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• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[3]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[3]

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EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-14 20:01:28.630
	1	+2016-10-14 20:01:28.0

Caselist.CitesClass[3]

Cites

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	1	+Water becomes tritiated and radioactive after being used as a coolant- leads to cancer
	2	+Biello 14 Biello, David. "Is Radioactive Hydrogen in Drinking Water a Cancer Threat?"Scientific American. Nature America Inc., 7 Feb. 2014. Web. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-radioactive-hydrogen-in-drinking-water-a-cancer-threat/.
	3	+That bomb-made tritium will eventually decay away completely (presuming the test ban holds), leaving power plants and cosmic rays as the major sources, along with minor contributions from the tritium in photoluminescent signs and the like. But nuclear power plants have not done a good job of containing tritium, whether from steam or water leaks at U.S. plants. In 2005 a group of farmers in Illinois successfully sued utility Exelon for tritiated water escaping from the Braidwood nuclear power plant that had contaminated their wells, even though the levels were below those set by the EPA. And there is at least 400,000 cubic meters of tritiated water now in storage at Japan’s wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex, which suffered multiple meltdowns after the 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami. A suite of technologies there filter out 62 different radioactive particles created by the Fukushima meltdowns—leaving out only tritium, largely because it is difficult and expensive to separate water from water. Companies such as Kurion, which already helps filter out radionuclides like cesium, suggest that they have a solution if the Japanese want to eliminate the tritium as well. "It's up to TEPCO the utility and the Japanese people to decide what they want to do with that water," says materials scientist Gaetan Bonhomme, vice president of strategic planning and initiatives at Kurion. "It is a radionuclide and it does cause public concern." The Kurion process concentrates the radionuclide in a small volume of water. A proprietary material then captures the tritium and stores it—and will not release it until heated above 500 degrees Celsius. "It's stable in an accident," Bonhomme notes. The technology could be applied wherever tritium is produced, including aging nuclear reactors in the U.S. It is the hope of Bonhomme and others that by offering a solution for tritium and other nuclear wastes, they can help ease fears of fission as a source of electricity. But any treatment will be more expensive than simply dumping tritiated water. "If it was really all about science, we would be releasing most of tritium from nuclear power in the water stream, because that's the best way to dilute it," Bonhomme admits. So the question becomes: Is treating for tritium worth it? And that answer depends on the risk. Cancer is the main risk from humans ingesting tritium. When tritium decays it spits out a low-energy electron (roughly 18,000 electron volts) that escapes and slams into DNA, a ribosome or some other biologically important molecule. And, unlike other radionuclides, tritium is usually part of water, so it ends up in all parts of the body and therefore can, in theory, promote any kind of cancer. But that also helps reduce the risk: any tritiated water is typically excreted in less than a month. Some evidence suggests the kind of radiation emitted by tritium—a so-called beta particle—is actually more effective at causing cancer than the high-energy radiation such as gamma rays, even though skin can block a beta particle. The theory is that the low-energy electron actually produces a greater impact because it doesn't have the energy to travel as far and spread its impact out. At the end of its atomic-scale trip it delivers most of its ionizing energy in one relatively confined track rather than shedding energy all along its path like a higher-energy particle. This is known as density of ionization, and has been shown with the similar form of radiation called an alpha particle. Ionization is what makes radiation dangerous for human health. Essentially, the radioactive particle smashes into the atom or molecule and pushes out an electron or other particle, leaving that atom or molecule in a charged or ionized state. These charged molecules can then cause other damage as they interact with other atoms and molecules. That includes damage to DNA, genes and other cellular mechanisms. Over time this DNA instability results in a higher chance of cancer. As a result, scientists work under the assumption that any amount of radiation poses a health risk. Density of ionization suggests tritium exposure may have an increased risk of causing cancer. