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1		-2016-10-06 01:16:59.8
	1	+2016-10-06 01:16:59.0

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	1	+==1AC- Belgium==
	2	+
	3	+===Plan===
	4	+Plan: The federal government of The Republic of Belgium should prohibit the production of nuclear power through immediate decommissioning of all currently operating nuclear plants
	5	+IEA 16: International Energy Agency. May 19, 2016, Brussels. IEA urges Belgium to take a long-term approach to energy policy. https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/may/iea-urges-belgium-to-take-a-long-term-approach-to-energy-policy-.html. RW
	6	+Belgium should adopt a national long-term energy strategy without delay, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said today, stressing that such a plan was required to respond to the challenge of decarbonising the economy while ensuring security of supply and affordability of energy. Speaking at the launch of an IEA review of Belgium’s energy policies, IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol encouraged Belgium’s federal and regional governments to work decisively together. "Our review rings alarm bells due to the lack of private-sector investment in the electricity sector," Dr. Birol commented. "Government efforts to mobilise investment should include an electricity market design that ensures a viable business model for power generation. And to avoid a lack of generation capacity in the medium term, Belgium could consider operating their nuclear power plants as long as they are certified to be safe by the regulator." The new IEA report, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Belgium 2016 Review, acknowledges Belgium’s recent progress in several areas of energy policy. Competition has increased in the electricity and natural gas markets. The use of fossil fuels has declined and the supply of renewable energy has grown. The country’s economy is becoming less energy-intensive, and its energy-related carbon emissions are declining. A major issue to be addressed, however, is the country’s nuclear phase-out policy. Nuclear energy accounts for around half of Belgium’s electricity generation, but the current policy is to close its nuclear power plants between 2022 and 2025. The report cautions that this would seriously challenge Belgium’s efforts to ensure electricity security and provide affordable low-carbon electricity. Allowing the plants to run as long as they are considered safe by the regulator would ease electricity security pressures, would reduce the costs of electricity generation in the medium term, would likely reduce the costs of the phase-out itself and would create time for investments in alternative generation options. "It is of the utmost importance that Belgium’s policy on nuclear power is consistent with its objectives regarding electricity security and climate change mitigation," Dr. Birol stressed. The report highlights the potential energy efficiency offers to help Belgium meet its energy policy goals. It welcomes the decision to implement nationwide road pricing for heavy-duty vehicles. The report also recommends further support to renovating the building stock and switching away from oil in space heating. In addition, it suggests abolishing direct and indirect subsidies on energy use and replacing them with more targeted measures on citizens and companies in need. Under any scenario, Belgium’s energy supply needs to be further diversified and energy demand further limited. Transport and buildings hold a large potential for efficiency and climate gains, and fiscal incentives and price signals could be used more frequently in order to reap them. The IEA Executive Director applauded Belgium for its excellent gas transport infrastructure and the high level of cross-border integration of its gas market. Referring to the eventual phase-out of imports of low-calorific gas from the Netherlands, he encouraged the government to give a higher priority to this matter, in case production of the Groningen gas field declines faster than currently expected. Dr. Birol also congratulated Belgium for holding large emergency stocks of oil.
	7	+
	8	+====Decommissioning will be issued through four steps ====
	9	+Schmittem 16 **~~Schmittem, Marc (Analyst for EU-Japan Energy Cooperation ). "Nuclear Decomissioning in Japan- Opportunities for European Companies". EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation. Tokyo, March 2016. http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/default/files/publications/docs/2016-03-nuclear-decommissioning-japan-schmittem-min'0.pdf~~ NB**
	10	+Decommissioning is the responsibility of the operator of a nuclear facility. The NRA defines the decommissioning of NPPs in Japan by the following four activities: Dismantling of the relevant reactor ~~includes~~ (1), transfer of nuclear fuel (2), removal of irradiated material (3), and the disposal of radioactive waste (4)19. Within these boundaries, nuclear operators can design their own decommissioning strategies. The 1currently preferred approach for commercial NPPsin Japan combines immediate dismantling with deferred dismantling. Immediate dismantling is a strategy where dismantling begins immediately after the approval of the project, whereas in deferred dismantling, the reactor is first placed in safe storage for a number of years to reduce the radioactive inventory. The operators of commercial power reactors in Japan have opted for such safe storage periods, but the dismantling of secondary facilities will begin as soon as possible. Like the decommissioning strategies of many other countries, the basic decommissioning strategy in Japan consists of sequential stages: Site preparation (including site characterisation, defueling and decontamination), safe storage, and deconstruction and dismantling (DandD) (see Figure 1). Waste management and disposal is also a part of the decommissioning process. The basic strategy envisions this as only becoming an issue during the DandD stage, but in practice waste from decommissioning also needs to be handled at earlier stages. While this is acknowledged in the individual decommissioning plans for Japanese reactors, lingering problems with waste management have led to delays in some ongoing decommissioning projects (see the description of the individual decommissioning projects in Part II and the discussion of waste management later in this chapter). The newest decommissioning plans also show a tendency for more prolonged safe storage periods.¶ In the first stage of the decommissioning project, the fuel in the reactor core and the spent fuel¶ pool (SFP) is retrieved and transported to either a temporary storage site21 or a reprocessing¶ plant22¶ . After a survey and characterisation of the radioactive inventory of the facility, systems¶ and facilities are decontaminated to reduce the radioactive dose rates in the work spaces and to¶ prepare the site for dismantling. In the second stage, the reactor core is placed in safe storage, during which basic safety, monitoring and cooling systems are maintained. This stage is meant to reduce the radioactive inventory in the reactor through natural decay processes. The duration of this phase is usually around 10 years for physicochemical reasons, but a certain period of relative inactivity in the decommissioning process might also be necessary for some utilities to recover the financial losses from the premature or long-term shut-down of the reactor after the Fukushima accidents (see part I.6). The dismantling of non-essential and redundant systems and peripheral facilities also begins at this point. The safe storage stage is followed by the DandD stage. During this phase, again in a number of sequential steps, the various components of the reactor are dismantled. This stage sees the highest demand for specialised equipment, particularly during the dismantling of the highly radioactive reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and its internals, where remote-controlled, submersible equipment is required for safety reasons. After the reactor has been dismantled, the reactor building and the remaining facilities are dismantled. Large quantities of waste, both radioactive and non-radioactive (see section I.4), are generated in this stage. The Japanese strategy envisions the implementation of strategies to reduce the amount of waste, through means such as a clearance system and the recycling of non-radioactive waste. At the end of the decommissioning process an application for verification of completion is submitted to the NRA, which then assesses the final state of the site. If the measurable radioactive dose rates are within the legal limits and all targets of the decommissioning plan have been reached, the NRA formally terminates the licence of the operator and releases the site from regulatory control. The site of the former reactor can then be reused for new purposes. The current plan is to build new reactors on the sites of decommissioned reactors, due to difficulties in acquiring sites for new reactors and an expected unwillingness of the local population to develop the land of the former NPP for agricultural or residential purposes23. However, in light of strengthened safety regulations, stricter licensing criteria and growing opposition to the operation of NPPs in the surrounding communities and local governments, it is not yet known if this strategy will be economically and politically feasible.
