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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,98 @@ 1 +1AC 2 +Plan 3 +Public colleges and universities in the United States should adopt policies on freedom of speech modeled on Yale University’s Woodward Report of 1974. 4 + 5 +The plan effectively restores free speech and intellectual freedom on campuses 6 +Kurtz 15 7 +Stanley Kurtz (graduated from Haverford College and holds a Ph.D. in social anthropology from Harvard University. He did his field work in India and taught at Harvard and the University of Chicago). “A Plan to Restore Free Speech on Campus.” National Review. December 7th, 2015. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/428122/plan-restore-free-speech-campus-stanley-kurtz 8 +Many of the proposals listed below can be mandated for public universities by state legislatures. These proposals can also galvanize student activism on campuses across the country, as well as activism by faculty, parents, alumni, administrators, trustees, and citizens. Alumni can press their alma maters to adopt these proposals, on pain of losing donations. Citizens can press their state legislators to adopt these proposals, on pain of losing votes. Here is the program: First: Colleges and universities ought to adopt a policy on freedom of expression modeled on Yale’s Woodward Report of 1974, which identifies ensuring intellectual freedom in the pursuit of knowledge as the primary obligation of a university. While the Woodward Report forthrightly acknowledges the importance of solidarity, harmony, civility, and mutual respect to campus life, it unmistakably marks these values as subordinate in priority to freedom of expression. In accordance with this, the Woodward Report rejects the proposition that members of an academic community are entitled to suppress speech they regard as offensive. Of course, within a university, the need for intellectual freedom is in the service of the pursuit of knowledge. Freedom of expression is a critical consideration, yet does not in itself fully resolve issues like the structure of the college curriculum. That said, the Woodward Report can and should serve as a model for statements on free expression at our colleges and universities. Once adopted, new statements on freedom of expression would supersede and replace any pre-existing speech codes. Second: Colleges and universities need to systematically educate members of their community in the principles of free expression. The central theme of freshman orientation, for example, ought to turn around the primacy of free speech. Many colleges and universities now assign incoming freshman a “common reading” to complete over the summer before entering school. During freshman year, colleges organize seminars and guest-lectures around that reading. The National Association of Scholars has reported on the thin and tendentious nature of many common reading selections, and I have commented on their politicization. As an antidote to such problems, colleges should consider assigning John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty as a common reading for entering freshmen. Responding to threats to intellectual freedom at Princeton, a student group, the Princeton Open Campus Coalition, recently called for bringing more representatives of seldom-heard viewpoints to campus. Inviting outside speakers to address John Stuart Mill’s argument for liberty of thought and discussion during freshman orientation would be an easy way to draw unconventional voices to campus. At every level of the university, efforts should be made to invite both outsiders and insiders to study, discuss, and debate the scope and meaning of free speech. Political philosopher Peter Berkowitz recently floated the idea of establishing university centers for the study and practice of free speech. These centers would “foster an understanding of free speech and its indissoluble connection with liberal education.” The founding of such centers on our campuses should become a priority. Third: “A university administration’s responsibility for assuring free expression imposes further obligations: it must act firmly when a speech is disrupted or when disruption is attempted; it must undertake to identify disruptors, and it must make known its intentions to do so beforehand.” The above passage is from Yale’s Woodward Report. Although the Woodward Report is official university policy at Yale, some of its central recommendations are apparently not being taken seriously. Consider the recent controversy over freedom of speech at Yale, where a student had to be dragged out of a lecture hall by a police officer after disrupting the William F. Buckley, Jr. Program’s conference on free speech (video here). The conduct of this student would appear to be a violation of Yale’s Undergraduate Regulations on “peaceful dissent, protests, and demonstrations” (derived from the Woodward Report), which bar any member of the University community from preventing “the orderly conduct of a University function or activity, such as a lecture, meeting…or other public event,” on pain of potential suspension or expulsion. If Yale’s regulations were being properly enforced, this student would have faced a disciplinary hearing. Ultimately, if the facts turned out to be as they appear from the video and published reports, some sort of discipline would result — at minimum, a warning that any further such actions would bring certain suspension or expulsion. To all appearances, no such discipline has taken place. And appearances are important, because a core recommendation of the Woodward Report is that in order to serve as effective deterrents to further violations, sanctions for disruption of speech must be publicized. (I have submitted a series of questions to Yale’s administration on disciplinary proceedings related to the disruption at the Buckley Program conference on free speech, and will report when I receive a reply.) We take it for granted nowadays that conduct like this student’s disruption of the Yale free-speech conference — and conduct far worse — entails no consequences for students. If we are to restore free speech to our campuses, that needs to change. In the absence of a deeper understanding of the principles of free expression, discipline alone will not be effective. Yet in combination with broader education in the principles of intellectual freedom, discipline for interference with campus speech can be very effective indeed. We will not see freedom of speech on our campuses until disruptors face discipline for silencing, or attempting to silence, others. Fourth: College and university trustees must monitor administrators to ensure that they promote and defend freedom of expression. Thomas D. Klingenstein, chairman of the board of the Claremont Institute, recently suggested that college and university trustees establish a board-level standing committee on free expression (COFE), and provide that committee with staff and considerable independence. A university COFE could act as a check on the reluctance of college administrators to court student displeasure by enforcing rules against disruption of speech. For public universities, state legislatures could receive and act on reports from a system-wide COFE. The public should also take an interest in COFE reports. Fifth: Colleges and universities ought to adopt policies on institutional political neutrality based on the University of Chicago’s Kalven Committee Report of 1967. The Kalven Report explains that the ability of a university to foster political dissent and criticism by faculty and students actually depends upon the political neutrality of the institution itself. The principles of academic freedom and institutional neutrality embodied in the Kalven Report are the surest antidote to demands that universities divest themselves of stock in fossil-fuel providers, Israeli companies, and other political targets. Advocates who attempt to inject universities into the political process by means of their endowments substantially inhibit the intellectual freedom of faculty and students who wish to explore contrary points of view. The National Association of Scholars’ recent reports on campus sustainability and fossil-fuel divestment detail the illiberal implications of these movements. The American Council of Trustees and Alumni includes the text of the Kalven Report and an excellent commentary by civil libertarian attorney Harvey Silverglate in its guide to academic freedom. Trustees should take note. ********* Designing a program to restore free speech to our campuses is not difficult. The steps outlined above — most of them drawn from widely respected reports issued by major universities — would go a long way toward solving the problem. The difficulty is finding the political will and the levers of influence to take these steps 9 + 10 +Campus speech restrictions are increasing now—the plan is key 11 +Friedersdorf 16: Conor Friedersdorf, March 4th, 2016. The Glaring Evidence that Free Speech is Threatened on Campus. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-glaring-evidence-that-free-speech-is-threatened-on-campus/471825/. RW 12 +At a recent Intelligence Squared debate, an audience filled an auditorium at Yale University to weigh the timely proposition, “Free speech is threatened on campus.” The debate concerned higher education generally, not just the host institution. And at the event’s conclusion, having heard arguments on both sides of the question, 66 percent of the crowd agreed: free speech is threatened. That represented a 17-point shift from a poll taken as the event began. The evidence is that persuasive. One of the losers in the debate was Professor Shaun Harper of the University of Pennsylvania, who heads its Center for the Study of Race and Equity in Education. He began by noting that “there has been a significant increase in the demand for our campus climate work” since last semester’s protests. In fact, he added, “this past December, we brought together 8,000 college presidents and other senior leaders who came to us for guidance on how to respond to racism on their campuses With that background, I expected Professor Harper to have a broad sense of how common speech restrictions are at American colleges and universities. And I assumed that he would offer arguments for the position that they do not threaten free speech. I was wrong on both counts. Late in the event, he declared, “I don't want anyone's speech to be suppressed in any setting.” The root of the disagreement was his belief that little speech is restricted. And earlier in his remarks, Harper declared that while colleges may ask students to voluntarily limit their speech in various ways, like not wearing offensive costumes, “I invite our opponents to present us more than a handful of written, institutional policies––where it's been put in writing that you can't say certain things. You can't wear certain costumes. Sure, students would be encouraged to do or not do something. But I, as a higher-education scholar who studied thousands of colleges and universities, have never seen a written institutional policy.” That statement is baffling. The Foundation of Individual Rights in Education keeps track of colleges that have speech restrictions, rating each institution green, yellow, or red. To receive the worst rating, a college must have at least one policy “that both clearly and substantially restricts freedom of speech.” That threshold is met only when a policy “unambiguously infringes on what is or should be protected expression” in a way that is “obvious on the face of the policy and does not depend on how the policy is applied.” Read "Follow-up Notes" END "Follow-up Notes" The University of Pennsylvania, where Harper teaches, earns the best rating from FIRE, green, for having policies that “normally protect free speech.” Institutions with “red light” ratings for policies that unambiguously impinge upon expression include the following: That is only the beginning. I trust that I needn’t run through D, E, an F colleges to hammer home the ubiquity of written rules that limit what one can express. Even if Professor Harper were to defend some of those rules, it beggars belief to think that he could run through colleges beginning with G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, and P and still fall short of his “handful of written, institutional policies” threshold, let alone his claim to have “never seen” one. READ FOLLOW-UP NOTES Tell us: Is your speech policed in your dorm? What’s more, a written policy doesn’t determine if free expression is protected or violated in practice. And one needn’t search long to find widespread examples of free speech being threatened or assaulted outright. To cite just one example, since Harper brought up the matter of costume controversies: UCLA is a public institution that is bound by the First Amendment; as such, it has no written policy banning students from wearing offensive costumes. Nevertheless, administrators at the campus suspended a fraternity for holding a “Kanye Western” theme party, where attendees dressed like the famous rapper and his celebrity wife, Kim Kardashian. Later in the debate, during a back and forth with Wendy Kaminer, who was arguing that free speech is threatened on campus, Harper said: But I fail to understand how any scholar who takes the campus climate and last semester’s protests as a core focus of their research could miss student demands to punish speech. The Wall Street Journal reported on a survey of 800 college students that found 51 percent favored speech codes. Yale protestors formally demanded the removal of two professors from their jobs in residential life because they were upset by an email one of them wrote. Missouri law students passed a speech code that Above the Law called Orwellian. Amherst students called for a speech code so broad that it would’ve sanctioned students for making an “All Lives Matter” poster. At Duke, student activists demanded disciplinary sanctions for students who attend “culturally insensitive” parties, mandatory implicit-bias training for all professors, and loss of the possibility of tenure if a faculty member engages in speech “if the discriminatory attitudes behind the speech,” as determined by an unnamed adjudicator, “could potentially harm the academic achievements of students of color.” At Emory, student activists demanded that student evaluations include a field to report a faculty member’s micro aggressions to help ensure that there are repercussions or sanctions, and that the social network Yik Yak be banished from campus. Activists at Wesleyan trashed their student newspaper then pushed to get it defunded because they disagreed with an op-ed that criticized Black Lives Matter. Dartmouth University students demanded the expulsion of fraternities that throw parties deemed racist and the forced a student newspaper to change its name. Need I go on? Harper’s ally in the debate, the Yale philosophy Professor Jason Stanley, didn’t perform any better. During portions the event, he claimed that folks on the other side, who say free speech is under threat, aren’t really engaged in a debate about free speech––he said the real debate is about racism and anti-racism and about leftism. In this telling, free speech is being invoked as a cover, in service of less-sympathetic agendas. That grossly distorted the positions taken by his opponents at the Intelligence Squared debate. And the broader claim about free-speech defenders—which is lamentably common in public discourse on the subject—can be refuted a dozen different ways. Here’s one: Many college newspapers are struggling with free-speech issues that have nothing to do with race or leftism, as David Wheeler reported. Or consider another narrow area of campus expression that is under threat: the formal speech, delivered to a broad audience. We’ll restrict our “threat survey” to a single year. In 2015 alone, Robin Steinberg was disinvited from Harvard Law School, the rapper Common was disinvited from Kean University, and Suzanne Venker was disinvited from Williams College. Asra Nomani addressed Duke University only after student attempts to cancel her speech were overturned. UC Berkeley Chancellor Nicholas Dirks participated in an event on his own campus that student protestors shut down. Speakers at USC needed police to intervene to continue an event. Angela Davis was subject to a petition that attempted to prevent her from speaking at Texas Tech. The rapper Big Sean faced a student effort to get him disinvited from Princeton. Bob McCulloch faced a student effort to disinvite him from speaking at St. Louis University. William Ayers was subject to an effort to disinvite him from Dickinson School of Law. Harold Koh faced a student effort to oust him as a visiting professor at New York University Law School. That list includes speakers from the right and the left. It involves several controversies that have nothing to do with antiracism. How many examples are needed to persuade Stanley that there is a problem? Because I only stopped listing them to avoid being tedious. Those examples are a mere subset of 2015 efforts to censor speakers based on their viewpoints. There are still more from 2014. Further roundups could be written about 2013, 2012, and beyond. Speech is frequently threatened. Speeches are regularly disrupted. Some are cancelled every year. To perceive no threat is to ignore reality. Or forget big speeches and look to another example of left-leaning speech that is threatened. As Glenn Greenwald wrote at The Intercept, “One of the most dangerous threats to campus free speech has been emerging at the highest levels of the University of California system, the sprawling collection of 10 campuses that includes UCLA and UC Berkeley. The university’s governing Board of Regents, with the support of University President Janet Napolitano and egged on by