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health calculates compensation due energy workers who develop cancers that may have been caused by exposure to ionizing radiation with such enhanced biological effectiveness of tritium in mind as does the fund for the 200,000 or so personnel who served at nuclear test sites, the atomic veterans (although few had any tritium exposure). But there is no definitive epidemiological study to assess the true risk of tritium, and animal studies are also lacking. The cancer rates in Japanese survivors of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki can reveal little because they were not exposed to tritium either. "You need huge study populations to have any chance of seeing anything," Kocher notes, and that money is simply unavailable. "There is no compelling need to spend the money required to do this." To make matters even more tricky, tritium's radioactivity is difficult to detect. Because the electron tritium spits out is not a penetrating or high-energy particle, it is hard for radiation monitoring devices to even detect. That makes measuring the radiation dose from tritium difficult. "Dosimetry has been a problem," Kocher notes. "I think a definitive epidemiological study is probably impossible."
	4	+The poor of Japan were exploited and were left disposable under nuclear reactors
	5	+Schrader-Frechette 12 Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. “Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”. Environmental Justice Journal. Volum 5, Number 3, 2012. Dr. Shrader-Frechette is O’Neill Family Endowed Professor, Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, and also the director of the Center for Environmental Justice and Children’s Health, at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. NB
	6	+University scientists, nuclear-industry experts, and physicians say FD radiation will cause at least 20,000- 60,000 premature-cancer deaths.41,42 Japanese poor people are among the hardest hit by FD DREI because, like those abandoned after Hurricane Katrina, Japan’s poor received inadequate post-FD-disaster assistance. Abandoned by government and ‘‘marooned’’ for weeks without roads, electricity, or water, many poor people had no medical care,43,44 transportation, or heat—despite frigid, snowy conditions.45,46 At least four reasons suggest prima-facie evidence that Japanese poor near FD have faced DREI. One prima-facie reason is that because poor people tend to live near dangerous facilities, like reactors, they face the worst accident risks. Within weeks after the FD accident began, long-lived cesium-134 and other radioactive isotopes had poisoned soils at 7.5 million times the regulatory limit; radiation outside plant boundaries was equivalent to getting about seven chest X-rays per hour.47 Roughly 19 miles Northwest of FD, air-radiation readings were 0.8 mSv per hour; after 10 days of this exposure, IARC dose- response curves predict 1 in 5 fatal cancers of those ex- posed would be attributable to FD; two-months exposure would mean most fatal cancers were caused by FD. Such exposures are likely because many near-Fukushima resi- dents were too poor to evacuate.20 ¶ Farther outside the evacuation zone—less than two weeks after the accident began—soil 25 miles Northwest of FD had cesium-137 levels ‘‘twice as high as the threshold for declaring areas uninhabitable around Chernobyl,’’ suggesting ‘‘the land might need to be abandoned.’’48 Not until a month after US and interna- tional agencies recommended expanding FD evacuation zones, did Japanese-government officials consider and reject expanding evacuation.49,50 ¶ A second prima-facie reason for Fukushima DREI is that poor people, living near reactors, have higher probabili- ties of being hurt by both normal and disaster-related radiation releases. Reactors normally cause prima facie EI because they release allowable radiation that increases local cancers and mortality, especially among infants/ children.51–55 Because zero is the only safe dose of ioniz- ing radiation (as the US National Academy of Sciences warns), its cumulative LNT (Linear, No Threshold for increased risk) effects are worst closer to reactors, where poor people live. The US EPA says even normal US ra- diation releases, between 1970–2020, could cause up to 24,000 additional US deaths.56,57 ¶ A third prima-facie reason for Fukushima DREI is that although nearby (poor) people bear both higher pre- accident and post-accident risks, others receive little/no risks and most benefits. Wealthier Tokyo residents—140 miles away—received virtually all FD electricity, yet vir- tually no EI or DREI. ¶ A fourth prima-facie reason for DREI burdens on FD poor is that their poverty/powerlessness arguably forced them into EI and accepting reactor siting. Companies hoping to site nuclear facilities target economically de- pressed areas, both in Japan and elsewhere.17,58 