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1 -INTERPRETATION- Debaters must disclose all broken cases on the NDCA wiki under their own name. In this disclosure, they must post cites, tags, and first three and last three words of all cards read. Debaters may begin disclosing at any point during the season, but they must disclose all broken cases at least an hour before this round in order to meet my interp, regardless of whether the tournament requires disclosure.
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5 -Academic Integrity
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1 -2016-12-09 23:40:21.0
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1 -Lexington Rourke Aff
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1 -Disclose or Lose
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1 -Armenia AC
2 -
3 -Part One: Framing
4 -The Standard is Maximizing Expected Well Being.
5 -
6 -1.) Pain provides an objective for badness – anything else is abstraction.
7 -Gray 09
8 -Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008)
9 -If we have evidence that anything in particular has intrinsic value, then we also
10 -AND
11 -attempt to show that the alternatives are less justified in the next section.
12 -
13 -2.) Non ideal theory good.
14 -Mills 05
15 -Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
16 -I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune
17 -AND
18 -that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
19 -
20 -Part Two: Solvency
21 -
22 -Plan Text:
23 -
24 -The Republic of Armenia ought to prohibit production of nuclear power by partnering with the European Union to facilitate decommission of their only nuclear power plant: Metsamor. I reserve the right to clarify in CX.
25 -Anadolu 14
26 -Anadolu, Agency. “Turkey wants nuclear plant in Armenia to be shut down”. Daily News. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-wants-nuclear-plant-in-armenia-to-be-shut-down~-~-~-~-~-~-.aspx?pageID=238andnid=63928. 3/21/14 LBE
27 -The Metsamor nuclear power plant in Armenia is outdated and should be urgently closed down
28 -AND
29 -, defying safety risk concerns voiced by a number of groups at home.
30 -
31 -Process
32 -
33 -EU covers funding due to safety concerns.
34 -Hadzhieva 16
35 -Eli Hadzhieva, Eli Hadzhieva is Director and founder of Dialogue for Europe, a Brussels-based NGO. She previously served in the European Parliament and in OCDE. Easy target for terrorists: Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear plant. https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/easy-target-for-terrorists-armenias-metsamor-nuclear-plant/ NG
36 -On numerous occasions, the EU has called for the ‘earliest possible closure’ of
37 -AND
38 -, as the power plant accounts for 40 of Armenia’s electricity supplies.
39 -
40 -EU covers transition to renewables.
41 -Azeri 16
42 -Azeri press news agency. “Azerbaijan should bring the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the agenda of the UN”. Energy Central News. http://www.energycentral.com/news/azerbaijan-should-bring-closure-metsamor-nuclear-power-plant-agenda-un 5/15/16 LBE
43 -Zahid Oruj said that in April, during an unsuccessful 4-day war for
44 -AND
45 -. As if the Metsamor nuclear power plant was on an auction. "
46 -
47 -EU grant means plan directly transitions to renewable energy.
48 -Vorotnikov 16
49 -Vorotnikov, Vladislav. “Legislative Reform to Promote Solar Energy in Armenia”. Renewable Energy World. Vladislav Vorotnikov After graduating from the journalistic faculty of the Voronezh State University in Russia specializating of agricultural management, Vladislav began working in the one of Russian largest livestock news and trading service Agro.ru. http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2016/06/legislative-reform-to-promote-solar-energy-in-armenia.html. 6/1/16 LBE
50 -The Armenian Parliament on May 12 adopted the second and final reading draft amendments “
51 -AND
52 -, hydroelectric and thermal power stations, will make this transition less painful.”
53 -
54 -Part Three: Advantage
55 -
56 -One: Renewables
57 -
58 -Nuclear ban fuels interest in renewables.
59 -Korosec 11
60 -Korosec, Kirsten. “Germany’s nuclear ban: the global effect” CBS News. Author for CBS and Forbes. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/germanys-nuclear-ban-the-global-effect/ . 5/31/11 LBE
61 -Germany is already a world leader in renewable energy. Today, renewable energy provides
62 -AND
63 -opportunity, will enter the market and existing renewable energy businesses will expand.
64 -
65 -Coming energy reform supercharges transition to renewables.
66 -McGinnity 15
67 -McGinnity, Ian. “Armenia at an Energy Crossroads”. RSC. http://regional-studies.org/blog/443-010415. 4/1/15 LBE
68 -Despite Armenia’s progress, the country now faces challenging questions about its energy future.
69 -AND
70 -With so much on the line, there is little margin for error.
71 -
72 -Comprehensive analysis proves - renewable energy in Armenia is economically viable, and would create economic growth, reduce harm to the environment, and improve national security. Multiple impacts.
73 -Touryan et al No Date
74 -Areg Gharabegian1 , Artak Hambarian2 , Morten Søndergaard3 , Kenell Touryan4. “Renewable Energy in Armenia”. Danish Energy Management. Hetq.am. 1 - Areg Gharabegian is a principal project manager with Parsons, Pasadena, CA. 2 - Artak Hambarian is a professor in School of Engineering of American University of Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia. 3 - Morten Søndergaard is a project manager with Danish Energy Management, Denmark. 4 - Kenell Touryan is a visiting professor in School of Engineering of American University of Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia and retired researcher from NREL, Denver, CO. http://hetq.am/static/content/pdf/Renewable_Energy_in_Armenia_9-17-11.pdf . No date LBE
75 -The findings of a comprehensive review of renewable energy potential in Armenia have ranked small
76 -AND
77 -, which in turn could be a major component of Armenia’s national security.
78 -
79 -Two: Azerbaijan War
80 -
81 -Azerbaijan wants the plant closed due to empirical terrorism concerns – existence of the plant harms relations.
82 -Azeri 16
83 -Azeri press news agency. “Azerbaijan should bring the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the agenda of the UN”. Energy Central News. http://www.energycentral.com/news/azerbaijan-should-bring-closure-metsamor-nuclear-power-plant-agenda-un 5/15/16 LBE
84 -According to the parliamentarian, though the Metsamor nuclear power plant is not a nuclear
85 -AND
86 -the existence of the plant is a threat not only to Azerbaijan. "
87 -
88 -An Armenia-Azerbaijan war is extremely likely – relations are key.
89 -Amos 16
90 -Amos, Howard. “Rare Deadly Blast Hits Armenian Capital; Terrorist Attack Feared”. IBTimes. Howard Amos is the Russia correspondent for IBT Media/Newsweek. http://www.ibtimes.com/rare-deadly-blast-hits-armenian-capital-terrorist-attack-feared-2359440. 4/25/16 LBE
91 -Four days of clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops in early April in Nagorno-
92 -AND
93 -war could break out “at any moment” in Nagorno-Karabakh.
94 -
95 -The nuclear issue is a source of regional conflict.
96 -Shaffer 16
97 -Shaffer, Brenda. “Fighting in the Caucasus: Implications for the Wider Region”. The Washington Institute. Brenda Shaffer is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies. She has also provided energy research and analysis to various governments and companies, including in Azerbaijan and the wider Caspian region. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/fighting-in-the-caucasus-implications-for-the-wider-region. 4/7/16 LBE
98 -While Baku and Yerevan blame each other for the outburst of renewed fighting on April
99 -AND
100 -to strengthen cooperation between Washington and Baku after two years of rocky relations.
101 -
102 -This war would go global.
103 -Shaffer 16
104 -Shaffer, Brenda. “Fighting in the Caucasus: Implications for the Wider Region”. The Washington Institute. Brenda Shaffer is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies. She has also provided energy research and analysis to various governments and companies, including in Azerbaijan and the wider Caspian region. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/fighting-in-the-caucasus-implications-for-the-wider-region. 4/7/16 LBE
105 -The current escalation could also draw in actors beyond the Caucasus, including in the
106 -AND
107 -its disposal to coerce the Israelis given its ongoing intervention in neighboring Syria.
108 -
109 -Global war goes nuclear.
110 -Nichols 14
111 -Nichols, Tom. “Five ways a nuclear wat could still happen”. The National Interest. Tom Nichols is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School. His most recent book is No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (University of Pennsylvania, 2014) The views expressed are his own. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-ways-nuclear-war-could-still-happen-10665?page=4. 6/16/14 LBE
112 -As we move from mechanical errors to human agency, things actually get scarier.
113 -AND
114 -have a clarifying, rather than a panicking, effect on the enemy.
115 -
116 -Nuclear war leads to extinction.
117 -Starr 15
118 -Starr, Steven. “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction” Federation of American Scientists. Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/. 10/14/15 LBE
119 -Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-
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1 -2016-12-11 16:57:35.0
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1 -Jonathan Alston
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1 -Bronx HS of Science JO
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1 -Lexington Rourke Aff
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1 -SeptOct- Armenia 1AC
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1 -Byram Hills Invitational
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1 -QI- Ableism 1AC
2 -
3 -Framing
4 -
5 -Structural violence necessitates the exclusion of certain groups—this renders ethical theories meaningless
6 -
7 -Winter and Leighton 99
8 -
9 - Winter and Leighton ‘99 Deborah DuNann Winter (Professor of Psychology Department of Psychology Whitman College) and Dana sC. Leighton (Ph.D. I teach and do research in social psychology and peace psychology.). Winter "Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century."
10 -Finally, to recognize the operation
11 -AND
12 -building lasting peace.
13 -
14 -
15 -Ableism operates as foundational tactic of oppression that must be resisted
16 -
17 -Siebers 09
18 -University of Michigan, Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism ¶ (Tobin, “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, Oct 28, Lecture, http://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=1andved=0CCoQFjAAandurl=http3A2F2Fdisabilities.temple.edu2Fmedia2Fds2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.docandei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQandusg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQandsig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA, accessed 7/7/12, sl)
19 -Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form
20 -AND
21 -represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.
22 -
23 -Thus, the Role of the ballot is to endorse the strategy for resisting ableist oppression
24 -
25 -Social constructions of disability are the root cause of other forms of oppression since the drive for normalization and the desire for aesthetic coherence forms the basis of our politics—thus, the Role of the judge is to facilitate disability scholarship.
