Changes for page Lexington Alessandro Aff

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1 -xwiki:XWiki.Admin
1 +XWiki.stephenalessandro3@gmailcom
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1 -I reserve the right to read anything from my teammates' wiki.
2 -My email is stephenalessandro3@gmail.com but it would be easier to reach me over FB or at 781-457-8355
3 -I post neg cites on aff page as well not on the neg page.
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1 -2016-11-12 14:04:18.0
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1 -Court Clog
2 -Thomson 9: Linda Thomson. January 22, 2009. US Supreme court: Police are protected from lawsuits. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705279304/US-Supreme-Court-Police-are-protected-from-lawsuits.html?pg=all. RW
3 -The U.S. Supreme Court has sided with police officers who raided a suspected drug dealer's home in Millard County and seized evidence without a warrant and were later sued by the man for financial damages because he contends they violated his Fourth Amendment constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. The high court ruled that the police did have governmental immunity against civil lawsuits. However, the Supreme Court was silent on the issue of any alleged constitutional amendment violation. Wednesday's ruling will have wide-reaching implications for law enforcement officials throughout the nation. Previously, when a civil rights case of this type was filed the courts had to take a two-pronged and often lengthy approach to resolving it — first litigating it to determine whether a constitutional violation had in fact occurred and then checking to see if the law was "clearly established" in case law. This ruling gives greater leeway to federal district courts and appeals courts in deciding whether to use the two-pronged approach or decide if there is a better way to handle the case. "The court's unanimous decision clearly vindicates our position that our officers should not be liable for money damages when the law was not clearly known," said Salt Lake attorney Peter Stirba, who represented Millard County. "Our officers believed their conduct was constitutionally permissible at the time, thus the very purpose for qualified immunity is to protect police officers from personal liability unless th
4 -
5 -QI prevents frivolous trials- that clogs courts
6 -Beerman 09 Beermann, Jack Michael. (Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Schoolar, BU School of Law_ “Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance” Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 09-51. December 2, 2009 NB
7 -This two-pronged formulation of the qualified immunity standard36 lasted only seven years.
8 -AND
9 -purpose for qualified immunity is to protect police officers from personal liability unless th
10 -
11 -Police misconduct cases clog courts
12 -Osnos 2k: Evan Osnos, Tribune Staff WriterChicago Tribune. “City to try mediation of cop brutality cases”. November 15, 2000. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-11-15/news/0011150315_1_civil-rights-cases-mediation-police-department. RW
13 -Hoping to avert costly legal battles over alleged police brutality, the City of Chicago
14 -AND
15 -that is less that we have to put into them," Hoyle said.
16 -
17 -Court clog leads to poor decisions and hurts the minorities the worst- turns case
18 -Brunt 15 Alexa Van Brunt, "Poor people rely on public defenders who are too overworked to defend them" Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked, June 17, 2015.
19 -Money can buy you a great defense team, but what if you can’t afford
20 -AND
21 -This group bears the brunt of our public defender systems’ underfunding and overwork.
22 -
23 -Turns and outweighs the case
24 -
25 -A. Caseloads take longer which limits the aff’s solvency because police won’t be held accountable if judges can’t do their jobs
26 -
27 -B. Hurts the minorities the most because they are left with public defenders who don't do their job either
EntryDate
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1 -2016-11-12 14:10:40.0
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1 -John Staunton
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1 -Princeton CP
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1 -Departments DA
2 -Qualified immunity avoids court clog – it deters frivolous lawsuits, and makes it easier for courts to dismiss the case.
3 -Qualified immunity doctrine prevents longer trials and uniquely enables federal and district courts—civil trials are uniquely bad
4 -Thomson 9: Linda Thomson. January 22, 2009. US Supreme court: Police are protected from lawsuits. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705279304/US-Supreme-Court-Police-are-protected-from-lawsuits.html?pg=all. RW
5 -damages because he contends they violated his Fourth Amendment constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. The high court ruled that the police did have governmental immunity against civil lawsuits. However, the Supreme Court was silent on the issue of any alleged constitutional amendment violation. Wednesday's ruling will have wide-reaching implications for law enforcement officials throughout the nation. Previously, when a civil rights case of this type was filed the courts had to take a two-pronged and often lengthy approach to resolving it — first litigating it to determine whether a constitutional violation had in fact occurred and then checking to see if the law was "clearly established" in case law. This ruling gives greater leeway to federal district courts and appeals courts in deciding whether to use the two-pronged approach or decide if there is a better way to handle the case. "The court's unanimous decision clearly vindicates our position that our officers should not be liable for money damages when the law was not clearly known," said Salt Lake attorney Peter Stirba, who represented Millard County. "Our officers believed their conduct was constitutionally permissible at the time, thus the very purpose for qualified immunity is to protect police officers from personal liability unless th
6 -
7 -Court cases against the police kill city budgets and harm local economy.