Thus, although FD-owner Tokyo Electric Company (TECO) has long-term safety and ‘‘cover-up scandals,’’ Fukushima residents agreed to accept TECO reactors in exchange for cash. With Fukushima $121 million in debt, in 2007 it approved two new reactors in exchange for ‘‘$45 million from the government.60 percent’’ of total town reve- nue.17,59 Yet if economic hardship forced poor towns to accept reactors in exchange for basic-services monies, they likely gave no informed consent. Their choice was not voluntary, but coerced by their poverty. Massive Japa- nese-nuclear-industry PR and media ads also have thwarted risk-disclosure, thus consent, by minimizing nuclear risks.17,53,60–62 Scientists say neither industry nor government disclosed its failure to (1) test reactor-safety equipment; (2) thwart many natural-event disasters; (3) withstand seismic events worse than those that already had occurred; (4) withstand Fukushima-type disasters; (5) admit that new passive-safety reactors require electricity to cool cores and avoid catastrophe; or (6) base reactor- safety on anything but cost-benefit tests.17,53,60–62 Thus, because prima facie evidence suggests Fukushima poor people never consented to FD siting, they are EI victims whose reactor proximity caused them also to become DREI victims. ¶ Prima-facie evidence likewise shows buraku nuclear workers are both EI and DREI victims. Internationally, nuclear workers are prominent EI victims because even without accidents, they are allowed to receive ionizing- radiation doses (50 mSv annually) 50 times higher than those received by the public. Yet, only low socio- economic-status people—like buraku—tend to take such risks. This double standard is obviously ethically ques- tionable, given that many developed nations (e.g., Germany, Scandinavian countries) prohibit it because it encourages EI—workers’ trading health for paid work, and innocent worker-descendants’ (future generations’) dying from radiation-induced genomic instability. Thus, both buraku children and their distant descendents face EI—higher radiation-induced death/disease.17,61,62 ¶ Prima-facie evidence shows, second, that FD-buraku- nuclear workers also are EI and DREI victims because they likely consented to neither normal-, nor accident- level, radiation exposures. Why not? Under normal con- ditions, 90 percent of all 83,000 Japanese nuclear workers are temporary-contract workers who receive about 16 times more radiation than the already-50-times-higher- than-public doses received by normal radiation workers. For non-accident exposures, buraku receive $350–$1,000 per day, for several days of high-radiation work. They have neither full-time employment, nor adequate com- pensation, nor union representation, nor health benefits, nor full dose disclosure, yet receive the highest work- place-radiation risks. Why? Industry is not required to ‘‘count’’ temporary workers’ radiation exposures when it calculates workers’ average-radiation doses for regula- tors. However, even if buraku were told their non- accident doses/risks, they could not genuinely consent. They are unskilled, socially shunned, temporary laborers who are forced by economic necessity to accept even deadly jobs. This two-tier nuclear-worker system—where buraku bear most (unreported) risks, while highly-paid employees bear little (reported) risk—’’ ‘is the hidden world of nuclear power’ said.a former Tokyo University physics professor.’’ In 2010, 89 percent of FD nuclear workers were temporary-contract employees, ‘‘hired from construction sites,’’ local farms, or ‘‘local gangsters.’’ With a ‘‘constant fear of getting fired,’’ they hid their injuries/ doses—to keep their jobs.61–65 ¶ Among post-FD-accident buraku, lack of adequate consent also caused prima-facie DREI because government raised workers’ allowable, post-accident-radiation doses to 250 mSv/year—250 times what the public may receive annually.63 Yet IARC says each 250-MSv FD exposure causes 25 percent of fatal cancers. Two-years’ exposure (500 MSv) would cause 50 percent of all fatal cancers. Given such deadly risks and the dire economic situation of buraku, their genuine consent is unlikely.24,25 ¶ Still another factor thwarting FD-buraku consent—and indicating prima-facie DREI—is that FD workers likely ¶ received higher doses than government admitted. ‘‘The company refused to say how many FD contract workers had been exposed to post-disaster radiation’’; moreover, nuclear-worker-protective clothing and respirators, whe- ther in the US or Japan, protect them only from skin/lung contamination; no gear can stop gamma irradiation of their entire bodies.56,63,66 Neither TECO, nor Japanese regulators, nor IAEA has released statistics on post-FD- radiation exposures, especially to buraku inside the plant. IAEA says merely: ‘‘requirements for occupational expo- sure of remediation workers can be fulfilled’’ at FD, not that they have been or will be fulfilled—a fact also