Changes for page Lexington Weiler Aff

Last modified by Administrator on 2017/08/29 03:37

From version < 48.1 >

edited by Reed Weiler
on 2016/12/16 20:10

To version < 49.1 >

edited by Reed Weiler
on 2016/12/16 20:10

< >

Change comment: There is no comment for this version

Raw
Rendered

Summary

Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
- Caselist.RoundClass[9]
- Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[9]

EntryDate

@@ -1,1
          +1,1 @@
--2016-12-16 20:10:25.877
++2016-12-16 20:10:25.0

Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Cites

@@ -1,0
          +1,58 @@
++===Kant Aff===
++Humanity must be valued as an end in itself—two warrants:
++First, realism fails, prefer a constructivist approach to ethics—there are no mind-independent moral truths, instead those can only be derived through rational reflection—it follows that humanity is the source of all value
++Bagnoli 14 Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/constructivism-metaethics/.
++
++====This is not to say that one is bound by requirements because one legislates them; otherwise, evil people would not be bound by the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a, 234–235; O'Neill 2003c; Reath 2006, 112–113, 92–170; Korsgaard 2008, 207–229). Rather, one can autonomously act on such requirements only if one legislates them. This is because universal principles guarantee that action is expressive of an agent's integrity, rather than merely in the service of satisfying preferences or desires. Like Plato and Kant, Korsgaard argues that some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent and cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality, which is founded on reason (Korsgaard 2009, xii, Chapter 3; cf. Plato Republic 443d-e). A canonical objection against the attempt to ground morality on rationality is that it fails to account for the special bonds and ties we have with our loved ones and thus fails to capture the nature of integrity and morality (Williams 1981). To address these worries, Korsgaard introduces the notion of "practical identities", which specify roles as sources of special obligations. For instance, Adam values himself and finds his life worth living and his actions worth undertaking under the description of being a teacher of music, an American citizen, and Robert's friend (Korsgaard 1996a, 101, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 20). These practical identities govern Adam's choices, sustain his integrity, and are sources of specific obligations to his pupils, fellows, and friends (Korsgaard 1996a, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 22). However, we do not have obligations just because we occupy certain roles as teachers, citizens, or friends. Rather, such roles become practical identities, and sources of reasons, insofar as we rationally endorse them. Rational endorsement, in turn, requires that we test our loyalties and allegiances according to the principle of universality, which commits us to morality. In order to value ourselves under these specific descriptions, we ought to value humanity in ourselves and in others (Korsgaard 2008, Lecture 6, 25–26). Korsgaard offers what is called a ‘transcendental argument’ for this conclusion. A transcendental argument is an argument that identifies the conditions under which it is possible for something to be the case. Korsgaard argues that valuing humanity, understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all (Korsgaard 1996a, 121–123; Korsgaard 1998, 60–62; Korsgaard 2009). Evaluators bestow value on objects on the basis of reasons, and thus in virtue of their rational capacity. The value of any object thus ultimately depends on the rational capacity of evaluators. ~~thus~~ valuing ‘Humanity’ is the name of a distinctive value, which is unconditional and counts as the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all. Since humanity is embodied in all rational beings, we should value humanity in ourselves as well as in others, on pain of incoherence. Special obligations and bonds that derive from local identities are insufficient to sustain our integrity when they are inconsistent with valuing humanity. For instance, the conduct of a Mafioso cannot be coherently justified on the basis of a universal principle. The Mafioso thus fails as a rational agent and leads a life that is not autonomous, since his life is not the product of reflective self-government. A systematic failure to be guided by universal principles of self-government amounts to a loss of agency. We cannot but be agents, and thus we are necessarily bound by the norms of rationality and morality. Korsgaard's strategy depends on establishing that the norms of rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of agency and that agency is inescapable. Both these claims have been attacked on grounds that will be discussed in section §====
++
++====Second is Practical Identity— other obligations are particulars, which depend on contingent conditions, while standing as persons is more fundamental.====
++Stephen Engstrom 08 ~~professor of philosophy. Before coming to the University of Pittsburgh in 1990, he taught at the University of Chicago and at Harvard~~, "Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge", 2008, BE