the state’s legislature, has been attempting to adopt new speech codes that—in the name of combating ‘anti-Semitism’—would formally ban various forms of Israel criticism.” He continued: There are still more examples. Here is a Marquette professor whose tenure was threatened over a blog post. Two years ago, I wrote about the NYPD’s efforts to spy on Muslim students using undercover agents for no reason other than their religion, an effort that spanned months and produced zero leads. Anyone who doubts that this abhorrent profiling chilled the speech of an ethnic-minority group should inform themselves about their understandable reaction to discovering that government spies were in their midst. To sum up: free speech on campus is threatened from a dozen directions. It is threatened by police spies, overzealous administrators, and students who are intolerant of dissent. It is threatened by activists agitating for speech codes and sanctions for professors or classmates who disagree with them. It is threatened by people who push to disinvite speakers because of their viewpoints and those who shut down events to prevent people from speaking. Harper and Stanley were unpersuaded that free speech is under threat not because they defend speech codes or sanctions––both say outright at different times that they are for untrammeled speech––but because they are blind to the number and degree of threats to speech. And this whole discussion has been restricted to documented, overt threats to speech. Chilling effects are harder to quantify or cite, but they are real. Professors and students see those around them being punished for their viewpoints and decide to hold their tongues rather than speak their minds. Stanley denies that this is a significant problem. And yet, last semester, without looking very hard, I found and spoke to tenured and non-tenured professors and students at Yale, his own institution, who told me that their speech was chilled. They feared that their place at the school would be jeopardized if they opined honestly about campus controversies; or did not want to be targets of intolerant activists like the ones who spat on lecture attendees because the activists disagreed with words spoken at the lecture. The evidence that free speech is threatened on college campuses is overwhelming. Doubters who can’t accurately characterize the evidence should study the relevant material more thoroughly before dismissing free-speech concerns and impugning the motives of the people who raise them––especially if, like Harper and Stanley, they earnestly believe that free speech should be protected. I urge them to look again at the evidence and to join other liberals already engaged in this fight. The marginalized college students of the future will thank them. 13 + 14 +Advantage 1- Growth 15 +Restrictions on campus speech undermine the free exchange of ideas—that kills economic growth and competitiveness 16 +Millsap 16 17 +Adam Millsap (research fellow for the State and Local Policy Project with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University). “Free Speech Is Good for the Economy.” U.S. News and World Report. May 23rd, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-23/free-speech-is-good-for-the-economy 18 +Commencement season is now underway, and President Barack Obama recently had the honor of speaking at Howard University. His speech touched on a variety of topics, including the troubling trend of colleges canceling speakers that some students and faculty find offensive. The president is right that people should engage with one another on the battlefield of ideas rather than try to silence those with whom they disagree. As many people have pointed out, this engagement is important for a well-functioning democracy. But what people may not realize is that it's critical for a well-functioning economy as well. New ideas and innovation are necessary for sustaining economic growth, and there's a large body of evidence that emphasizes the exchange of ideas as an important component of an innovative economy. The United States has been especially successful at fostering innovation and growth in the technology sector. Facebook's market capitalization alone is twice the size of all the large European tech giants combined. There's good reason to believe that America's economic prosperity in this rapidly changing sector is due to its commitment to the free exchange of ideas. The theory that ideas and innovation are crucial to economic growth is an old one. Joseph Schumpeter's "creative destruction" is perhaps the best known explanation of the role that innovation plays in the economy. Schumpeter explained that competition requires firms to constantly innovate, since those that don't will quickly be replaced by those that do. Ultimately micro-level creative destruction helps drive macro-level economic growth. But not all countries have to be innovators in order to grow. From the 1950s until the mid-'80s the Solow growth model was the primary tool of economists who studied economic growth. One of its main predictions was that poorer countries would eventually catch up to, or converge with, rich countries. The intuitive reasoning behind the theory of convergence is that poor countries could simply imitate the technological innovation of rich countries and grow accordingly. Instead of spending time and resources reinventing the internal combustion engine, the airplane, antibiotics or the assembly line, all countries like China and India had to do was start using them. But while imitation is a viable method of generating economic growth when a country is lagging behind, it can't go on forever. Once a country reaches the economic frontier – where there are no longer any countries to imitate – only innovation and technological progress can generate additional growth. The United States has been on the frontier for at least a century and our economic growth is primarily powered by our ability to innovate. Innovation itself is often described as an output of a country – e.g. the United States "leads the world in innovation" – but this language obscures where innovation actually takes place. It happens locally; individuals, not countries, innovate. Engineers and scientists working for companies, laboratories and universities and people tinkering in their garage, shed or basement are the real drivers of innovation, and most of this innovation occurs in cities. The large amount of specialized knowledge in cities, along with the rapid dissemination of information, is what fosters innovation. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that a city's success is proportional to the ability of its residents to innovate and generate new ideas. Cities devoid of entrepreneurs who routinely generate new ideas will stagnate and decay. And stagnation at the local level inevitably leads to stagnation at the national level. Researchers routinely point out that the proximity of people in cities is one of the primary reasons most innovation occurs there, but the exact mechanism through which the transfer of knowledge and ideas takes place is often omitted. The assumption seems to be that simply putting a bunch of people together on the same city block will create innovation. But the actual communication part is a crucial input into the production of innovation. As economists Curtis Simon and Clark Nardinelli note in their study of the growth of English cities in the 19th and 20th centuries: "The creativity of the market economy – the increasing returns so important in modern growth theory – in large part arises from what happens when people with information get together and talk. The talk is necessary to turn information into productive knowledge." Since spreading ideas and information requires communication – people talking to one another, attending lectures and presentations, watching videos, etc. – it's likely that limiting speech, either formally or informally, would have pernicious effects on innovation and harm economic growth in the United States. Despite the robust protections of the First Amendment and Americans' long history of exercising their right to free speech, there are signs that a significant portion of society is questioning how far this right should extend. College students around the country are increasingly calling for limits on speech. Several colleges have cancelled speakers due to the vocal opposition of students and faculty, and some college administrations are beginning to favor safety and inclusivity over the free exchange of ideas. Even high schools are getting on board; after students at a Bronx high school recently threatened to walk out on former presidential candidate Ted Cruz, his appearance was cancelled. The combination of these incidents reveals that many of the next generation of teachers, politicians, government administrators and business people are comfortable with suppressing speech they personally don't like. While it's true that speech that offends a large portion of the population, or that criticizes a specific group, is unlikely to be the type of speech that leads to innovation, this criticism in large part misses the point. What matters is not whether restrictions on offensive, hurtful or "hate" speech harm innovation directly, but whether such restrictions significantly reduce the likelihood of engaging in conversation in general. It's hard to predict where a conversation will end up. While civilized people should try to be sensitive to others, the subjectivity of offensive speech makes it difficult to always say the "right" thing. If the penalty for saying the "wrong" thing is large enough, even a small probability of digressing to a sensitive topic can be enough to discourage conversation. Currently the United States is one of the most economically competitive countries in the world as well as the most supportive of free expression. I don't think this is a coincidence: America's unique commitment to free speech and the open exchange of ideas has given entrepreneurs in the United States a competitive advantage. Efforts to clamp down on speech at the local level for the sake of safety and inclusivity may seem largely benign at first. But over time a climate that is hostile to certain forms of speech can have a chilling effect on all speech. As an economic leader, we rely on the free exchange of ideas and information for the serendipitous discoveries that increase our standard of living, and because of this, the long-term costs of stifling speech are larger than commonly recognized. 19 + 20 +Economic decline risks a breakdown of international institutions—that causes war 21 +Kreitner 11 22 +Ricky Kreitner (intern at Business Insider). “Serious People Are Starting To Realize That We May Be Looking At World War III.” Business Insider. August 8th, 2011. http://www.businessinsider.com/serious-people-are-starting-to-realize-that-we-may-be-looking-at-world-war-iii-2011-8 23 + 24 +Noting liberal despair over the government's inability to combat economic depression, and conservative skepticism that traditional tools will be effective, John Judis of The New Republic argues that a global depression far longer and more severe than anyone expected now seems nearly impossible to avoid. Judis believes that the coming "depression" will be accompanied by geopolitical upheaval and institutional collapse. "As the experience of the 1930s testified, a prolonged global downturn can have profound political and geopolitical repercussions. In the U.S. and Europe, the downturn has already inspired unsavory, right-wing populist movements. It could also bring about trade wars and intense competition over natural resources, and the eventual breakdown of important institutions like European Union and the World Trade Organization. Even a shooting war is possible." Daniel Knowles of the Telegraph has noticed a similar trend. In a post titled, "This Really Is Beginning To Look Like 1931," Knowles argues that we could be witnessing the transition from recession to global depression that last occurred two years after the 1929 market collapse, and eight years before Germany invaded Poland, triggering the Second World War: "The difference today is that so far, the chain reaction of a default has been avoided by bailouts. Countries are not closing down their borders or arming their soldiers – they can agree on some solution, if not a good solution. But the fundamental problem – the spiral downwards caused by confidence crises and ever rising interest rates – is exactly the same now as it was in 1931. And as Italy and Spain come under attack, we are reaching the limit of how much that sticking plaster can heal. Tensions between European countries unseen in decades are emerging." Knowles wrote that post three days ago. Since then it has become abundantly obvious that Europe will soon become unwilling or unable to continue bailing out every country with a debt problem. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy continues to chug along, to the extent it is chugging at all, on the false security offered by a collective distaste for one ratings agency and its poor mathematics. 25 + 26 +That goes nuclear and causes extinction 27 +Kemp 10 28 +Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, “The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East”, p. 233-4 29 + 30 +The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population. 31 + 32 +Advantage 2- NSA 33 +Campus censorship spills over and perpetuates serious invasions of freedom—that includes NSA surveillance 34 +Silverglate 13 35 +Harvey Silverglate (I practice law ~-~- criminal defense, civil liberties, and academic freedom/student rights cases. I'm a four-decade columnist and contributor to the Boston Phoenix, an alternative weekly, as well as an occasional contributor to The National Law Journal, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, and elsewhere). “Campus Censorship Breeds Societal Dysfunction.” Forbes. January 16th, 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2013/01/16/campus-censorship-breeds-societal-dysfunction/#51f21f847d1c 36 + 37 +Lukianoff posits that the pervasive trend of campus censorship has had a wider effect on our society as a whole. He persuasively argues that, in short, we are entering an era of our own creation where the anti-liberty culture in Harvard Yard (part of the university) is dictating a similarly unfree culture in Harvard Square (part of the City of Cambridge). After all, we educate the next generation of leaders on these campuses. From this perspective, contemporary campuses can be seen essentially as incubators for a future society governed by censorship of iconoclastic ideas and kangaroo courts that enforce those prohibitions. As Lukianoff’s title suggests, “campus censorship” produces, as students are sent out into the real world, an “end of American debate” that disrupts the gears and self-correcting mechanisms so essential for the functioning of our free society. This set off a little light bulb in my head. As regular readers of “Injustice Department” know, I wrote a book of my own in 2009 titled Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent, in which I describe how the U.S. Department of Justice prosecutes an alarming number of innocent people, using statutes so vague they are essentially incomprehensible. In Three Felonies, as in “Injustice Department,” I describe the “what” but do not much attempt to explain the “why.” Unlearning Liberty gave me surprising insight into how it could be that such a large number of graduates of some of the nation’s leading colleges and law schools wind up as U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors doing so many awful things to so many often innocent people. I likewise gained insight into how some of the sharper legal minds now sitting on the federal bench do not blanch when innocent citizens are convicted of violating statutes and regulations that no normal person could possibly understand. Students, who get accustomed to the administrative tyranny that marks the vast majority of colleges, universities and graduate schools today, don’t have much adjusting to do when they gain, and abuse, real power of their own in the nation at large, including in its legislative chambers, executive offices, and courts. An understanding of campus speech codes elucidates why undefined federal “mail fraud” statutes (the use of the mails to facilitate the commission of fraudulent activity, which is often undefined itself) do not strike either legislators or judges as unconstitutionally vague (that is, they do not give adequately clear warning as to what conduct is criminal). Legislators and judges have, after all, been to college. And those who have more recently graduated are more likely than their predecessors to buy into the notion that real and legitimate violations are stated in such codes. “Harassment” on campus is the equivalent of “mail fraud” out in the real world. And Unlearning Liberty helps explain the insufficient concern out in the real world at the increasingly invasive investigatory practices carried out on American citizens by such agencies as the FBI and the CIA. For instance, we have seen few, if any, credible primary challenges of senators and congressmen (on both sides of the aisle) who vote every year to reauthorize the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), despite its provisions authorizing the indefinite detention of American citizens. Nor have there been any repercussions whatsoever stemming from the National Security Administration’s warrantless wiretapping program that began under the Bush administration—an extension of which was signed into law by President Obama last month. The law, as one friend of mine puts it, has become “silly putty,” and few have noticed the implications for both education and freedom. Lukianoff makes the point persuasively and in great detail that our institutions of higher learning are destroying our students’ sense of critical thinking and devotion to liberty—a phenomenon that translates into dysfunction in our society at large. 