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  • Caselist.CitesClass[27]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[28]

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Caselist.CitesClass[27]

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Caselist.CitesClass[28]

Cites

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	1	+Russia currently assists Iran’s nuclear program—multiple relations benefits for both
	2	+Retinger 14 Andrei Retinger (Independent Expert who has written about Russian nuclear industry for more than 10 years), 11-26-2014, "Russia-Iran deal is about more than nuclear Power," Russia Beyond The Headlines, http://rbth.com/opinion/2014/11/26/russia-iran_deal_is_about_more_than_nuclear_power_41727.html NB
	3	+Russia and Iran signed a series of documents providing for the construction of eight nuclear power units along with a specific contract for the construction of two power units at the already operating Bushehr nuclear power plant. Overall, this is one of the biggest deals to be signed on the world nuclear market in recent years. ¶ The value of the whole package of projects is estimated to be worth tens of billions of dollars, given that the price of building one nuclear power unit on the world market varies between $5 billion and $7 billion. ¶ The arrangement will not only generate massive profits for Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom, but will also strengthen Russia’s position in the Middle East.¶ According to preliminary estimates, thanks to the deals, Iran may eventually produce a minimum of 10 gigawatts of energy from nuclear power. This estimate includes power generated by the first power unit at Bushehr. As a reference, Russia currently generates 25 gigawatts of energy from nuclear power. With the agreement, Moscow and Tehran have sent a clear signal to the international community that despite a difficult political climate, the two countries are moving their relationship forward. The construction of these new nuclear power generation capacities could make Iran an exporter of electricity to the countries of the Persian Gulf, where there is an ever-increasing demand.¶ The entire project for the construction of new nuclear power units in Iran, including equipment and fuel supplies, will be carried out under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) and will fully comply with the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear materials, as was the case with the construction of the first power unit at the Bushehr plant.¶ Russia has much to gain from the new agreement in both the short and long term. The agreement provides work for Russia’s nuclear machine factories and engineers, who will have to supply all the equipment for the power plants throughout the construction period. In addition, the nine power units, including Bushehr-1, will also be buying Russian nuclear fuel for the foreseeable future. The provision of fuel alone will mean a constant inflow of revenue into Russia for many years. The profit from the sales of fuel is also estimated to be tens of billions of dollars. ¶ More importantly, the deal, like the agreement to finish the construction of Bushehr in the first place after it was abandoned by Germany, gives Russia a place from which to grow its presence in the Iranian market once sanctions on Tehran are lifted. Iran has been under some form of sanctions since its 1979 revolution, and additional sanctions were imposed in 2006 after the country refused to curtail its nuclear enrichment program. Today, sanctions are in place against Iran’s oil and petrochemical industries, banking and insurance services, shipping and some online services such as Web hosting. ¶ Many observers, however, believe that the country will soon be allowed back into the global economic community. The U.S. and the E.U. lifted some sanctions against Iranian oil in January after Iran stopped enriching uranium past 5 percent, and are expected to lift more restrictions before the end of 2014. ¶ In anticipation of the re-opening of the Iranian economy, businesspeople from all over the world are flocking to Tehran. The nuclear agreement gives Moscow a boost. This is especially important since once the country is open for business, Russia will face stiff competition from China, Japan and Europe in providing goods and services. ¶ Iran, for its part, will also reap multiple benefits. The country is diversifying its energy policy. Expanding the percentage of domestic energy provided by nuclear power will free up oil and gas to sell on the world market. Additionally, the project will provide Iran with thousands of jobs for years to come. The plants will require large teams of construction workers along with specialized architects and engineers. Another plus — the Iranian scientists and engineers who will build and work at the power plants will learn from the experience of their Russian colleagues. ¶ In anticipation of the re-opening of the Iranian economy, businesspeople from all over the world are flocking to Tehran. The nuclear agreement gives Moscow a boost. This is especially important since once the country is open for business, Russia will face stiff competition from China, Japan and Europe in providing goods and services. ¶ Iran, for its part, will also reap multiple benefits. The country is diversifying its energy policy. Expanding the percentage of domestic energy provided by nuclear power will free up oil and gas to sell on the world market. Additionally, the project will provide Iran with thousands of jobs for years to come. The plants will require large teams of construction workers along with specialized architects and engineers. Another plus — the Iranian scientists and engineers who will build and work at the power plants will learn from the experience of their Russian colleagues.