	11	+Belgium’s renewables could completely replace nuclear power—EU-wide shift has started and is driving global renewable development
	12	+KOS 11: Daily KOS News. An outlet for American political blogging. It functions as a discussion forum and group blog for a variety of netroots activists whose efforts are primarily directed toward influencing and strengthening progressive policies and candidates. October 31, 2011. Belgium to phase out Nuclear Power Completely by 2025. Daily KOS. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/10/31/1031722/-. RW
	13	+In 2003, the government of Belgium had decided to phase out nuclear power. With the so-called Nuclear Renaissance, however, by 2009 there were plans to extend the running times of the nuclear power plants by ten years. Then came the Fukushima disaster, public opinion shifted strongly against nuclear power, and Belgium is now set to phase out nuclear power by the year 2025, 3 years after the scheduled complete phase-out of nukes in Germany. The Reuters article goes on to express "concern" about the intermittency of renewables, ignores the fact that the planned North Sea Supergrid will be providing virtual baseload power There is some concern about the price of electricity, with nuclear being phased out. That concern, however, also is overblown, since wind power is less expensive than new nuclear:While the concern about the intermittency and price of renewables is overblown, Belgians will have their work cut out for them in replacing the 50 of their electricity that is produced by nuclear power plants with renewables. Belgium is a small, densely populated, highly industrialized country. While they have excellent offshore wind resources and are one of the lead countries in regards to offshore wind electricity production, their coastline is quite small, and they will have to utilize both their offshore and onshore wind resources efficiently in order to replace the electricity generated by the seven nuclear reactors that are currently running. Official govt. estimates for the potential of Belgian offshore power are at about 18 TwH/year, which would cover 25 of Belgian electricity needs. With technological advances over the next 15 years, my educated guess would be that the combination of offshore and onshore wind power could replace their nuclear power completely, with the addition of solar and biomass power cutting into their use of fossil fuels. In order to attain the European goal of 80 or more renewable power by 2050, Belgium will have to efficiently and intelligently maximize the use of wind, solar, biomass, and the newer forms of renewable energy, such as wind and wave power, while continually increasing conservation and efficiency efforts. One thing is becoming increasingly clear, as Belgium joins Germany, Greece, Denmark, and Austria in their stated quest for a nuclear free Europe: in the post-Fukushima world, the will of the people is driving European nations towards a massive revolution in energy production, with the primary focus being on the implementation of renewable energy technology. This will likely lead to a huge burst of innovation that will not only drive the implementation of renewables in Europe, but also throughout the world. The Vox Populi is increasingly being heard on European energy matters. And that's a good thing
	14	+Belgium’s current phase-out plan allows major plants to operate for another 10+ years before decommissioning starts—that poses extremely high security risks—also undermines renewable development
	15	+Green 15: Jim Green. Nuclear Monitor Editor. March 19, 2015. World Information Service on Energy. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/800/belgium-and-end-nuclear-power. RW
	16	+Belgium's seven reactors − all pressurized water reactors − are all operated by Electrabel, a GDF Suez subsidiary. Electrabel owns 100 of two reactors, 89.8 of four reactors and 50 of one reactor. EDF and SPE are the other companies with ownership stakes. When all seven reactors were operating, they supplied about half of Belgium's electricity. All aare due to be shut down by the end of 2025. Belgium's nuclear phase-out law mandates the shut down of six reactors when they have operated for 40 years − with the exception of Tihange 1, which is due to be shut down in 2025 when it has operated for 50 years. All seven reactors have been in the news over the past year: Doel 1: Shut down when its 40-year licence expired in February 2015. Doel 2: Now operating but due to be shut down in December 2015. GDF Suez / Electrabel is negotiating a possible licence extension for Doel 1 and 2 to operate for another 10 years, and seeking regulatory approval. Doel 3 and Tihange 2: Offline since March 2014 due to concerns about the integrity of reactor pressure vessels; future uncertain. Doel 4: Offline for more than four months in 2014 due to suspected sabotage of the high-pressure turbine. Now operating. Tihange 1: Now in its fortieth year of operation but licensed to operate for another 10 years. Greenpeace has initiated a legal challenge against the licence extension, because of the failure to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment and cross-boundary consultation in line with Belgium's obligations under the Espoo Convention (the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context). Court hearings are scheduled for March 24 and the judge is expected to present his verdict soon after. Tihange 3: Briefly shut down following a fire in December 2014. Now operating. Policies and politics Nuclear power policies and laws have been in flux over the past two decades:3 In 1999, the government announced that reactor lifetimes would be limited to 40 years, and banned further reprocessing. In 2003, the Belgian Parliament passed legislation banning the building of new power reactors and limited the operating lives of existing reactors to 40 years. In 2009, the government decided to postpone the phase-out by 10 years, so that it would not begin before 2025. This would allow the licensing of reactor life extensions. Reactor operators agreed to pay a special tax of €215−245 million (US$227−259m) per year from 2010−14, and more thereafter. GDF Suez also agreed to subsidise renewables and demand-side management by paying at least €500 million (US$528m) for both, and it maintaining 13,000 jobs in energy efficiency and recycling. However, an election in April 2010 occurred before the agreed proposals were passed by parliament and thus the nuclear phase-out law remains in place. In July 2012 Belgium's Council of Ministers announced that Doel 1 and 2 were to close in 2015 after 40 years of operation, but Tihange 1 would be permitted to operate to 2025. This was written into law in December 2013. The government said that it had rewritten the 2003 law so that its current stance could not be changed by decree, and therefore the timing of the phase-out "is now final."3,4 In December 2014 the Council of Ministers from the new ruling coalition government agreed that Doel 1 and 2 could continue operating for a further 10 years, to 2025. Energy minister Marie-Christine Marghem said that it was an "unconditional prerequisite" that the Belgian nuclear regulator − the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) − approve licence extensions for the two reactors. She noted that Belgium's planned nuclear phase-out by the end of 2025 remains in place.4 The government decision to allow Doel 1 and 2 to continue to operate for a further 10 years was partly a result of problems with other reactors − in particular the outages of Tihange 2 and Doel 3 and uncertainty about