sug- gesting prima-facie DREI toward buraku.67,68 ¶ Local FD children likewise comprise one of the most troubling groups of prima-facie DREI victims. Post- accident, government has allowed FD children to annu- ally receive radiation of 2000 mrem(20mSv)/year—20 times higher than normally allowed for adults, although children are up to 40 times more sensitive than adults to radiation.56,69 Thus, PSR says the FD ‘‘impact on the health of Japanese children is being glossed over’’—that about 350,000 children under age 18 are living in Fu- kushima and, after four years, FD exposures could cause 5,000 of them to die prematurely from cancer. After eight years exposure, 10,000 of them would die prematurely.22 ¶ Japanese children’s weakened FD-radiation protections and resulting prima-facie DREI are problematic because FD children receive less protection than adults, despite their higher sensitivity. Yet all other things being equal, greater vulnerability ethically demands greater govern- ment protection. The weakened FD-radiation protections also are problematic because Japanese-government- radiation-dose standards take account only of external/ airborne-radiation, not internal exposures from food and water—although government and IAEA admit internal exposures are crucial to total FD doses. Only three months after the FD disaster began, Fukushima children tested positive for internal-radiation contamination—that Japa- nese standards ignored. Even worse, because isotopes such as cesium-134/137 have half-lives greater than 30 years, this contamination will continue for decades, con- tinually causing problems like cancer. Yet PSR says gov- ernment continues to cover up risks, by ‘‘not adequately monitoring radiation contamination of soil, food, water and air and.not providing.parents with sufficient in- formation to protect their children.’’ Likewise, warning that government-allowed-FD-risks to children are ‘‘un- conscionable,’’ government-scientific advisor Toshiso Kosako tearfully resigned. Cover-up of serious risks— which negates risk disclosure and consent—thus provides evidence of prima-facie DREI to Japanese children.22,32,68,70,71 ¶ Another prima-facie reason FD children face DREI is that they are being put at risk—despite inadequate stakeholder/victim involvement, a formal requirement for parental/guardian consent. Even the pro-nuclear IAEA questioned Japanese-government ‘‘credibility’’ be- cause it was merely ‘‘developing a stakeholder-involvement ¶ strategy’’; instead, IAEA demanded interactions with ‘‘stakeholders should start as early as possible.’’ Partly because of government cover-up and no stakeholder involvement, more than seven months after the FD catas- trophe began, IAEA warned that no government radiation- ’’data-management plan’’ exists; that many contaminated Japanese schools had no radiation monitors; that because of no warning signs, Japanese have ‘‘free and unmarked’’ ac- cess to Japan’s high-radiation, ‘‘deliberate-evacuation area;’’ and that Japanese officials have neither monitored citizens’ radiation doses nor involved university scientists in re- sponding to the crisis. Hirosaki University scientists, for instance, themselves did measurements of FD radiation. They warned that many civilian FD-radiation victims received four times the 20mSv dose—80 times normally- allowed exposures—while government claimed doses were ‘‘far below levels that warrant concerns about human health.’’68,70,71 ¶ Still another prima-facie reason Japanese children are DREI victims is that their parents/guardians showed they did not consent to children’s ‘‘allowed’’ 20mSv doses—because parents did most of the school-radiation cleanup, despite neither ‘‘appropriate training, supervi- sion,’’ nor government ‘‘technical assistance.’’ Even IAEA admits many FD-contaminated schools have been ‘‘re- mediated mostly by volunteers.parents of the pupils’’— something that would not have happened if parents had consented to government-allowed child doses and lack of clean-up.68 The plight of Japanese victims of prima-facie DREI suggests several lessons, similar to those from Hurricane Katrina. One lesson is that prima-facie EI can occur both before, and after, pollution disasters if government disaster-preparedness, government risk disclosure, or noxious-facility-siting violate justice or consent. A second lesson is that prima-facie DREI is predictable whenever disasters strike areas where poor people or shunned mi- norities, like buraku, live or work. A third lesson is that prima-facie DREI is predictable, given industry cover-up, data-falsification, and failure to retrofit/update facilities in predominantly poor/minority areas. For instance, Japanese and US reactors (unlike Swiss) are neither wa- terproof, armored against terrorists, earthquake resistant, nor able to operate for 10 hours after station blackout.41 ¶ The three previous lessons suggest that DREI often is predictable, not accidental. It