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	5	+Russia nuclear reactors allow alliances and presence in Middle East and others
	6	+Armstrong 15 Ian Armstrong Is A Supervisor and Researcher At Wikistrat, The World’S First Crowdsourced Geopolitical Consultancy. He Previously Assisted In Research At Temple University, The University Of Pennsylvania, Scottish Parliament, And Hudson Institute'S Center For Political-Military Analysis, Where He Has Focused On Non-Proliferation And International Energy. His Research Has Been Presented At Conferences At Tufts University And University Of Edinburgh. Ian'S Analysis Has Been Featured At Prominent Outlets Such As Business Insider, Foreign Policy Association, Cbs News, And Realclearenergy., 10-29-2015, "Russia is creating a global nuclear power empire," Global Risk Insights, http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/russia-is-creating-a-global-nuclear-power-empire/ NB
	7	+Though these economic implications are worth considering, they are far overshadowed by the geopolitical impacts of Russia’s nuclear power expansion strategy. The same local governments that may experience economic upticks as a result of Russian-installed NPP’s will also become sutured ot the Russian nuclear industry – and therefore the broader Russian government. To be clear, the influence gained by Russia through each bilaterial nuclear agreement should not be understated. For one, the construction timeline for nuclear power plants is typically long-term, ensuring that Russia will have a presence in any country it signs a nuclear contract with for a minimum of several years. In addition, Moscow has secured special comprehensive contracts with highly strategic countries like Turkey under the premise of “build-own-operate”—a system in which Russia builds, owns, and permanently operates a nuclear power plant. From this perspective, Russian-built nuclear power plants in foreign countries become more akin to embassies – or even military bases- than simple bilateral infrastructure projects. The long-term or permanent presence that accompanies the exportation or Russian nuclear power will afford President Vladmir Putin a notable influence in countries crucial to regional geopolitics. Western influence will subsequently be undermined in crucial ally states like Egypt, Turkey, and Algeria. This now=justified Russian presence abroad will also provide Moscow intelligence opportunities that would otherwise be significantly more difficult and risky. Russian nuclear expertise will also be required in some form for maintenance and operational purposes even in countries that do not sign on for the full build-own-operate package. ¶ All these benefits—significant as a stand alone strategic gains—will be undergirded by the traditional Russian leverage that emerges when nations become dependent on Russia for their energy needs. ¶
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	9	+Continued Russian presence stabilizes the Middle East
	10	+Maxim 1-15 Maxim A (expert at Russian International Affairs Council and a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Russia Pulse. He was a Fullbright Visiting Fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian Russian and East European Studies and ., 1-15-2016, "Russia's Plan for the Middle East," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-plan-the-middle-east-14908?page=3 NB
	11	+Moscow’s activity in the Middle East has been on the rise in recent years, but its decision in late September and early October to strike in Syria came as a shock to many. The Kremlin used its air and missile operations—carried out with sophisticated weaponry and in an impressive manner—to demonstrate that Russia is a modern military superpower with a global reach.¶ Whether Russian covert operations for Assad’s army or the 5,240-plus mission flights it has launched—including 145 flyouts of strategic missile-carrying and long-range bomber aviation—were game changers on the ground is still an issue that is debated even within the Russian expert community. Nevertheless, Moscow’s coordinated efforts with regional governments, as well as targeted strikes on key assets of terrorist and rebel groups, accomplished two politically important objectives for Moscow.