their future. GDF Suez / Electrabel is in negotiation with the Belgian government over the Doel 1 and 2 licence extensions but an agreement has not yet been reached − hence the shutdown of Doel 1 in February in accordance with the nuclear phase-out law. Further, the regulator FANC has not yet approved licence extensions for Doel 1 and 2.4 GDF Suez / Electrabel is unwilling to invest up to €600−700 million (US$634−740m) in necessary upgrades to Doel 1 and 2 unless the government provides a "clear legal and economic framework" to justify the investment. Negotiations include removal of the nuclear generation tax introduced by a previous government − according to the World Nuclear Association, that tax cost the company €397 million (US$419m) in 2014.5 As Rianne Teule, campaign director for Greenpeace Belgium, put it: "In order to agree to such a large investment, Electrabel demands 'a clear legal and economic framework'. Read: 'a good deal to reduce the investment risks'. It's the Belgian people who will pay the price, one way or another. If not through increased taxes, when Electrabel's payments to the state decrease, then through increased electricity prices when Electrabel passes on their investments to their clients."6 In 2012 the government passed laws increasing the tax on nuclear operators. The government set a total contribution from nuclear operators for 2012 of €550 million (US$581m), of which Electrabel had to pay €479 million (US$506m). In June 2013 Electrabel filed an appeal to Belgium's Constitutional Court, claiming the tax violated a protocol signed by the company and the federal government in 2009, which included a lower tax, and took no account of declining revenue from nuclear power generation. In April 2014 the Court of First Instance in Brussels rejected Electrabel's claim. The company appealed, but the appeal was rejected in July 2014. Electrabel said it would continue "to examine all potential legal means in order to defend its interests" and "examine all options concerning the future of its nuclear activities in Belgium."3,7 According to Greenpeace, nuclear power is part of the energy security problem, not part of the solution: "The reason for the potential electricity supply problem is Belgium's excessive dependency (55) on unreliable nuclear power. A political decision to extend the lifetime of two old reactors will not mitigate this acute supply problem. It will take at least a year to implement the necessary safety upgrades, and to order and fabricate new fuel for them. Extending the legally fixed phase-out calendar will undermine investment in real climate solutions such as energy efficiency and renewables."8 Tihange 2 and Doel 3 − compromised reactor pressure vessels Doel 3 and Tihange 2 were taken offline in 2012 when ultrasound testing suggested the presence of cracks in their reactor vessels. Further investigations indicated that the defects are so-called hydrogen 'flakes'. FANC allowed Electrabel to restart the reactors in May 2013. However the reactors were again taken offline in March 2014 after Electrabel reported that tests to investigate the mechanical strength of irradiated specimens of similar material "did not deliver results in line with experts' expectations".9 FANC said that "a fracture toughness test revealed unexpected results, which suggested that the mechanical properties of the material were more strongly influenced by radiation than experts had expected."10 In January 2015, FANC said the process to restart the reactors had been extended from April to July so that Electrabel could answer further questions. In February, FANC announced that additional inspections revealed more extensive flaking within the pressure vessels of the two reactors than previously identified. FANC said 13,047 flaw indications have now been found in the vessel of Doel 3 and 3,149 in that of Tihange 2. Further test results are expected by April.1,9 FANC Director General Jans Bens said: "This may be a global problem for the entire nuclear industry. The solution is to implement worldwide, accurate inspections of all 430 nuclear power plants."11 Shortly after approving the restart of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 in May 2013 − a decision that was contested at the time and seems unwise in hindsight − Bens was seriously downplaying nuclear risks: "The harbour of Antwerp is being filled with windmills, and the chemical industry is next to it. If there is an accident like a break in one of the wings, that is a guillotine. If that goes through a chloride pipe somewhere, it will be a problem of a bigger magnitude than what can happen at Doel. Windmills are more dangerous than nuclear power plants."12 Two materials scientists have said the unexpected flaws in Doel 3 and Tihange 2 could be related to corrosion from normal operation, with potential implications for reactors worldwide. Prof. Digby MacDonald said: "The consequences could be very severe ... like fracturing the pressure vessel. Loss of coolant accident. This would be a leak before break scenario. ... My advice is that all reactor operators, under the guidance of the regulatory commissions should be required to do an ultrasonic survey of the pressure vessels. All of them." Prof. Walter Bogaerts said: "If I had to estimate, I would really be surprised if it ... had occurred nowhere else.13,14 Electrabel reacted to the latest news by saying that it may be willing to "sacrifice" one of the two reactors to allow destructive testing to learn more about the problem.15 Doel 3 and 4: Fire and sabotage On 1 December 2014 at 10:30am, a fire began in the electrical substation transformer building at Doel and led to an emergency shutdown of reactor ~~#3. The fire was put out by the local fire service and the reactor was restarted at 5am the following day.16 Fires at nuclear power plants pose significant risks to reactor safety due to the potential disruption of the electrical supply to vital reactor safety functions. The risks in Belgium are all the greater because of the high population density and the concentration of seven reactors at just two sites.17 Sabotage at Doel 4 The Belgium nuclear industry was shaken on 5 August 2014 when it was revealed that sabotage had caused, in Electrabel's words, "significant damage" at Doel 4. Lubricant had been discharged from the high-pressure turbine through a valve which had probably been opened deliberately by a worker. Some 6,000 professionals from 15 companies participated in the repair of the turbine. The repair involved the manufacture of 2500 blades at four plants in China, Croatia, Italy and Switzerland.18 The reactor was restarted on December 19.19 The END of nuclear power When the last reactor is shut down in 2025, that won't be the end of Belgium's nuclear program but the beginning of the END − the Era of Nuclear Decommissioning. In addition to the decommissioning of seven reactors, Belgians will somehow have to manage: high-level nuclear waste currently stored at Dessel and at reactor plants; larger volumes of low- and intermediate-level waste; and other nuclear facilities now in various stages of decommissioning including a MOX fuel fabrication plant and the Eurochemic reprocessing plant at Dessel
	17	+
	18	+====Only decommissioning puts the necessary pressure on renewables====
	19	+Mez 16 ,,Lutz Mez, Berlin Centre for Caspian Region Studies, Freie Universität Berlin "The experts on nuclear power and climate change" the Bulletin asked top energy and environmental experts to comment on the role they think nuclear energy should (or should not) play in efforts to implement the climate plans that countries around the world 18 FEBRUARY 2016 http://thebulletin.org/experts-nuclear-power-and-climate-change8996,,