26 -
27 -Siebers 10
28 - Tobin, Professor of English at the University of Michigan, Disability Aesthetics, pg. 58-63
29 -These two episodes may seem worlds apart, their resemblance superficial. The first turns
30 -AND
31 -kids that do weird things. (Cited by Fine and Asch 48)
32 -
33 -Offense
34 -
35 -Plan Text: The United States federal government should overturn San Francisco v Sheehan and rule that police officers found to have violated the Americans with Disabilities act (or ADA) should be denied qualified immunity.
36 -
37 -Contention 1- Accountability
38 -
39 -The court’s decision in San Fransico v. Sheehan ruled that officer’s actions need not comply with the ADA to be granted qualified immunity
40 -
41 -SCOTUS 15
42 - SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Syllabus CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. SHEEHAN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 13–1412. Argued March 23, 2015—Decided May 18, 2015 201. RW
43 -Respondent Sheehan lived in a group home for individuals with mental illness. After Sheehan
44 -AND
45 -ill person who has been acting irrationally and has threatened anyone who enters.
46 -
47 -That makes legal recourse for disabled people impossible, weakens ADA protections and justifies police atrocities—training doesn’t solve
48 -
49 -Çevik 15
50 - Mrs. Kerima Çevik is curently a blogger for disabilty rights, autistic inclusion, accommodation, communication rights, and representation. A parent activist, editor and contributing writer who consults on Autism and Ethnicity, she blogs on topics of critical race, intersectionality, autism and social justice. An independent researcher, she focuses on shining a light on disparities in qualify of life for marginalized intersected disabled populations and their families through grassroots community building activities and pay it forward activism models. She is a married mother of two children, and world traveler currently homeschooling her adventurous son Mustafa, who is intensely Autistic and nonspeaking.. Standing at the intersectino of adolescence, race, and disability. The Autism Wars. June 9, 2015. http://theautismwars.blogspot.com/2015/06/standing-at-intersection-of-adolescence.html. RW
51 -When I realized that roughly 70 of people with disabilities encountered law enforcement more
52 -AND
53 -no one will ever answer for the innocent lives taken that day either.
54 -
55 -Qualified immunity as a defense legitimizes ableist stigmas and enables police killings—that’s a state-sanctioned form of structural violence that normalize genocidal practices—accountability is at the heart of this problem
56 -
57 -Mack 16
58 - Tracy Mack. January 6, 2016. International Socialists. Legitmizing police violence: Sanism, ableism, and racism. http://www.socialist.ca/node/2978. RW
59 -Even when damning evidence exists against Toronto police officers, they have not been held
60 -AND
61 -legitimized practice of the state and of the social order that authorizes it.
62 -
63 -Plan solves—Overturning San Fransisco v. Sheehan is key to stop ableist police violence by holding police accountable for their actions—it also enables more effective policing
64 -
65 -Perry 15
66 - David M. Perry. Aljazeera America. A chance to reduce police killings of the disabled. March 23, 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/a-chance-to-reduce-police-killings-of-the-disabled.html. RW
67 -Twenty-five years after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA
68 -AND
69 -officers did not reasonably accommodate her disability. Furthermore, her attorneys argue that
70 -
71 -Threat of litigation specifically in ADA cases incentivizes better policing and catalyzes reform necessary for inclusion
72 -
73 -Auner 16
74 - Thomas J. Auner. “For the Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable, the ADA Should Apply to Arrests." Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 49.1 (2016). RW
75 -When courts deem the ADA applicable to specific situations, public and private entities typically
76 -AND
77 -but more importantly, will tangibly improve the safety of the mentally ill.
78 -
79 -ADA lawsuits are a crucial check on state power—reforming qualified immunity is a good first step to transform the criminal justice landscape to better suit the needs of disabled people
80 -
81 -Perry 2
82 - David M. Perry. Aljazeera America. A chance to reduce police killings of the disabled. March 23, 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/a-chance-to-reduce-police-killings-of-the-disabled.html. RW
83 -tthe violation of the ADA should exempts the officers from qualified immunity,
84 -AND
85 -need legal reform to convince law enforcement of that on a national level.
86 -
87 -Qualified immunity blocks larger social movements by fragmenting systemic problems into individual cases—the aff is key
88 -
89 -Hassel 99
90 - Hassel, Diana. "Living a Lie: The cost of Qualified Immunity" Winter 1999. Volume 64. Missouri law Review. Available at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9 NB
91 -The problem with qualified immunity is not so much that the outcomes are sometimes unfair
92 -AND
93 -us peace, but it keeps from us the tools required for reform.
94 -
95 -Contention 2- Competence
96 -
97 -Qualified immunity cases are decided based on a standard of “reasonable competence”—letting good officers off the hook and punishing the incompetent ones
98 -
99 -Blum 13
100 - Karen M. Blum. Suffolk University Law School. February 1, 2013. Qualified immunity: Update on absolute immunity. http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/Section1983QualifiedImmunity.pdf. RW
101 -Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244-51
102 -AND
103 -not entitled to the shield of immunity, even after Van de Kamp.”).
104 -
105 -The law enforcement and justice system’s perpetuation of competent/incompetent binaries institutionalize ableist violence and marginalization—rejecting them is a key form of resistance
106 -
107 -Brown 13
108 - Lydia X.Z. Brown. Organizer, Editor, Writer, Speaker. Interrogation of competency in the mentally disabled subject. May 25, 2013. http://www.autistichoya.com/2013/05/interrogating-competency-in-mentally.html. RW
109 -Those of us who live with psychiatric, developmental, and neurological disabilities know intimately
110 -AND
111 -those are only the natural consequences of such and systemic ableism.
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1 -NovDec- Ableism 1AC
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1 -Ridge Debates
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1 -=1AC – Agonism=
2 -
3 -====First, realism fails—there are no objective moral truths because truth is always subjectively constructed by the agents in question—====
4 -
5 -====a.) Agents construct claims based on their particular circumstances, not some higher order maxim ====
6 -
7 -====Young 90: ~~Iris Marion Young. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Justice and the Politics of Difference." Princeton University Press. 1990~~ KB====
8 -Impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental "view from nowhere" that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects. This ideal of the impartial transcendental subject denies or represses difference in three ways. First, it denies the particularity of situations. The reasoning subject, emptied of all its particularity, treats all situations according to the same moral rules, and the more the rules can be reduced to a single rule or principle, the more this impartiality and universality will be guaranteed. Whatever her or his particular situation, any subject can reason from this universal point of view according to uni­ versal principles that apply to all moral situations in the same way. Second, in its requirement of dispassion, impartiality seeks to master or eliminate heterogeneity in the form of feeling. Only by expelling desire or affectivity from reason can impartiality achieve its unity. The construct of an impartial point of view is arrived at by abstracting from the concrete particularity of the person in situation. This requires abstracting from the particularity of bodily being, its needs and inclinations, and from the feel­ ings that attach to the experienced particularity of things and events. Normative reason is defined as impartial, and reason defines the unity of the moral subject, both in the sense that it knows the universal principles of morality and in the sense that it is what all moral subjects have in common in the same way. This reason thus stands opposed to desire and affectivity as what differentiate and particularize persons. Third, the most important way that the ideal of impartiality reduces particularity to unity is in reducing the plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity. In its requirement of universality, the ideal of impartial rea­ son is supposed to represent a point of view that any and all rational sub­ jects can adopt, precisely by abstracting from the situational particulari-ties that individualize them. The impartial moral judge, moreover, ideally should treat all persons alike, according to the same principles, impar­ tially applied. In its will to reduce plurality to unity, impartiality seeks one transcen­ dental moral subjectivity. Impartial reason judges from a point of view outside of the particular perspectives of persons involved in interaction, able to totalize these perspectives into a whole, or a general will. From this point of view of a solitary transcendent god, the moral reasoner si­ lently deduces its judgment from weighing the evidence and conflicting claims, and applying to them universal principles. Because it already takes all perspectives into account, the impartial subject need acknowl­ edge no subjects other than itself to whose interests, opinions, and desires it should attend. .. Impartial reason, as we have seen, also generates a dichotomy between reason and feeling. Because of their particularity, feeling, inclincation, needs, and desire are expelled from the universality of moral reason. Dispassion requires that one abstract from the personal pull of desire, commitment, care, in relation to a moral situation and regard it impersonally. Feeling and commitment are thereby expelled from moral reason; all feelings and desires are devalued, become equally irrational, equally irrelevant to moral judgment (Spraegens, 1981, pp.250-56). This drive to unity fails, however. Feelings, desires, and commitments do not cease to exist and motivate just because they have been excluded from the definition of moral reason. They lurk as inarticulate shadows, belying the claim to comprehensiveness of universalist reason. In its project of reducing the plurality of subjects to one universal point of view, the ideal of impartiality generates another dichotomy, between a general will and particular interests. The plurality of subjects is not in fact eliminated, but only expelled from the moral realm; the concrete interests, needs, and desires of persons and the feelings that differentiate them from one another become merely private, subjective. In modern political theory this dichotomy appears as that between a public authority that represents the general interest, on the one hand, and private individuals with their own private desires, unshareable and incommunicable. We shall explore this dichotomy further in the next section. The ideal of impartiality expresses in fact an impossibility, a fiction. No one can adopt a point of view that is completely impersonal and dispassionate, completely separated from any particular context and commitments. In seeking such a notion of moral reason philosophy is utopian; as Nagel expresses it, the impartial view is a view from nowhere. I argue that instead of focusing on distribution, a conception of justice should begin with the concepts of domination and oppression. Such a shift brings out issues of decisionmaking, division of labor, and culture that bear on social justice but are often ignored in philosophical discussions. It also exhibits the importance of social group differences in structuring social relations and oppression; typically, philosophical theories of justice have operated with a social ontology that has no room for a concept of social groups. I argue that where social group differences exist and some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, social justice requires explicitly acknowledging and attending to those group differences in order to undermine oppression. Although I discuss and argue about justice, I do not construct a theory of justice. A theory of justice typically derives fundamental principles of justice that appl~~ies~~y to all or most societies, whatever their concrete configuration and social relations, from a few general premises about the nature of human beings, the nature of societies, and the nature of reason. True to the meaning of theoria, it wants to see justice. It assumes a point of view outside the social context where issues of justice arise, in order to gain a comprehensive view. The theory of justice is intended to be self-standing, since it exhibits its own foundations. As a discourse it aims to be whole, and to show justice in its unity. It is detemporalized, in that nothing comes before it and future events will not affect its truth or relevance to social life. Theorists of justice have a good reason for abstracting from the particular circumstances of social life that give rise to concrete claims of justice, to take a position outside social life that rests on reason. Such a self-standing rational theory would be independent of actual social institutions and relations, and for that reason could serve as a reliable and objective normative standard for evaluating those institutions and relations. Without a universal normative theory of justice grounded independently of the experience of a particular society, it is often assumed, philosophers and social actors cannot distinguish legitimate claims of justice from socially specific prejudices or self-interested claims to power. The attempt to develop a theory of justice that both stands independent of a given social context and yet measures its justice, however, fails in one of two ways. If the theory is truly universal and independent, presupposing no particular social situations, institutions, or practices, then it is simply too abstract to be useful in evaluating actual institutions and practices. In order to be a useful measure of actual justice and injustice, it must contain some substantive premises about social life, which are usually derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the actual social context in which the theorizing takes place. Many have argued that Rawls’s theory of justice, for example, must have some substantive premises if it is to ground substantive conclusions, and these premises implicitly derive from experience of people in modern liberal capitalist societies (see Young, 1981; Simpson, 1980; Wolf~~}, 1977, pt. IV). A theory of justice that claims universality, comprehensiveness, and necessity implicitly conflates moral reflection with scientific knowledge (Williams, 1985, chap. 6). Reflective discourse about justice, however, should not pose as knowledge in the mode of seeing or observing, where the knower is initiator and master of the known. Discourse about justice is not motivated originally by curiosity, a sense of wonder, or the desire to figure out how something works. The sense of justice arises not from looking, but as jean-Francois Lyotard says, from listening: For us, a language is First and foremost someone talking. But there are language games in which the important thing is to listen, in which the rule deals with audition. Such a game is the game of the just. And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens, that is, one speaks as a listener, and not as an author. (Lyotard, 1985, pp. 71-72) While everyday discourse about justice certainly makes claims, these are not theorems to be demonstrated in a self-enclosed system. They are instead calls, pleas, claims upon some people by others. Rational reflection on justice begins in a hearing, in heeding a call, rather than in asserting and mastering a state of affairs, however ideal.