++In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical reason that needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. Since the exercise of practical reason proceeds from the universal to the particular, the application of the formula of universal law should proceed in this direction as well. Thus in attempting to determine what obligations to other persons this principle of universality might support, we should first consider its application in the most primitive, or fundamental, exercise of the will, and to do this we will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception of a particular human person.11 It would be inappropriate, for example, to begin with duties that presuppose particular relations between the persons involved, such as the ties between citizens, family members, or friends. Such obligations, important though they are, depend upon specific, contingent conditions of action, whereas the cases we should consider first are those of duties that attach to us most fundamentally, merely in virtue of our standing as human persons, or subjects with wills, sharing the power of practical reason.
++
++====Next, the categorical imperative must be the ultimate guide to action—it’s the only way to ground moral obligations—that means the maxims we act on must be universalizable ====
++Bagnoli 2 Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/constructivism-metaethics/.
++
++====Among contemporary philosophers, Christine Korsgaard has developed the most ambitious, and controversial, version of Kantian constructivism. She defines Kantian constructivism as a form of "procedural realism"—the view that "there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them"; and she contrasts procedural realism with "substantive realism"—the view that "there are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts, which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track" (Korsgaard 1996a, 36–37; see also Engstrom 2009, 119). Substantive realism holds that there are objective criteria of correctness for moral judgments only if such judgments represent matters of fact about the way the world is. By contrast, the constructivist view is that there are objective criteria of moral judgment insofar as there are objective criteria about how to reason on practical matters. There are objective reasons that prohibit deceiving and manipulating others, but such reasons are the result of practical reasoning, rather than discovered by empirical investigation, grasped by the intellect, or revealed by some god. What makes this view "Kantian" is that there is ultimately one criterion for reasoning on practical matters, which is the Categorical Imperative. By reasoning according to this criterion, we objectively ground moral obligation. This is to say, moral obligations are requirements of practical reason. Korsgaard's case for constructivism parallels Kant's as Rawls reconstructs it. It starts by objecting that substantive realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge because it simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them. As a consequence, the realist also fails to account for the authority of moral obligations—for why we really ought to do as morality says. (Korsgaard 1996a; Korsgaard 2008, 234, 30–31, 55–57, 67–68). Realists are misled by the presumption that, in order to fend off skepticism, one has to anchor practical reasons in facts that are in themselves normative. But no appeal to such "normative facts" can explain how they count as reasons and motivate rational agents. Suppose we agree that it is a normative fact that deception is morally wrong. How does awareness of this fact rationally ~~doesn’t~~ compel us to refrain from deceiving? This is not only a psychological question about the force that such a fact might exercise on our minds, but also, and most importantly, a normative question that concerns their authority. According to Korsgaard, "the normative question" arises for humans insofar as they are capable of reflecting on themselves and considering their thoughts and desires from a detached perspective. This reflective distance allows rational agents to call into question the legitimacy of particular thoughts and desires and to suspend their pull. Because they are reflective, rational agents have ideals about the sort of persons they want to be, and they can guide their minds and actions accordingly. That is, they are capable of self-governance. Like Kant, Korsgaard thinks that the appropriate form of self-governance is self-legislation (Korsgaard 1996a, 36, 91, 231–232; Korsgaard 2008, 3). According to Korsgaard, rational agents are guided by universal principles that they have legislated. The appeal to self-legislation does not make the moral law coincide with the arbitrary decisions of particular agents. The moral law is a principle of reasoning that binds all rational agents, not a decree of any one rational agent (Korsgaard 1996a, 36, 234–236; Korsgaard 2008, 207–229; Reath 2006, 112–113, 92–170). The constructivist claim is that the moral law obliges us only insofar as it is self-legislated. ====
++Put away your Util NC—this notion of value precludes aggregation.
++Korsgaard 93 Korsgaard, Christine.  Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. "The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values." Cambridge University Press, 1993. Previously published in Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1: 24-51. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3196321/Korsgaard'ReasonsShare.pdf?sequence=2