also is no accident that FD- DREI-related-economic losses are $700 billion, excluding health/medical losses72—at least 20 times more than any multiple-reactor owner’s market capitalization. As of late February 2012, the market capitalization of major US multiple-reactor owners, for instance, ranged from $7.40 billion (Ameren) to $30 billion (Exelon).73 Exelon’s 17 re- actors have a total market capitalization of only $30 bil- lion, equivalent to $1.8 billion per reactor, whereas individual banks have a market capitalization nearly 10 times higher.74 Nuclear capitalization may be so low be- cause most nations give the nuclear industry freedom from 98–100 percent of total-accident liability, although the US government says a single reactor accident could cost at least $660 billion.17
	7	+This creates the possibility of japan to go thermonuclear
	8	+TOURAN 16
	9	+Touran, Nick. "Common Myths And Misconceptions About Thorium Going ’Round". Whatisnuclear.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 14 Aug. 2016.
	10	+Weapons were produced with graphite or heavy-water moderated production reactors and with gas centrifuge enrichment. Oh, and thermonuclear weapons require tritium as well, which is something that many Thorium MSR designs excel in producing (darn that lithium!).
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	13	+Earthquakes cost nuclear plants billions and tsunamis cause meltdown – makes nuclear inefficient and not cost competitive
	14	+WNA 16 WNA 2016 "Nuclear Power Plants And Earthquakes - World Nuclear Association ". World-nuclear.org. N. p., 2016. Web. 11 Aug. 2016.
	15	+Tepco posted a loss of JPY 150 billion (US$ 1.68 billion) for FY2007 (to 31/3/08) due to the prolonged closure of the plant, followed by JPY 109 billion loss in the first half of FY2008. While no damage to the actual reactors has been found, detailed checks continue, and upgrading of earthquake resistance is required. Major civil engineering works are also required before the reactors resume operation. Overall, the FY2007 impact of the earthquake was projected to be JPY 603.5 billion ($5.62 billion), three quarters of that being increased fuel costs to replace the 8000 MWe of lost capacity. NISA approved the utility’s new seismic estimates in November 2008, and conducted final safety reviews of the units as they were upgraded. Unit 7 restarted in May, unit 6 in August 2009, unit 1 in May 2010, and unit 5 in November 2010. Units 2-4 remain shut down. The magnitude 9.0 Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake at 2.46 pm on 11 March did considerable damage, and the tsunami it created, with run-up height of 40 metres, caused even more. It appears to have been a double quake giving a severe duration of about 3 minutes, and was centred 130 km offshore of the city of Sendai in Miyagi prefecture on the eastern cost of Honshu Island. It moved Honshu 4 metres east and subsided the nearby coastline by up to one metre. Eleven reactors at four nuclear power plants in the region were operating at the time and all shut down automatically when the quake hit. Power was available to run the cooling pumps at most of the units, and they achieved cold shutdown in a few days. However, at Tepco's Fukushima Daiichi plant, a major accident sequence commenced. The three reactors were shut down by the earthquake and the emergency diesel generators started as expected, but then they shut down an hour later when submerged by the tsunami, about 15 metres high at that point. Other systems proved inadequate and led the authorities to order, and subsequently extend, an evacuation while engineers worked to restore power and cooling. The operating units which shut down were Tepco's Fukushima Daiichi 1, 2, 3, Fukushima Daini 1, 2, 3, 4, Tohoku's Onagawa 1, 2, 3, and Japco's Tokai. Onogawa 1 briefly suffered a fire in the non-nuclear turbine building, but the main problem centred on Fukushima Daiichi units 1-3. First, pressure inside the containment structures increased steadily and led to this being vented to the atmosphere on an ongoing basis. Vented gases and vapour included hydrogen, produced by the exothermic interaction of the fuel's very hot zirconium cladding with water. Later on 12th, there was a hydrogen explosion in the building above unit 1 reactor containment, and another one two days later in unit 3, from the venting as hydrogen mixed with air.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-14 20:01:29.972

Judge

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	1	+Martin Sigalow

Opponent

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	1	+Gilmour SW

ParentRound

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	1	+3

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Lexington Balachundhar Aff

Title

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	1	+SEPOCT- 1AC- Yakuza Buraku Adv

Tournament

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	1	+Bronx