8 -Elinson and Frosh 15 Zusha Elinson (Zusha Elinson is a U.S. news reporter based in Northern California) and Dan Frosch (Dan Frosch is a general assignment reporter for The Wall Street Journal's Southwest Bureau.), 7-15-15, "Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-police-misconduct-cases-soars-in-big-u-s-cities-1437013834(VR 10/31/16)
9 -The cost of resolving police-misconduct cases has surged for big U.S
10 -AND
11 -death after being put in a police chokehold last summer sparked widespread protests.
12 -
13 -Police budget cuts turns and outweighs the case- multiple warrants
14 -
15 -A. Higher crime rates in impoverished areas
16 -Jackman 10 Tom Jackman (Washington Post Staff Writer ), 9-30-2010, "Police fear crime increase as recession saps forces," No Publication, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/29/AR2010092907447.html(VR 10/31/16)
17 -Police chiefs across the country say that they are feeling the effects of the nation's
18 -AND
19 -.6 million. "We won't have enough officers," he said.
20 -
21 -B. Lack of Police training- leads to more misconduct and police brutality.
22 -Hollowell 11 Perry W. Hollowell (Perry W. Hollowell recently retired as Chief of Police, but has also been a Sheriff, Chief Deputy, Captain, Lieutenant and Sergeant while serving with three jurisdictions. Along with a thirty-five year law enforcement career he has also had a successful military career retiring after twenty-two years of service. A strong training background includes training law enforcement and military on both a national and international basis. Along with educating thousands of police and military, Perry has been adjunct faculty for three colleges. He has also pursued numerous hours of professional development programs to include the FBI National Academy, U.S. Army Sergeant’s Major Academy and a Master of Business Management Degree. His training, experience and education has provided the opportunity to train in a wide variety of topics.), 2011, “Are Budget Cuts Killing Police Officers?” N.p, http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Are_Budget_Cuts_Killing_Police_Officers_11-01-11.pdf (VR 11/1/16)
23 -While it can be argued that budget cuts are making life more dangerous for law
24 -AND
25 -could easily see how an officer under stress would revert to his firearm.
26 -
27 -C. Incentivizes unjust arrests to make more money
28 -Benson 15 Thor Benson (Thor Benson is a traveling writer based in Los Angeles, California. He regularly contributes to ATTN:, and his writing has also been featured in The Atlantic, Wired, Rolling Stone, Vice, The Verge, and elsewhere. ), 5-16-2015, "The 4 Disturbing Reasons Why Police Obsess over Petty Crime," ATTN:, http://www.attn.com/stories/1663/police-departments-prioritize-drug-crimes-over-violent-crimes(VR 10/1/16)
29 -Why so much attention on low-level drug offenders? One major reason is
30 -AND
31 -enough overall arrests, the department can lose some of its federal funding.
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1 -2016-11-12 14:11:54.0
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1 -John Staunton
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1 -Princeton CP
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1 -Civil lawsuits employ neolib to put an asking price on people’s suffering.
2 -
3 -Abel 81
4 -Richard L. Abel, Prof of Law @ UCLA, ’81 (British Journal of Law and Society 8:1, “A Critique of American Tort Law,” jstor)
5 -Finally, tort law responds to intangible injury by extending that fundamental concept of capitalism
6 -AND
7 -the compensation system is working well if anything, too well. 116
8 -
9 -Link: Their emphasis on police brutality as a singular issue disguises the problem. This turns the aff- police violence is a direct result of capitalism. Inhumane treatment of blacks including their deaths and their rate of incarceration is caused by capitalism.
10 -
11 -Hedges 15
12 -http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/corporate_capitalism_is_the_foundation_of_police_20150 705 Chris Hedges is a columnist at Truthdig.com He has published 11 books including a New York Times Bestseller: “Days of Destruction”
13 -Our national conversation on race and crime is based on a fiction. It is
14 -AND
15 -, as they have for decades, and disproportionately locked in prison cages.
16 -
17 -This turns the aff – police violence is a direct result of neoliberalism. A failure to recognize that makes violence inevitable.
18 -
19 -Lane 7/21
20 -Alycee Lane (Alycee J. Lane is a former professor who taught African American literature and culture at UC Santa Barbara.), 7-21-16 “Violence, Death and Our Neoliberal Police,” CounterPunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/07/21/violence-death-and-our-neoliberal-police/
21 -If we examine through the prism of neoliberalism the killing of Philando Castile – that
22 -AND
23 -this was true as well for Officer Darren Wilson of Ferguson, Missouri.
24 -
25 -Alt
26 -
27 -The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism’s grip on policing. Different groups must coalesce together to resist neo-liberalism which seeks to divide them.
28 -
29 -LaVenia 15
30 -Peter A. LaVenia PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, SUNY. He is the Secretary of the NY State Green Party and manages Matt Funiciello’s campaign for Congress. JANUARY 16, 2015 “Police Behavior and Neoliberalism” http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/16/police-behavior-and-neoliberalism/
31 -The cause of impotence on the part of elected officials even in the face of
32 -AND
33 -see nothing but equivocation by local officials and big city mayors.