9 -
10 -====b.) All social relations and identity formations are fluid and constantly changing—that means we can never reach a complete understanding of the world or ethical consensus====
11 -Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. "Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism" Feminists Theorize the Political
12 -If I can, then, I'lI try to return to the subject at hand. In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms its situation. The subject is constructed through acts of differentiation that distinguish the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity conventionally associated with the feminine, but clearly not exclusively. Precisely in this recent war we saw "the Arab" figured as the abjected other as welI as a site of homophobic fantasy made clear in the abundance of bad jokes grounded in the linguistic sliding from Saddam to Sodom. Joint Chiefs of Staff invoked what is, I think, a new military convention of calling the sending of missiles "the delivery of an ordnance." The phrase is significant, I think; it figures an act of violence as an act of law (the military term "ordnance" is linked etymologically to the juridical "ordi- nance"), and so wraps the destruction in the appearance of orderliness; but in addition, it figures the missile as a kind of command, an order to obey, and is thus itself figured as a certain act of speech which not only delivers a message-get out of Kuwait-but effectively enforces that message through the threat of death and through death itself. Of course, this is a message that can never be received, for it kills its addressee, and so it is not an ordinance at alI, but the failure of alI ordinances, the refusal of a communication. And for those who remain to read the message, they will not read what is some- times quite literally written on the missile. Throughout the war, we witnessed and participated in the conflation of the television screen and the lens of the bomber pilot. In this sense, the visual record of this war is not a reflection on the war, but the enactment of its phantasmatic structure, indeed, part of the very means by which it is socially constituted and maintained as a war. The so-calIed "smart bomb" records its target as it moves in to destroy it-a bomb with a camera attached in front, a kind of optical phallus; it relays that film back to a command control and that film is refilmed on television, effectively constituting the television screen and its viewer as the extended apparatus of the bomb itself. ln this sense, by viewing we are bombing, identified with both bomber and bomb, flying through space, transported from the North American continent to Iraq, and yet securely wedged in the couch in one's own living room. The smart bomb screen is, of course, destroyed in the moment that it enacts its destruction, which is to say that this is a recording of a thoroughly de- structive act which can never record that destructiveness, indeed, which ef- fects the phantasmatic distinction between the hit and its consequences. Thus as viewers, we veritably enact the allegory of military triumph: we retain Ourvisual distance and our bodily safety through the disembodied enactment of the kill that produces no blood and in which we retain our radical im- permeability. In this sense, we are in relation to this site of destruction ab- solutely proximate, absolutely essential, and absolutely distant, a figure for imperial power which takes the aerial, global view, the disembodied killer who can never be killed, the sniper as a figure for imperialist military power. The television screen thus redoubles the aerial view, securing a fantasy of transcendence, of a disembodied instrument of destruction which is infinitely protected from a reverse-strike through the guarantee of electronic distance. This aerial view never comes c10se to seeing the effects of its destruc- tion, and as a c1ose-up to the site becomes increasingly possible, the screen Conveniently destroys itself. And so although it was made to seem that this Was a humane bombing, one which took buildings and military installations as its targets, this was, on the contrary, the effect'of a frame which excluded from view the systematic destruction of a population, what Foucault calIs the modem dream of states.8 Or perhaps we ought to state it otherwise: precisely through excluding its targets from view under the rubric of proving the capacity to target precisely, this is a frame that effectively performs the annihilation that it systematically derealizes. The demigod of a U.S. military subject which euphorically enacted the fantasy that it can achieve its aims with ease fails to understand that its actions have produced effects that will far exceed its phantasmatic purview; it thinks that its goals were achieved in a matter of weeks, and that its action was completed. But the action continues to act after the intentional subject has announced its completion. The effects of its actions have already in- augurated violence in places and in ways that it not only could not foresee but will be unable ultimately to contain, effects which will produce a mas- sive and violent contestation of the Westem subjects phantasmatic self-con- struction. If I can, then, I'lI try to retum to the subject at hand. In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms its situation. The subject is constructed through acts of differentiation that distinguish the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity conventionally associated with the feminine, but clearly not exclusively. Precisely in this recent war we saw "the Arab" fig- ured as the abjected other as welI as a site of homophobic fantasy made clear in the abundance of bad jokes grounded in the linguistic sliding from Saddam to Sodom. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subjects production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an ex- temal web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be tumed against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratiza- tion? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an extemal political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed ooly at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that "agency" has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation that can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fulIy constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power's own possibility of being reworked. It is not enough to say that the subject is invariably engaged in a political field; that phenomenological phrasing misses the point that the subject is an accomplishment regulated and produced in advance. And is as such fulIy political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.
13 -
14 -====That presents an inherent conflict within the nature of ethical deliberation—conflicting viewpoints are inevitable because identity is inevitably shaped by the environment that surrounds it—abstract ethics misunderstand the reality of social location—that means ethics must account for the epistemological differences between subjects, or else it would fail to make normative claims on the individual ====
15 -Mills 5: Charles W. Mills, "Ideal Theory" as Ideology, 2005. RW
16 -"An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds." (168)
17 -
18 -====If difference in ethical viewpoints is inevitable, then reaching consensus is impossible because some level of disagreement will always exist—the question now becomes how to proceed from that conflict—prefer agonism because it frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy.====
19 -Dryzek 6 ~~John Dryzek, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649~~
20 -Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but ppositive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing "equal respect," under "procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking" (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of "agonistic respect" as "a critical pluralist ethos" (1999, 70). Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to ~~would~~ be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable. Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply "anything goes" in terms of the substance of positions. Recall that Mouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worries about dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks "transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice" (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from "anything goes" relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.