++The difference between these two interpretations of neutral value is naturally associated with two other differences. First, the two views will normally involve a different priority-ordering between subjective or relative and objective or neutral values. According to Objective Realism, subjective values are derived from objective ones: an individual comes to value something by perceiving that it has (objective) value. Our relation to values, on this account, is epistemological, a relation of discovery or perception. According to Intersubjectivism, objective values are derived or - better - constructed from subjective ones. Our individual, subjective interests become intersubjective values when, because of the attitude we take towards one another, we come to share each other’s ends. On this view, our relation to values is one of creation or construction. The second and related difference concerns the possibility of adding and subtracting value across the boundaries between persons. On an Intersubjectivist interpretation, neutral reasons are shared, but they are always initially subjective or agent-relative reasons. So on this view, everything that is good or bad is so because it is good or bad for someone. This makes it natural for an Intersubjectivist to deny that values can be added across the boundaries between people. My happiness is good for me and yours is good for you, but the sum of these two values is not good for anyone, and so the Intersubjectivist will deny that the sum, as such, is a value. But an Objective Realist, who thinks that the value is in the object rather than in its relation to the subject, may think that we can add. Two people’s happinesses, both good in themselves, will be better than one. Since consequentialism depends upon the possibility that values may be added, an Objective realist about value may be a consequentialist, while an Intersubjectivist will not ~~be a consequentialist~~.
++It follows that a system of equal freedom is key. Only a system of equal freedom respects the right of humans to set their own purposes.
++Ripstein 9 Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy." 2009.
++The same right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates what Kant calls an "internal duty" of rightful honor, which "consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them."14 Kant says that this duty can be "explained. as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person." Kant’s characterization of this as an "internal duty" may seem out of place, given his earlier characterization of the Universal Principle of Right in terms of restrictions on each person’s conduct in light of the freedom of others. But the duty of rightful honor is also relational: it is a duty because it is a limit on the exercise of a person’s freedom that is imposed by the Universal Principle of Right. Just as the rights of others restrict your freedom, so that you cannot acquire a right to anything by acting in ways inconsistent with the innate right of another person, so, too, the humanity in your own person restricts the ways in which you can exercise your freedom by entering into arrangements with others. Your innate right prevents you from being bound by others more than you can in turn bind them; your duty of rightful honor prevents you from making yourself bound by others in those ways. Rightful honor does not warn you away from some juridical possibility that would somehow be demeaning or unworthy. You do not wrong yourself if you enter into a binding arrangement inconsistent with the humanity in your own person. Instead, your duty of rightful honor says that no such arrangement can be binding, so no other person could be entitled to enforce a claim of right against you that presupposes that you have acted contrary to rightful honor. Rightful honor does not demand that you behave selfishly, or refrain from helping another person with some particular project, or make another person’s ends your own. To do any of these things is just to adopt some particular purpose, and so is an exercise of your freedom. In later chapters, we will see that rightful honor prevents you from giving up your capacity to set your own purposes, and so prevents others from asserting claims of right that assume that you did. In private right your rightful honor prevents you from entering into an enforceable contract of slavery, even if you were to believe the arrangement to be to your advantage. In public right, it prevents officials from making arrangements on your behalf that are inconsistent with your innate right. Rightful honor also provides the link from private right to public right by imposing a duty on each to leave the state of nature, which Kant characterizes as a condition in which everyone is subject to the choice of others.
++
++====The state of nature facilitates an infinite number of rights violations, so an omnilateral will is a necessary part of any ethical system  ====
++**Kant:** Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd. 1797. Indianapolis: Hackett Publsihing, 1999.
++When I declare (by word or deed), "I will that an external thing shall be mine," I thereby declare it obligatory for everyone else to refrain from the object of my will. This is an obligation that no one would have apart from this juridical act of mine. Included in this claim, however, is an acknowledgement of being reciprocally bound to everyone else to a similar and equal restraint with respect to what is theirs. The obligation involved here comes from a universal rule of the external juridical relationship. Consequently, I am not bound to leave what is another’s untouched if everyone else does not in turn guarantee to me with regard to what is mine that ~~t~~he~~y~~ will act in accordance with exactly the same principle. This guarantee does not require a special juridical act, but is already contained in the concept of being externally bound to a duty on account of the universality, and hence also the reciprocity, of an obligation coming from a universal rule. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine only in a civil society.
++Thus, the standard is consistency with a system of equal freedom
++Prefer additionally:
++Human equality mandates a system of equal freedom
++Ripstein 9 Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy." 2009.