EntryDate
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1 -2016-12-03 12:11:14.0
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1 -Ryan Monagle
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1 -Andrew Hong
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1 -Qualified Immunity K
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1 -Princeton
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1 -Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all broken cases (ACs, NCs, DAs, CPs, and kritiks) on the NDCA wiki under their own name if they have disclosed in the past/have internet access. In this disclosure, they must post cites, tags, and first three and last three words of all cards read. Debaters may begin disclosing at any point during the season, but they must disclose all broken cases at least 30 min before this round in order to meet my interp. They must disclose regardless of whether the tournament requires disclosure.
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1 -2016-12-03 15:48:35.0
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1 -Paul Erlanger
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1 -Devansh Chuahan
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1 -I affirm
2 -
3 -The value criterion is adhering to the U.S Constitution.
4 -A. The constitution denotes explicit obligations meaning only it can serve as a guide to action because only it is accessible - the obligations are clear.
5 -B. Bodies like the executive and judicial branch enforce the constitution and ensure the
6 -AND
7 -other ethical theory and its obligating capacity but they’ve already endorsed the constitution.
8 -
9 -Morality for a body is based on the function of that body.
10 -
11 -Macintyre 81 Alasdair MacIntyre, “After Virtue”, 1981 Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (born 12 January 1929) is a Scottish1 philosopher primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy but also known for his work in history of philosophy and theology. He is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) at London Metropolitan University, and an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. During his lengthy academic career, he also taught at Brandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt University, and Boston University.
12 -Yet in fact the alleged unrestrictedly general logical principle on which everything is being made to depend is bogus- and the scholastic tag applies only to Aristotelian syllogisms. There are several types of valid arguments in which some element may appear in a conclusion which is not present in the premises. A.N. Prior’s counter-example to this illustrates its breakdown adequately; from the premise ‘He is a sea captain’; the conclusion may be validly inferred that ‘He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to do’. This counter-example not only shows that there is no general principle of the type alleged; but it itself shows what is at least a grammatical truth—an ‘is’ premise can on occasion entail an ‘ought’ conclusion. From such factual premises as ‘This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping’ and ‘This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably’, the evaluative conclusion validly follows that ‘This is a bad watch’. From such factual premises as ‘He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district’, ‘He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known’ and ‘His dairy herd wins all the first prizes at the agricultural shows’, the evaluative conclusion validly follows that ‘He is a good farmer’. Both of these arguments are valid because of the special character of the concepts of a watch and of a farmer. Such concepts are functional concepts; that is to say, we define both ‘watch’ and ‘farmer’ in terms of purpose of function which a watch or a farmer are characteristically expected to serve. It follows that the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch nor the concept of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; and that the criterion of something’s being a watch and the criterion of something’s being a good watch.
13 -
14 -And the functional nature of the U.S. is adhering with the Constitution.
15 -
16 -The White House https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/constitution
17 - “The Constitution of the United States of America is the supreme law of the United States. Empowered with the sovereign authority of the people by the framers and the consent of the legislatures of the states, it is the source of all government powers, and also provides important limitations on the government that protect the fundamental rights of United States citizens.
18 -Thus, ought implies the standard which is maintaining consistency with the constitution.
19 -
20 -=
21 -
22 -Thus the plan: The USFG should remove the clearly established doctrine from qualified immunity.
23 -
24 -Wright 15 is the advocate Sam Wright http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/ Sam Wright is a public interest lawyer and he graduated from Brooklyn Law School in May 2014 and currently works as a Pro Bono Attorney for Earthjustice in the New York office. SA
25 -Instead, police officers have recourse to the broad protections of the judicially established doctrine of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, state actors are protected from suit even if they’ve violated the law by, say, using excessive force, or performing an unwarranted body cavity search — as long as their violation was not one of “clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would be aware.” In other words, if there’s not already a case where a court has held that an officer’s identical or near-identical conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, there’s a good chance that even an obviously malfeasant officer will avoid liability — will avoid accountability. To To bring about true accountability and change police behavior, this needs to change. And change should begin with an act of Congress rolling back qualified immunity. Removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity would be a good start — after all, shouldn’t it be enough to deviate from a basic standard of care, to engage in conduct that a reasonable officer would know is illegal, without having to show that that conduct’s illegality has already been clearly established in the courts?
26 -
27 -The clearly established clause creates a vicious cycle which results in greater uncertainty regarding the law and more rights violations in the future.
28 -
29 -Carbado 16 Devon Carbado https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808010 Carbado is a Professor of Law at UCLA. SA
30 -With respect to the “clearly established” doctrine, there are two problems with the standard. First, courts often avoid deciding the question of whether the officer’s conduct violated the Constitution and rule instead on whether the constituitional right in question was clearly established. The Supreme Court has made clear that lower courts are free to proceed in this way, making it relatively easy for courts to make the defense of qualified immunity available to a police officer without having to decide whether the officer violated a constitjitional right. This avoidance compounds the extent to which the law is unsettled. And, the greater the uncertainty about the law, the greater the doctrinal space for a police officer to argue that particular rights were not “clearly established’ at the time the officer acted. In other words, the more courts avoid weighing in on the sub-stantive question of whether police conduct violates the Constitution, the more leeway police officers have to argue that their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.