21 -====Analytic
22 -
23 -====Argumentation must be embraced as the starting point for ethics—Inevitable conflicts in deliberation prove the necessity of argumentation in creating normative claims ====
24 -
25 -====Kinsella 11: **~~Stephan Kinsella, Friday, May 27, 2011. Attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Ludwig von Mises Institute~~====**
26 -In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument is lacking: It has been a common quarrel with the natural rights position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far "too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law." Furthermore, its description of rationality is equally ambiguous in that it does not seem to distinguish between the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature on the one hand and normative laws of human conduct on the other. (The Economics and Ethics of Private Property ~~EEPP~~, p. 313; also A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism ~~TSC~~, p. 156n118) Hoppe's ~~the~~ solution is to focus on the nature of argumentation instead of action in general: The praxeological approach solves this problem by recognizing that it is not the wider concept of human nature but the narrower one of propositional exchanges and argumentation which must serve as the starting point in deriving an ethic. (EEPP, p. 345) Here he draws on the work of his PhD advisor, the famous European philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and fellow German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel, who had developed a theory of "discourse ethics" or "argumentation ethics." As Hoppe explains this basic approach, any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this ~~is~~ very fact has been aptly called "the a priori of communication and argumentation." (EEPP, p. 314) That is, there are certain norms presupposed by the very activity of arguing. Apel and Habermas go on to argue that the ethics presupposed as legitimate by discourse as such justify the standard set of soft-socialist policies. But Hoppe, while recognizing the value of the basic approach, rejected their application of this theory and socialist conclusions. Instead, Hoppe took what was valuable in the Apel-Habermas approach and melded it with Misesian-Rothbardian insights to provide a praxeological-discourse-ethics twist on the standard natural-law defense of rights. In essence, Hoppe's view is that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting, which requires individual control of scarce resources. In genuine discourse, the parties try to persuade each other by the force of their argument, not by actual force: Argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his ~~or her~~ own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth). (TSC, p. 158)
27 -====Analytic
28 -====Thus, the standard is consistency with agonistic democracy — To clarify, it's a question of creating procedural elements that allow for discussion, not achieving specific ends. Consequentialism is circular because it relies on induction but every induction relies on another induction—namely that past trends tend to reproduce themselves which means their framework causes infinite regress ====
29 -====Analytic
30 -
31 -====And Only adopting an agonistic stance towards political engagement can contest dominant power structures—everything else makes mass violence and authoritarianism inevitable====
32 -
33 -====Wingenbach 11====
34 - (Ed, Notre Dame Government and international studies PhD, "Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy," pg 190-198, https://books.google.com/books?id=7-8JrC64UgwCandprintsec=frontcover//LADI)
35 -Third, because Knops ignores the situated source of antagonism and the persistence of hegemony in the construction of meaning he misconceives the problem of subordination and oppression. The objective of agonistic democracy is not to eliminate all relations of domination and oppression; this sort of utopian aspiration leads precisely to the rationalist exclusions they are at pains to expose. Rather, the goal is to craft conditions under which these relations can be made visible, and thus contested. The common values that make agonism possible, and their dominant institutional interpretations, inevitably and explicitly favor some identities, interests, or other articulations of subjectivity over others. In fact, these values and their dominant interpretations act to shape subjectivity so that they are seen not as constructions but simply "the way things are." Because Knops assumes the project of agonism is to eliminate these hegemonic relations of domination, he also assumes that Mouffe needs to establish an unbiased and objective set of criteria by which to identify and ameliorate these injustices. Hence his claim that her theory ultimately must rely on rationalist arguments. But agonism does not share this aspiration. Instead pluralist agonism accepts that the inevitability of injustice is the price of democratic plurality, and endeavors to identify practices that render these injustices amenable to contestation. Agonism hopes to set interpretation against interpretation, identity against identity, hegemonic claim against hegemonic claim, so that in the perpetual conflict between citizens the burden of domination shifts and moves. Where Knops sees unbiased consensus on rational principles eliminating domination, Mouffe sees an elaboration of hegemonic power so thorough as to make the injustices it produces not merely invisible but unthinkable. When Knops concludes that Mouffe's agonism should be seen as an adjunct to deliberation, one that calls attention to "the erroneous projection of one party's understandings onto another, constraining their meanings - it is fraught with the possibility of hegemony" (2007, 125), he is mistakenly subsuming agonism into deliberation by eliding the ontological distinctions between the two accounts. Deliberative democracy has faith that careful scrutiny of arguments, rational evaluation of principles, and deliberation oriented toward understanding will produce an unforced consensus shorn of power, domination, and manipulation. Its reconstruction of democratic principles is one that aspires to transcend the ambiguity of the everyday in order to resolve injustice. It takes this possibility as a real one, because its ontology is fundamentaily committed to the universality of human nature. Agonistic democrats refuse any such commitments, asserting instead that the premises of social life are themselves products of humanity, and that the ontology within which our politics emerges is itself a product of political assertions. No standard can be found or created that can extract us from this process of meaning creation, and thus all political standards should be understood as both historically constraining (we cannot start anew) and subject to collective reconstruction (we can act upon our situation by rendering it visible). Nonetheless, Knops's confusion is understandable-how is one to know what this process of contestation and reinterpretation looks like, absent some institutional suggestions consistent with the particularity of the history that makes agonism attractive? Political liberalism, modified as I suggested in the last chapter, helps clarify this question. Pluralist agonism requires some shared commitments without which the unavoidably contentious process of disputing hegemonic interpretations will descend into antagonism. Precisely because the clashes of politics are not oriented toward consensus, and precisely because democratic engagement always involves challenges with the potential to become explicitly violent (as all challenges are, at some level, hegemonic contestations), some institutional norms are needed to confine or limit the range of these battles. Agonism proposes that our situated context may provide governing norms that permit the procedures of contestation to occur, without those same norms becoming idealized or acquiring pseudo¬transcendent status. We begin from "our" norms, which contain within them some commitment to fundamental values (liberty/equality), but make the contest over the meaning and implementation of these norms a central aspect of institutional and political debate. Schmittian violence emerges when contestants cannot perceive a commonality sufficient to justify limitations of the tactics employed. But the commonality that permits these shared limits need not hold extra-political status. Put differently, the concern of critics of agonism seems to be that the barrier to violence can only be effective if it is itself uncontaminated by the conflicts it is meant to mediate, or can be sufficiently abstracted from these conflicts as to play a semi-transcendental role. If the boundaries of engagement are recognized as being themselves in play, then they will lack sufficient purchase to restrain politics. Thus the proposed dichotomy: either agonism will collapse into warfare, or agonism presupposes a hidden extra-political claim. Emphasizing the post-foundational elements from which agonism derives helps illustrate why this dichotomy can be plausibly refused. This is why the tum to Rawls (and, to a lesser extent, Habermas) is useful for agonistic democracy. Political liberalism details the way institutional and cultural structures shape and constrain political engagement without demanding an external anchor. Political liberalism is a situated reconstruction of the emergence of the values of liberal democracy and the operation of those values upon citizens. It is only the Rawlsian insistence upon a well-ordered society that makes political liberalism appear as a moralized account of democratic politics rather than a situated and contingent one. As I show in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of the situated norms of liberalism does not, ultimately, depend upon the semi-transcendental status Rawls evokes. That these values are ours historically, and that they shape our identities and aspirations contingently, provides sufficient status to guide political action. Highlighting this contingency and inviting citizen engagement in conflicts over the interpretation and application of these values need not weaken their pragmatic significance. It is only dangerous to expose the contingency of our deeply shared ontopolitical premises if one of those premises suggests that legitimacy must be derived from criteria not subject to human agency. It is on this point that agonism captures better than many theories the central insights of democratic theory. To the extent democracy is identified with individual and collective autonomy from imposed authority, to the extent democracy is identified with individual and collective agency over the terms of social cooperation, and to the extent democracy is identified with the rights of individuals and collectives to challenge these authorities and those terms, an agonistic account of democracy as situated historically while engaged in ongoing reconstruction of the contingent but deeply shared values of liberal democracy represents a powerful vision. It shares with other post-metaphysical theorists, like Habermas and Rawls, an emphasis on the reconstructive aspects of democratic theory, designed to adduce from extant practices and necessary assumptions the best possible description of legitimate democratic politics. But it pushes these reconstructive projects further by demanding that the practices and institutions of democracy itself be engaged in this reconstruction rather than merely governed by it. Agonistic democracy emerged reactively, offered as an alternative vision of liberalism, deliberation, and democratic engagement. The emphasis of this work on critique, practices of identity, contestation of power, exposure of hegemonic interpretations, and so on depict a vision of democracy that is primarily procedural: democracy reflects practices that take place within the existing realm of the political. Agonism thus explicitly situates itself within existing institutional forms, not outside them. Unlike radical democracy, agonistic thinkers propose not a revolution but a reformation, urging that extant democratic resources be strengthened, democratic values reinterpreted, and hegemonic structures exposed and contested. To the extent agonism is transformative, it is transformative from within the horizon of politics from which it emerges. Agonism does not evoke sudden and rapid change in the character of social order. Over time agonism might lead, directly and indirectly, to dramatic reforms to, and even revolutionary redesign of, democratic institutions, but that change is inevitably slow. This makes agonism appear conservative when compared to radical democracy, as radical democracy takes as its goal the near term transformation and elimination of social and economic injustice. Agonism aspires to create a democratic social order that will lead to the amelioration or destruction of injustice, but recognizes that such injustices are embedded in the context of politics within which such work occurs and against which organization, mobilization, and resistance must take place. Agonism does not represent transformation, but it creates democratic conditions out of which real transformation might arise. To claim that liberalism in its Rawlsian variant represents the best path for agonism is not a capitulation to the narratives of liberalism and its inevitable injustices, nor an endorsement of chastened conservatism about social change. It is to recognize that transformative politics begins within existing politics, and that an effective strategy must identify the structures most amenable to that project. Agonism as a political practice demands both the common ontopolitical framework within which conflict can take place and an institutional framework open to this practice. Political liberalism offers both, without also requiring agonism to shed its skepticism about foundational or teleological claims. Agonism presupposes active engagement with the situated character of social life in order to grasp our own circumstances without demanding to be liberated from them. Political liberalism takes these circumstances as the frame from which a governing interpretation of justice emerges; as long as this conception remains open to further reinterpretation (as it can be once severed from the insistence on stability) political liberalism supports agonistic politics. The objections of Mouffe and others can be attributed to Rawls's insistence that the governing interpretation of the political embody an overlapping consensus with deep roots in comprehensive moral doctrines, and which can be invoked to resolve contentious questions of democratic life. But as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the political conception can also be understood as a relatively contingent modus vivendi, subject itself to debate when invoked to resolve conflict. For Rawls an overlapping consensus is necessary to forestall the sort of deeper public debate and passionate engagement that agonistic democrats hope to foster. Understanding the political conception as the negotiated but revisable shared interpretation of liberal democratic principles permits both the channeling of passionate conflict into agonistic engagement and the possibility that the governing interpretation can be itself an object of engagement. In fact, Mouffe makes the same distinction as Rawls between a political conception ("commitment to principles") and substantive moral doctrines, as does Connolly when he describes the practices of contemporary democratic citizenship: They embrace their faith at one level, and recoil back upon it at another to come to terms with the obdurate fact that it does not