	20	+The electrical power production sector accounts for about 28 percent of global anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions and constitutes by far the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. That is why supposedly carbon dioxide-free nuclear power plants have frequently been praised as a panacea for addressing climate change. However, in 2013 nuclear electricity contributed just 10.6 percent of global electricity generation, and because electricity represents only 18 percent of total global final energy consumption, the nuclear share is just 1.7 percent of global final energy consumption. Even if generation in nuclear power plants could be increased significantly, nuclear power will remain a marginal energy source. Therefore, the turnaround in energy systems has to prioritize energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy technologies and cogeneration plants, which do not cause any more carbon dioxide emissions than nuclear power plants. From a systemic perspective, nuclear power plants are by no means free of carbon dioxide emissions. Today, they produce up to one third of the greenhouse gases that large modern gas power plants produce. Carbon dioxide emissions connected to production of nuclear energy amounts to (depending on where the uranium used in a reactor is mined and enriched) between 7 and 126 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt hour, according to an analysis by International Institute for Sustainability Analysis and Strategy co-founder Uwe Fritsche. For a typical nuclear power plant in Germany, the specific emission estimate of 28 grams has been calculated. An initial estimate of global carbon dioxide emissions through the generation of nuclear electricity in 2014 registered at about 110,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent—or roughly as much as the carbon dioxide emissions of a country like the Czech Republic. And this data does not even include the emissions caused by storage of nuclear waste. In the coming decades, indirect carbon dioxide emissions from nuclear power plants will increase considerably, because high-grade resources of uranium are exhausted and much more fossil energy will have to be used to mine uranium. In view of this trend, nuclear power plants will no longer have an emissions advantage over modern gas-fired power plants, let alone in comparison to the advantages offered by increased energy efficiency or greater use of renewable energies. Nuclear power plants may also contribute to climate change by emitting radioactive isotopes such as tritium or carbon 14 and the radioactive noble gas krypton 85. Krypton 85 is produced in nuclear power plants and released on a massive scale in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The concentration of krypton 85 in Earth's atmosphere has soared over the last few years as a result of nuclear fission, reaching a new record. Krypton 85 increases the natural, radiation-induced ionization of the air. Thus the electrical balance of the Earth's atmosphere changes, which poses a significant threat to weather patterns and climate. Even though krypton 85 is "one of the most toxic agents for climate," according to German physicist and political figure Klaus Buchner, these emissions have not received any attention in international climate-protection negotiations down to the present. As for the assertion that nuclear power is needed to promote climate protection, exactly the opposite would appear to be the case: Nuclear power plants must be closed down quickly to exert pressure on operators and the power plant industry to redouble efforts at innovation in the development of sustainable and socially compatible energy technologies and especially the use of smart
	21	+
	22	+===Adv- Terror===
	23	+Belgium reactors at high vulnerability to terrorism now—attacks are likely and acquisition is ridiculously easy—this tanks the economy
	24	+Bunn 16: Matthew Bunn. Matthew Bunn is a Professor of Practice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research interests include nuclear theft and terrorism; nuclear proliferation and measures to control it; the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle; and policies to promote innovation in energy technologies.March 29, 2016. Huffington Worldpost. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-bunn/belgium-nuclear-terrorism'b'9559006.html. RW
	25	+As world leaders gather for the fourth nuclear security summit this week, in the aftermath of the horrifying terrorist attacks in Brussels, it seems likely that Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel will have more to say than anyone else — both about real nuclear terrorist dangers and about real steps taken to improve nuclear security. Since the 2014 summit, Belgium has suffered a number of suspicious and alarming activities at its nuclear sites and against some of its nuclear technicians. In Aug. 2014, for example, someone with inside access at the Doel-4 nuclear reactor drained the lubricant for the reactor turbine, causing it to overheat and resulting in an estimated $100-$200 million in damage. The perpetrator and the motive remain unknown. In Nov. 2015, Belgian police discovered that the terror cell that carried out the Paris attacks used a secret video camera to monitor an official at nuclear research sites with a wide range of nuclear and radiological materials, including enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear bombs. In response to what seemed to be a growing terrorist threat to the country’s nuclear infrastructure, the authorities beefed up protection against insider threats, toughened access control, deployed armed troops to protect reactors and, following the airport and subway attacks, removed all non-essential personnel from nuclear sites in order to reduce the number of potential insiders. With a variety of different takes on these events swirling in recent news stories (see here and here), it’s worth clarifying what we know and what is still unknown about the scale of this threat and how best Belgium — and the rest of Europe — can protect itself. (A just-released Harvard study also has details up through February.) What was the video monitoring of a nuclear official about? The short answer is that we don’t know yet — though sustained monitoring of a nuclear expert may be the most troubling indicator yet of nuclear intent from the so-called Islamic State. Belgian terrorists recorded about 10 hours of video of a nuclear official at Belgium’s SCK-CEN research facility, near the town of Mol. As the Times story reports, Belgian authorities believe the hidden video camera was picked up by Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui, brothers who are believed to have later been suicide bombers in the Brussels attacks. They reportedly delivered it to Mohammed Bakkali, now under arrest, who is accused of helping with logistics for the Paris attacks. Several media accounts have suggested the terrorists might have been after radiological material for a "dirty bomb" from SCK-CEN. This seems unlikely (unless they were confused, as is certainly possible) — radiological materials are available in many locations where they would be much easier to steal, like in hospitals and industrial sites. (The Nuclear Threat Initiative has a very good new report on the dirty bomb threat and steps to address it.) The Times story quotes me as seemingly worrying about Cs-137 from SCK-CEN; what I was actually saying is that Cs-137 is a big