31 -
32 -The empircal example of Stanton v. Sims shows how the process with the clearly established clause stops courts from upholding the 4th amendment.
33 -
34 -Carbado 16 Devon Carbado https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808010 Carbado is a Professor of Law at UCLA. SA
35 -Consider, for example, Stanton v. Sims.202 There, the Court avoided the question of whether an officer’s entrance into a yard to effectuate the arrest of a misdemeanant vio- lated the Fourth Amendment, but ruled that the right to avoid such an intrusion was not clearly established.203 Unless and until the Supreme Court expressly rules that, absent ex- igent circumstances, one has a right to be free from warrantless entry into one’s yard, courts will likely grant qualified immunity in cases involving such arrests
36 -
37 -Police Culture has developed to a point that where excessive force and 8th amendment violations are common place- we need a major change to Qualified Immunity to solve.
38 -Joyner 15, Irving. "The Police, the Law, and the Unjustified Use of Force." RSS. N.p., 8 July 2015. Web. 24 Oct. 2016. http://www.scalawagmagazine.org/articles/police-law-force. Law Professor Irving Joyner explains the near impossibility of prosecuting police officers for using excessive force, and suggests what we can do about it. VV
39 -Where a police officer uses any degree of force, fatal or non-fatal
40 -AND
41 -the police culture and its use of force will continue to frustrate people.
42 -
43 -The clearly established clause hurts clear precedent and favors officers- that allows judges to avoid setting new rights
44 -Carbado 16 Drew Carbado (Honorable Harry Pregerson Professor of Law, UCLA), “Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes,” Georgetown Law Journal Vo. 104, 2016.
45 -Qualified Immunity: Perhaps a more fundamental barrier to holding police officers ac- countable
46 -AND
47 -a significant doctrinal hurdle to holding police officers accountable for acts of violence.
48 -
49 -The status quo makes people deterred from filing lawsuits
50 -Pattis 16 bracketed for ableist rhetoric Pattis, Norm. Management, Elite. "Norman Pattis Blog". Norm Pattis Blog. N. p., 2016. Web. 25 Oct. 2016.KB
51 -I get many calls each week from people who believe they have been abused by
52 -AND
53 -accomplices in a police state; most of them don't even realize it.
54 -
55 -Lawsuits are uniquely key to revealing the truth behind constitutional rights violations.
56 -1. Takes out Body Cam CPs cause they don’t solve with out the AFF
57 -Schwartz 11-2 Schwartz, Joanna C. is a Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. She teaches Civil Procedure, the Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, and a variety of courses on police accountability and public interest lawyering. In 2015, she received UCLA’s Distinguished Teaching Award. She is a graduate of Brown University and Yale Law School "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841. http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/event/265497/media/slspublic/What_Police_Learn_From_Lawsuits.pdf NN
58 -The most “glaring deficiency” of the internal investigation was the failure to enhance
59 -AND
60 -be filled, at least in part, by information revealed in litigation.
61 -
62 -The plan allows for increased litigation and solves-multiple warrants
63 -
64 -1. Precedent and Cooperation- litigation establishes clear precedents for the future and fosters trust in the community
65 -Stefan 16 De Stefan, Lindsey, (J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall Universtiy School of Law; B.A. Ramapo College of New Jersey. "“No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It:” How Qualified Immunity Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb Widespread Police Misconduct" (2017). Law School Student Scholarship. Paper 850. http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/850 SA
66 -Altering the qualified immunity doctrine is an excellent way to begin the path to restoring
67 -AND
68 -, in the heat of the moment, whether reasonably or not.59
69 -
70 -Underview
71 -
72 -The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the best post-fiat policy option.
73 -
74 -Role playing is the best method for creating social change by students outside the debate space.
75 -
76 -Coverstone 2 Alan “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact”
77 -However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than Acting on Activism - 16 the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against...their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57)
78 -The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the
79 -AND
80 -that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.
81 -
82 -Critiques don’t provide a concrete political alternative, rendering them useless.
83 -Bryant 12 Levi R. “Underpants Gnomes: A Critique of the Academic Left” (2012) https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/ (Bryant is a Philosophy Professor at Collin Colledge, and a psychoanalyst)
84 -Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s
85 -AND
86 -make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?
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1 -2016-12-03 23:43:28.0
Judge
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1 -Varun Bhave
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1 -Ron Packin
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1 -AC
2 -
3 -First, Prefer a pluralist account of morality:
4 -
5 -1. Monistic theories fail to account for specific situations and relationships- we should reject absolute duties in favor of prima facie duties tailored to specific situaitons.
6 -DESAULNIERS 1 Angela Desaulniers, “Rossian Moral Pluralism: A (Partial) Defense”, Georgia State Department of Philosophy, Masters Thesis, 2006, pp. 3-16 DDA
7 -In developing his moral theory, Ross aimed at finding a way to ground our
8 -AND
9 -knowledge has increased, we may find something new and need to reevaluate.
10 -
11 -2. Only pluralistic duties takes into account all moral features of action and weighs the conflicting prima facie duties relevant to an action to determine rightness.