38 +NSA surveillance undermines Internet security and global trust in the Internet 39 +Zetter 14 40 +Kim Zetter (award-winning, senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security). “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance.” Wired. July 29th, 2014. https://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/ 41 + 42 +Deterioration of Cybersecurity Out of all the revelations to come to light in the past year, the most shocking may well be the NSA’s persistent campaign to undermine encryption, install backdoors in hardware and software and amass a stockpile of zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. “For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies,” according to a 2010 memo from Government Communications Headquarters, the NSA’s counterpart in the UK, leaked by Edward Snowden. Furthermore, a story from Pro Publica noted, the NSA “actively engages the US and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products’ designs” to make them more amenable to the NSA’s data collection programs and more susceptible to exploitation by the spy agency. The NSA, with help from the CIA and FBI, also has intercepted network routers from US manufacturers like Cisco to install spy tools before they’re shipped to overseas buyers, further undermining customer trust in US companies. Cisco senior vice president Mark Chandler wrote in a company blog post that his and other companies ought to be able to count on the government not interfering “with the lawful delivery of our products in the form in which we have manufactured them. To do otherwise, and to violate legitimate privacy rights of individuals and institutions around the world, undermines confidence in our industry.” All of these activities are at direct odds with the Obama administration’s stated goal of securing the internet and critical infrastructure and undermine global trust in the internet and the safety of communications. The actions are particularly troubling because the insertion of backdoors and vulnerabilities in systems doesn’t just undermine them for exploitation by the NSA but makes them more susceptible for exploitation by other governments as well as by criminal hackers. “The existence of these programs, in addition to undermining confidence in the internet industry, creates real security concerns,” the authors of the report note. 43 +Destruction of the Internet causes extinction 44 +Eagleman 10 45 +David Eagleman (neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate)). “Six ways the internet will save civilization.” Wired. Nov. 9, 2010. http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no 46 + 47 +Many great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: natural disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The internet will predict natural disasters We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning ~-~- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation ~-~- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation. Historically, a more successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free speech ~-~- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality ~-~- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some governments to build firewalls, it’s clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance. Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. The net opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge ~-~- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us well when we confront existential threats we’ve never imagined before. Energy expenditure is reduced Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons ~-~- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet ~-~- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation. The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us. 48 +NSA surveillance also kills US leadership on Internet freedom 49 +Zetter 14 50 +Kim Zetter (award-winning, senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security). “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance.” Wired. July 29th, 2014. https://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/ 51 + 52 +Undermining U.S. Support for Internet Freedom Finally, the NSA’s spying activities have greatly undermined the government’s policies in support of internet freedom around the world and its work in advocating for freedom of expression and combating censorship and oppression. “As the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good,” then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a 2010 speech launching a campaign in support of internet freedom. But while “the US government promotes free expression abroad and aims to prevent repressive governments from monitoring and censoring their citizens,” the New American report notes, it is “simultaneously supporting domestic laws that authorize surveillance and bulk data collection.” The widespread collection of data, which has a chilling effect on freedom of expression, is precisely the kind of activity for which the U.S. condemns other countries. This hypocrisy has opened a door for repressive regimes to question the US role in internet governance bodies and has allowed them to argue in favor of their own governments having greater control over the internet. At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the report notes, a representative from Pakistan—speaking on behalf of Cuba, Iran, China and other countries—said the surveillance programs highlighted the need for their nations to have a greater role in governing the internet. 53 + 54 +US promotion of Internet freedom is key to human rights 55 +Posner 11 56 +Michael Posner (assistant secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor). “Internet Freedom and Human Rights: The Obama Administration’s Perspective.” U.S. Department of State. July 13th, 2011. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/168475.htm 57 + 58 +But this is not just about technology. Secretary Clinton has put Internet freedom on the map as a key diplomatic priority, in our bilateral relationships and in multilateral institutions, including the UN Human Rights Council, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which just held a ministerial on these issues a few weeks ago, and others. Many of you here today have urged us to not view Internet freedom in isolation, but to wrestle with the challenge of integrating Internet freedom with national security, combating cyber crime, protecting intellectual property, and other vital interests. This is what we’ve done in President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, which incorporates all of these legitimate interests. This is the hard part – it’s where Americans disagree not only with repressive governments but amongst ourselves. But we all agree on the importance of getting it right. By now, every government understands the power of ordinary citizens to harness the Internet and social media to organize and express themselves. Some have embraced these new technologies as a way to connect with and serve their citizens. Others are redoubling their attempts to control them. We are seeing the development of more sophisticated tools for cyber-repression, including filtering, surveillance, anti-circumvention, and network-disabling technologies by government security forces in closed societies. We’re also witnessing the rise of cyber attacks on the computers of independent media, Distributed Denial of Service attacks on the sites of watchdog groups, and other attempts to thwart the work of civil society. Before I joined this administration, I spent 30 years working on human rights issues from the low-tech NGO side. So today I want to refocus attention not on the technologies to fight Internet repression, but on the psychology of the repressors. What causes a regime to perceive the Internet as such a profound threat that it is willing to damage its country’s economy by choking bandwidth, blocking content or even shutting down the network entirely? These are the acts of governments that fear their own people. In cracking down on the Internet, they expose their own lack of legitimacy. But these crackdowns also indicate a basic lack of understanding that free speech – whether it’s supportive speech or subversive speech – is harder than ever to suppress in the Digital Age. And the young people who have taken to the streets across the Arab world this year understand that it isn’t pornography or pirating that is being suppressed. It’s people. It’s their demands for dignity and a say in the political and economic future of their countries. After all, Facebook does not foment dissent; people do. Twitter only amplifies those voices that have the most resonance, those ideas that people find most powerful. As President Obama said in a speech in Cairo in June 2009 ~-~- 19 months before the protests in Tahrir Square ~-~- “Suppressing ideas never succeeds in making them go away.” Two billion people now have access to the Internet. That’s a lot of speech to try to suppress. In the next 20 years, nearly 5 billion more people will come online. Will they be joining a true global conversation over a single, unified global network? Or will they be entering a stilted alternative reality of government-approved content on controlled national intranets? This is the vision of the “halal” Internet being advocated by some in Iran, a course that would only deepen the country’s isolation and the Iranian authorities’ estrangement from their own citizens. So let’s be honest: Governments that respect the rights of their citizens have no reason to fear a free Internet. The Internet didn’t topple the governments of Tunisia or Egypt; their people did. But smart governments are using social media tools to better communicate with and understand their own people ~-~- and to deliver services in a more open and accountable fashion. And they are recognizing that free access to tech tools spurs both social and economic progress. If you really want to address popular discontent, you don’t need an army of censors deleting posts on social media sites. You need a cadre of government officials reading those posts and figuring out how to identify and address the legitimate grievances that are being expressed there. So don’t shoot the instant messenger! Instead, address the underlying grievances ~-~- the corruption, the abuse of power, the environmental degradation, the lack of political and economic opportunity, the daily affronts to dignity by indifferent authorities. More than anything else, it is this quest for dignity that has prompted so many young people to walk away from their keyboards and into the streets to demand a chance to build a better future. And it is their vision of the future that matters. This administration is working to support them. Our work on Internet freedom is not about messaging; it’s about empowerment. It is up to all the people of each country to build societies in which governments respect not some rights part of the time, but all of the rights of the governed, every day. The role of the international community is to offer support ~-~- technological and institutional. Your generation – the digital natives ~-~- has developed new tools with unprecedented potential to empower people around the world to participate in a truly democratic process. The world is eager to see what you will invent next. But we’re equally eager for your help in forging international consensus and setting the expectations needed to support Internet freedom. It will be up to your generation to make this vision a reality for the 5 billion users – by setting the rules of the road on the Internet for the 21st century. The human challenge of Internet freedom is to use technological tools to build a different kind of relationship between citizens, civil society and their governments ~-~- a relationship based not merely upon the consent of the governed, but upon broad participation in governance by all citizens. With your help, we will continue to put U.S. diplomatic power behind that vision of a more inclusive, peaceful and democratic world. 59 +Promoting human rights norms solves war and nuclear proliferation 60 +Burke-White 4 61 +William W. Burke-White (Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge). “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation.” The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis. 2004. 62 + 63 +This Article presents a strategic~-~-as opposed to ideological or normative~-~-argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period *250 indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues. 64 +Prolif causes extinction 65 +Kroenig 15 66 +Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council, “THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM: DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE?” http://www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch3_Kroenig.pdf 67 + 68 +WHY NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS A PROBLEM The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national security, including nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human extinction, and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. 71 To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus year tradition of nuclear nonuse as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting in the late-1990s and the Great Recession of late-2000s.53 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure second-strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike 72 to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel “use ‘em or loose ‘em” pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.54 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israel-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews and who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. 73 One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As discussed previously, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest, and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: How can you credibly threaten to attack a nuclear-armed opponent? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated earlier, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.55 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, given NATO’s conventional inferiority. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. Finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed earlier, leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”56 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. Scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.57 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. 69 + 70 + 71 +Framework 72 +The standard is maximizing Expected Wellbeing. 73 +First, revisionary intuitionism is most reliable 74 +Yudkowsky 8 75 +Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the_intuitions_behind_utilitarianism/ 76 + 77 +I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless. And this appears to be a general syndrome - people do much better when discussing whether torture is good or bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level wherever I possibly can. Occasionally people object to any discussion of morality on the grounds that morality doesn't exist, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that "exist" is not the right term to use here, I generally say, "But what do you do anyway?" and take the discussion back down to the object level. Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. I see the project of morality as a project of renormalizing intuition. We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. Delete all the intuitions, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, you're left with a rock. Keep all your specific intuitions and refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, you're left with a grunting caveperson running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. Even modus ponens is an "intuition" in this sense - it's just that modus ponens still seems like a good idea after being formalized, reflected on, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". 78 +That means util—non-utilitarian intuitions are scope insensitive, making them cognitively biased 79 +Yudkowsky 8 80 +Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the_intuitions_behind_utilitarianism/ 81 +However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50 probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, if you try to violate "utilitarianism", you run into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and other things that aren't symptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity - people will pay only 28 more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, you could look at this intuition, and think it was revealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? Or you could look at that and say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't successfully multiply by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. But it ought to, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. When you've read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don't see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to show that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001 probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you've reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply." Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And that's why I'm a utilitarian - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone. 82 +Outweighs— 83 +A. The inescapability of our intuitions means being utilitarians is our most fundamental practical identity 84 + 85 +B. Deontology fails; it can’t weigh conflicts of duty. Only util solves by valuing the objective end of all rational beings. 