¶ First, they pushed all the interested players to deal with the Kremlin, which can no longer be treated as “isolated.” Some, such as the Gulf states and Syrian opposition groups, criticize Moscow sharply in public but continue to work behind the scenes through multiple channels. This trend will likely continue to develop as Saudi Arabia becomes one of Moscow’s major Gulf negotiating partners. Others, like the Obama administration, while continuing to disagree on President Bashar al-Assad’s role in the Syrian conflict, have cooperated with the Kremlin on technical issues and matters of mutual security. For instance, even though a confrontational spirit still dominates the relationship, Moscow and Washington are now actively involved in sorting out the groups that should be blacklisted as terrorist from those that can become a part of a future political process in Syria. Second, Moscow’s actions have managed to shift some Western elites’ perception of Assad, especially when contrasted with the rapidly growing threat of the Islamic State. While the Paris atrocities and the shootings in California helped make ISIS the primary concern, Moscow’s military operations in Syria firmly positioned the Kremlin as a leader in the anti-ISIS campaign. It has become clear that including Russia is far more profitable, both politically and operationally, than marginalizing it.¶ All of those developments, however, must be sustained. Given that there are about 150 groups currently on the ground in the Syrian crisis—and the different amounts of leverage that Moscow, Washington, Riyadh, Doha and Tehran have with their respective proxies—practical implementation of a political transition may be impossible. Nonetheless, Moscow’s intent to bring the conflict into the political realm as soon as possible seems real and understandable; carrying it out militarily is a politically costly and demanding enterprise, especially when acting alone.¶ Rhetoric aside, Tehran and Baghdad are tactical partners; few seriously believe they would be willing to help shoulder whatever burden the Russians bring to Syria. Moreover, in his annual question-and-answer session, President Vladimir Putin expressed doubts that Russia needs a full-fledged military base in Syria. Reading between the lines, this means that Moscow is not willing to make long-term security commitments in Syria—at least without clear gains of its own. Nor does it want to get bogged down in regional spats, although the situation Russia now finds itself in suggests quite the opposite.¶ Moscow is not looking for a face-saving exit strategy at this point, but rather one that would allow it to emerge victorious. The Kremlin is likeliest to pursue a Syrian political transition in which Moscow has an equal say with Washington, and its ideas are well-heard and implemented. If the current level of limited cooperation continues between Moscow and Washington, and if the Kremlin doesn’t see any factors threatening to unbalance its accomplishments—such as foreign ground troops—Russia will likely become more cooperative, including on issues regarding Assad’s departure.¶ The turbulent nature of the conflict and the region in general, however, leaves plenty of room for “thunderheads”—uncalculated risks and unexpected developments in the region or elsewhere that can complicate Russia’s strategy. The spiraling confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia is an example. Most of those who advise the Kremlin on the Middle East believe that the ongoing spat between Saudi Arabia and Iran is fundamentally a bitter regional political rivalry which is reinforced by the ideological divide between Sunnis and Shia, not the other way around. The rupture of diplomatic ties merely institutionalized the mutual non-admittance and antagonism that has long found expression in proxy wars across the region.¶ Therefore, contrary to the popular opinion that Russia will interfere on the side of Iran, Moscow will most probably take a neutral stance—despite its strong language condemning Saudi Arabia’s killing of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. But what worries Russia is that a crisis would push Moscow and Washington to make bold moves in the region—one area where coordination between the two capitals is unlikely and the consequences may therefore be dangerous. Besides, if focus moves to the Sunni-Shia nature of the regional conflict, there’s a real risk that ISIS could have a respite from the pain it has recently felt, if not a chance at rebirth as a quasi-state with a violent and populist ideology. With the news that Daesh has obtained surface-to-air missile technology capable of downing civil and military aircraft, fighting the Islamic State becomes even more of a challenge for both Russia and the United States.¶ On a bilateral level, Iran will remain an essential counterpart for Moscow in the war in Syria and the post-war settlement, even though the two states’ interests are not identical. Neither do they completely share interests elsewhere in the Middle East, so their cooperation will continue to be substantial but limited to issues of security. Moscow and Tehran continue to be compelled adversaries and pragmatic allies. Should Iran be relieved from the U.S. sanctions regime over the course of the year, and pursue a more robust policy on the energy market, their relations in 2016 will be marked by more adversity than friendship.