12 -
13 -HINE 1 Kristen A. Hine, Professor at the Towson University Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Massachusetts at Amherst, with a specialization in Applied Ethics (Biomedical Ethics and Business Ethics), “What is the Outcome of Applying Principlism?”, DDA
14 -Ross’s view is sometimes characterized as a version of pluralism. According to such views, the rightness of an action is a matter of a plurality of moral features of the action, none of which are reducible to, or able to be explained in terms of, one particular feature. These views can be contrasted with monist accounts under which of rightness. On these views, rightness of an action is determined by one property of the action, such as being the action that maximizes utility. Ross’s pluralism manifests itself through his use of what he refers to as prima facie duties. These duties are to be differentiated from actual duties, or what he calls a duty proper. Ross explains the distinction as follows: I suggest “prima facie duty” or “conditional duty” as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant 9, p. 19. The idea here is that actions have several qualities or characteristics. Being a prima facie duty is one characteristic that an action has, and it has this characteristic because of the kind of action it is: being the keeping of a promise, being just, and so on. These are characteristics that “tend” to make the actions right (or wrong). And, whether an action really is right, whether an action is one’s duty proper, is determined by the entire nature of the action, not just one characteristic of the action. In some cases there is one prima facie duty; in other cases, there are several prima facie duties. So, for example, if I make a promise to a student to meet her for lunch, and there are no other morally salient features at play in this situation (there are no other prima facie duties), then my actual duty (duty proper) is to keep my promise. However, if on the way to my meeting with my student I see that someone is in need of assistance, a second morally salient feature has emerged. There is a conflict of prima facie duties. In this revised scenario, my actual duty is the action with the greatest balance of prima facie rightness over prima facie wrongness. According to Ross, Every act, therefore, viewed in some aspect, will be prima facie right, and viewed in others, prima facie wrong, and right acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in those circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie right, over prima facie wrongness, in those respects in which they are prima facie wrong…For the estimation of the comparative stringency of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I can see, be laid down 9, p. 41. Ross’s view is, of course, not simple, since there is no unifying principle. Ross, however, is not bothered by this, as “…it is more important that our theory fit the facts than it be simple, and the account we have given above corresponds (it seems to me) better than either of the simpler theories with what we really think…” 9, p. 19. While Ross’s view is interesting and insightful, and deserves far more attention that I can allow here, due to space constraints I will have to limit my comments to those above. These comments are meant to explain and elaborate on Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism uses of prima facie duties. Given that this notion is central to Ross’s theory of right action, we have some reason to believe that principlism is likewise a theory of right action. Finally, the regular appearance of terms such as ‘duty,’ ‘obligation,’ ‘morally required’ and ‘wrong’ further support this interpretation of the view. For example, in their discussion of the appropriate application of principlism, Gordon et al. say the following, “He claimed that when it is clear that a patient will die soon, the physician’s duty is to alleviate the patient’s suffering: this means that it can sometimes be wrong to keep a patient alive for as long as possible and at all costs” 2, p. 2. Beauchamp and Childress, likewise, frequently talk of duties and obligations. They say, “Our framework encompasses several types of moral norms, including principles, rules, obligations, and rights…principles and rules establish rights as well as obligations…” 1, p. 13. And in his earlier discussion of the now well-known four cases, Beauchamp says, “My view is that it is morally required—not merely morally permitted—to overrule the parental refusal of treatment” 4, p. 271. In light of all of this evidence, it appears to be the case that philosophers working on theories in biomedical ethics believe that their theories provide decision procedures, which when properly applied, identify one’s moral obligation. They are, in other words, action-guiding criteria for the rightness of action.
15 -
16 -And contractualism is a pluralistic theory- taking into account consequences, and intrinsic value of humans as well.
17 -
18 -ASHFORD AND MULGAN Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan “Contractualism” 2007. SEP
19 -In contractualism, individuals are motivated both by self-regard and by respect for others. Since each person is partly motivated by concern for her own interests, contractualism can ground consequentialist reasons. Part of what we owe others is to promote their interests. Contractualism can therefore accommodate important consequentialist aspects of the structure of moral thought. Unlike utilitarianism, however, the account of value underlying contractualism does not claim that there is only one rational attitude to have towards value. So contractualism can accommodate consequentialist aspects without being a completely consequentialist theory. (This represents an advantage of contractualism over naïve versions of Kantian ethics, which reject all consequentialist reasons and thus make it very difficult to explain why the consequences of our actions have any moral significance at all.) In contrast to an outcome ethics (such as utilitarianism), what is foundational for contractualism is not minimising what is undesirable, but considering what principles no-one could reasonably reject. Moral principles are grounded in the idea of living with others on terms of mutual respect. This means that as well as accommodating some consequentialist aspects, contractualism can also accommodate certain deontological intuitions: commonsense prohibitions against treating persons in certain ways even in circumstances in which the aggregate value of the consequences of doing so is very great. Which prohibitions are justified? This question “is best answered by considering what principles licensing others to take our lives could be reasonably rejected” (Scanlon 1998, p. 85). Among these principles might be ones that involve “accepting a certain view of the reasons one has: that the positive value of saving others does not justify killing someone” (Scanlon 1998, p. 84).