concern, and in many places it is much less well protected than at SCK-CEN. The Times story largely dismissed — wrongly, in my view — the idea that the HEU at SCK-CEN might have been the terrorists’ ultimate objective, saying that the idea that terrorists could get such material and make a crude nuclear bomb "seems far-fetched to many experts." Unfortunately, as we document in detail in our recent report, repeated government studies, in the United States and elsewhere, have concluded that this is not far-fetched — that it is quite plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a nuclear bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. As a 1977 Office of Technology Assessment study put it: Of course, just because the terrorists could find and monitor a nuclear official’s home does not mean they could have broken in to SCK-CEN and gotten HEU or anything else. What did they think they could accomplish with this monitoring? One obvious possibility is that they envisioned either kidnapping the official or kidnapping his family to coerce him into helping them carry out whatever plot they had in mind. Such coercion is a frequent criminal and terrorist tactic. Breaking into a nuclear facility is not as simple as kidnapping someone. But a kidnapping might well contribute to a more complex plot. Did the Belgian bombers first plan to attack nuclear facilities? If the Belgian suicide bombers were the ones monitoring the nuclear official, it’s possible they first planned to attack the country’s nuclear infrastructure. They may have shifted to the airport when their plans were accelerated by the arrests of co-conspirators, or because of Belgium’s deployment of armed troops to guard its nuclear facilities. But a spokesman at the Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control told the Washington Post that they "knew nothing" of any such a plot, and Belgian federal prosecutors have not confirmed any such plot. Press accounts of the possibility the terrorists were planning some kind of an attack on nuclear facilities have unduly played down the potential dangers of reactor sabotage. A story in The New York Times, for example, quotes an argument that the TATP explosive the terrorists were using would not get through the steel pressure vessel of a nuclear reactor. It is certainly true that to cause a major radioactive release, terrorists would have to understand how to overcome a number of different safety and security systems. Getting into a power plant with a suicide vest of explosives would not be enough. But as Fukushima made clear, cutting off a reactor’s electricity and cooling water can cause a disaster that can provoke widespread panic and cause devastating disruption and economic losses. Sabotage at Doel-4 The sabotage at Doel-4 in 2014 also remains a mystery. By sabotaging the turbine (in a non-nuclear part of the plant), the perpetrator caused serious economic damage — but there was never any chance of a radioactive release. Was this a terrorist incident? A disgruntled worker? Something else? The bare facts are these. In August 2014, an insider at the plant opened a locked valve and allowed all the lubricant for the reactor turbine to drain out, causing the turbine to overheat and destroy itself. The reactor was down for months. Total damage was in the range of $100-$200 million, making it one of the biggest economic sabotage incidents of all time. Investigators have yet to find the culprit — who may still be on staff. A radical extremist in vital areas As investigators were looking into the 2014 sabotage, they found that almost two years before, a contractor employee at the plant named Ilyass Boughalab had left to go fight for terrorists in Syria. He was later convicted in absentia of participating in the Sharia4Belgium terrorist group. He had passed a security investigation in 2009 to get clearance for access to the "vital areas" of the reactor — the places where equipment whose sabotage could cause a major disaster is located. His main job was inspecting the quality of welds. His family reportedly asserts that he was radicalized after the background check — but the police chief in the town he grew up in has been quoted as saying he had an extensive criminal record (including assault and battery charges) before getting the clearance, raising questions about how careful the investigation was. One interesting element of the Times story is that it refers to two jihadists having been employed at this facility. The other was likely Elias Taketloune, accused of having been the person who radicalized Boughalab and who was also tried in the Sharia4Belgium trial. I have not yet seen any public confirmation that he worked at Doel-4 with Boughalab. Belgium beefs up protection In December 2014, after the August sabotage, Belgium’s Federal Agency for Nuclear Control imposed new regulations substantially strengthening protection against insider threats. Then, after the Brussels airport and subway attacks, Belgium withdrew non-essential personnel from its nuclear facilities. This significantly reduced the number of personnel at these sites, reducing the chance that there might be a malevolent insider among them. They also added new rules on security cameras and use of two-person rule in sensitive areas. Moreover, Belgian authorities reportedly withdrew access passes for at least four workers at nuclear facilities in the days after the attacks. Following the Paris attacks, the revelation of terrorist rings in Brussels and the monitoring of the Belgian nuclear official, Belgium decided to deploy armed troops to guard its nuclear facilities. (A specialized guard force will be trained and deployed in the coming months.) Two days after the airport and subway terrorist attacks, with armed guards newly deployed at Belgium’s nuclear facilities, a security guard at one site was murdered. The dead man worked at a radioactive materials facility, not a power reactor. Prosecutors have denied early reports that the guard’s security pass had been stolen, and are playing down any militant link. Still, in a country with one of the world’s lowest murder rates — only about 200 murders occur in Belgium each year — it is a surprising coincidence. Previously, Belgium had no armed guards at all at its nuclear facilities, relying instead on response forces a few minutes away. U.S. officials had long criticized Belgium on this and other aspects of nuclear security; the Center for Public Integrity reported on an incident in the mid-2000s in which the United States became so concerned that it threatened to cut off further nuclear supply to Belgium. While there are important unanswered questions about each of these incidents, all told they offer troubling suggestions that ISIS is pursuing nuclear or radiological attacks. Ultimately, the group envisions a total war between the "crusader forces" and itself; winning a total war with a nuclear-armed superpower would presumably require very powerful weapons. Fortunately, as Belgium has shown, there are clear actions that can drastically reduce the risk. At this week’s summit, the assembled leaders must take action to ensure that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide are effectively and sustainably secured against the full spectrum of threats terrorists and criminals might pose. Major nuclear facilities, similarly, must be protected from sabotage. And radiological sources must be protected, tracked throughout their life and, where possible, replaced with less dangerous technologies. The world needs to act to ensure that ISIS can never get its hands on the ingredients of nuclear terror.