¶ Russia’s relations with Turkey will most likely deteriorate further, and could indeed become a major spoiler to a U.S.-Russia settlement on Syria. The initial round public outrage after the downing of the Russian plane, another “thunderhead,” died down eventually. But in the Kremlin, it continued to dominate Moscow’s policy vis-à-vis Ankara. In part, this has to do with the genuine feeling of personal betrayal that the Russian president experienced from the shoot-down, which grew—rightly or wrongly—into an understanding that the current Turkish government is inclined to provocative policies. Turkey, for its part, turned out to be the only player that voiced its disagreement with Russia’s actions through open hostilities of its own. The feeling of resentment, mixed with wounded vanity and a (quite legitimate) sense of insecurity, could drive Ankara toward more aggressive posturing and militarized unilateral actions in its own near abroad. Russia will act on this perception in dealing with Turkey from now on.¶ Moscow will most likely try to restore its ties with Egypt, a country for which it has had special intentions as a regional partner since the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood. Relations with Egypt cooled off after the explosion of the Russian plane over the Sinai Peninsula. Since Moscow and Cairo disagreed over the nature of the accident, with the Egyptians insisting it was not a terrorist attack, Moscow unilaterally suspended Russian tourism to the country and halted what had been a fast-developing economic and military partnership. Nevertheless, Egypt remains an important regional player on Russia’s radar screen, and Moscow hopes to win Egyptian support for its initiatives in the region. Above all, it fits into another major goal for Russia’s Middle East diplomacy in the upcoming year: restoring its image among the region’s Sunni states. Perception of Russia as pro-Shia has become rampant in the region since the start of its campaign in Syria. This has seriously limited many policy options for Moscow, and the Kremlin feels a need to reverse the trend. Soft power projection will consequently become an important facet of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. Israel may be another topic for Moscow to cautiously explore in 2016. The Israeli-Palestinian talks have become increasingly dysfunctional over the past year; should Moscow feel it has ideas for nudging them along, and senses support for such a nudge, it may become more active diplomatically. But Moscow views Israel in a broader context—as a country with serious military and intelligence capabilities. It will most likely work with the Israelis across a wide range of the regional security agenda, mainly over cooperation on Sunni radical groups and a Syrian peace settlement, while keeping its contacts relatively low-profile.¶ At the end of 2015, the Kremlin forecasted and feared that 2016 would bring further political crises in Yemen, Lebanon, Libya and Iraq. Now, with Saudi-Iranian tensions worsening across the Middle East, this scenario seems much more certain. For its part, Moscow will continue to promote its grand vision for the Middle East as a region with a coherent security structure, which would let it cope with its own internal challenges and keep threats from bubbling up from the region, including into Central Asia and the Caucasus. The contours of the current conflict patterns in the region make this vision much harder to promote, let alone implement. The Russian operation in Syria clearly stretches far beyond its regional goals and has much to do with setting the boundaries of what the Kremlin considers a struggle to shape the world order. However, as 2015’s three months of intensive Russian action in the Middle East revealed, Moscow often misses the global forest for the trees.
	12	+Middle East descent into further conflict means nuclear escalation
	13	+Kissinger 15 Henry Kissinger, October 16, 2015, Kisinger, served as national-security adviser and secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Wall Street Journal, A Path Out of the Middle East Collapse, http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-path-out-of-the-middle-east-collapse-1445037513 DOA: 10-17-15 NB