20 -
21 -And
22 -
23 -Moral theories must be able to explain why we care about right and wrong.
24 -
25 -SCANLON 2K T.M. Scanlon, “What We Owe to Each Other”, 2000, DDA
26 -A satisfactory moral theory needs to explain the reason-giving and motivating force of judgments of right and wrong. This is commonly referred to as the problem of explaining moral motivation. I will continue to use this familiar label, but I want to stress at the outset that it is misleading in two important respects. First, it suggests that the problem in question is one of understanding how people are motivated rather than of understanding the reasons they have. As explained in Chapter 1, I hold that the question of reasons is primary and that once the relevant reasons are understood there is no separate problem of motivation. Second, the term “moral motivation” suggests a problem about motivation, or reasons, for action: a problem of understanding a special form of motivation, or a special kind of reason, that is triggered when one decides that it would be wrong not to do some- thing, and can move one, even in the face of strong countervailing considerations, to do it. As I will argue below, this formulation seems to me to be overly narrow. But, taking the problem in this form for the moment, I want to examine some of the questions it raises and some of the problems involved in answering them. The task of explaining how the fact that an action would be wrong provides a reason not to do it can be seen, first, as a task of self-understanding: we want to understand the reasons we are responding to when we are moved by moral considerations. But there seems to be more at stake than mere interpretation of the reasons we take ourselves to have. Even from the point of view of those of us who already care about right and wrong, a mere portrait of what it is we care about may seem to give us less than what we want: what we want to know is not merely what we care about when we care about right and wrong but why this is something we must care about. This concern is magnified when we turn to consider others: it seems that an adequate account of the morality of right and wrong should explain not merely what those who care about it are moved by but also why its importance is something that everyone has strong reason to recognize. This might be put by saying that what the question “Why be moral?” calls for is not mere self-understanding but justification: an account of why we and others have compelling reason to be moral. But ‘justification’ is a misleading term for what is needed here. It is misleading to say that what those of us who already care about right and wrong are looking for in our own case is a justification, because this suggests that we think we should abandon our concern with right and wrong unless some additional ground for it can be provided. It is also misleading to say that we are looking for a way of justifying the morality of right and wrong to someone who does not care about it—an “amoralist”—because this suggests that what we are looking for is an argument that begins from something to which such a person must be already committed and shows that anyone who accepts this starting point must recognize the authority of the morality of right and wrong. I myself doubt whether such a justification can always be provided. What we can provide, and what seems to me sufficient to answer our reasonable concerns, is a fuller explanation of the reasons for action that moral conclusions supply. In giving this explanation, however, we must address the problem of the moral “must”—the seeming necessity of moral demands—in two slightly different forms. The fact that an action would be wrong constitutes sufficient reason not to do it (almost?) no matter what other considerations there might be in its favor. If there are circumstances in which an agent could have sufficient reason to do something that he or she knew to be wrong, these are at best very rare. But if right and wrong always or even almost always take precedence over other values, this is something that requires explanation. How can it make sense, if we recognize values other than right and wrong and take them seriously, to claim that reasons of this one kind have priority over all the rest? I will refer to this as the problem of the priority of right and wrong over other values. This is the first way in which moral reasons seem to have a special force that needs to be explained. The second concerns our attitude toward people who are not moved by considerations of right and wrong. Failure to see the reason-giving force of such considerations strikes us as a particularly serious fault. This failure is not, in my view, a case of irrationality. (It could be called this only in the overextended sense in which it is irrational to fail to respond to any strong reason.) Nonetheless, failing to be moved by the fact that an action would be wrong seems quite different from merely being deaf to the appeal of reasons of some other kind, such as failing to see the value of art or literature, say, or the value of great works of nature. It strikes us as a more serious and important kind of fault. This is not just a difference in moral importance. It is no doubt trivially true that moral failings are more serious, from a moral point of view, than nonmoral failings. But it also seems true, in a more general sense which requires explanation, that there is a difference between a lack of concern with considerations of right and wrong and a failure to respond to reasons of other kinds, and that the former is a more serious failing in this more general sense, one with particularly grave implications. I will refer to the problem of explaining this difference as the problem of explaining the special importance of considerations of right and wrong. The problem of priority is a problem of explaining how considerations of right and wrong can play a certain role in the thinking of an agent. The problem of importance concerns the significance, for a third party, of the fact that an agent does or does not give moral considerations this role. Taken together, these two problems capture much of the concern that I mentioned above in discussing the idea of the moral “must.” I do not believe that an adequate answer to either of them needs to take the form of a justification of morality, but they are two related features of our notions of right and wrong that any adequate account of moral motivation must explain.
27 -
28 -Contractualism gives the best account for moral motivation.