convince millions of others. Sometimes their own commitment is punctuated with a residual element of uncertainty. That seems noble to me, but perhaps not necessary to deep pluralism. What is needed is pursuit of a bicameral orientation to citizenship and being, in which you embrace your creed as you bring it into the public realm; and then recoil back without deep resentment on its contestability to open up negotiating space with others (Schoolman 2008: 316). The agonistic practice so envisioned is strikingly similar to that proposed by Rawls: citizens hold their own moral doctrines as true and complete, while recognizing that the entrance of this doctrine into the public realm will expose your absolute in its partiality. The bicameralism Connolly describes mirrors the distinction between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception, with the difference that Connolly does not think that faith is incompatible with democratic negotiation. Rawls excludes the metaphysical because it undermines the overlapping consensus, which must be minimal in order to be consensual. An agonistic political liberalism maintains this model without the demand that the passions, ideals, and beliefs of citizens be confined to the private realm. Since the political conception is recognizably partial, understood as hegemonic, and an explicit subject of political engagement, the line between metaphysical and political need not be policed. What the political conception does, once generated, is provide a guiding framework within which democratic conflicts can be engaged openly, where a real possible result of that engagement is a revision of the negotiated interpretation that is the condition of agonistic encounters. Mouffe asserts that "a difficult balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, democracy understood as a set of procedures required to cope with plurality, and, on the other, democracy as the adherence to values which inform a particular mode of coexistence" (1993: 131 ). Political liberalism shorn of the imperative to consensus capture this balance by offering the framework through which democratic societies can manage plurality by articulating a shared understanding of liberal values, while also permitting this articulation to be contested and revised. Agonism thus forestalls the idea that any democratic institution can claim substantive legitimacy for its use of power-any act of government is an act of a particular identity or interest acting upon (not implementing) the collective. There are collectively binding decisions but no collective decisions; the institutional conditions of democratic agonism are much like those described by Dahl's vision of polyarchy, where minorities rule and liberty is preserved by ensuring that no minority comes to dominate in the name of a fictionalized popular identity. Similarly, Connolly envisages a society "made up of intersecting and independent minorities of numerous types and sorts who occupy the same territorial space and who negotiate an ethos of engagement between themselves" (2000: 92). This is the structural argument for an agonistic liberalism-a competitive environment of plural identities and interests will tend to undercut any and all claims to overcome contingency, thus cultivating practices that make visible and contest hegemonic interpretations. If this can happen within an agonistic cultural order, within a shared symbolic framework (liberty/equality), exercised by citizens informed by an ethos of reciprocity and presumptive gratitude (which will, of course, require some material conditions to be maintained), it is likely to maximize inclusion and minimize domination. Under such circumstances the range of emancipatory visions and contested democratic norms is likely to be vast. Since the shared interpretation of common principles that permits agonistic participation is itself subject to the same regular challenge and renegotiation, the mechanism for significant democratic change resides at the heart of agonistic liberalism. And to the extent the experience of living in a society in which peaceful but passionate negotiation and renegotiation of the inherited values that bind people collectively is likely to shape subjectivity, as post-foundational thinkers and Rawlsian liberals all suggest, the possibilities for dramatic transformation to the ontopolitical grounds of that social order increase as citizens come to see both conflict and reciprocity as living norms of political life. There is room in this modus vivendi for radical visions of the future, and room for these visions to transform the temporary hegemony of the political conception of justice. While no political order, liberal or otherwise, can ever attain full transparency, consensus, or inclusion, an institutional commitment to negotiate and renegotiate terms of agreement that are themselves both the condition of further conflict and themselves subjects of this same conflict offers a vision of political life sufficiently capacious to render transformative change conceivable. I began this book with a discussion of post-foundationalism and its implications for politics. Agonistic democracy, I claimed, offers the account of democratic politics best suited to post-foundational circumstances in which claims to have achieved a stable consensus to guide political action, whether rooted in truth, nature, identity, morality, rationality, or any other extra-contextual criteria, cannot be sustained. I also argued that the justification for democracy, agonistic or otherwise, does not derive from the recognition of post-foundational conditions; like any other hegemonic ideal democracy is a situated product of the history within which its dominant position emerged. That is not to say that convergence on some sort of democratic norms is unlikely, as absent massive coercion or uncommon homogeneity the radical pluralism post-foundationalism tends to provoke is also likely to undermine claims to authority based upon claims of truth. In the case of western societies with liberal democratic histories, however, the convergence of post-foundational pluralism and an historical framework that privileges the values of equality and liberty produces circumstances in which democratic institutions are the unavoidable default for politics. A commitment to liberalism also shapes these historical conditions, so attempts to articulate an appropriate vision of democratic politics that expresses these situated values and embraces a post-foundational account of meaning must also grapple with the powerful role liberalism plays in the interpretation of democratic values in western democracies. These constraints are neither optional nor binding. We find ourselves always already inhabiting a history of meaning, practice, and identity, and these elements of our being are not infinitely malleable. They may be transformed, reinterpreted, and eventually even overcome, but such work begins with recognition of our limitations. Marx, despite his otherwise universalistic commitments, captured these circumstances as clearly anything in Heidegger's work, writing in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that "men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted." The inherited circumstances of western democratic theory include the powerful presence of liberalism, and a viable theory aspiring to deepen democratic possibilities must grapple with this fact. This commitment to dealing with the world as we find it helps explain the recurrent frustration with agonism expressed by more radical critics. Because pluralist agonists focus on the situated possibilities inherent to the hegemonic interpretations and norms already in place and then try to expand these possibilities, they appear to those committed to the complete transformation of contemporary liberalism to be defending the status quo. Tally makes this argument in his review of Mouffe: The most damning critique of On the Political may be that it winds up reinforcing the status quo ... Indeed, Mouffe's agonistic politics does not seem very radical at all. Whenever Mouffe addresses practical matters, she uses the language of adversarial or agonistic politics, but evokes tame and familiar scenes. Mouffe argues for a pluralism that recognizes real differences, but that also ensures that everyone plays by the same rules. "Partisans" who really want to change the political landscape may not be allowed to participate (2007: 7-8). Vazquez-Arroyo (2004) develops a similar critique of Connolly. There are two problems with this critique, and addressing each will help clarify why an agonistic pluralism is best cultivated within liberal institutional bounds. First, the critique underestimates the democratic capacities of liberalism, associating all liberal accounts with a broader indictment of capitalist rationality. Second, the critique fails to account for the situated character of politics, asserting a transformative radicalism that agonism rejects. Often the objection to liberalism offered by radical theorists represents an objection to an idea of liberalism imbricated with existing structures of inequality, a rationalistic account of individual interests, and the problems of global capitalism. Liberalism thus represents a constellation of problems against which democratic advocates position themselves. Dietz identifies this view of liberalism as an abstracted enemy of democracy: "The polemic that afflicts so many current studies of democracy and citizenship is most evident at the level of discourse on liberal ism, where this complex and multifaceted historical phenomenon has become little more than an ideational enemy, or a suspect to be processed and called forth for 'rebuke'" (1998: 116). But liberalism is as complex and pluralistic as any other major account of contemporary politics, and both its theoretical and historical specificity should not be elided. Some aspects of liberal politics contribute to visions of subjectivity that will generate resentment and oppression, but elements within these same theories might also be used to mitigate such pressures. Some versions of liberalism identify closely with capitalism and neo-liberal aspirations, but others endeavor to identify an economic order consistent with liberal values without offering any such privilege to markets or competition. Some versions of liberalism presuppose strong forms of rationality while others are attentive to the variety of ways different identities organize and prioritize their values and actions. There is no single liberalism, and-democratic theory would do well to be attentive to the range of possibilities available within this plurality. Instead, liberalism "in much contemporary democratic theory, particularly post-structural and post¬foundational work, is taken to embody the flaws of modernity generally and thus becomes the flaw that democratic theorizing is intended to overcome" (Dietz 1998: 117). But a theory of democracy that takes historicity seriously cannot reduce liberalism to polemic and the dominant mode of democratic institution to that which is to be overcome. That liberal democracy is in practice and theory flawed is beyond dispute, but if it also lacks any potential to nurture a more democratic and less flawed practice then there is little hope for post-foundational democratic theory. If only a rupture and overcoming can achieve democratic outcomes and democracy will ever be over the horizon of history, a democratic theory of institutions and engagement rather than resistance and aspiration is impossible. I hope to have shown by looking carefully at Rawlsian liberalism as a singular and situated example of a particular and historically viable form of liberalism that the more radical aspirations of democratic theory need not begin and end with the rejection of the dominant interpretation of democracy within and against which political action must engage. Agonistic theory can offer an account of democracy mindful of both the danger and the potential of the liberal hegemony. Agonism does not envision contestation extending "all the way" down, as it were. The ontopolitical foundations of agonistic democracy are contingent and revisable, but they cannot be the constant object of debate. If, as I have tried to argue, a post-foundational politics demands the recognition both of the contingency of foundations and the situated limits to the range of possible meanings found in any particular grounds of the political, then an agonistic politics must also be a bounded politics. Agonism works within historicity in order to expand the constellation of conceivable conflicts, without rejecting the tragic reality that limits to inclusion are endemic to politics. Hegemony can be productive or destructive, democratic or authoritarian, contested or univocal, but hegemony cannot be universal. Post-foundational politics embraces the inevitability of boundaries and limits, and then works to make those boundaries as wide as possible without turning debates into ontological conflicts, conflicts that cannot but be violent as they take place outside the grounds of shared ontopolitical premises. Calling perspectives that accept the contingent liberal principles of democratic politics legitimate may seem dangerous, as it implies that perspectives beyond this consensus are illicit and excluded. And it does so imply. But the language of legitimacy is unavoidable for post-foundational politics. "Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight - even fiercely - but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are accepted as legitimate perspectives" (Mouffe 2005a: 52). The condition of peaceful democratic agonism is a willingness to accept some set of principles, interpretations, or procedures as legitimate, even if that legitimacy is understood as subject to legitimate conflict itself. Pluralist agonism endeavors not to utterly transform the political in order to bring about a new democratic dawn. Instead, it aspires to deepen, extend, and intensify the democratic capacity for contestation and questioning already latent within the situated norms and hegemonic articulations of the political. At some point the confrontation between principles is so vast that the contest must be antagonistic, and enemies simply cannot recognize one another as legitimate. Political liberalism offers a set of principles and practices compatible with the type of "conflictual consensus" agonistic democrats advocate, while also highlighting the historically contingent yet also ontologically powerful status of these same principles. Post-foundationalism dictates democratic theorizing both pay close attention to the ontopolitical grounds of any proposed politics and propose ways to preserve the pluralism that inevitably follows from the recognition of contingency. A theory of agonistic democracy embedded within a modified version of political liberalism can support Institutions capable of addressing both imperatives, and the institutions it supports are not remarkably different from those envisioned by liberal theory. The resources necessary for agonistic transformation are present in the political institutions, political culture, and political theory of contemporary democracy. The modified political liberalism proposed in this book is probably not the only institutional possibility for agonistic democracy, but its plausibility demonstrates that institutionalization is neither incompatible with agonistic principles nor impossible to develop within existing social norms. By situating liberalism explicitly within a post-foundational ontology, liberalism is transformed in significant ways and its practices opened up to greater contestation, generosity, and active re-constitution.