	14	+The debate about whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran regarding its nuclear program stabilized the Middle East’s strategic framework had barely begun when the region’s geopolitical framework collapsed. Russia’s unilateral military action in Syria is the latest symptom of the disintegration of the American role in stabilizing the Middle East order that emerged from the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. In the aftermath of that conflict, Egypt abandoned its military ties with the Soviet Union and joined an American-backed negotiating process that produced peace treaties between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan, a United Nations-supervised disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria, which has been observed for over four decades (even by the parties of the Syrian civil war), and international support of Lebanon’s sovereign territorial integrity. Later, Saddam Hussein’s war to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq was defeated by an international coalition under U.S. leadership. American forces led the war against terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States were our allies in all these efforts. The Russian military presence disappeared from the region. That geopolitical pattern is now in shambles. Four states in the region have ceased to function as sovereign. Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq have become targets for nonstate movements seeking to impose their rule. Over large swaths in Iraq and Syria, an ideologically radical religious army has declared itself the Islamic State (also called ISIS or ISIL) as an unrelenting foe of established world order. It seeks to replace the international system’s multiplicity of states with a caliphate, a single Islamic empire governed by Shariah law. ISIS’ claim has given the millennium-old split between the Shiite and Sunni sects of Islam an apocalyptic dimension. The remaining Sunni states feel threatened by both the religious fervor of ISIS as well as by Shiite Iran, potentially the most powerful state in the region. Iran compounds its menace by presenting itself in a dual capacity. On one level, Iran acts as a legitimate Westphalian state conducting traditional diplomacy, even invoking the safeguards of the international system. At the same time, it organizes and guides nonstate actors seeking regional hegemony based on jihadist principles: Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria; Hamas in Gaza; the Houthis in Yemen. Thus the Sunni Middle East risks engulfment by four concurrent sources: Shiite-governed Iran and its legacy of Persian imperialism; ideologically and religiously radical movements striving to overthrow prevalent political structures; conflicts within each state between ethnic and religious groups arbitrarily assembled after World War I into (now collapsing) states; and domestic pressures stemming from detrimental political, social and economic domestic policies. The fate of Syria provides a vivid illustration: What started as a Sunni revolt against the Alawite (a Shiite offshoot) autocrat Bashar Assad fractured the state into its component religious and ethnic groups, with nonstate militias supporting each warring party, and outside powers pursuing their own strategic interests. Iran supports the Assad regime as the linchpin of an Iranian historic dominance stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean. The Gulf States insist on the overthrow of Mr. Assad to thwart Shiite Iranian designs, which they fear more than Islamic State. They seek the defeat of ISIS while avoiding an Iranian victory. This ambivalence has been deepened by the nuclear deal, which in the Sunni Middle East is widely interpreted as tacit American acquiescence in Iranian hegemony. These conflicting trends, compounded by America’s retreat from the region, have enabled Russia to engage in military operations deep in the Middle East, a deployment unprecedented in Russian history. Russia’s principal concern is that the Assad regime’s collapse could reproduce the chaos of Libya, bring ISIS into power in Damascus, and turn all of Syria into a haven for terrorist operations, reaching into Muslim regions inside Russia’s southern border in the Caucasus and elsewhere. On the surface, Russia’s intervention serves Iran’s policy of sustaining the Shiite element in Syria. In a deeper sense, Russia’s purposes do not require the indefinite continuation of Mr. Assad’s rule. It is a classic balance-of-power maneuver to divert the Sunni Muslim terrorist threat from Russia’s southern border region. It is a geopolitical, not an ideological, challenge and should be dealt with on that level. Whatever the motivation, Russian forces in the region—and their participation in combat operations—produce a challenge that American Middle East policy has not encountered in at least four decades. American policy has sought to straddle the motivations of all parties and is therefore on the verge of losing the ability to shape events. The U.S. is now opposed to, or at odds in some way or another with, all parties in the region: with Egypt on human rights; with Saudi Arabia over Yemen; with each of the Syrian parties over different objectives. The U.S. proclaims the determination to remove Mr. Assad but has been unwilling to generate effective leverage—political or military—to achieve that aim. Nor has the U.S. put forward an alternative political structure to replace Mr. Assad should his departure somehow be realized. Russia, Iran, ISIS and various terrorist organizations have moved into this vacuum: Russia and Iran to sustain Mr. Assad; Tehran to foster imperial and jihadist designs. The Sunni states of the Persian Gulf, Jordan and Egypt, faced with the absence of an