29 -
30 -SCANLON 2 T.M. Scanlon, “What We Owe to Each Other”, 2000, DDA
31 -Contractualism offers such an account. It holds that an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.8 I will defer discussion of the normative content of this account until later chapters. It should at least be clear, however, that it overlaps to a significant degree with Mill’s definition of wrongness while not coinciding with it exactly. If we all have good reason to want acts of a certain kind not to be performed, then it is likely that any principles allowing such acts could be reasonably rejected, hence that they will be wrong. But it does not follow that this will be so in every case in which a greater balance of happiness would result from such acts’ being punished. According to contractualism, thinking about right and wrong is in one respect like thinking about the civil and criminal law: it involves thinking about how there is reason to want people in general to go about deciding what to do. But thinking about right and wrong differs from thinking about law in a number of crucial ways. One of these is that the reasons that guide us in thinking about what the law should be are commonly very different from the “sanction” that moves us to obey it (whether this is fear of punishment or a sense of obligation). In the case of the morality of right and wrong, however, these two kinds of reasons flow from the same more general reason: the reason we have to live with others on terms that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they also are motivated by this ideal. Because we have this reason we have reason to attend to the question of which actions are right and which wrong, that is, to try to determine what would be allowed by principles that others could not reasonably reject, and we also have reason to govern our practical thought and our conduct in the ways that these principles require. This account of moral motivation has much in common with another idea mentioned by Mill. In the chapter of Utilitarianism devoted to moral motivation Mill does not appeal directly to the substantive value of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” but invokes instead what he calls “the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures.”9 The ideal to which contractualism appeals—that of being able to justify your actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject—is very similar to Mill’s idea of “unity.” One important difference, however, is that Mill takes himself to be describing a sentiment—a natural feature of human psychology—which explains how the motivation to act in accordance with utilitarianism could arise on some basis other than social conditioning. By contrast, on the account I am offering there is no need to appeal to a special psychological element to explain how a person could be moved to avoid an action by the thought that any principle allowing it would be one that others could reasonably reject. This is adequately explained by the fact that people have reason to want to act in ways that could be justified to others, together with the fact that when a rational person recognizes something as a reason we do not need a further explanation of how he or she could be moved to act on it.
32 -And
33 -
34 - Universality dictates that individuals give others’ moral reasons equal weight in their moral reasoning.
35 -
36 -SCANLON 4 T.M. Scanlon, “What We Owe to Each Other”, 2000, DDA
37 -Different people can have different reasons for action, because of differences in their circumstances, their interests, and their intentions. People can also disagree about reasons, and I have been defending the view that people can be mistaken about their reasons for action—not just mistaken about what will promote their ends, but mistaken in having those ends to begin with. Attempts to claim this kind of objectivity for judgments about reasons are sometimes viewed with suspicion, on the ground that they are driven by a desire to claim the authority to criticize others and to tell them what to do. I therefore want to say something here about the diverse reasons we have for caring about what reasons other people have and about what reasons they take themselves to have. What should be said first is that there is fundamentally no question of why we should be concerned with the reasons that other people have. We must be so concerned, insofar as we take ourselves to have any reasons at all, since any judgment about our own reasons entails claims about the reasons that others have or would have in certain circumstances. I have already made this point in passing in discussing our reasons for resisting the idea that all reasons have subjective conditions, but it is important enough to merit fuller discussion. Suppose Jane looks out her window after a snowstorm and sees her neighbor shoveling his driveway. The snow is heavy. He is already panting, and he still has a long way to go. Jane sees that he could use help, and she takes this as a reason to get her shovel and go out. Even though she may not make them explicit to herself at the time, there are certain features of her neighbor’s situation and her own in virtue of which she takes this consideration to be a reason. Perhaps she thinks that she has a reason to help only because she cares about her neighbor, or only because she would enjoy helping, or only because she expects to need his help in the future and wants to make it harder for him to refuse. On the other hand, she may be a strict moralist who thinks that she has a reason to provide such help whether she feels like it or not. Leaving this question open, let G be the set of factors, whatever they may be, in virtue of which Jane takes herself to have reason to help her neighbor. Since she accepts the judgment that, given G, she has reason to help her neighbor, Jane is also committed to the view that anyone else who stands in the relation described by G to someone in need of help has reason to provide it. This is an instance of what I will call the universality of reason judgments. This is not a moral principle; Jane may be moved by moral considerations or she may not.62 It is not even a substantive claim about the considerations that count as reasons, since the contents of G have been left entirely open. In particular, the universality of reason judgments is not something that should be a matter of controversy between those who hold, and those who deny, that all our reasons, or certain of them, have subjective conditions. Even if all reasons are based on desires, the universality of reason judgments still holds that if I have a reason to do something because it will satisfy my desire, then anyone else who has that same desire (and whose situation is like mine in other relevant respects) also has this reason. The universality of reason judgments is a formal consequence of the fact that taking something to be a reason for acting is not a mere pro-attitude toward some action, but rather a judgment that takes certain considerations as sufficient grounds for its conclusion. Whenever we make judgments about our own reasons, we are committed to claims about the reasons that other people have, or would have under certain circumstances. We thus have wholly self-regarding reasons for having views about the correctness or incorrectness of the judgments people make about the reasons they have, since these judgments imply conclusions about the reasons we have. So situations can arise in which, if their judgments about their reasons for action are correct, our judgments about our own reasons must be mistaken. In order for such conflicts to be real, both parties must be making judgments about the same thing: for example, about whether certain considerations do in fact count in favor of a given attitude for a person in a certain situation. This means that they must be talking about the same attitude and that they must be employing similar sets of evaluative categories.