++Kant offers different formulations of innate right, each of which elaborates an aspect of the idea that one person must not be subject to the choice of another, which Kant glosses in terms of one person being a mere means for another. This familiar Kantian theme is explained in terms of the classic distinction, from Roman law, between persons and things. A person is a being capable of setting its own purposes. A thing is something that can be used in the pursuit of whatever purposes the person who has it might have. The classic example of a person being treated as a mere thing is the slave, for a slave is entirely at the disposal of his or her master. The slave’s problem is that he is subject to the master’s choice: the master gets to decide what to do with the slave and what the slave will do. The slave does not set his own ends, but is merely a means for ends set by someone else. To call it "the" problem is not too strong: if the other problems a slave has—low welfare, limited options, and so on—were addressed by a benevolent master, the relationship of slavery would perhaps be less bad, but it would not thereby be any less wrong. The right to be your own master is neither a right to have things go well for you nor a right to have a wide range of options. Instead, it is explicitly contrastive and interpersonal: to be your own master is to have no other master. It is not a claim about your relation to yourself, only about your relation to others. The right to equal freedom, then, is just the right that no person be the master of another. The idea of being your own master is also equivalent to an idea of equality, since none has, simply by birth, either the right to command others or the duty to obey them. So the right to equality does not, on its own, require that people be treated in the same way in some respect, such as welfare or resources, but only that no person is the master of another. Another person is not entitled to decide for you even if he knows better than you what would make your life go well, or has a pressing need that only you can satisfy.
++That controls the internal link to other frameworks—equality is a basic assumption of any moral system
++Gosepath 11 Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/.
++This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is accepted as a minimal standard by all leading schools of modern Western political and moral culture. Any political theory abandoning this notion of equality will not be found plausible today. In a period in which metaphysical, religious and traditional views have lost their general plausibility (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39-44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p.5).
++Focus on rationality as the basis for rights is a good starting point for social justice—rejecting it denies agency
++Parker et al 8: Sonia Corea, Rosalind Petchesky, Richard Parker. 2008. Sexuality, Health and Human Rights. On the indispensability and insufficiency of human rights. http://silo-public.hunter.cuny.edu/a3e2748e5460a098c8c663a9ac3a4e5d42891043/Sexuality-Health-and-Human-Rights.pdf. RW
++Effective and genuinely democratic community participation – especially participation of women and economically, racially, and sexually marginalized groups – in monitoring sexual and reproductive health policies and services will happen neither as an accident of the market nor as a beneficent gift of charitable donors.2 Such participation can only come through the efforts of robust, politically conscious social movements. In turn, the logic of such movements arises out of radical oppositional ideologies and practices, not ‘consultations’ or ‘partnerships’ with the managing institutions of global capitalism. A human rights framework provides both the norms upon which movements can base social justice claims and systems of public regulation and accountability they can use as forums to publicize those claims and shame corporate and government violators – even when, in practice, enforcement is weak. Market-based and cost- effectiveness approaches fail in this regard because they are ethically closed systems; that is, they measure value only by private preferences or by price, with the lowest costs having the highest value (Schrecker 1998). Welfare state and philanthropic approaches fail as well, insofar as they treat the recipients of aid or services as passive victims or clients rather than as rights-bearing agents and equal participants in decision making. The language we use here matters. When we call the people who rely on reproductive and sexual health services ‘consumers’ or ‘users’, we reinforce the marketization of health care rather than challenging it. Individual health ‘consumers’ may be subjects of marketing research to find out about their product preferences or may be surveyed for their evaluation of provider practices. However, this is very different from a model of health provision that treats the recipient of services as a citizen with rights, that encourages her ‘to feel that she has "the right to have rights and to create rights" ~~and~~ to regard ~~themself~~ herself as the "agent and subject" of their own actions’ (Paiva 2003, p. 199). And it is not at all the same as communities mobilized on the basis of claims for social justice and human rights, and organized to participate directly in the design and evaluation of services and setting priorities for budgets and programmes. We agree with Pheng Cheah that, for contemporary social movements, rights are a necessary and irrepressible mode of expression and always, inevitably bound up in politics: ~~T~~he irreducible contamination of the subject of human rights indic- ates that we can no longer theorize the normativity of rights claims in terms of the