36 -
37 -==Advocacy==
38 -I affirm the resolution – Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. I am willing to comply with the negative in CX on issues of specification or topicality in order to avoid frivolous theory and have a substantive debate.
39 -
40 -==Contention==
41 -
42 -====First, Discourse in academic spaces is agonistic in nature ====
43 -
44 -====Butler 13 ====
45 -~~Judith **Butler 13,** 2-7-2013, professor in the Rhetoric and Comparative Literature department at UC Berkeley. She is the author of several books on feminist theory, continental philosophy and contemporary politics, "Judith Butler’s Remarks to Brooklyn College on BDS," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/judith-butlers-remarks-brooklyn-college-bds/~~
46 -The principle of academic freedom is designed to make sure that powers outside the university, including government and corporations, are not able to control the curriculum or intervene in extra-mural speech. It not only bars such interventions, but it also protects those platforms in which we might be able to reflect together on the most difficult problems. You can judge for yourself whether or not my reasons for lending my support to this movement are good ones. That is, after all, what academic debate is about. It is also what democratic debate is about, which suggests that open debate about difficult topics functions as a meeting point between democracy and the academy. Instead of asking right away whether we are for or against this movement, perhaps we can pause just long enough to find out what exactly this is, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, and why it is so difficult to speak about this. I am not asking anyone to join a movement this evening. I am not even a leader of this movement or part of any of its governing committee, even though the New York Times tried to anoint me the other day—I appreciated their subsequent retraction, and I apologize to my Palestinian colleagues for their error. The movement, in fact, has been organized and led by Palestinians seeking rights of political self-determination, including Omar Barghouti, who was invited first by the Students for Justice in Palestine, after which I was invited to join him. At the time I thought it would be very much like other events I have attended, a conversation with a few dozen student activists in the basement of a student center. So, as you can see, I am surprised and ill-prepared for what has happened. Omar will speak in a moment about what the BDS movement is, its successes and its aspirations. But I would like briefly to continue with the question, what precisely are we doing here this evening? I presume that you came to hear what there is to be said, and so to test your preconceptions against what some people have to say, to see whether your objections can be met and your questions answered. In other words, you come here to exercise critical judgment, and if the arguments you hear are not convincing, you will be able to cite them, to develop your opposing view and to communicate that as you wish. In this way, your being here this evening confirms your right to form and communicate an autonomous judgment, to demonstrate why you think something is true or not, and you should be free to do this without coercion and fear. These are your rights of free expression, but they are, perhaps even more importantly, your rights to education, which involves the freedom to hear, to read and to consider any number of viewpoints as part of an ongoing public deliberation on this issue. Your presence here, even your support for the event, does not assume agreement among us. There is no unanimity of opinion here; indeed, achieving unanimity is not the goal.
47 -
48 -====And Restrictions terminate the conditions of public discourse by framing speech as a weapon instead viewpoints between equals—that outweighs because speech is the source of agonistic democracy ====
49 -
50 -====Butler 13====
51 -~~Judith **Butler 13,** 2-7-2013, professor in the Rhetoric and Comparative Literature department at UC Berkeley. She is the author of several books on feminist theory, continental philosophy and contemporary politics, "Judith Butler’s Remarks to Brooklyn College on BDS," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/judith-butlers-remarks-brooklyn-college-bds/~~
52 -And yet all of us here have to distinguish between the right to listen to a point of view and the right to concur or dissent from that point of view; otherwise, public discourse is destroyed by censorship. I wonder, what is the fantasy of speech nursed by the censor? There must be enormous fear behind the drive to censorship, but also enormous aggression, as if we were all in a war where speech has suddenly become artillery. Is there another way to approach language and speech as we think about this issue? Is it possible that some other use of words might forestall violence, bring about a general ethos of non-violence, and so enact, and open onto, the conditions for a public discourse that welcomes and shelters disagreement, even disarray?
53 -====Analytic
54 -
55 -====Counter-speech is an effective mode of deliberation and solves things like racist hate speech better than restrictions====
56 -
57 -====Calleros 95====
58 - **~~Calleros, Charles R. "Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun" (Professor of Law, Arizona State University). HeinOnline. Arizona State Law Journal. 1995~~ NB**
59 -Delgado and Yun summarize the support for the counterspeech argument by paraphrasing Nat Hentoff: "~~A~~ntiracism rules teach black people to depend on whites for protection, while talking back clears the air, emphasizes self-reliance, and strengthens one's self-image as an active agent inchargeofone'sowndestiny."50 DelgadoandYunalsocitetothosewho believe that counterspeech may help educate the racist speaker by addressing 51 the ignorance and fear that lies behind hostile racial stereotyping.
But they reject this speech-protective argument, stating that "it is offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith" by those "in a position of power" who "rarely offer empirical proof of their claims. ,,52 The authors argue that talking back in a close confrontation could be physically dangerous, is unlikely to persuade the racist speaker to reform his views, and is impossible "when racist remarks are delivered in a cowardly fashion, by means of graffiti scrawled on a campus wall late at night or on a poster placed outside of a black student's dormitory door." 53 They also complain that "~~e~~ven when successful, talking back is a burden" that minority undergraduates 54 should not be forced to assume. In rejecting the counterspeech argument, however, Delgado and Yun cast the argument in its weakest possible form, creating an easy target for relatively summary dismissal. When the strategies and experiential basis for successful counterspeech are fairly stated, its value is more easily recognized. First, no responsible free speech advocate argues that a target of hate speech should directly talk back to a racist speaker in circumstances that quickly could lead to a physical altercation. If one or more hateful speakers closely confronts a member of a minority group with racial epithets or other hostile remarks in circumstances that lead the target of the speech to reasonably fear for her safety, in most circumstances she should seek assistance from campus police or other administrators before "talking back." Even staunch proponents of free speech agree that such threatening speech and conduct is subject to regulation and justifies more than a purely educative response. The same would be true of Delgado's and Yun's other examples of speech conveyed in a manner that defaces another's property or 56 When offensive or hateful speech is not threatening, damaging, or impermissibly invasive and therefore may constitute protected speech, 57 education and counterspeech often will be an appropriate response. However, proponents of free speech do not contemplate that counterspeech always, or even normally, will be in the form of an immediate exchange of views between the hateful speaker and his target. Nor do they contemplate that the target should bear the full burden of the response. Instead, effective counterspeech often takes the form of letters, discussions, or demonstrations joined in by many persons and aimed at the entire campus population or a community within it. Typically, it is designed to expose the moral bankruptcy of the hateful ideas, to demonstrate the strength of opinion and numbers of those who deplore the hateful speech, and to spur members of the campus community to take voluntary, constructive action to combat hate and to remedy its ill effects. 58 Above all, it can serve to define and underscore the community of support enjoyed by the targets of the hateful speech, faith in which may have been shaken by the hateful speech. Moreover, having triggered such a reaction with their own voices, the targets of the hateful speech may well feel a sense of empowerment to compensate for the undeniable pain of the speech. 59 One may be tempted to join Delgado and Yun in characterizing such a scenario as one "offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith" and without experiential support. 6° However, campus communities that have creatively used this approach can attest to the surprising power of counterspeech. Examples of counterspeech to hateful racist and homophobic speech at Arizona State and Stanford Universities are especially illustrative.61 In an incident that attracted national attention, the campus community at Arizona State University ("A.S.U.") constructively and constitutionally responded to a racist poster displayed on the outside of the speaker's dormitory door in February 1991. Entitled "WORK APPLICATION," it contained a number of ostensibly employment-related questions that advanced hostile and demeaning racial stereotypes of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Carla Washington, one of a group of African- American women who found the poster, used her own speech to persuade a resident of the offending room voluntarily to take the poster down and allow her to photocopy it. After sending a copy of the poster to the campus newspaper along with an opinion letter deploring its racist stereotypes, she demanded action from the director of her residence hall. The director organized an immediate meeting of the dormitory residents to discuss the issues. In this meeting, I explained why the poster was protected by the First Amendment, and the women who found the poster eloquently described their pain and fears. One of the women, Nichet Smith, voiced her fear that all nonminorities on campus shared the hostile stereotypes expressed in the poster. Dozens of residents expressed their support and gave assurances that they did not share the hostile stereotypes, but they conceded that even the most tolerant among them knew little about the cultures of others and would 62 benefit greatly from multicultural education.
 The need for multicultural education to combat intercultural ignorance and stereotyping became the theme of a press conference and public rally organized by the student African-American Coalition leader, Rossie Turman, who opted for highly visible counterspeech despite demands from some students and staff to discipline the owner of the offending poster. The result was a series of opinion letters in the campus newspaper discussing the problem of racism, numerous workshops on race relations and free speech, and overwhelming approval in the Faculty Senate of a measure to add a course on American cultural diversity to the undergraduate breadth 63 requirement.