86 +Cummiskey 90 87 +David Cummiskey (professor of philosophy at Bates College, Ph.D., M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., Washington College). “Kantian Consequentialism.” 1990. http://www.bates.edu/Prebuilt/kantian.pdf 88 + 89 +Now, according to Kant, the formula of the end-in-itself generates both negative and positive duties (GMM, p. 430; MEJ, p. 221; DV, pp. 448-51). In the negative sense we treat persons as ends when we do not interfere with their pursuit of their (legitimate) ends. In the positive sense we treat persons as ends when we endeavor to help them realize their (legitimate) ends. Kant describes the positive interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a duty to make others’ ends my own. Since, it one wills an end, one wills the necessary means (GMM, p. 417), it follows that the positive interpretation requires that we do those acts which are necessary to further the permissible ends of others. Since Kant also maintains that “to be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational but finite being” (CPR, p. 25; GMM, p. 415), we have a positive duty to promote the happiness of others. Thus, in addition to any constraints on action which Kant’s principle might generate, it also provides a rationale for a moral goal that we are obligated to pursue (GMM, pp. 398, 423, 430; DV, pp. 384-387). Since Kant’s principle generates both positive and negative duties, and since there are many situations which involve, at least, prima facie conflicts of these duties, we need a rationale for giving priority to one duty rather than the other. Of course, according to Kant, there cannot be unresolvable conflicts of duty. The concept of duty involves the objective practical necessity of an action and since two conflicting actions cannot both be necessary, a conflict of duties is conceptually impossible. Kant, however, does not grant that “grounds of obligation” can conflict, even if obligations cannot. He is thus left with the priority problem at this level. Kant argues that in cases of conflict “the stronger ground of obligation prevails” (MEJ, p. 224). Although such a response is intuitively plausible, without an account of how one ground of obligation can be stronger than another, it does not provide any practical guidance. In addition to the conceptual impossibility of conflicting duties, Kant’s confidence that there are no unresolvable conflicts of duty is rooted in his larger moral and metaphysical system; specifically, his conception of the Kingdom of Ends, his teleology of nature, and his division of reality into sensible and intelligible realms. According to Kant, the ends of fully rational beings will not conflict but will form a harmonious Kingdom of Ends. It is part of the very idea of lawful ends and rational beings that they coexist in a state of harmony, because as fully rational beings they would all will the same thing. Of course, as finite, imperfect, rational beings (beings guided by both reason and natural inclination) we need some guide to the proper ends of rational beings. Kant often maintains that the teleological ends of natural law are our guide in identifying the proper and legitimate ends of a rational being. As imperfectly rational beings, existing in the sensible rather than the intelligible realm, we can act in accordance with the teleological laws of nature to assure that our ends are rational and thus worthy of being realized. As Bruce Aune explains, “If by treating an imperfectly rational being in a certain way, we promote a kingdom of nature, we can infer, by analogy, that we are acting in accordance with the requirements of the pure moral law, which directly applies to an inaccessible domain of purely rational, intelligible beings.” Essentially, Kant argues that a kingdom of nature represents a Kingdom of Ends and natural law represents a universal practical law. Natural law is, according to Kant, our analogue for universal practical law. Most neo-Kantians do not defend these parts of Kant’s theory. If we reject (as I assume we do) the view of nature as a system of teleological laws which prescribes the natural and lawful ends to rational beings, then we must rely on the concept of rational nature as an end-in-itself to determine the shared ends of all rational beings. The telos of rational action must replace the telos of nature. Thus, to discover which ground of obligation is stronger, and thereby resolve prima facie conflicts of duty, we must appeal directly to the objective end of rational action. 90 + 91 +Any risk of moral uncertainty means we default to preventing extinction 92 +Bostrom 13 93 +Nick Bostrom (Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford). “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, Vol. 4, Issue 1. 2013. http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html 94 +These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this we must prevent any existential catastrophe. 95 + 96 +Additionally: 97 +Analytic 98 +Analytic - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,27 @@ 1 +Empirics prove hate speech laws can’t be enforced and get targeted against minorities 2 +Ash 16 3 +Timothy Garton Ash (Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford; Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; prize-winning author of many books of political writing). Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World. Yale University Press. 2016. 4 + 5 +Moreover, so much depends on the context. Harmless hate speech in Reykjavik is dangerous speech in Rwanda. In the argument that follows, I shall confine myself to mature democracies, having the rule of law, diverse media and a developed civil society. Here there is a compelling case that the advantages of hate speech laws, as they have actually worked over the last half century, are outweighed by the disadvantages, including their unintended consequences. There is scant evidence that mature democracies with extensive hate speech laws manifest any less racism, sexism or other kinds of prejudice than those with few or no such laws. Take France, which has a relatively high level of hate speech prosecutions. There were about 100 convictions per year in the five-year period from 1997 to 2001, and an annual average of 208 in 2005 to 2007. French courts have convicted Brigitte Bardot five times for incitement to racial hatred, on account of her fulminating attacks on Muslims in France, starting with the way they slaughter animals. The distinguished intellectual Edgar Morin was found guilty for a fierce attack on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and a member of parliament, Christian Vanneste, for expressing ‘homophobic views’, although both convictions were overturned on appeal. Yet France has endemic discrimination in its labour market against people of migrant origin and especially Muslims, racist monkey chants in its football stadiums and a xenophobic party, the Front National, which gains the support of a large number of French voters. Similarly, the British writer Kenan Malik has pointed out, recalling his own personal experience of racist attacks, that the decade after Britain passed legislation against incitement to racial hatred in 1965 was probably the country’s worst for racism. Plainly we can’t argue that the persistence of prejudice is a result of the laws, and some will say that, on the contrary, it shows how necessary they are. Indeed, the apparent ineffectiveness of Britain’s 1965 law was one reason it was strengthened in 1976, so that you did not even have to intend to stir up racial hatred; your words or actions just had to be ‘likely to’ stir it up. A causal connection cannot be proven either way. What is clear is that there is no correlation between the presence of extensive hate speech laws on the statute books and lower levels of abusively expressed prejudice about human difference. If, as Errera argues, the main purpose of such laws is to enforce civility, they have not succeeded. Interestingly, even two of the most outspoken American critics of racist hate speech, from the perspective of what they call ‘critical race theory’, Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, found the efficacy of such laws to be ‘an open question’. The application of good laws is clear, predictable and proportionate. That of hate speech laws has been unpredictable and often disproportionate. In Canada, the uncertainty has been even greater because findings on hate speech have in part been delegated to Human Rights Commissions in each individual province. As a result, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found in 2009 that section 13 of the Human Rights Act, which mandated controls over hate speech on the internet, violated the free speech clause of the country’s own Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 13 was repealed in 2013. What is more, laws intended to afford protection to ‘vulnerable minorities’ have often ended up being used against members of those minorities. There is a reason for this. Members of a secure majority, where it still exists, are less likely to express themselves in extreme terms. They don’t feel the need to scream to make themselves heard. The internet has brought an explosion of offensive, extreme expression, exacerbated by the online norm of anonymity. Reacting instantly, behind the mask of a pseudonym, people jerk out things online that they would never say when using their real name in a face-to-face encounter or public meeting. If we believe in openness and robust civility, we must address this challenge, and I shall say more about how this can be done by civil society, online communities and private powers. However, this new reality weakens rather than strengthens the case for hate speech laws. Given this explosion, the law struggles to identify and prosecute even those cases of online abuse which plainly do constitute incitement to violence against particular people, harassment and the online equivalent of ‘fighting words’. It does not catch many of them. If, beyond that, the state attempts to prosecute more general forms of rude and offensive speech, it will be bound to catch only a tiny fraction of what is out there. As the Hungarian scholar Peter Molnar notes, trying to stop extreme speech on the internet is ‘like jumping on a shadow’. The result will be even more legal uncertainty. Again and again, people will ask: ‘why me but not him—and him, and her, and him?’ The very principle of equality—specifically a claim for equal treatment by the state—which is one of the justifications for such laws will be undermined by their arbitrary application. 6 +Hate speech codes distract us from efforts to combat structural racism—there’s a direct tradeoff 7 +Wise 5 8 +Tim Wise (American anti-racism activist and writer. Since 1995, he has given speeches at over 600 college campuses across the U.S.). “Hate Speech Codes Will Not End Racism and Hate Crimes.” Lip Magazine. December 23rd, 2005. http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/ViewpointsDetailsWindow?zid=da108d69995a5a10a4718835fd943d2fandaction=2andcatId=anddocumentId=GALE7CEJ3010196217anduserGroupName=new11178andjsid=c0d42c9e3c09d9de7267a76c0f47bb22 9 + 10 +Hate Speech Codes Are a Distraction In other words, by focusing on the overt and obvious forms of racism, hate speech codes distract us from the structural and institutional changes necessary to truly address racism and white supremacy as larger social phenomena. And while we could, in theory, both limit racist speech and respond to institutional racism, doing the former almost by definition takes so much energy (if for no other reason than the time it takes to defend the effort from Constitutional challenges), that getting around to the latter never seems to follow in practice. Not to mention, by passing hate speech codes, the dialogue about racism inevitably (as at Bellarmine) gets transformed into a discussion about free speech and censorship, thereby fundamentally altering the focus of our attentions, and making it all the less likely that our emphasis will be shifted back to the harder and more thoroughgoing work of addressing structural racial inequity. Perhaps most importantly, even to the extent we seek to focus on the overt manifestations of racism, putting our emphasis on ways to limit speech implies that there aren't other ways to respond to overt bias that might be more effective and more creative, and engage members of the institution in a more thoroughgoing and important discussion about individual responsibilities to challenge bigotry. 11 +Prohibitions on hate speech fail 12 +Baker 8 13 +C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008. 14 + 15 +Even more problematic, to be an effective place to intervene, adopted prohibitions must be efficacious in reducing the likelihood of serious racist evils. Most obviously, this result probably requires sufficient enforcement of the prohibitions against the relevant targets. Maybe, however, their mere adoption could help create a cultural climate where racist speech, and even more importantly, virulent racist practices, are unacceptable. The question of whether to expect effective enforcement is made more difficult because it is not clear at what stage enforcement would be meaningful in preventing the polity from devolving in an unacceptably racist direction or whether enforcement could be effective at reversing cultural directions. Active enforcement (against appropriate targets) is likely only if racist groups have not become too established. By the time Nazis were gaining power, or during the year immediately preceding the genocide in Rwanda, effective enforcement was unlikely. At the relevant time, enforcement would likely either be blocked, create a backlash against the enforcers and sympathy for the ‘suppressed’ racists, or as will be discussed below, enforced primarily against ‘unpatriotic’ or ‘racist’ speech of those most needing protection – Jews or Tutsis, for example, or against African-Americans in the United States or Algerians in France. Thus, the hope of those favoring hate speech prohibitions must be that enforcement will be meaningful and effective at a quite early stage. Pessimism about this speculative hope seems justified. First are generic doubts about the likelihood of effective legal enforcement. More important, however, is the likelihood that at this most relevant stage the speech that meaningfully contributes to developing or sustaining racism will be subtle, quotidian and, to many people, seemingly inoffensive or at least not ‘seriously’ offensive speech. This speech is likely to fly under the legal radar screen and, in any event, meaningful enforcement of prohibitions against this speech is even less likely. Thus, even given a belief that racist speech contributes significantly to virulent racism and genocidal practice, my hypothesis is that at earlier stages legal prohibitions will not cover or be effectively enforced against the most relevant speech and at later stages enforcement will not occur, will be counter-productive in creating martyrs for a racist cause, or will focus on the wrong targets. 16 + 17 +Hate speech codes cause racist backlash—that weakens social protections against racism which are more effective 18 +Baker 8 19 +C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008. 20 + 21 +As an empirical hypothesis, I suggest that more active (and thus more effective) opposition to racist views is likely to come from social practices of not tolerating racist expression than from laws making it illegal. People in positions of power or authority do and should lose their influence, and often even their position of authority, for public or exposed private racist expression. Society should be and apparently is prepared to maintain strong social norms rejecting racist viewpoints. I fear, however, that such social practices would be weakened by, and even replaced by laws prohibiting racist expression. Legal prosecutions focus on the wrong issues – legal requirements, legal line drawing, propriety of prosecution of this rather than other cases. In any minimally decent society that legally permits hate speech, such expression of hate reflexively creates, for those who object to racism, a platform to explain and justify their objections. This expressive activity may provide the greatest safeguard against racist cultures and polities. In contrast, repression creates a platform for racists to claim victim-hood and to appeal to the many who value liberty to oppose the suppression of their freedom, shearing off the energy of a significant group from the chorus that condemns the racist views. 22 + 23 +Laws against hate speech cause racist views to go underground—that makes resistance less effective 24 +Baker 8 25 +C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008. 26 + 27 +Second is a closely related point. By causing racism to (largely) go underground, speech prohibitions are likely to obscure the extent of the problem and the location or the human or social carriers of the problem, thereby reducing both the perceived necessity and the likely effectiveness of opposition to racism. My experience has been that among those people who are likely targets of hate speech but who still favor free speech, the reason most often given for favoring speech is the advantage of ‘knowing the enemy.’ Knowledge of the existence, views, and, importantly, the identity of those with racist attitudes increases the capacity of those potentially subject to racist harms to protect themselves and to make meaningful rhetorical, strategic, political and legal responses. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,38 @@ 1 +1AC Zizek 2 +Colleges and universities have significantly repressed constitutionally protected speech—as political correctness defines the milieu of campuses, limits on speech have all but disappeared with the rise of Trump 3 +Burleigh 16: Nina Burleigh (Newsweek's National Politics Correspondent. She is an award-winning journalist and the author of five books. Her last book, The Fatal Gift of Beauty: The Trials of Amanda Knox, was a New York Times bestseller. In the last several years, she has covered a wide array of subjects, from American politics to the Arab Spring). “The Battle Against ‘Hate Speech’ on College Campuses Gives Rise to a Generation that Hates Speech.” Newsweek. May 26th, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/college-campus-free-speech-thought-police-463536.html 4 +More than half of America’s colleges and universities now have restrictive speech codes. And, according to a censorship watchdog group, 217 American colleges and universities—including some of the most prestigious—have speech codes that “unambiguously impinge upon free speech.” Judges have interpreted the First Amendment broadly, giving Americans some of the most expansive rights of speech in the world. But over the past two decades, and especially the past few years, American college administrators and many students have sought to confine speech to special zones and agitated for restrictions on language in classrooms as well. To protect undergrads from the discomfort of having to hear disagreeable ideas and opinions, administrators and students—and the U.S. Department of Education—have been reframing speech as “verbal conduct” that potentially violates the civil rights of minorities and women. American college campuses are starting to resemble George Orwell’s Oceania with its Thought Police, or East Germany under the Stasi. College newspapers have been muzzled and trashed, and students are disciplined or suspended for “hate speech,” while exponentially more are being shamed and silenced on social media by their peers. Professors quake at the possibility of accidentally offending any student and are rethinking syllabi and restricting class discussions to only the most anodyne topics. A Brandeis professor endured a secret administrative investigatiuman 5 +on for racial harassment after using the word wetback in classs while explaining its use as a pejorative. As college campuses have become bastions of rigorously enforced political correctness, the limits on speech have come crashing down in the real world, with the presumptive Republican nominee for president dishing out macroaggressions on a daily basis. Donald Trump’s comments about the alleged criminality of Hispanics and Muslims, and about how fat or ugly his female enemies are, need no restating here, but many of his words would aflmost certainly be prohibited speech on most college campuses. 6 +Trump is an example of how public vulgarity has returned to the political, disintegrating the ethical substance of public life—at the same time, restrictions which mandate politically correct speech contribute to the same destruction by normalizing state violence 7 +Zizek 16 8 +Slavoj Zizek (cultural critic). “The Return of Public Vulgarity.” Newsweek. February 12th, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/return-public-vulgarity-425691 9 +We should be under no illusions about the meaning of statements like those of Netanyahu: They are a clear sign of the regression of our public sphere. Accusations and ideas that were till now confined to the obscure underworld of racist obscenity are now gaining a foothold in official discourse. The problem here is what Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel called Sittlichkeit: mores, the thick background of (unwritten) rules of social life, the thick and impenetrable ethical substance that tells us what we can and cannot do. These rules are disintegrating today: What was a couple of decades ago simply unsayable in a public debate can now be pronounced with impunity. It may appear that this disintegration is counteracted by the growth of political correctness, which prescribes exactly what cannot be said; however, a closer look immediately makes it clear how the "politically correct" regulation participates in the same process of the disintegration of the ethical substance. To prove this point, it suffices to recall the deadlock of political correctness: The need for PC rules arises when unwritten mores are no longer able to regulate effectively everyday interactions—instead of spontaneous customs followed in a nonreflexive way, we get explicit rules, such as when “torture” becomes an “enhanced interrogation technique.” The crucial point is that torture—brutal violence practiced by the state—was made publicly acceptable at the very moment when public language was rendered politically correct in order to protect victims from symbolic violence. These two phenomena are two sides of the same coin. We can discern a similar phenomenon in other domains of public life. When it was announced that, from July till September 2015, “Jade Helm 15”—a large U.S. military exercise—would take place in the Southwest, the news immediately gave rise to a suspicion that the exercises were part of a federal plot to place Texas under martial law in a direct violation of the Constitution. We find all the usual suspects participating in this conspiracy paranoia, up to Chuck Norris; the craziest among them is the website All News Pipeline, which linked these exercises to the closure of several Wal-Mart megastores in Texas: “Will these massive stores soon be used as 'food distribution centers' and to house the headquarters of invading troops from China, here to disarm Americans one by one as promised by Michelle Obama to the Chinese prior to Obama leaving the White House?” What makes the affair ominous is the ambiguous reaction of the leading Texas Republicans: Governor Greg Abbott ordered the State Guard to monitor the exercise, while Ted Cruz demanded details from the Pentagon. Trump is the purest expression of this tendency toward debasement of our public life. What does he do in order to “steal the show” at public debates and in interviews? He offers a mixture of “politically incorrect” vulgarities: racist stabs (against Mexican immigrants), suspicions on Obama’s birthplace and university diploma, bad-taste attacks on women and offenses to war heroes like John McCain. Such tasteless quips are meant to indicate that Trump doesn’t care about false manners and “says openly what he (and many ordinary people) think.” In short, he makes it clear that, in spite of his billions, he is an ordinary vulgar guy like all of us common people. However, these vulgarities should not deceive us: Whatever Trump is, he is not a dangerous outsider. If anything, his program is even relatively moderate (he acknowledges many Democratic achievements, and his stance toward gay marriage is ambiguous). The function of his “refreshing” provocations and vulgar outbursts is precisely to mask the ordinariness of his program. His true secret is that if, by a miracle, he wins, nothing will change—in contrast to Bernie Sanders, the leftist Democrat whose key advantage over the academic politically correct liberal left is that he understands and respects the problems and fears of ordinary workers and farmers. The really interesting electoral duel would have been the one between Trump as the Republican candidate and Sanders as the Democratic candidate. But why talk about politeness and public manners today when we are facing what appears to be much more pressing “real” problems? Because manners do matter—in tense situations, they are a matter of life and death, a thin line that separates barbarism from civilization. There is one surprising fact about the latest outbursts of public vulgarities that deserves to be noted. Back in the 1960s, occasional vulgarities were associated with the political left: Student revolutionaries often used common language to emphasize their contrast to official politics with its polished jargon. Today, vulgar language is an almost exclusive prerogative of the radical right, so that the left finds itself in a surprising position as the defender of decency and public manners. That’s why the moderate “rational” Republican right is in a panic: After the decline of the fortunes of Jeb Bush, it is desperately looking for a new face, toying even with the idea of mobilizing Bloomberg. But the true problem resides in the weakness of the moderate “rational” position itself. The fact that the majority cannot be convinced by the “rational” capitalist discourse and is much more prone to endorse a populist anti-elitist stance is not to be discounted as a case of lower-class primitivism: Populists correctly detect the irrationality of this rational approach; their rage directed at faceless institutions that regulate their lives in a nontransparent way is fully justified. 10 +This seeming paradox at the heart of speech restrictions proves the undecidability at the heart of our symbolic order—political correctness guarantees that offensiveness will appear in a worse form that is masked by benevolence~-~-we must understand the power relations at the heart of language 11 +Zizek 99 12 +Slavoj Zizek. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. Pgs. 332-333, 1999. Google Books. 13 +In all these domains, the différend seems to be irreducible—that is to say, sooner or later we find ourselves in a grey zone whose mist cannot be dispelled by the application of some single universal rule. Here we encounter a kind of counterpoint to the ‘uncertainty principle’ of quantum physics; there is, for example, a structural difficulty in determining whether some comment was actually a case of sexual harassment or one of racist hate speech. Confronted with such a dubious statement, a ‘politically correct’ radical a priori tends to believe the complaining victim (if the victim experienced it as harassment, then harassment is was…), while a diehard orthodox liberal tends to believe the accused (if he sincerely did not mean it as harassment, then he should be acquitted…). The point, of course, is that this undecidability is structural and unavoidable, since it is the big Other (the symbolic network in which victim and offender are both embedded) which ultimately ‘decides’ on meaning, and the order of the big Other is, by definition, open; nobody can dominate and regulate its effects. That is the problem with replacing aggressive with ‘politically correct’ expressions: when one replaces ‘short-sighted’ with ‘visually challenged’, one can never be sure that this replacement itself will not generate new effects of patronizing and/or ironic offensiveness, all the more humiliating inasmuch as it is masked as benevolence. The mistake of this ‘politically correct’ strategy is that it underestimates the resistance of the language we actually speak to the conscious regulation of its effects, especially effects that involve power relations. So to resolve the deadlock, one convenes a committee to formulate, in an ultimately arbitrary way, the precise rules of conduct….It is the same with medicine and biogenetics (at what point does an acceptable and even desirable genetic experiment or intervention turn into unacceptable manipulation?), in the application of universal human rights (at what point does the protection of the victim’s rights turn into an imposition of Western values?), in sexual mores (what is the proper, non-patriarchal procedure of seduction?), not to mention the obvious case of cyberspace (what is the status of sexual harassment in a virtual community? How does one distinguish here between ‘mere words’ and ‘deeds’?) The work of these committees is caught in a symptomal vicious cycle: on the one hand, they try to legitimate their decisions by reference to the most advanced scientific knowledge (which, in the case of abortion, tells us that a foetus does not yet possess self-awareness and experience pain; which, in the case of a mortally ill person, defines the threshold beyond which euthanasia is the only meaningful solution); on the other hand, they have to evoke some non-scientific ethical criterion in order to direct and posit a limitation to inherent scientific drive. 14 +The culture of political correctness and the biopolitics of the university are two sides of the same coin—individual subjects are reduced to bare life, and attempts at transgression have failed because of our narcissistic subjectivities 15 +Huang 11: Han-yu Huang (Department of English, National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan). “Risk, Fear and Immunity: Reinventing the Political in the Age of Biopolitics.” Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies 37.1 March 2011: 43-71 16 +From his very early work onwards, Žižek has been preoccupied with how the bureaucratic machine or technocratic system directly dominates over the subject’s essence of life; it is a concern that is exemplified by his reading of Kafka, and of Nazi and Stalinist regimes and, more recently, by his analysis of cyberspace and The Matrix trilogy.5 From the late 1990s onwards, his critique of contemporary postpolitics, a task that brings him closer to Rancière and Badiou than he would admit, targets a variety of objects that include multiculturalist identity politics, the culture of political correctness and risk society on the common ground of their disavowal of fundamental social antagonism and lumps them together into the theme of the totally administered society in the interest of global capitalism. More recently still, his take on Levinasian ethics and critical dialogue with Judith Butler as well as his sophisticated conceptualization of the Neighbor-Thing, as is most thoroughly exemplified in “Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence,” are concerned above all with the Other beyond symbolic and imaginary identification and, more fundamentally, the passive, undead, and inhuman kernel that constitutes humanity, or humanity of zero degree; such an orientation places him on a par with biopolitical theorists proper like Foucault, Agamben, Hardt and Negri. Put in a simplified but accurate way, Žižek characterizes the contemporary postpolitical era in terms of its refusal of higher Causes than life purely immanent to itself. Two ideologico-political constellations, as the two sides of the same coin, perfectly fit in this milieu: that of the biopolitical administration that reduces humans to bare life and that of “the multiculturalist respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity that experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential ‘harassments’” (“From Politics to Biopolitics” 509, also see The Parallax View 297). For Žižek, contemporary biopolitics depends on the narcissistic personality that is bent on self-realization or happiness qua supreme commodity; it is subjects that make themselves objects of biopolitical administration of life: hence, from Žižek’s perspective, the expansion of Foucauldian “care of the self” to almost every aspect of everyday life. This also explains away the proliferation of ethics and dominance of experts of life. These experts, in Žižekian terms, enunciate the University discourse from the position of neutral knowledge or, in Lacan’s own terms, “the fantasy of a totality-knowledge” (Seminar XVII 33), while the discourse in question aims to calculate and totalize surplus jouissance (Seminar XVII 177) and “addresses the remainder of the real . . . turning it into the subject ($)” (Žižek, “From Politics to Biopolitics” 505-06). For both Lacan and Žižek, all these biopolitical techniques involve the new capitalist master that has replaced the classical master and has dominated, in the context of this paper, the biopolitical field in the place of knowledge. 6 The upper level of the University discourse (notated as S2→a) condenses Foucauldian and Agambenian biopolitics, where expert knowledge dominates and reduces individuals to bare life; the lower level (S1—$) represents the impossibility of the subject to assume its symbolic mandate, namely, the subject’s life in the state of excess. Such excess or surplus, as is further reinforced by the Hysterical discourse which legitimates permanent self-questioning of desire, has been well integrated into today’s capitalist system as the driving force of its social production. Transgressions turn out to be immanent to today’s capitalist-bureaucratic biopolitics. And their outcome amounts to nothing but “the postmetaphysical survivalist stance of the Last Man” (“From Politics to Biopolitics” 506), which ends up, again, disavowing the fundamental social antagonism. 