alternative political structure, favor the American objective but fear the consequence of turning Syria into another Libya. American policy on Iran has moved to the center of its Middle East policy. The administration has insisted that it will take a stand against jihadist and imperialist designs by Iran and that it will deal sternly with violations of the nuclear agreement. But it seems also passionately committed to the quest for bringing about a reversal of the hostile, aggressive dimension of Iranian policy through historic evolution bolstered by negotiation. The prevailing U.S. policy toward Iran is often compared by its advocates to the Nixon administration’s opening to China, which contributed, despite some domestic opposition, to the ultimate transformation of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The comparison is not apt. The opening to China in 1971 was based on the mutual recognition by both parties that the prevention of Russian hegemony in Eurasia was in their common interest. And 42 Soviet divisions lining the Sino-Soviet border reinforced that conviction. No comparable strategic agreement exists between Washington and Tehran. On the contrary, in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear accord, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei described the U.S. as the “Great Satan” and rejected negotiations with America about nonnuclear matters. Completing his geopolitical diagnosis, Mr. Khamenei also predicted that Israel would no longer exist in 25 years. Forty-five years ago, the expectations of China and the U.S. were symmetrical. The expectations underlying the nuclear agreement with Iran are not. Tehran will gain its principal objectives at the beginning of the implementation of the accord. America’s benefits reside in a promise of Iranian conduct over a period of time. The opening to China was based on an immediate and observable adjustment in Chinese policy, not on an expectation of a fundamental change in China’s domestic system. The optimistic hypothesis on Iran postulates that Tehran’s revolutionary fervor will dissipate as its economic and cultural interactions with the outside world increase. American policy runs the risk of feeding suspicion rather than abating it. Its challenge is that two rigid and apocalyptic blocs are confronting each other: a Sunni bloc consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; and the Shiite bloc comprising Iran, the Shiite sector of Iraq with Baghdad as its capital, the Shiite south of Lebanon under Hezbollah control facing Israel, and the Houthi portion of Yemen, completing the encirclement of the Sunni world. In these circumstances, the traditional adage that the enemy of your enemy can be treated as your friend no longer applies. For in the contemporary Middle East, it is likely that the enemy of your enemy remains your enemy. A great deal depends on how the parties interpret recent events. Can the disillusionment of some of our Sunni allies be mitigated? How will Iran’s leaders interpret the nuclear accord once implemented—as a near-escape from potential disaster counseling a more moderate course, returning Iran to an international order? Or as a victory in which they have achieved their essential aims against the opposition of the U.N. Security Council, having ignored American threats and, hence, as an incentive to continue Tehran’s dual approach as both a legitimate state and a nonstate movement challenging the international order? Two-power systems are prone to confrontation, as was demonstrated in Europe in the run-up to World War I. Even with traditional weapons technology, to sustain a balance of power between two rigid blocs requires an extraordinary ability to assess the real and potential balance of forces, to understand the accumulation of nuances that might affect this balance, and to act decisively to restore it whenever it deviates from equilibrium—qualities not heretofore demanded of an America sheltered behind two great oceans. But the current crisis is taking place in a world of nontraditional nuclear and cyber technology. As competing regional powers strive for comparable threshold capacity, the nonproliferation regime in the Middle East may crumble. If nuclear weapons become established, a catastrophic outcome is nearly inevitable. A strategy of pre-emption is inherent in the nuclear technology. The U.S. must be determined to prevent such an outcome and apply the principle of nonproliferation to all nuclear aspirants in the region.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-22 22:40:04.591

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	1	+Other

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	1	+Other

ParentRound

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	1	+8

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	1	+8

Team

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	1	+Lexington Balachundhar Neg

Title

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	1	+SEPOCT- DA- Russian Middle East Presence

Tournament

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	1	+Bronx