 The four women who initially confronted the racist poster were empowered by the meeting at the dormitory residence and later received awards from the local chapter of the NAACP for their activism.64 Rossie Turman was rewarded for his leadership skills two years later by becoming the first African-American elected President of Associated Students of A.S.U.,65 a student body that numbered approximately 40,000 students, only 66 2.3 percent of them African-American. Although Delgado and Yun are quite right that the African-American students should never have been burdened with the need to respond to such hateful speech, Hentoff is correct that the responses just described helped them develop a sense of self-reliance and constructive activism. Moreover, the students' counterspeech inspired a community response that lightened the students' burden and provided them with a sense of community support and empowerment. Indeed, the students received assistance from faculty and administrators, who helped organize meetings, wrote opinion letters, spoke before the Faculty Senate, or joined the students in issuing public statements at the press conference and public rally.67 Perhaps most important, campus administrators wisely refrained from disciplining the owners of the poster, thus directing public attention to the issue of racism and ensuring broad community support in denouncing the racist poster. Many members of the campus and surrounding communities might have leapt to the racist speaker's defense had the state attempted to discipline the speaker and thus had created a First Amendment issue. Instead, they remained united with the offended students because the glare of the public spotlight remained sharply focused on the racist incident without the distraction of cries of state censorship. Although the counterspeech was not aimed primarily at influencing the hearts and minds of the residents of the offending dormitory room, its vigor in fact caught the residents by surprise. 68 It prompted at least three of them to apologize publicly and to display curiosity about a civil rights movement that they were too young to have witnessed first hand. 69 This effective use of education and counterspeech is not an isolated instance at A.S.U., but has been repeated on several occasions, albeit on smaller scales.7°
One year after the counterspeech at A.S.U., Stanford University responded similarly to homophobic speech. In that case, a first-year law student sought to attract disciplinary proceedings and thus gain First Amendment martyrdom by shouting hateful homophobic statements about a dormitory staff member. The dean of students stated that the speaker was not subject to discipline under Stanford's code of conduct but called on the university community to speak out on the issue, triggering an avalanche of counterspeech. Students, staff, faculty, and administrators expressed their opinions in letters to the campus newspaper, in comments on a poster board at the law school, in a published petition signed by 400 members of the law school community disassociating the law school from the speaker's epithets, and in a letter written by several law students reporting the incident to a prospective employer of the offending student.71 The purveyor of hate speech indeed had made a point about the power of speech, just not the one he had intended. He had welcomed disciplinary sanctions as a form of empowerment, but the Stanford community was alert enough to catch his verbal hardball and throw it back with ten times the force. Thus, the argument that counterspeech is preferable to state suppression of offensive speech is stronger and more fully supported by experience than is conceded by Delgado and Yun. In both of the cases described above, the targets of hateful speech were supported by a community united against bigotry. The community avoided splitting into factions because the universities eliminated the issue of censorship by quickly announcing that the hateful speakers were protected from disciplinary retaliation. Indeed, the counterspeech against the bigotry was so powerful in each case that it underscored the need for top administrators to develop standards for, and some limitations on, their participation in such partisan speech. 72 Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out against intolerance when it is isolated as an issue rather than diluted in muddied waters along with concerns of censorship. Just as the nonviolent demonstrations of Martin Luther King, Jr., depended partly for their success on the consciences of the national and international audiences monitoring the fire hoses and attack dogs on their television sets and in the print media,73 the empowerment of the targets of hateful speech rests partly in the hands of members of the campus community who sympathize with them. One can hope that the counterspeech and educational measures used with success at A.S.U. and Stanford stand a good chance of preserving an atmosphere of civility in intellectual inquiry at any campus community in which compassionate, open minds predominate. On the other hand, counterspeech by the targets of hate speech could be less empowering on a campus in which the majority of students, faculty, and staff approve of hostile epithets directed toward members of minority groups. One hopes that such campuses are exceedingly rare; although hostile racial stereotyping among college students in the United States increased during the last decade, those students who harbored significant hostilities (as contrasted with more pervasive but less openly hostile, subconscious racism) still represented a modest fraction of all students.74 Moreover, even in a pervasively hostile atmosphere, counterspeech might still be more effective than broad restrictions on speech. First, aside from the constitutional constraints of the First Amendment, such a heartless campus community would be exceedingly unlikely to adopt strong policies prohibiting hateful speech. Instead, the campus likely would maintain minimum policies necessary to avoid legal action enforcing guarantees of equal educational opportunities under the Fourteenth Amendment 75 or federal antidiscrimination statutes such as Title V176 or Title IX. 77 Second, counterspeech even from a minority of members of the campus community might be effective to gradually build support by winning converts from those straddling the fence or from broader regional or national audiences. Such counterspeech might be particularly effective if coupled with threats from diverse faculty, staff, and students to leave the university for more hospitable environments; even a campus with high levels of hostility likely would feel 78 pressures to maintain its status as a minimally integrated institution.
The A.S.U. and Stanford examples illustrating the efficacy of counterspeech also lend support to the argument that "~~firee speech has been minorities' best friend ...~~as~~ a principal instrument of social reform."79 In both cases, demonstrations, opinion letters, and other forms of counterspeech dramatically defined the predominant atmosphere on each campus as one that demanded respect and freedom from bigotry for all members of the community; it is doubtful that passage of a speech-restrictive policy could have sent a similar message of consensus any more strongly. Moreover, in the A.S.U. case, the reasoned counterspeech, coupled with the decision to refrain from disciplining the hateful speaker, persuaded the Faculty Senate to pass a multicultural education proposal whose chances for passage were seriously in doubt in the previous weeks and months.8 The racist poster at A.S.U. may have been a blessing in disguise, albeit an initially painful one, because it sparked counterspeech and community action that strengthened the campus support for diversity.
60 -
61 -====The open exchange of ideas is key to solving for the root cause of hatred. They make us look good by comparison. Empirics prove with the LGBTQ. ====
62 -
63 -====Rauch 13====
64 -~~Jonathan Rauch (Jonathan Rauch is a contributing editor at The Atlantic and National Journal and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a vice president of the Independent Gay Forum.) 11-13, "The Case for Hate Speech," The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-case-for-hate-speech/309524/~~(Lexington God VR 12/13/16)
65 -A generation ago, the main obstacle to gay equality was not hatred, though of course there was a good deal of that. Most people who supported the repressive status quo meant well. The bigger problem, rather, was that people had wrong ideas about homosexuality: factual misapprehensions and moral misjudgments born of ignorance, superstition, taboo, disgust. If people think you are a threat to their children or their family, they are going to fear and hate you. Gays’ most urgent need was epistemological, not political. We had to replace bad ideas with good ones. Our great blessing was to live in a society that understands where knowledge comes from: not from political authority or personal revelation, but from a public process of open-ended debate and discussion, in which every day millions of people venture and test billions of hypotheses. All but a few of those theories are found wanting, but some survive and flourish over time, and those comprise our knowledge. The restless process of trial and error does not allow human knowledge to be complete or perfect, but it does allow for steady improvement. If a society is open to robust critical debate, you can look at a tape of its moral and intellectual development over time and know which way it is running: usually toward less social violence, more social participation, and a wider circle of dignity and toleration. And if you see a society that is stuck and not making that kind of progress, you can guess that its intellectual system is not very liberal. The critical factor in the elimination of error is not individuals’ commitment to the truth as they see it (if anything, most people are too confident they’re right); it is society’s commitment to the protection of criticism, however misguided, upsetting, or ungodly. America’s transformation on gay rights over the past few years is a triumph of the open society. Not long ago, gays were pariahs. We had no real political power, only the force of our arguments. But in a society where free exchange is the rule, that was enough. We had the coercive power of truth. History shows that the more open the intellectual environment, the better minorities will do. We learn empirically that women are as intelligent and capable as men; this knowledge strengthens the moral claims of gender equality. We learn from social experience that laws permitting religious pluralism make societies more governable; this knowledge strengthens the moral claims of religious liberty. We learn from critical argument that the notion that some races are fit to be enslaved by others is impossible to defend without recourse to hypocrisy and mendacity; this knowledge strengthens the moral claims of inherent human dignity. To make social learning possible, we need to criticize our adversaries, of course. But no less do we need them to criticize us. All of which brings me back to Orson Scott Card. Some of the things he has said are execrable. He wrote in 2004 that when gay marriage is allowed, "society will bend all its efforts to seize upon any hint of homosexuality in our young people and encourage it." That was not quite a flat reiteration of the ancient lie that homosexuals seduce and recruit children—the homophobic equivalent of the anti-Semitic blood libel—but it is about as close as anyone dares to come today. Fortunately, Card’s claim is false. Better still, it is preposterous. Most fair-minded people who read his screeds will see that they are not proper arguments at all, but merely ill-tempered reflexes. When Card puts his stuff out there, he makes us look good by comparison. The more he talks, and the more we talk, the better we sound.
