Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[9]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[21]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[9]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-16 20:16:04.767
	1	+2016-12-16 20:16:04.0

Caselist.CitesClass[21]

Cites

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	1	+===1-NC===
	2	+
	3	+===="Good" and "bad" can only be understood in relation to something’s essential, constitutive features====
	4	+Geach 56
	5	+Peter T. Geach. "Good and Evil." Analysis, vol. 17. 1956. http://fair-use.org/peter-t-geach/good-and-evil
	6	+
	7	+I can now state my first thesis about good and evil: good and bad are always attributive, not predicative, adjectives. this is fairly clear about bad because bad is something like an alienans adjective; we cannot safely predicate of a bad A what we predicate of an A, any more than we can predicate of a forged banknote or a putative father what we predicate of a banknote or a father. We actually call forged money bad; and we cannot infer e.g. that because food supports life bad food supports life. For good the point is not so clear at first sight, since good is not alienans—whatever holds true of an A as such holds true of a good A. But consider the contrast in such a pair of phrases as red car and good car. I could ascertain that a distant object is a red car because I can see it is red and a keensighted but colour-blind friend can see it is a car; there is no such possibility of ascertaining that a thing is a good car by pooling independent information that it is good and that it is a car. This sort of example shows that good like bad is essentially an attributive adjective. Even when good and bad stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so. (If I say that something is a good or bad thing, either thing is a mere proxy for a more descriptive noun to be supplied from the context; or else I am trying to use good or bad predicatively, and its being grammatically attributive is a mere disguise. The latter attempt is, on my thesis, illegitimate.)
	8	+Thus, the standard is constitutivism.
	9	+
	10	+====Restrictions are constitutive of speech—speech isn’t inherently valuable but relies on an ulterior purpose—when speech comes into conflict with a university’s purposes, restrictions are justified====
	11	+Fish 94
	12	+Stanley Fish. "There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech, And It’s a Good Thing, Too." Oxford University Press. 1994. https://www.english.upenn.edu/~~cavitch/pdf-library/Fish'FreeSpeech.pdf
	13	+
	14	+I want to say that all affirmations of freedom of expression are like Milton’s, dependent for their force on an exception that literally carves out the space in which expression can then emerge. I do not mean that expression (saying something) is a realm whose integrity is sometimes compromised by certain restrictions but that restriction, in the form of an underlying articulation of the world that necessarily (if silently) negates alternatively possible articulations, is constitutive of expression. Without restriction, without an inbuilt sense of what it would be meaningless to say or wrong to say, there could be no assertion and no reason for asserting it. The exception to unregulated expression is not a negative restriction but a positive hollowing out of value—we are for this, which means we are against that—in relation to which meaningful assertion can then occur. It is in reference to that value—constituted as all values are by an act of exclusion—that some forms of speech will be heard as (quite literally) intolerable. Speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the good to which it must yield in the vent of conflict. When the pinch comes (and sooner or later it will always come) and the institution (be it church, state, or university) is confronted by behavior subversive of its core rationale, it will respond by declaring "of course we mean not tolerated ———, that we extirpate," not because an exception to a general freedom has suddenly and contradictorily been announced, but because the freedom has never been general and has always been understood against the background of an ordinary exclusion that gives it meaning.
	15	+
	16	+====Free speech is not an ultimate good—universities and colleges must restrict it in some circumstances to achieve their purposes====
	17	+Fish 94
	18	+Stanley Fish. "There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech, And It’s a Good Thing, Too." Oxford University Press. 1994. https://www.english.upenn.edu/~~cavitch/pdf-library/Fish'FreeSpeech.pdf
	19	+
	20	+But if this is the case, a First Amendment purist might reply, why not drop the charade along with the malleable distinctions that make it possible, and declare up front that total freedom of speech is our primary value and trumps anything else, no matter what? The answer is that freedom of expression would only be a primary value if it didn’t matter what was said, didn’t matter in the sense that no one gave a damn but just liked to hear talk. There are contexts like that, a Hyde Park corner or a call-in talk show where people get to sound off for the sheer fun of it. These, however, are special contexts, artificially bounded spaces designed to assure that talking is not taken seriously. In ordinary contexts, talk is produced with the goal of trying to move the world in one direction rather than another. In these contexts—the contexts of everyday life—you go to the trouble of asserting that X is Y only because you suspect that some people are wrongly asserting that X is Z or that X doesn’t exist. You assert, in short, because you give a damn, not about assertion—as if it were a value in and of itself—but about what your assertion is about. It may seem paradoxical, but free expression could only be a primary value if what you are valuing is the right to make noise; but if you are engaged in some purposive activity in the course of which speech happens to be produced, sooner or later you will come to a point when you decide that some forms of speech do not further but endanger that purpose. Take the case of universities and colleges. Could it be the purpose of such places to encourage free expression? If the answer were "yes," it would be hard to say why there would be any need for classes, or examinations, or departments, or disciplines, or libraries, since freedom of expression requires nothing but a soapbox or an open telephone line. The very fact of the university’s machinery—of the events, rituals, and procedures that fill its calendar—argues for some other, more substantive purpose. In relation to that purpose (which will be realized differently in different kinds of institutions), the flourishing of free expression will in almost all circumstances be an obvious good; but in some circumstances, freedom of expression may pose a threat to that purpose, and at that point it may be necessary to discipline or regulate speech, lest, to paraphrase Milton, the institution sacrifice itself to one of its accidental features.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-16 20:16:06.937

Judge

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	1	+Dean Doneen

Opponent

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	1	+Peninsula JL

ParentRound

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	1	+9

Round

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	1	+2

Team

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	1	+Lexington Weiler Neg

Title

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	1	+JANFEB- NC- Balancing Test

Tournament

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	1	+Blake