rational universality of a pure, atemporal and context- 154 Promises and limits of sexual rights independent human dignity ... separated from economics or politics.... Yet, ~~rights~~ are the only way for the disenfranchised to mobilize. (Cheah 1997, p. 261) Of course, such participation has its costs; as Cheah observes, it ‘contami- nates’ civil society advocates with the stain of politics. For example, to become legitimate, effective actors within the UN system, transnational feminist, AIDS, and LGBTQ groups have had to learn, and in many ways internalize, the rules and procedures of that system. Whether in special ses- sions of the General Assembly or meetings of the Human Rights Council, they have had to rely on, and compete among themselves for, resources and recognition from various international donors, including not only gov- ernments and private foundations but also the World Bank and other intergovernmental agencies. Even counter-hegemonic movements asserting human rights demands in the streets – against the WTO or sexually repres- sive national laws; in favour of a moratorium on debt or treatment access for HIV and AIDS – do so in response to institutional frameworks and agendas set by those in power, including multinational corporations. But acknowledging that we act, and even achieve our identities as actors, within existing power regimes has a liberating dimension. Misnaming this process ‘co-optation’ reduces all power to a zero-sum game and misconstrues the nature of power, as well as underestimating the potential of even marginalized actors to effect change.
++
++===Contention  ===
++I contend that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.
++
++First, restricting free speech in academic settings violates the system of equal freedom—It’s internally contradictory and denies basic rights
++
++Surprenant 15: Chris W. Surprenant. Chris W. Surprenant is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Orleans, where he directs the Alexis de Tocqueville Project in Law, Liberty, and Morality. He is the author of Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue (Routledge 2014), co-editor of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary (Routledge 2012), and has published numerous journal articles in moral and political philosophy.
++Kant on the virtues of a free society. April 7, 2015. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/kant-virtues-free-society. RW
++Kant claims that for this enlightenment to take place, "nothing is required but freedom…namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters" (E 8:36). By "public use of one’s reason," he means "that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers" (E 8:37). More simply put: freedom of speech through the press. Kant’s defense of free speech is fairly consistent throughout his work, where, more often than not, it is linked to his support for the policies and practices of Frederick the Great. But in his "Theory and Practice" essay, he presents a defense of free speech more generally, commenting on the importance of free speech and its contribution to a free society. He writes: "~~F~~reedom of the pen…is the sole palladium of the people’s rights. For to want to deny them this freedom is not only tantamount to taking from them any claim to a right with respect to the supreme commander (according to Hobbes), but is also to withhold from the latter…all knowledge of matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him in contradiction with himself" (TP 8:304). In this passage, Kant’s claim regarding the importance of free speech is two-fold. His first point, which is fairly straightforward, is that freedom of the press is the only right the people have against the sovereign. That is, they have the right to speak out against policies that they perceive to be unjust or otherwise defective. (It is important to note here that, for the most part, Kant does not believe that people have the right to disobey the law or take action against the sovereign. For more on this point, including how we might reconcile it with Kant’s emphasis on individual autonomy, see Surprenant, 2014, especially Chapter 3.) The second point is a bit less straightforward. His claim is that a sovereign that outlaws free speech creates a condition where his actions "put him in contradiction with himself." This language is remarkably similar to what he uses in his moral theory to describe principles that violate~~s~~ the categorical imperative, Kant’s supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that when a principle of action fails when tested against the categorical imperative, it fails because something about that principle is contradictory. It may be the case that it is not possible to conceive of the action that comes about as a result of universalizing the underlying principle connected to the action (i.e., a contradiction in conception), or the result of universalizing the principle is self-defeating in some way (i.e., a contradiction in the will). In the case of the sovereign restricting freedom of the press, the contradiction appears to be more practical. Elsewhere Kant argues what justifies sovereign authority is that his actions are supposed to represent the united will of the people (MM 6:313). But a sovereign that denies free speech and otherwise undermines the conditions necessary to maintain a free society has made it impossible to gather the information needed to represent the will of the people appropriately. In this way, Kant sees any attempt by the sovereign to limit or otherwise suppress the free exchange of ideas, and, in particular, the exchange of ideas among the educated members of society (e.g., ~~especially~~ academics), as ~~is~~ undermining his own authority. In addition to these two, practical, political benefits, and as discussed previously, free intellectual exchange also is a necessary condition for individual enlightenment. And so while Kant’s position on the function of juridical law differs from Aristotle, they share the belief that an individual can live well only if he is a member of civil society (cf. Pol 1278b 21-24). Living in a free society makes enlightenment possible. Therefore, while Kant’s "race of devils" passage suggests that the possibility of a free society does not depend on the presence of enlightened or virtuous citizens, an individual’s ability to become enlightened does depend on his living in a free society.