	26	+
	27	+A terror attack on Belgium’s nuclear plants is going to happen within the next five years—cyber-attacks take out generic defense
	28	+
	29	+Newton 16: Jennifer Newton. March 26, 2016. Two Belgian nuclear power plant workers have joined ISIS leading to fears the jihadis have the intelligence to cause a meltdown disaster. Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter ~| DailyMail on Facebook Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3510384/Belgian-nuclear-plant-guard-murdered-security-pass-stolen-two-days-Brussels-attacks.html. RW
	30	+Nuclear power plants are known to be targets for the terror network behind the Brussels bombings and the Paris attacks in November. According to the New York Times, several employees working in the Belgian nuclear industry have had their security clearances revoked over potential ISIS plots. Following last November's terror attack in Paris, Belgian police recovered surveillance footage of a senior nuclear official in the home of ISIS ringleader Mohamed Bakkali, who was arrested and is currently facing terrorism charges. In a nation on high alert following this week's attacks, the report stokes fears about the possibility militants are seeking to get hold of nuclear material or planning to attack a nuclear site. Such is the level of fear within the Belgian nuclear power industry, all non-essential staff at the Doel and Tihange power plants have been sent home. A spokeswoman said: 'Only those who are really needed are staying, the other people were sent home.' She said that for the foreseeable future Belgium's nuclear plants will continue operating with staffing levels similar to weekend service to ensure that no unauthorised personnel could gain access to the plants. UN WARNS TERRORIST COULD CREATE A NUCLEAR BOMB Terrorists have the 'means, knowledge and information' to create a nuclear bomb, the head of the UN atomic watchdog has warned in the wake of the Brussels attacks. The warnings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Yukiya Amano come just days before world leaders meet for an important summit against 'nuclear terrorism'. 'Terrorism is spreading and the possibility of using nuclear material cannot be excluded,' Mr Amano told AFP. 'Member states need to have sustained interest in strengthening nuclear security. 'The countries which do not recognise the danger of nuclear terrorism are the biggest problem.' According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium still exists to make 20,000 weapons of the magnitude that levelled Hiroshima in 1945. A grapefruit-sized amount of plutonium can be fashioned into a nuclear weapon, and according to Mr Amano it is 'not impossible' that extremists could manage to make a 'primitive' device - if they got hold of the material. 'It is now an old technology and nowadays terrorists have the means, the knowledge and the information,' he said. 'Some 1,000 people work on sites like these. Their backgrounds are all checked thoroughly, but better safe than sorry.' On Thursday, Derniere Heure newspaper had reported the suicide bombers who blew themselves up on Tuesday originally considered targeting a nuclear site, but a series of arrests of suspect militants forced them to speed up their plans and instead switch focus to the Belgian capital. However, Charleroi prosecutors has reportedly played down reports of a connection between the murder and a planned terror attack, according to the Belga news agency. Belga also said that the prosecutor had also denied media reports that the guard's access badge had gone missing. There was no immediate independent confirmation from the prosecutor's office in Charleroi, about an hour's drive south of Brussels. Late last year, investigators found a video tracking the movements of a man linked to the country's nuclear industry during a search of a flat as part of investigations into the Islamist militant attack on Paris on November 13 that killed 130 people. The video, lasting several hours, showed footage of the entrance to a home in northern Belgium and the arrival and departure of the director of Belgium's nuclear research programme. Interior minister Jan Jambon previously told Belgium's Parliament there was not a threat to the country's nuclear facilities last month Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3510384/Belgian-nuclear-plant-guard-murdered-security-pass-stolen-two-days-Brussels-attacks.html~~#ixzz4KfAUOzmt Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter ~| DailyMail on Facebook At the time, the interior minister said that while there was a threat 'to the person in question,' there was not one to the country's nuclear facilities. He added: 'To date, we have no indication that there is a specific threat to the Belgian nuclear sites. The nuclear industry is one of the best protected areas.' However, the European Union's counter-terrorism chief warned today that Belgium's network of nuclear power plants and other major infrastructure face the threat of a cyber-attack over the next five years. 'I would not be surprised if there was an attempt in the next five years to use the Internet to commit an attack,' Gilles de Kerchove told daily La Libre Belgique. 'It would take the form of entering the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), which is the nerve centre of a nuclear power plant, a dam, air traffic control centre or railroad switching station,' he added. It comes as the head of the UN atomic watchdog also warned that terrorists have the 'means, knowledge and information' to create a nuclear bomb. The warnings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Yukiya Amano come just days before world leaders meet for an important summit against 'nuclear terrorism'.