17 +Political correctness prevents us from truly overcoming inequalities—we choose to soften our language in place of challenging structures—only a method of shared obscene solidarity places ourselves and the Other on equal footing 18 +Merelli 15 19 +Annalisa Merelli (holds a master's degree in semiotics and a bachelor's degree in mass communication from the University of Bologna). “Slavoj Žižek thinks political correctness is exactly what perpetuates prejudice and racism.” Quartz. May 8th, 2015. http://qz.com/398723/slavoj-zizek-thinks-political-correctness-is-exactly-what-perpetuates-prejudice-and-racism/ 20 + “I’m well aware that we should not just walk around and humiliate each other,” says the philosopher. And yet he finds that “there is something so fake about political correctness”—something that, according to him, prevents a true overcoming of prejudice and racism. Žižek explains: That’s my problem with political correctness. It’s just a form of self discipline which doesn’t really allow you too overcome racism. It’s just oppressed, controlled racism. Žižek’s words might be blunt, but his point is valid. Political correctness stems from the understanding that racism and inequality exist, and that in lieu of fixing those problems, prettier language will do the trick—as if by using inoffensive words and avoiding crass jokes we are to paint over the filth of reality. Politically correct expressions, to Žižek, become patronizing because they actually highlight inequalities. As the philosopher notes, “one needs to be very precise not to fight racism in a way which ultimately reproduces, if not racism itself, at least the conditions of racism.” The subtext of every carefully chosen, politically correct, expression is that there are still people in a position so privileged that they need to refer to “others” in a way that is not offensive—that doesn’t, for instance, make reference to their origin, or skin color. The implication is that there is nothing possibly offensive in the speaker’s skin tone or their origin. Jokes and blunt words can’t scratch their confidence—no, it’s only the rest of the population who needs the protection of politically correct language. Beyond the offensive jokes, avoiding politically correct language is also about calling things by their name. Just like a family friend’s three-year-old nephew who, back from his first day of kindergarten, excitedly told his parents: “I have a new friend! He’s all brown!” And it is not just race, of course, that Žižek talks about. Gender, disability–anything that diverges from norms presented in society or media–are all coated with neutral words and behaviors, by the very people who claim to be accepting of it. This special language, despite its intentions, serves to reinforce certain conditions as special, fragile, and weak. Can we dare to see differences for what they are—nothing else than differences? And can we ever safely name them, perhaps even with the occasional offensive joke? Perhaps adopting a little of Žižek’s attitude would indeed result in what he refers to as a “wonderful sense of shared obscene solidarity.” It might generate misunderstanding, but if a more light-hearted approach is adopted in a genuine way, that would reflect a profound belief that the other isn’t weaker, doesn’t need anyone’s protection, and is at our level—hence can openly be made fun of, just as we do of ourselves. 21 +Only embracing the obscenities of language can foster intellectual freedom—language must be a conduit for venting our aggressiveness—however censorship forces us to repress our desires, making physical violence inevitable 22 +Schwartz 86 23 +Joel Schwartz (University of Toronto). “Freud and Freedom of Speech.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1227-1248. JSTOR. 24 +These statements suggest that Freud defends intellectual freedom for reasons similar to some of those motivating earlier figures such as John Stuart Mill. Freud, like Mill, appears to advocate freedom of speech and thought in order to facilitate the intellectual progress of the individual and the human race-in order to foster personal growth or development toward "the psychological ideal, the primacy of intelligence." Nevertheless, one senses a significant difference in tone between Freud and Mill: underlying Freud's praise of honest speech is an apparent hostility or aggressiveness directed against conven- tional "society," the "fainthearted" home of shamefacedlyy" hypocritical or dishonest speech. Freud evidently prides himself on his honesty, which leads him both to express his anger at society and consequently to anger society. For Freud, intellectual freedom in some way appears to connote not only the search for truth but also the willingness to give vent to one's own aggressiveness and to brave the aggressiveness of others. I believe this is significant, for we will see that aggres- sion, both as manifested by Freud and as understood by him, is central to what is original and psychoanalytic in the Freud- ian defense of freedom of speech and emo- tion (which differs in important ways from the traditional and intellectual "Millian" defense of freedom of speech and thought). In order to understand Freud's specifically psychoanalytic grounds for defending freedom of speech, it is useful to begin with two statements in which he and his one-time collaborator Breuer ex- plain the reason for the importance of speech in psychoanalytic therapy. In the first, they write that "language serves as a substitute Surrogat for action; by its help, an affect can be 'abreacted' i.e., a disturbing emotion can be discharged almost as effectively as it can by an action" (Freud and Breuer, 1893a, p. 8). Developing this point in the second state- ment, Breuer adds that "telling things is a relief" (Freud and Breuer, 1895d, chap. 3, sec. 3, p. 211). However, these statements are primar- ily of interest not because of what they tell us about the function of speech within psychoanalytic therapy but because Freud's view of the social function of ordi- nary speech in some ways resembles his view of the function of the speech directed by a patient to his or her analyst. In society, as in therapy, Freud believes that "language serves as a substitute for action"-that "telling things is a relief." These beliefs lead Freud to construct his psychoanalytic argument suggesting both the advantages and, secondarily, the lim- itations of freedom of speech. Freud has been described as "the great liberator . . . of speech" (Marcus, 1975, p. 294); by assessing Freud's psychoanalytic argu- ment in comparison with more traditional arguments, my intention is to elucidate this description of Freud and to evaluate its adequacy. I do so hoping to increase not only our understanding of Freud but also our understanding of hte more tradi- tional liberal defense of freedom of speech. Cursing and Censorship Freud himself suggests the analogy that I have proposed between the function of speech in therapeutic situations specifi- cally and in social situations generally:3 The most adequate reaction by which height- ened emotion can be lessened is always a deed. But, as an English writer has wittily remarked, the man who first flung a word of abuse at an enemy instead of a spear was the founder of civilization. Thus the word is the substitute Ersatz for the deed, and in some circumstances (e.g., in Confession) the only substitute. Accord- ingly, alongside the adequate reaction there is one that is less adequate. (Freud, 1893h, p. 36; I have made the translation more literal.) What is crucially important about this statement is Freud's assumption that the first word (or at least the first relevant word in the civilizing process) was a word "of abuse." In saying this, Freud here im- plies something he states explicitly elsewhere: that social relations are inherently conflictual.4 One crucial function of speech is, therefore, to provide an outlet for our aggressiveness that is safer, both for us and for others, than physical violence. In an important sense (for which Freud elsewhere provides a theoretical justification) conflict is prior to and more fundamental than cooperation.5 Because this is already implicit in Freud's state- ment about the "word of abuse," one can say that Freud's understanding of lan- guage in some measure resembles Caliban's in Shakespeare's Tempest, for Caliban remarks to Prospero, "You taught me language, and my profit on't / Is, I know how to curse" (act 1, scene 2, lines 363-64). Language makes it possible for us to curse and profits us by enabling us to work out our hostility to others in a reasonably harmless manner. However, it is to some extent unfortunate, in Freud's view, that we are often unwilling to employ the linguistic vehicle for the exor- cism of our aggression because we are unwilling to admit our aggressiveness (and more generally, our egoism) to ourselves. Thus, the aggressiveness displayed by Freud vis-a-vis society and those whom he derisively calls "the masses stems in part from his impa- tience at their failure to acknowledge and to act out their aggressiveness.6 Insofar as we are reluctant to acknowledge our aggressiveness, Freud contends that we curtail the freedom of our own speech excessively and harm ourselves by repressing our aggressiveness instead of expressing it in our speech. Free speech should profit us Calibans by enabling us to curse. It does not always do so, however; we suppress our desire to curse because to a great extent-too great-we are Calibans with a bad conscience. Our bad conscience is apparent in a phenomenon whose very name suggests its relevance to the question of freedom of speech-the phenomenon Freud calls censorship. Freud employs the concept of censorship most prominently in his discussions of dreaming: censorship ac- counts for the fact that dreams must be interpreted for the fact that a dream is less "the fulfilment of a wish" than it is "a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish" (Freud, 1900a, ch. 2, p. 121, and chap. 4, p. 160, respectively). To explain why dreams are censored would take me well beyond the scope of my argument; for my purposes here, it is sufficient to note what is censored in dreams. Dream censorship is directed against things that are invariably of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the ethical, aesthetic and social point of view-matters of which one does not venture to think at all or thinks only with dis- gust. These wishes, which are censored and given a distorted expression in dreams, are first and foremost manifestations of an unbridled and ruthless egoism. (Freud, 1916-17, lecture 9, p. 142) 25 + 26 +Thus, I affirm that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. 27 + 28 +Violence is not always given rational articulation—that makes it impossible to comprehend simply through moral philosophy—only psychoanalysis enables us to understand the symbolic violence at the heart of political correctness 29 +Valentic 16 30 +Tonci Valentic (University of Zagreb). “Symbolic Violence and Global Capitalism.” International Journal of Zizek Studies, vol. 2, no. 2. 2016. http://www.zizekstudies.org/index.php/IJZS/article/viewFile/108/108 31 +The major task of philosophical analysis of violence in contemporary world should be developing a theory of political violence. Obviously, there are numerous theories on the respective issue, but very few of them reflect properly today's global socio-political constellation. For example, authors like Weber or Arendt provided noteworthy insight, but they cannot fully cope with issues we are dealing today in the beginning of 21st century. The main problem with violence is that it doesn't have always a deep-lying cause based on rational articulation, which means it is impossible to understand it only using arguments of classical political theory or moral philosophy: one had to incorporate psychoanalysis and semiotic or symbolic interpretation as well. Wherein should we search for relationship between violence and politics in today's world? Since violence is a complex phenomenon, several things have to be taken into account: first of all, it is always primarily a "structural" problem, an "objective" feature of today's capitalist societies. Second, as I mentioned before, structural (or objective) violence is placed in the very heart of capitalism itself (this is the idea that Slavoj Žižek advocates - relying on the idea which came from Balibar and is even earlier extracted out of Marxism). Third, violence does not necessarily refer to activity or any deeds: passivity can also be violent. The major point here is, as Žižek would put it, that violence presented in media (such as suicidal bombings, humanitarian crisis, terrorist attack, and so on) actually blinds us to the objective violence in the world where we become "perpetrators and not just innocent victims". As Žižek would argue, we consistently overlook the objective or "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms, i.e. democratic state's monopoly on legitimate violence. He asserts that "subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of the non-violent zero-level, as a perturbation of the “normal” peaceful state of things; however, objective violence is precisely the violence sustaining this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as visible violence – in order to perceive it, one has to perform a kind of parallax shift". The horror of violent acts and empathy for the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking, for example when we are forced to act urgently, or when confronted with "humanitarian politics" of human rights that serves as the ideology of military interventionism for specific economic-political purposes, which utterly prevents any radical socio-political transformation (i.e. charity becomes the humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation). Having that in mind, there are four possible theoretical tasks one should undertake in order to clearly articulate a theory of political violence: 1) to point out that "structural" violence is in the heart of global capitalism, 2) to deconstruct media's coverage of crime, terrorism as well as humanitarian crisis, 3) to unravel true motives of terrorists, 4) to expose racism and racial violence as fear which is deeply rooted in the liberal and tolerant multicultural societies obsessed with political correctness. Therefore, as Žižek has pointed out, subjective violence we see (the one with a clear identifiable agent) is only the tip of an iceberg made up of "systemic" violence. 32 +The role of the ballot and judge is to investigate violence through psychoanalytic phenomenology—this is uniquely key to understanding political correctness and fostering meaningful dialogue 33 +Schwartz 16 34 +Howard Schwartz. Political Correctness and the Destruction of Social Order: Chronicling the Rise of the Pristine Self. Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 4, 2016. Google Books. 35 +The occasion for this has been what I call the rise, or the establishment, or the normalization, of the pristine self. This is a self that is touched by nothing but love. The problem is that nobody is touched by nothing but love, and so if a person has this as an expectation, if they have built their sense of themselves around this premise, the inevitable appearance of something other than love, indeed the appearance even of any other human being, blows this structure apart. That is where we are today. Where the idea of the pristine self has come from, how it and its decomposition have become manifest, and what the effects of this are likely to be, are the subjects of this book. I cannot offer a happy prognosis here, except to say that nothing lasts forever. This, too, shall pass and when it does those who are left will need to know how what happened to them happened. So I am writing a chronicle now. Hopefully, when the time comes, it will be of use. This is a work of what I call psychoanalytic phenomenology. My subject matter is my own mind. I try to understand the minds of others by finding them within my own. As I have said, my theoretical framework for this is psychoanalytic, and that calls for a word of explanation. The credibility of psychoanalytic theory is, of course, not universally granted. It has, however, a unique suitability to the study of political correctness. There is clearly an element of irrationality in political correctness. It is a form of censorship without a censor; we impose it on ourselves. Yet, it keeps us away from the reasoned discussion of social issues which everybody can see are important, consequential, and desperately in need of wide-ranging analysis. It does so through an emotional power that is rarely gainsaid and which anyone can see is ultimately against everyone’s interest; yet it prevails nonetheless. If that is not irrationality playing itself out in the social domain, what is? Yet where does it get that power? This is a question that is rarely posed—it is, after all, politically incorrect to do so—but it is no less important than the totality of the issues that political correctness has obscured. And if we do not approach this question through psychoanalytic theory, what, exactly, shall we approach it through? The rational understanding of irrationality is what psychoanalysis was developed to accomplish. In fact, more than any specific theory that is what psychoanalysis is. It is in that spirit that we will undertake this inquiry. 36 +Self-reflexive interrogation of the psyche is essential to ushering in new patterns of symbolization 37 +Moon 13: Davis S. Moon. “Autonomy and alienated subjectivity: A re-reading of Castoriadis, through Zizek.” Subjectivity, 6 (4). pp. 424-244. 2013. http://opus.bath.ac.uk/36738/1/AaAS_Subjectivities_R_R_FINAL_DSM.pdf 38 +Alienation and Autonomy: Prerequisite, not Obstacle The key issue here is the psyche. For Castoriadis autonomy is predicated upon an ability to think ‘at a distance’ from the social-historical and this is made possible by the extrasocial matrix of meaning which exists in the monadic psyche, continuing across from the pre-socialised monadic state of the infans. On the other hand, autonomy in the Žižek-ian sense is made possible for exactly the opposite reason: It is the lack of any such monadic psyche which keeps open the possibility of traversing present sedimented modes of thinking. This is because the psyche, as lack, acts as ‘a hitch’ – that is, as ‘an impediment which gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one endeavours to integrate and domesticate it ... but which simultaneously condemns these endeavours to ultimate failure’ (Žižek, 1994b, 22). Indeed, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 8), the autonomous individual, it might be said, works (i.e. acts in a manner which can be deemed autonomous) ‘only when they break down, and by continually breaking down’. This is meant not in the Deleuzian sense – i.e. of a shattering, fragmenting or disintegrating subject – but instead as something akin to an irreparable perpetual-motion machine which, continual glitching and occasionally crashing, always subsequently re-boots with a modified programming: There is a ‘ghost’ in this machine, but this ghost is not the ‘mind’ as distinct from the ‘matter’ as understood in the normal Cartesian sense, but the catalytic tension created by the ineliminable ‘gap’ constitutive of subjectivity, be it 25 labelled ‘magma’ (following Castoriadis) or ‘lack’ (following Žižek). It is here that we find the space for a form of agential autonomy worthy of the name. As Fabio Vighi (2010, 133) writes in his own re-working of Žižek’s philosophy: ‘Žižek’s materialism is based on the groundbreaking insight that the gap constitutive of reality is nothing but the gap constitutive of subjectivity: we are the very impossibility that we ascribe to external reality, and that we must constantly disavow or displace if we are to connect with it.’ It is for this reason that ‘it is therefore crucial, politically, to conceive self-alienation not as a problem but as the key to the solution’ (ibid, 101). In seeking answers regarding the possibility of autonomy, the focus must therefore be upon the occurrence of this ‘short-circuiting’ (Johnston, 2007, xxiii) qua displacement from external reality, how it comes about and the possibilities for pro-active, positive agency attached to it. Since Žižek’s position is that this short-circuiting occurs by surprise, without agential intension (2000, 376), the notion of seeking out encounters with such a resultant effect might seem too self-authorial and thus quasi-existentialist from his perspective. Yet arguably active critical reflexivity allows exactly such an act(ion), even with the excision of the positively-charged psychic monad. It is this ability which, as noted, for Castoriadis underlies subjects’ capacity for autonomy – his ‘project of autonomy’ envisaging ‘the maximization of the possibilities of reflection, self-reflection and deliberation’ (Peter Osborne quoted in Castoriadis, 1996, 13). As Sharpe and Bouchner note, in his early works Žižek (1989-c.1995) arguably shared such a view: ‘the political ideal that animates this work is the modern notion of autonomy: rational self-determination by self-legislating individuals, in opposition to our dependent, heteronomous subjection to the socio-political Other’ (2010, 63). This, however, was in his ‘radical democratic’ 26 phase, before and the embracing of the ‘Leninist-Lacanian’ Act as the only true path to change. In judging how this can be actualised we can return to Castoriadis, or at least one of his primary interpreters, David Ames Curtis and his delineation of the concept of improvisation. As Curtis (1988, xvii) describes, ‘to “im-pro-vise” literally means not to “foresee,” not to anticipate’ (ibid, xvii). As a statement regarding action, this chimes in regards to the Act, as explained above. Discussing the concept via the metaphor of jazz improvisation, however, Curtis writes that: In “improvisation” as I conceive it, one does not act in an “immediate,” un-prepared way lacking all foresight ... The very process of “improvisation” ... involves planning, the making of choices (one of the most elementary being when to start “playing” and when to remain silent), and the creation of alternative forms of articulation (what to “play”); it also gives birth to that which was not contained in previous activities. (ibid, xix) Castoriadis (2010, 188) speaks of the need for an individual seeking ‘enlightenment’ to first ‘shake herself enough to be able to be enlightened’, the latter not being a passive state, but one sought: ‘You must want to be enlightened’ as ‘the reception of the Enlightenment is just as creative as its creation.’ Like a reader who selects a random article from Subjectivity on the judgement that its content may confront her with radical new ideas which are until the point of encounter unanticipated, individuals can elect to self-reflexively interrogate their own positions on different issues of their own determining in a manner whereby the end point reached is unknown. What do I believe? Why do I believe it? Upon what grounds have I made this judgement? All knowledge of the world being mediated through existing socialhistorical imaginary-symbolic institutions, themselves held ‘open’ by the limits of the 27 Real, all judgements regarding these questions are made based upon contingently founded foundations and as such can become ‘unstuck' (see: Marchart, 2007). It is in looking at seemingly foundational statements awry that this lack of objective finality is evident. In all of this, self-reflexivity is key; however, pace Castoriadis, in said reflecting there is no pre-historic matrix of meaning to buttress and mould new ideas from. Rather, it is the alienation fundamental to subjectivity, barring the closure of individual identity, that makes possible subjective short-circuiting and thus keeps open spaces ‘at a distance’ from pre-existing systems of social significations wherein new patterns of symbolisation can arise. Peeling away justifications one arrives at the empty space of a pure “because”, thus dislocating the pre-existing imaginary-symbolic institution and opening up the space for another more ’readable’ (re)articulation. Castoriadis (2011, 38) himself compared this process to the autonomy of the poet, explaining that ‘when you write a poem, you use the words of the language, but what you are doing is not a combination of these words. It’s a new form that you impose on them, through their linkage, through a sense esprit that pervades a poem.’ This form of creation, he argues, ‘is not a simple reprisal of elements that were in existence’ as ‘there is a new form created that is not limited to combination.’ As Kioupkiolis (2012, 188) echoes: ‘Original self-creation consists mainly in the sporadic emergence of new forms that cannot be fully reduced to antecedent conditions. But new figures make use of pre-existing materials and spring up within pre-established contexts.’ Such a conception of autonomous change viz. reflexive improvisation involves the rearticulation of pre-existing elements of the social-historical, such that a fundamentally new form of imaginary-symbolic representation is created ex nihlo. It thus offers a proactive conceptualisation of how radical agent-led change can occur which goes beyond, without rejecting, the Žižek-ian Act as (a) mode of autonomous revolution – but is not reliant upon Castoriadis’s problematic ontology of subjectivity based around concepts such as a monadic psyche containing a pre-social meaning which continues to exist post-socialisation. In an act of filtration, re-reading Castoriadis through Žižek as advocated here produces a new composite purer for being tainted. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,51 @@ 1 +1AC- Death of God 2 +FW 3 +There are no a priori, universal values which can define our meaning and guide our actions, because humans don’t have any fundamental sense of “essence”—the only thing common to us is that we all exist—that means the starting point of ethics must be the human condition, because questions of what to do all stem from the question of what it means to exist 4 +Sartre 46: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Jean-Paul Sartre, lecture from 1946. Existentialism is a Humanism. Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman, Meridian Publishing Company, 1989; https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm. RW 5 +Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not – after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. The word “subjectivism” is to be understood in two senses, and our adversaries play upon only one of them. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism. When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. If I am a worker, for instance, I may choose to join a Christian rather than a Communist trade union. And if, by that membership, I choose to signify that resignation is, after all, the attitude that best becomes a man, that man’s kingdom is not upon this earth, I do not commit myself alone to that view. Resignation is my will for everyone, and my action is, in consequence, a commitment on behalf of all mankind. Or if, to take a more personal case, I decide to marry and to have children, even though this decision proceeds simply from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy. I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man. 6 + 7 +The project of morality inevitably fails because ethics seek to prescribe “essence” without first answering the question of existence—only existentialism solves by epistemically prioritizing shared principles of existence 8 +SEP 4: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Existentialism”. August 23rd, 2004. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/. RW 9 +What makes this current of inquiry distinct is not its concern with “existence” in general, but rather its claim that thinking about human existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects. On the existential view, to understand what a human being is it is not enough to know all the truths that natural science—including the science of psychology—could tell us. The dualist who holds that human beings are composed of independent substances—“mind” and “body”—is no better off in this regard than is the physicalist, who holds that human existence can be adequately explained in terms of the fundamental physical constituents of the universe. Existentialism does not deny the validity of the basic categories of physics, biology, psychology, and the other sciences (categories such as matter, causality, force, function, organism, development, motivation, and so on). It claims only that human beings cannot be fully understood in terms of them. Nor can such an understanding be gained by supplementing our scientific picture with a moral one. Categories of moral theory such as intention, blame, responsibility, character, duty, virtue, and the like do capture important aspects of the human condition, but neither moral thinking (governed by the norms of the good and the right) nor scientific thinking (governed by the norm of truth) suffices. “Existentialism”, therefore, may be defined as the philosophical theory which holds that a further set of categories, governed by the norm of authenticity, is necessary to grasp human existence. To approach existentialism in this categorial way may seem to conceal what is often taken to be its “heart” (Kaufmann 1968: 12), namely, its character as a gesture of protest against academic philosophy, its anti-system sensibility, its flight from the “iron cage” of reason. But while it is true that the major existential philosophers wrote with a passion and urgency rather uncommon in our own time, and while the idea sthat philosophy cannot be practiced in the disinterested manner of an objective science is indeed central to existentialism, it is equally true that all the themes popularly associated with existentialism—dread, boredom, alienation, the absurd, freedom, commitment, nothingness, and so on—find their philosophical significance in the context of the search for a new categorial framework, together with its governing norm. 10 + 11 +Outweighs— 12 +A. Analytic 13 +B. All moral questions collapse to existential ones because asking why we should perform a certain action presupposes that there is a reason to exist in the first place 14 +SEP 4: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Existentialism”. August 23rd, 2004. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/. RW 15 +By what standard are we to think our efforts “to be,” our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do “as” myself and as “anyone,” so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen). What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what “one” does (what “moral people” do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to “do what one does,” including feeling “the right way” about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.12 Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of “transparency” with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous “one-self” that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus “become” what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.13 Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in? Thus, to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In choosing “resolutely”—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so “irresolutely,” without commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm; that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose. Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either as “my own” or as “what one does,” transparently or opaquely. Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable doctrines. 16 + 17 +That yields the principle of existential freedom—we have an obligation to act in accordance with our common humanity, as this obligation to create our own meanings is something we all inevitably share and are bound to—actions are thus consistent with freedom insofar as they respect the condition of persons to define their own existence 18 +Manzi 13: Yvonne Manzi, January 23rd, 2013. Jean Paul Sartre: Existential Freedom and the Political. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/23/jean-paul-sartre-existential-freedom-and-the-political/. RW 19 +Existentialist philosophers such as Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre were well-known in their time for being involved in resistance, unforgiving of collaborationism and conformity, and for having an active interest in revolutionary movements7. When coupled with the fact that freedom is one of the most significant themes that are examined by existentialist philosophers, one wonders why this branch of philosophy has not been more appropriately dealt with in political thought. Perhaps it is because existentialism indeed appears to be more of a life-philosophy than a tradition fit for the conception of political theory and policy. I argue that before political theories, policies and institutions can be conceived, one must first be able to appropriately situate the human condition. Existentialism provides a unique and compelling account of what it means to be ‘human’, which allows for Sartre’s conception of freedom to be reasonably developed. Existentialists maintain that we cannot know anything if not from our subjectivity. The first and only real thing we know is that we exist and that we experience everything subjectively. This leads us into questions of being. Hegel distinguished between the being of objects (being-in-itself), and human Being (or Geist) – this provided one of the bases for Sartre’s later distinction (Hegel 1807). Heidegger provided a second contribution, which in a sense defines the core of this philosophical tradition. He claimed that we cannot reflect on the meaning of being in relation to our existence, if we do not first understand it philosophically8 (Heidegger 1927). Heidegger especially critiqued the Cartesian question of existence, claiming that such a question arises from an ontologically inadequate beginning (Ibid, 83). He criticised the notion of substance, and he argued that individuals are Dasein, or ‘beings-in-the-world’. A last notion which is worth mentioning is primarily a Sartrean one; that of authenticity. “Existence is authentic to the extent that the existe has taken possession of himself and… has moulded himself in his own image” (Macquarrie 1972, 206). When the individual does not allow himself to be moulded and bound by outside rules and morals, when he “exercises freedom rather than being determined by the prevailing public tastes and standards”11 (Ibid, 207), then he and lives an authentic existence. 20 + 21 +That outweighs normative obligations—existentialism means the subject is “condemned to be free” so our fw is inescapable 22 +Dastagir 7: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Dr. Md. Golam Dastagir. “Existentialist concepts of freedom and Morality: An Appraisal.” Published in Jibon Darshan – a Research Journal of Philosophy, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, vol. 1, 2007. RW 23 +The central thesis of Sartre’s view of existentialism lies in his famous statement ‘existence precedes essence,’ which means that man exists first and in that existence man defines himself and the world in his own subjectivity. Man is born as a single and unique being devoid of all nature, for ‘man is nothing,’ says Sartre. He says there are no essences that follow from the nature of the world, ‘for human reality essence comes after existence.’ Man creates his own character and his own personality from the time of conception, and in this way he builds up himself. He builds his own future, which is obviously uncertain from which his tension, in his words, anxiety flows. It is, thus, said that a man can still become what he is not, or he was not before, or has not become yet, by his own activity. So, the best way of defining a man is: ‘he is what he is not, he is not what he is.’ Man is free with an unrestricted possibility; he can even become God, as he puts it, ‘Being a man is equivalent to being engaged in becoming God’, for man is always incomplete. No one is complete until desath, when choosing ceases. And in choosing ‘man is alone’, as no one, not even God, can help him to choose, or intervene with his free choice. Sartre, actually, is of the opinion that individual man makes his existence and nature out of an endless world of possibility and innumerable problems for which he alone is responsible, since God or any other man cannot choose for a man on behalf of him. Man must blame himself, not others, for the consequences (desirable or undesirable) of his actions. So, I am responsible for only what I am and what I am not. From this point of view, Sartre seems to have said that we do not need God, even if He exists. He is, in Sartre’s words, de trop to human being. Otherwise Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist playwright-philosopher, differs from Kierkegaard in terms of freedom and responsibility. Sartre, while defending his existentialism as humanism, mentioned that ‘...we can begin by saying that existentialism, in our sense of the word, is a doctrine that does render human life possible; a doctrine, also, which affirms that every truth and every action implies both an environment and a human subjectivity.’17 As an individual human being, we cannot claim our actions are determined by forces exterior to us; for man is ‘condemned to be free.’ So, freedom is a basic factor of human existence. Sartre says we are ‘doomed to freedom,’ just as Heidegger says we are ‘thrown into freedom’. Avoiding any action is also an action, a choice, chosen only by himself. ‘Man is free’ means he is a non-being, for man is born as having fully nothing (like tabula rasa of Locke) and he cannot have any universal nature of his own. Since non-being or nothing, he decides for doing something in this world, and his nature is made up from that moment. Man is completely alone and unaided when he makes his decision, and he himself is responsible for what he does and what he is today. Thus, man is nothing more or less than what he makes of himself. This leads Sartre to claim that there is no God, or ultimate reality, who can determine man’s destiny to be regarded as good or evil. In this sense, it is man who himself is responsible for the consequences of his choices. 24 +Impacts: 25 +Analytic 26 +Thus, the standard is consistency with existential freedom 27 + 28 +Prefer additionally— 29 +All systems of ethics presuppose the existence of an autonomous will—otherwise culpability would be nonsensical 30 +Dastagir 7: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Dr. Md. Golam Dastagir. “Existentialist concepts of freedom and Morality: An Appraisal.” Published in Jibon Darshan – a Research Journal of Philosophy, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, vol. 1, 2007. RW 31 +Every individual man in this sense has to be regarded as determining his own criteria, for we have no universal, or a priori moral standard, in our consciousness. Thus, morality is created by only individual man. This is very much akin to the formation of art. But Sartre, as we have seen, never says that morality can be created by individual as ego-centric; rather, he applies it to the whole mankind since man’s duty is to consider before doing anything for himself whether it will be accepted to be good for all either. Man confronts anguish, because whenever I make a decision to be good, my sense of responsibility becomes conscious. In this sense, ‘choosing’ means to suffer from one kind of anguish and despair. Sartre’s view makes us believe that man bears his burden of freedom and responsibility until he has a chance of self-passing. If all desires of man are fulfilled, he will turn into an object like a cauliflower devoid of freedom of choice, responsibility, etc. Freedom, therefore, survives in the strife of ‘is’ and ‘is-not’ (being and non-being), and its end is only in death. But in fact, Sartre does not affirm death to be man’s free-choice, nevertheless, he claims that man is to be responsible for his life as well as his death.28 But, Sartre can be challenged. How can I be responsible for the action that is not chosen by me? In addition, if death is undetermined, uncertain, or undecided, we have to admit that death necessarily impairs our freedom. If I am responsible for my own freedom of choice, I must consciously determine my desires, because, if my willed-act is not determined by me, I can never be responsible for that action. Sartre holds that if anybody throws a part of burning cigarette unwillingly, or unconsciously, for which any fire can be occurred, then the man should not be regarded to be liable as his action is considered here to be undetermined. On the contrary, a man is fully liable for hurling a bomb anywhere as he wills to do it for which his act is undoubtedly considered to be free.29 32 + 33 +Ideal Theory Ks don’t link—Existentialism doesn’t rely on the same justifications as traditional rationalist philosophies 34 +Dastagir 7: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Dr. Md. Golam Dastagir. “Existentialist concepts of freedom and Morality: An Appraisal.” Published in Jibon Darshan – a Research Journal of Philosophy, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, vol. 1, 2007. RW 35 +Existentialism is a movement or tendency against traditional philosophical system. But why is this movement? Generally speaking, a strong protest against idealist and rationalist philosophy on the one hand, and an attempt to build up a new phase of life by recovering freedom and individuality of man lost in a steady pace of scientific and technological exploration on the other, gave birth to this philosophy. “It is a revolt against authority—against the church and the many forms of religious authoritarianism that tend to destroy the inner spiritual development of the individual.” The realization of philosophers that individual man of flesh and blood is not merely an idea or concept, nor an abstract reality manipulated by a machine or an instrument, but an independent human being experiencing anxiety, dread, fear and despair was the first and probably the foremost principle for which they boldly declared that man’s real significance rested on his consciousness of own existence and freedom. It seems that non- existence is an essential content of existence, because the necessity of one’s own existence is realized from one’s suspicion and inquisitiveness about own existence. Classic forms of existentialism can be traced not only in philosophy, but also in literature, art, films, etc.5 Existentialism typically exposes a dismissal of abstract theories, emphasizing the subjective realities of individual existence, individual freedom, and individual choice. Thus, ‘man exists’ means he has an individual reality, freedom for which every individual man is a probable of potency. Since free, he makes his own personality by his own independent choice for which he is solely responsible. Even not choosing is a form of choice. The key themes are the individuals and systems, being and absurdity, the nature and significance of choice, the role of extreme experiences, and the nature of communication. Individuals rather than the universals, and more clearly inner existence of the human individual, as inwardly experienced, are the primary concepts with which existentialists are concerned. 36 + 37 +Induction fails— 38 +A. Analytic 39 +B. Future predictions are indeterminate 40 +Jervis 97: Robert Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ’97 (Robert Jervis,"Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions," in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University). http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Complexity_Global.pdf. RW 41 +Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich." But the allies had changed because of Hitler’s behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes." Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britain’s ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentina’s claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraq’s claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs’ perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germany’s miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them. The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well— to underestimate actors’ influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversary’s hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states’ earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told. Interaction can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation. We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drive—they are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roro’s, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. You don’t mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care. 42 +Contention 43 + 44 +First, the ability to communicate freely through speech is an essential part of existential freedom 45 +Hawa no date: Salam Hawa, Philosphy of Literature. “Language as freedom in Sartre’s philosophy.” http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Lite/LiteHawa.htm. RW 46 +In this paper I shall argue that Sartre posits language as a medium of communication that is capable of safeguarding subjectivity and freedom. Language does this in a two-fold manner: on the one hand it is an action which does not phenomenally alter being, but which has the capacity of altering consciousness; on the other hand, language, more particularly written text, is a mode of communication that is delayed, hence that occurs out with the present, i.e. in a different space and a deferred time, and as such it preserves the subjectivity of both writer and reader. I present this argument in the following manner: first, I present Sartre's definition of freedom and subjectivity in terms of his definition of consciousness of the For-itself and In-self in Being and Nothingness; second, I draw on examples from La Nausée to illustrate the link between language, consciousness and the expression of freedom and subjectivity; third, I refer to The Psychology of Imagination and What is Literature? to illustrate further the importance that Sartre places on writing and reading as means both to freedom and subjectivity. In Existentialism and Humanism (1946), Sartre states that "if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or as Heidegger has it the human reality." (1) Sartre believes that "existence comes before essence — or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective." (2) This implies that each individual "cannot pass beyond human subjectivity," (3) i.e. that the recognition and constitution of one's subjectivity represent the highest point in the achievement of freedom, for there is no divine beyond, no transcendent Other whose Being can define the essence of humanity. (4) Human reality is characterized by 'contingency', and the identity of the self hinges upon the total sum and interpretation of the product of these 'accidents'. In his definition of subjectivity, Sartre makes a distinction between consciousness of the self and creation of the self. (5) Consciousness exists outside being, and is external to the phenomenon of existence; it appears in and through being, but does not constitute this being. (6) By contrast, self-creation lies in praxis, i.e. the action made by the individual according to a decision to commit such an act. The result of such an action constitutes the self in reality. This distinction appears in this (radical) form in the early philosophical essays and, more explicitly, in Being and Nothingness (1943). It also appears in Sartre's literary works: in La Nausée (1938), the author of the diary, Roquentin, recognizes that his essence is entirely distinct from his being. The freedom of his consciousness is displayed in its ability to become one with other existential beings, such as a tree-root or a gust of wind. Sartre's work expresses his desire to give rise to a knowledge of individual subjectivity that is 'authentic' — untainted, uninformed by social, religious or political pressures. Following from this radical separation between things and thought, freedom for Sartre is limited to the extent that I am able to remain as consciousness acting on the Other. However, the Other is not always a tree-root, or a gust of wind, but it is also, and more fundamental to my freedom, an-Other consciousness. My freedom is limited and runs the risk of disintegrating when faced with the Other's subjective world. (14) This falling apart of my universe occurs because in and through the Other's gaze I am an object in the Other's world, as much as the Other is an object in mine; to be looked at is to be annihilated in the gaze of the Other, thereby feeling myself transformed from a Subject to myself to an object for the Other. By being looked at I am transcended, my possibilities are transcended by those of the Other, and this because I am no longer the sole actor in the situation, nor the sole perceiver; my actions (intentions) are already perceived and observed by the Other, a situation which renders my possibilities (what I can and shall do) into probabilities (what I may and will do). The Other locates me in space, and posits me in time. This occurs because with the Other's presence I am forced to acknowledge the feeling and possibility of simultaneous existence. This feeling of simultaneity makes me also feel subject to the Other's actions, and therewith "I am his slave." (15) However, the Other's gaze does not endow me with ordinary knowledge, but is literally a "hole in my universe," and hence a new dimension which gives rise to specific reactions (shame, pride, alienation etc.) proving the Other's existence, as well as my 'being' as 'object' of these feelings. It then becomes my duty to myself to render manifest my will, hence 'act' according to a 'choice' that I have made, in order to alter this situation of 'objectivity'. It is up to me to become subject again, to free myself from this 'objectification'. This choice and its responsibility constitute my For-itself, i.e. my freedom, as well as my subjectivity. It is in the very nature of this choice and responsibility that lies my existential angst. According to Sartre, anguish is "far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself." (16) It is in this action that my reality is constituted, and lies the essence of my selfhood independent of any socially determined consciousness. This explains Sartre's demand that consciousness and actuality be distinct, for one may be conscious of many things, but it is only in action that one is able to ground this potential into reality. Therefore, it comes to appear that individuals need language — as distinct from simply disjointed words — to identify and define the content of their essence. The self is constituted in the totality of words defining its moments of 'becoming'. For Sartre, the self acquires a meaning in the very act of objectifying itself, albeit for simply the mere momentof this action. Its meaning is momentary, the time it takes to act, or utter a sentence, and then this self is altered by this act thereby becoming other to itself (i.e. the self before the act occurred). As such, the words uttered to express the first moment of an acted consciousness cannot be taken as final, and will have to wait until this self ceases to act, collects the essence of all previous actions in their totality, composes one last narrative that may be used to define it. Hence, words, although not defining the immediate empty self, do arise, and are indeed necessary, as Roquentin suggests, for the recognition, the knowledge of this lived life. 47 +Takes out hate speech DAs— 48 +Analytic 49 +Second, speech codes represent an unjust imposition of essence onto the subject 50 +Lambert 16 (Saber, writer @ being libertarian, "The Degradation of Free Speech and Personal Liberty," April 9, 2016, https://beinglibertarian.com/the-degradation-of-free-speech-and-personal-liberty). RW 51 +Many individuals in society claim that they live in a free nation full of individual liberties. North American constitutions such as the ones implemented in the United States and Canada allow for freedom of speech. However, it is evident that the government has implemented and enforced policies to the contrary. There are a plethora of entertainment programs that have strict censorship policies that go against freedom of speech as it disallows, for example, television producers and musicians to use words or phrases that may be offensive directly or indirectly to a person or group. Regardless, if it is possibly offensive to one or many, the U.S. and Canadian constitutions allow for individuals to say very controversial things. However, restricting one’s freedom of speech in the form of censorship greatly impacts the exchange of ideas that are said to contribute to the (possibly) improvement of society. It is not up to the government to decide what individuals choose to say, read, or hear, and it should not be up to the government to decide what is acceptable within society. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States controls all forms of television broadcasting and claims “it is a violation of federal law to air obscene programming at any time. It is also a violation of federal law to air indecent programming or profane language during certain hours.” It is quite clear that censorship by institutional power is a way to control a society in the sense that it determines what individuals in society can legally say, hear, or read. It is against the majoritarian virtues and values that are constitutionally instilled within a society, and is often paralleled to a form of dictatorship – no matter how miniscule. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +JANFEB- 1AC- Existentialism - Tournament
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Harvard
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Emory
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-01-28 16:48:52.0 - Judge
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +12 - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-01-30 20:22:03.0 - Judge
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-01-30 20:23:38.0 - Judge
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Chris Castillo, Terrence Lonam, Griffin Miller - Opponent
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Byram Hills JB - Round
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +13 - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-01-31 22:44:48.0 - Judge
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +14 - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-20 16:32:15.0 - Judge
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-20 16:35:33.212 - Judge
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