66 -
67 -====Universities restrict free speech in the squo - that stifles key intellectual discussion necessary for community deliberation====
68 -Maloney 10/13 **~~Cliff Maloney, Jr., Oct 13, 2016, "Colleges Have No Right to Limit Students' Free Speech," TIME, http://time.com/4530197/college-free-speech-zone/~~ NB**
69 -In grade school, I learned that debate is defined as "a discussion between people in which they express different opinions about something." Such open discourse was historically encouraged on our college campuses. Universities exemplified intellectual discussion and debate in America. No one voiced their opinions louder than students, professors and administrators. They pushed society’s limits by admitting women and people of color, and by encouraging diversity of thought amongst the college community. Historically, young people flocked to universities to learn more about the world around them, to encounter people from different backgrounds, to expand their minds and to form their own opinions. Unfortunately, things have changed. Recently on college campuses, our open discourse has been threatened, particularly when discussing politics. While the current presidential election represents polarizing wings of both the Democratic and Republican parties, we should be able to openly debate their policies and the direction in which they plan to take our country if elected. We should be able to discuss the abuse of power within our government and the consistent violations of our Bill of Rights. We should be able to participate in the free market of ideas. But our students are being silenced. University campuses are now home to a plethora of speech restrictions. From sidewalk-sized "free-speech zones" to the criminalization of microaggressions, America’s college campuses look and feel a lot more like an authoritarian dictatorship than they do the academic hubs of the modern free world. When rolling an inflated free-speech ball around campus, students at the University of Delaware were halted by campus police for their activities. A Young Americans for Liberty leader at Fairmont State University in West Virginia was confronted by security when he was attempting to speak with other students about the ideas he believes in. A man at Clemson University was barred from praying on campus because he was outside of the free-speech zone. And a student at Blinn College in Texas abolished her campus’ free-speech zone in a lawsuit after administrators demanded she seek special permission to advocate for self-defense. How have we let this happen in America, the land of the free? It’s because of what our universities have taught a generation of Americans: If you don’t agree with someone, are uncomfortable with an idea, or don’t find a joke funny, then their speech must be suppressed. Especially if they don’t politically agree with you. Instead of actually debating ideas that span topics from the conventional to the taboo, a generation of American students don’t engage, they just get enraged. In doing so, many students believe that they have a right to literally shut other people up. This is not only a threat to the First Amendment, but also to American democracy. In their manifestation, safe spaces and free-speech zones at public universities enable prejudice against unfavorable ideologies. Guised as progressive measures to ensure inclusion, these often unconstitutional policies exclude new and competing ideas, and are antithetical to a free academia. In excluding different ideologies, supposedly progressive campus speech codes do one thing: prevent the progression of ideas. Restrictive campus speech codes are, in fact, regressive.
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1 +Armenia AC
2 +
3 +Part One: Framing
4 +The Standard is Maximizing Expected Well Being.
5 +
6 +1.) Pain provides an objective for badness – anything else is abstraction.
7 +Gray 09
8 +Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008)
9 +If we have evidence that anything in particular has intrinsic value, then we also
10 +AND
11 +attempt to show that the alternatives are less justified in the next section.
12 +
13 +2.) Non ideal theory good.
14 +Mills 05
15 +Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
16 +I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune
17 +AND
18 +that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
19 +
20 +Part Two: Solvency
21 +
22 +Plan Text:
23 +
24 +The Republic of Armenia ought to prohibit production of nuclear power by partnering with the European Union to facilitate decommission of their only nuclear power plant: Metsamor. I reserve the right to clarify in CX.
25 +Anadolu 14
26 +Anadolu, Agency. “Turkey wants nuclear plant in Armenia to be shut down”. Daily News. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-wants-nuclear-plant-in-armenia-to-be-shut-down~-~-~-~-~-~-.aspx?pageID=238andnid=63928. 3/21/14 LBE
27 +The Metsamor nuclear power plant in Armenia is outdated and should be urgently closed down
28 +AND
29 +, defying safety risk concerns voiced by a number of groups at home.
30 +
31 +Process
32 +
33 +EU covers funding due to safety concerns.
34 +Hadzhieva 16
35 +Eli Hadzhieva, Eli Hadzhieva is Director and founder of Dialogue for Europe, a Brussels-based NGO. She previously served in the European Parliament and in OCDE. Easy target for terrorists: Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear plant. https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/easy-target-for-terrorists-armenias-metsamor-nuclear-plant/ NG
36 +On numerous occasions, the EU has called for the ‘earliest possible closure’ of
37 +AND
38 +, as the power plant accounts for 40 of Armenia’s electricity supplies.
39 +
40 +EU covers transition to renewables.
41 +Azeri 16
42 +Azeri press news agency. “Azerbaijan should bring the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the agenda of the UN”. Energy Central News. http://www.energycentral.com/news/azerbaijan-should-bring-closure-metsamor-nuclear-power-plant-agenda-un 5/15/16 LBE
43 +Zahid Oruj said that in April, during an unsuccessful 4-day war for
44 +AND
45 +. As if the Metsamor nuclear power plant was on an auction. "
46 +
47 +EU grant means plan directly transitions to renewable energy.
48 +Vorotnikov 16
49 +Vorotnikov, Vladislav. “Legislative Reform to Promote Solar Energy in Armenia”. Renewable Energy World. Vladislav Vorotnikov After graduating from the journalistic faculty of the Voronezh State University in Russia specializating of agricultural management, Vladislav began working in the one of Russian largest livestock news and trading service Agro.ru. http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2016/06/legislative-reform-to-promote-solar-energy-in-armenia.html. 6/1/16 LBE
50 +The Armenian Parliament on May 12 adopted the second and final reading draft amendments “
51 +AND
52 +, hydroelectric and thermal power stations, will make this transition less painful.”
53 +
54 +Part Three: Advantage
55 +
56 +One: Renewables
57 +
58 +Nuclear ban fuels interest in renewables.
59 +Korosec 11
60 +Korosec, Kirsten. “Germany’s nuclear ban: the global effect” CBS News. Author for CBS and Forbes. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/germanys-nuclear-ban-the-global-effect/ . 5/31/11 LBE
61 +Germany is already a world leader in renewable energy. Today, renewable energy provides
62 +AND
63 +opportunity, will enter the market and existing renewable energy businesses will expand.
64 +
65 +Coming energy reform supercharges transition to renewables.
66 +McGinnity 15
67 +McGinnity, Ian. “Armenia at an Energy Crossroads”. RSC. http://regional-studies.org/blog/443-010415. 4/1/15 LBE
68 +Despite Armenia’s progress, the country now faces challenging questions about its energy future.
69 +AND
70 +With so much on the line, there is little margin for error.
71 +
72 +Comprehensive analysis proves - renewable energy in Armenia is economically viable, and would create economic growth, reduce harm to the environment, and improve national security. Multiple impacts.
73 +Touryan et al No Date
74 +Areg Gharabegian1 , Artak Hambarian2 , Morten Søndergaard3 , Kenell Touryan4. “Renewable Energy in Armenia”. Danish Energy Management. Hetq.am. 1 - Areg Gharabegian is a principal project manager with Parsons, Pasadena, CA. 2 - Artak Hambarian is a professor in School of Engineering of American University of Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia. 3 - Morten Søndergaard is a project manager with Danish Energy Management, Denmark. 4 - Kenell Touryan is a visiting professor in School of Engineering of American University of Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia and retired researcher from NREL, Denver, CO. http://hetq.am/static/content/pdf/Renewable_Energy_in_Armenia_9-17-11.pdf . No date LBE
75 +The findings of a comprehensive review of renewable energy potential in Armenia have ranked small
76 +AND
77 +, which in turn could be a major component of Armenia’s national security.
78 +
79 +Two: Azerbaijan War
80 +
81 +Azerbaijan wants the plant closed due to empirical terrorism concerns – existence of the plant harms relations.
82 +Azeri 16
83 +Azeri press news agency. “Azerbaijan should bring the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the agenda of the UN”. Energy Central News. http://www.energycentral.com/news/azerbaijan-should-bring-closure-metsamor-nuclear-power-plant-agenda-un 5/15/16 LBE
84 +According to the parliamentarian, though the Metsamor nuclear power plant is not a nuclear
85 +AND
86 +the existence of the plant is a threat not only to Azerbaijan. "
87 +
88 +An Armenia-Azerbaijan war is extremely likely – relations are key.
89 +Amos 16
90 +Amos, Howard. “Rare Deadly Blast Hits Armenian Capital; Terrorist Attack Feared”. IBTimes. Howard Amos is the Russia correspondent for IBT Media/Newsweek. http://www.ibtimes.com/rare-deadly-blast-hits-armenian-capital-terrorist-attack-feared-2359440. 4/25/16 LBE
91 +Four days of clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops in early April in Nagorno-
92 +AND
93 +war could break out “at any moment” in Nagorno-Karabakh.
94 +
95 +The nuclear issue is a source of regional conflict.
96 +Shaffer 16
97 +Shaffer, Brenda. “Fighting in the Caucasus: Implications for the Wider Region”. The Washington Institute. Brenda Shaffer is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies. She has also provided energy research and analysis to various governments and companies, including in Azerbaijan and the wider Caspian region. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/fighting-in-the-caucasus-implications-for-the-wider-region. 4/7/16 LBE
98 +While Baku and Yerevan blame each other for the outburst of renewed fighting on April
99 +AND
100 +to strengthen cooperation between Washington and Baku after two years of rocky relations.
101 +
102 +This war would go global.
103 +Shaffer 16
104 +Shaffer, Brenda. “Fighting in the Caucasus: Implications for the Wider Region”. The Washington Institute. Brenda Shaffer is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies. She has also provided energy research and analysis to various governments and companies, including in Azerbaijan and the wider Caspian region. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/fighting-in-the-caucasus-implications-for-the-wider-region. 4/7/16 LBE
105 +The current escalation could also draw in actors beyond the Caucasus, including in the
106 +AND
107 +its disposal to coerce the Israelis given its ongoing intervention in neighboring Syria.
108 +
109 +Global war goes nuclear.
110 +Nichols 14
111 +Nichols, Tom. “Five ways a nuclear wat could still happen”. The National Interest. Tom Nichols is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School. His most recent book is No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (University of Pennsylvania, 2014) The views expressed are his own. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-ways-nuclear-war-could-still-happen-10665?page=4. 6/16/14 LBE
112 +As we move from mechanical errors to human agency, things actually get scarier.
113 +AND
114 +have a clarifying, rather than a panicking, effect on the enemy.
115 +
116 +Nuclear war leads to extinction.
117 +Starr 15
118 +Starr, Steven. “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction” Federation of American Scientists. Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/. 10/14/15 LBE
119 +Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-
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1 +Bronx HS of Science JO
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1 +Lexington Rourke Aff
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1 +SeptOct - Armenia 1AC
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1 +Byram Hills Invitational
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1 +0
EntryDate
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1 +2016-09-23 04:12:37.0
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1 +Jonathan Alston
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1 +Bronx HS of Science JO
Round
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1 +1
Tournament
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1 +Byram Hills Invitational

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