	31	+
	32	+
	33	+Even small-scale attacks are devastating
	34	+Toon 7: Owen B. Toon 7 , chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, "Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism," online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp- 7-1973-2007.pdf. RW
	35	+To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals . At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million . Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences . Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear "counterforce" exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes
	36	+
	37	+====EU is vulnerable now—nuclear terror causes total collapse ====
	38	+
	39	+====Mackinnon et al 16: Eric Reguly and Mark Mackinnon. Mark Mackinnon is the senior international correspondent for the Globe magazine. Eric Reguly is a senior European colonist. The Globe and Mail. Terrorism, Refugees, Economic upheaval: Will the EU collapse? March 25, 2016. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/between-terror-migration-and-the-economy-is-europe-about-to-collapseafter-brussels-the-eu-faces-questions-about-whether-its-about-to-collapse/article29397884/. RW====
	40	+This week’s bombings in Brussels shattered the peace, and the sense of self-confidence, in the heart of the European Union. The Islamic State militants who carried them out may yet achieve a much larger goal: speeding the breakup of the 28-country bloc that is the grandest geopolitical project since the Second World War. Even before the massacre, the EU – based on lofty ideals about the free movement of people, money and ideas – was reeling from a seemingly endless series of body blows. There was the refugee crisis, the spectre of Britain voting to leave and the rise of parties of extreme right and left, movements united only by their anti-EU positions. All these problems were exacerbated by Tuesday’s bloodshed. Throw in the continent’s lingering economic malaise – symbolized by shocking jobless rates in Mediterranean countries – and an institution that was lauded just four years ago with a Nobel Peace Prize for its role in maintaining stability in Europe seems at genuine risk of falling apart. That reality is just starting to sink into the institutional, clubby atmosphere of Brussels, a world of expense accounts, black BMWs and cushy high-paying jobs. Samir Benelcaid, a Belgian radio talk-show host who broadcasts in French and Arabic, said "people in Brussels didn’t really worry about the future of the EU" even though they were involved in shaping it. The mentality is starting to change since this week’s bombings. "My own view is that Europe is falling down," Mr. Benelcaid said. "The EU is facing so many issues with no responses, like migration, terrorism, unemployment. They give billions and billions of euros to young people for jobs formation and there are no results." The questions facing the EU post-Brussels are whether the bloc is just one, or perhaps two, more blows away from shattering – and whether the threat of disintegration will persuade the EU’s leaders and citizens that their union is worth saving. The attacks highlighted yet another crisis for the bloc, this one institutional, by providing fresh and gruesome evidence of the inadequacies of the EU’s security and intelligence apparatuses Tuesday’s assault on the city’s airport and metro system killed at least 31 people and injured almost 300, many gravely. It came just four months after the attacks on Paris nightlife that killed another 130. The EU has been on the precipice before. In 2012, at the height of the euro crisis, Greece was on the verge of bolting from the euro zone and reprinting its pre-euro currency, the drachma, until the European Central Bank (ECB) went into firefighting mode and kept the monetary union intact. A greater firefighting mission is required now, but who will lead it and how it will be done are open questions. The euro zone has, at points, slipped into deflation (falling prices), prompting the ECB to introduce negative interest rates in an effort to lift prices. The largely Mediterranean countries on the "periphery" are becoming increasingly critical of the economic and refugee policies imposed on them by Brussels and Berlin. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is now leading the anti-EU charge in his country, though he is not yet advocating Italy’s withdrawal from the EU or the euro zone. The EU’s economic woes, while intensifying, are nothing new. What is new is the number of problems the continent is having to simultaneously confront. It is one thing to have a euro crisis; it is quite another to have a euro crisis in a time of regular terrorism, mass refugee arrivals, right-wing populism and a key member contemplating leaving the bloc. "I think the fact that euro-zone crisis is a distant memory shows that the political and economic governance – and now security governance – of the EU is in shambles," said Mr. Spiro. "How much more evidence do you need to prove that the EU project is in disarray? It really is facing an existential crisis."
	41	+
	42	+====Euro collapse causes global economic downturn—not even the US is resilient enough====
	43	+
	44	+====The Economist 14: **The economist, the Euro Zone. "Deflation in the Euro zone is all too close and extremely dangerous". October 25, 2013. **http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21627620-deflation-euro-zone-all-too-close-and-extremely-dangerous-worlds-biggest-economic**. RW====**
	45	+THE world economy is not in good shape. The news from America and Britain has been reasonably positive, but Japan’s economy is struggling and China’s growth is now slower than at any time since 2009. Unpredictable dangers abound, particularly from the Ebola epidemic, which has killed thousands in West Africa and jangled nerves far beyond. But the biggest economic threat, by far, comes from continental Europe. Now that German growth has stumbled, the euro area is on the verge of tipping into its third recession in six years. Its leaders have squandered two years of respite, granted by the pledge of Mario Draghi, the European Central Bank’s president, to do "whatever it takes" to save the single currency. The French and the Italians have dodged structural reforms, while the Germans have insisted on too much austerity. Prices are falling in eight European countries. The zone’s overall inflation rate has slipped to 0.3 and may well go into outright decline next year. A region that makes up almost a fifth of world output is marching towards stagnation and deflation. Optimists, both inside and outside Europe, often cite the example of Japan. It fell into deflation in the late-1990s, with unpleasant but not apocalyptic consequences for both itself and the world economy. But the euro zone poses far greater risks. Unlike Japan, the euro zone is not an isolated case: from China to America inflation is worryingly low, and slipping. And, unlike Japan, which has a homogenous, stoic society, the euro area cannot hang together through years of economic sclerosis and falling prices. As debt burdens soar from Italy to Greece, investors will take fright, populist politicians will gain ground, and—sooner rather than later—the euro will collapse. This parrot has ceased to be Although many Europeans, especially the Germans, have been brought up to fear inflation, deflation can be still more savage (see article). If people and firms expect prices to fall, they stop spending, and as demand sinks, loan defaults rise. That was what happened in the Great Depression, with especially dire consequences in Germany in the early 1930s. So it is worrying that, of the 46 countries whose central banks target inflation, 30 are below their target. Some price falls are welcome. Tumbling oil prices, in particular, have given consumers’ incomes a boost (see article). But slowing prices and stagnant wages owe more to weak demand in the economy and roughly 45m workers are jobless in the rich OECD countries. Investors are starting to expect lower inflation even in economies, such as America’s, that are growing at reasonable rates. Worse, short-term interest rates are close to zero in many economies, so central banks cannot cut them to boost spending. The only ammunition comes from quantitative easing and other forms of printing money.