++
++And, limiting free speech constitutes illegitimate state action because speech can never be a violation of freedom
++Varden 10 ~~A Kantian Conception of Free Speech Helga Varden In Deidre Golash (ed.), Free Speech in a Diverse World. Springer (2010) philpapers.org/rec/VARAKC-5~~
++This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involv~~e~~ing wrongdoing from the point of view of right: "such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere" do not constitute wrongdoing because "it is entirely up to them ~~the listeners~~ whether they want to believe him or not" (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, ~~thus~~ it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my ~~and~~ external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coercion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
++
++Systems of equal freedom mandate the right to noninterference—that entails free speech
++Dorn 14: James A. Dorn. Equality, Justice and Freedom: A constitutional Perspective. October 1, 2014. https://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/equality-justice-freedom-constitutional-perspective. RW
++Just as equality of rights and equality of outcome are inconsistent usages, so too are the twin usages of equal opportunity just noted. Extending equal opportunity to everyone violates no one’s rights when used in the sense of equal freedom. All individuals can jointly have rights to life, liberty, and property—in the sense that all are free to choose among competing alternatives in a world of scarcity. One person’s right to noninterference in the use of his property does not preclude others from having the same right to their property. Whether the property right in question is the right to freedom of contract or freedom of speech, those rights are fundamental natural rights belonging to each individual on an equal basis. Thus, in the absence of any positive welfare rights, the set of rights stemming from the basic right to noninterference (which entails only negative obligations) is a world of consistent and equal rights, "a world in which we can at all times enjoy whichever exemplifications of our right to noninterference we choose to enjoy, subject only to the restrictions we incur as a result of our own actions" (Pilon 1979a: 148). Having an equal right to noninterference or liberty, however, is not the same as having an equal power to exercise that right.~~9~~ Under the First Amendment, all individuals have the right to free speech, but the exercise of that right will be affected by relative endowments and, thus, by the scarcity of resources. The same is true in the exercise of economic liberties such as the right to use and dispose of private property and the right to negotiate contracts so long as third-party rights are not violated. In sum, extending the right of equal opportunity—in the sense of equal freedom and equal justice under a rule of law—to everyone as a natural right entails no opportunity cost in terms of forgoing other legitimate rights and liberties.~~10~~ As such, equal opportunity in this limited sense is a legitimate part of the constitutional perspective of equality. However, once equal opportunity is enlarged to mean equal endowments, the state necessarily moves from protecting property rights to redistributing them.
++
++Restrictions in specific circumstances are incoherent and can’t be universalized
++ACLU 16: American Civil Liberties Union. "Hate Speech on Campus", 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus. RW
++
++Free speech rights are indivisible. Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone's rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice. For example, in the 1949 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, the ACLU successfully defended an ex-Catholic priest who had delivered a racist and anti-semitic speech. The precedent set in that case became the basis for the ACLU's successful defense of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s and '70s. The indivisibility principle was also illustrated in the case of Neo-Nazis whose right to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1979 was successfully defended by the ACLU. At the time, then ACLU Executive Director Aryeh Neier, whose relatives died in Hitler's concentration camps during World War II, commented: "Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it means that the freedoms to speak, publish or assemble any place in the United States are thereby weakened."

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-12-16 20:10:27.663

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+William Lai

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Roseville Area YF

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+9

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Lexington Weiler Aff

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+JANFEB- 1AC- Kant

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Blake

Changes for page Lexington Weiler Aff

Summary

Details

Quick Links

Schools