions the effectiveness of queer theory if, in fact, it is limited to the realm of discourse. He asks: What, for example, are the ethical and material implications of queer theory if its project is to dismantle all notions of identity and agency? The deconstructive turn in queer theory highlights the ways in which ideology functions to oppress and to proscribe ways of knowing, but what is the utility of queer theory on the front lines, in the trenches, on the street, or any place where the racialized and sexualized body is beaten, starved, fired, cursed-indeed, where the body is the site of trauma? (5) John’s query illuminates an aspect of the queer project that is problematic within; namely, its tendency to focus on the dismantling of power through discourse. Simply, what is dismissed is the attentiveness to materiality and the body, as well as, the radical modes of resistance that formally characterized the queer movement in the past. If the present ethos of queer studies/theory is that which is characterized by intellectualizing and theorizing alone as opposed to the propagation of an “in-your-face” praxis, then it will limit the potentiality of liberation for those SGL women and men engaged in “Black Struggle.”
49 +
50 +Solutions to critical issues must be discussed through pragmatic approaches within hegemonic power structures. Kapoor ‘08
51 +Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 138-139)
52 +There are perhaps several other social movement campaigns that could be cited as examples of a ‘hybridizing strategy’.5 But what emerges as important from the Chipko and NBA campaigns is the way in which they treat laws and policies, institutional practices, and ideological apparatuses as deconstructible. That is, they refuse to take dominant authority at face value, and proceed to reveal its contingencies. Sometimes, they expose what the hegemon is trying to disavow or hide (exclusion of affected communities in project design and implementation, faulty information gathering and dissemination). Sometimes, they problematize dominant or naturalized truths (‘development = unlimited economic growth = capitalism’, ‘big is better’, ‘technology can save the environment’). In either case, by contesting, publicizing, and politicizing accepted or hidden truths, they hybridize power, challenging its smugness and triumphalism, revealing its impurities. They show power to be, literally and figuratively, a bastard. While speaking truth to power, a hybridizing strategy also exploits the instabilities of power. In part, this involves showing up and taking advantage of the equivocations of power — conflicting laws, contradictory policies, unfulfilled promises. A lot has to do here with publicly shaming the hegemon, forcing it to remedy injustices and live up to stated commitments in a more accountable and transparent manner. And, in part, this involves nurturing or manipulating the splits and strains within institutions. Such maneuvering can take the form of cultivating allies, forging alliances, or throwing doubt on prevailing orthodoxy. Note, lastly, the way in which a hybridizing strategy works with the dominant discourse. This reflects the negotiative aspect of Bhabha’s performativity. The strategy may outwit the hegemon, but it does so from the interstices of the hegemony. The master may be paralyzed, but his paralysis is induced using his own poison/medicine. It is for this reason that cultivating allies in the adversarial camp is possible: when you speak their language and appeal to their own ethical horizons, you are building a modicum of common ground. It is for this reason also that the master cannot easily dismiss or crush you. Observing his rules and playing his game makes it difficult for him not to take you seriously or grant you a certain legitimacy. The use of non-violent tactics may be crucial in this regard: state repression is easily justified against violent adversaries, but it is vulnerable to public criticism when used against non-violence. Thus, the fact that Chipko and the NBA deployed civil disobedience — pioneered, it must be pointed out, by the ‘father of the nation’ (i.e. Gandhi) — made it difficult for the state to quash them or deflect their claims.
53 +Theory Underview
54 +
55 +And 14th Amendment violations are core of the topic lit, Knight and Wagner prove, discount T violations because they would only be used to try and silence the discourse the 1AC is talking about
56 +
57 +Aff RVIs: 1) Time skew: they can read an NC and theory, but I can’t generate offense on theory until the 1AR theory, which means 6 minutes less to develop. 2) Brute force: they can brute force any issue in the NR with 6 to my 3, which is especially pronounced on theory which is heavy line-by-lining. 3) speech time allocation heavily favors neg on tech issues like theory, since you have longer speech times, aff RVIs balance the skew
58 +
59 +Severance perms good: 1) Real-world. We constantly amend plans when a small change occurs. 2) Reciprocity – checks back against abusive PICs that co-opt 99 of the AC offense, 3) My aff’s whole-res open-source on the wiki, He should be able to prep a good strat – this also nullifies any abuse claims from the NC.
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