	46	+
	47	+====Economic downturn causes resource competition and regional instability – co-opts all other causes of conflict. ====
	48	+Harris and Burrows 09: **~~Mathew Harris, PhD European History @ Cambridge and Counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Jennifer Burrows, Member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit. "Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis" http://www.ciaonet.org/~~. (2009)~~ **
	49	+Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups'inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks'and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
	50	+
	51	+====Causes extinction====
	52	+Freeman 14: **~~Chas W. Freehamn, served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, past president of the Middle East Policy Council, co-chair of the U.S. China Policy Foundation and a Lifetime Director of the Atlantic Council, 9/13/14, "A New Set of Great Power Relationships" (2014)~~ **
	53	+We live in a time of great strategic fluidity. Borders are shifting. Lines of control are blurring. Long-established spheres of influence are fading away. Some states are decaying and dissolving as others germinate and take root. The global economic order is precarious. New economic and geopolitical fault lines are emerging. The great powers of North and South America are barely on speaking terms. Europe is again driven by geopolitical antagonisms. Ukraine should be a prosperous, independent borderland between the European Union and Russia. It has instead become a cockpit of strategic contention. The United States and Russia have relapsed into hostility. The post-Ottoman borders of West Asia and North Africa are being erased. Neither Europeans, nor Russians, nor Americans can now protect or direct their longstanding clients in the Middle East. Brazil, China, and India are peacefully competing for the favor of Africa. But, in the Indo-Pacific, China and Japan are at daggers drawn and striving to ostracize each other. Sino-American relations seem to be following US-Russian relations into mutual exasperation and intransigence. No one surveying this scene could disagree that the world would benefit from recrafting the relationships between its great powers. As President Xi Jinping has proposed, new types of relations might enable the great powers to manage their interactions to the common advantage while lowering the risk of armed conflict. This is, after all, the nuclear age. A war could end in the annihilation of all who take part in it. Short of that, unbridled animosity and contention between great powers and their allies and friends have high opportunity costs and foster the tensions inherent in military posturing, arms races, instability, and impoverishment.
	54	+Decommissioning is key to US presence in Europe’s energy markets—Belgium is a test market for new technologies
	55	+Spersaud et al 16: Felicia Spersaud and Curt Cultice, US Department of Commerce. New opportunities for US companies in Belgium’s civil nuclear energy industry. June 20, 2016. Power Engineering. http://www.power-eng.com/articles/npi/print/volume-9/issue-3/nucleus/new-opportunities-for-u-s-companies-in-belgium-s-civil-nuclear-energy-industry.html. RW
	56	+Generally speaking, the country’s central location in one of the wealthiest regions of Europe provides an ideal gateway for selling to the EU. If located in Belgium, U.S. companies can reach 60 percent of Europe’s purchasing power in less than 24 hours by road. This is an important advantage. Second, Belgium’s diversity makes it an excellent test market. The country contains a few distinctly separate socio-demographic groups, such as the Germanic Flemings and the Latin Walloons, who speak French. Although they are separate demographic groups, they are governed by the same legal system. Because of this diversity, the Belgian economy reflects the overall European economy and consumer base like a mini-Europe. It is easier to enter the market in Belgium than to start with larger European markets. In a nutshell, if you succeed in Belgium, you are likely to succeed anywhere in Europe. More specific to the U.S. civil nuclear industry, Belgium’s Westinghouse-designed fleet of reactors is supported by dozens of companies in the U.S. civil nuclear supply chain, so U.S. firms have a history of successfully exporting to Belgium’s civil nuclear market, and there is room for additional U.S. companies to enter the market. Q: Could you provide some background on Belgium’s legislation for decommissioning its nuclear reactors? Croigny: The Belgian federal government passed a law in 2003 barring the construction of any new nuclear plants in Belgium and establishing a limit of 40 years for the operating lives of existing reactors. The law was revised in 2014, allowing an additional ten years of operation for the three oldest reactors. The revised law does not provide guidance for the remaining four reactors, but it is expected that their life will also be extended for an additional ten years once they have reached the end of their 40-year period. This means that, under the current law, the two oldest reactors will be decommissioned in 2025, with the remaining ones gradually phasing out by 2035. Therefore, significant opportunities for U.S. companies able to support decommissioning activities and lifetime extension will arise in the future. Q: How significant are the decommissioning opportunities in Belgium for U.S. firms? Croigny: Well, in terms of decommissioning, any U.S. company that has experience or can offer innovative processes in terms of decommissioning nuclear plants is encouraged to consider the Belgian market. This is going to be a great business opportunity for U.S. companies in the upcoming years as plants across Europe are gradually decommissioned. Until the sector is completely phased out, utilities will continue to invest in and upgrade their plants. Electrabel, the largest Belgium utility, has announced investments in equipment upgrades worth $700 million over a period of 10 years for three reactors. Since liberalization of the energy market in 1999, three different utilities - Electrabel, EDF Belgium and EDF Luminus - have operated Belgium’s seven nuclear reactors. My advice would be for U.S. companies to partner with local companies. One local company that is active in decommissioning is Tractebel, a Belgian engineering company that has built some of the nuclear power plants with Westinghouse and was also active in building the SCK-CEN research center. The companies who were originally active in building and designing the power plants would logically be active in decommissioning the same plants. The U.S. Commercial Service in Belgium can help U.S. companies identify potential local partners. Q: Is there any demand in Belgium for new civil nuclear technology? Croigny: There are no new builds planned for now, but given that the phasing out law has been amended, demand for new technologies is possible. I believe there may be interest in smaller and more flexible technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs), and Belgium is very much involved in fusion technologies with the http://www.iter.org/"ITER project. Interest in Gen III+ or Gen IV advanced reactors s lower though. If the phasing law is not further amended or is cancelled, the future of Belgium will be one without nuclear technology, at least for energy production. There will always be a strong focus on nuclear medicine and RandD in general. U.S. companies can definitely play an active role in those fields in the future.
	57	+Safeguards don’t check
	58	+Barret et al 13: Anthony M. Barret, Seth D. Baum, and Kelly R. Hostetler. Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, and Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia. June 28, 2013. http://sethbaum.com/ac/2013'NuclearWar.pdf. RW
	59	+War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity. Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter- attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 1 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions, with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks

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	1	+2016-10-06 01:17:00.885

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	1	+Tom Evnen

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	1	+Oakwood JW

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	1	+SEPTOCT- 1AC- Belgium

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