38 -
39 -Thus the criterion is consistency with contractual obligation, which means an action is moral if it can be reasonably rejected . In the context of this resolution we msut look towards whether students would reasonably reject having their constiuaonly protected free speech be restricted by public collegs and univerisites.
40 -ASHFORD AND Mulgan explain what constitutes a “reasonable rejection”.
41 - Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan “Contractualism” 2007. SEP
42 -In order to reasonably reject a principle, I must have some objection to it
43 -AND
44 -vol. 48, issue. 2, article 5, Winter 1973.
45 -
46 -Analytic
47 -
48 -analytic
49 -
50 -Fourth- Students are hurt more when prilvdeges are prioritized over their rights to free speech
51 -
52 -Hinkle 15 Barton Hinkle (Senior editorial writer and a columnist at the Richmond Times-Dispatch), "The Death of Free Speech on College Campuses", reason.com, 3/18/2015, reason.com/archives/2015/03/18/the-death-of-free-speech-on-college-camp


53 -A. The second reason for protecting students from thoughts and ideas they find upsetting is to spare their tender feelings. But this effort is self-defeating. Even if it were possible to measure emotional pain, and to decide at what point such pain should (pardon the term) trigger the censor’s veto, it is not possible to protect everyone’s feelings the way we can protect everyone’s rights. A regime that protects everyone’s free-speech rights can allow both the gay-rights advocate and the Christian fundamentalist to speak her mind. But a regime concerned with protecting people’s feelings inevitably will hurt either the fundamentalist’s feelings (by allowing only the gay-rights advocate to speak) or the advocate’s feelings (by allowing only the fundamentalist to speak). Unless, of course, it hurts both of their feelings by letting neither of them speak. No matter what, though, it allows the censors to dismiss some people’s claims for consideration as less worthy. (You sometimes get the sense that’s exactly what the campus censors want.) What’s more, any regime that “privileges” feelings over rights inevitably will ignore the very real emotional pain experienced by another important group: those who cherish individual liberty and abhor censorship of any kind. There are still a few of them left – even on the modern American campus.
54 -And, Requiring people to conform to norms of political correctness on campus functions to exclude people even though the purpose is to promote inclusivity.

55 -
56 -Hinkle 15 Barton Hinkle (Senior editorial writer and a columnist at the Richmond Times-Dispatch), "The Death of Free Speech on College Campuses", reason.com, 3/18/2015, reason.com/archives/2015/03/18/the-death-of-free-speech-on-college-camp


57 -A. You can imagine how well that went over. The campus LGBT group, Allied in Pride, responded that YAF’s “refusal to use preferred gender pronouns should be considered an act of violence.” The comment calls to mind the Social Justice Kittens calendar, which features adorable kittens saying things such as “this conversation doesn’t make me feel safe” and “you are jeopardizing my well-being with your violent refusal to agree.” Episodes such as these – along with the increasing demand for “trigger warnings,” the campaigns to stamp out “microaggressions,” and so forth – neatly illustrate the snake-swallowing-its-own-tail nature of political correctness. Its support for diversity produces demands for conformity. Its insistence on inclusivity requires it to exclude those who, say, swell with pride at the sight of Old Glory. Its efforts to make the classroom a “safe space” have made classes unsafe for those whose views deviate from the campus norm. It deploys macro-aggression – coercion and compulsion – to punish such non-aggressive acts as the peaceful withholding of consent. The campaign against hate speech – or merely offensive speech, or just any speech the listener disagrees with – rests on a couple of different rationales. The first is that hateful speech can lead to hateful acts: Racial epithets might lead to lynching, for example. But there is no real empirical evidence to support that claim. Indeed, on today’s campus any violence is more likely to be directed at the offending speaker, rather than at his intended target. (E.g, when an anti-abortion protester showed up a few days ago at the University of Oregon, he didn’t change any minds, but students did snatch his poster and tear it up. “This is not part of your First Amendment right,” they said.)
58 -
59 -Next- restriction of free speech has racial undertones and has helped perpetuate racism in the past.
60 -
61 -Zimmerman 16 Jonathan Zimmerman (professor of the history of education at the University of Pennsylvania), "Racism Was Served by Silence. Justice Requires Free Speech for All." The Chronicle of Higher Education, 12/13/2016, www.chronicle.com/article/Racism-Was-Served-by-Silence/238667
62 -In 1905, when W.E.B. Du Bois and 28 others met at Niagara Falls, Ontario — because hotels on the American side wouldn’t serve blacks — they demanded not just equal access to public facilities and the ballot box but also freedom of speech. And when Du Bois helped launch the NAACP, four years after that, he insisted that African-Americans could never gain civil rights so long as they were prevented from speaking their minds. After World War II, Du Bois was indicted for failing to register as a member of an antinuclear organization that the government deemed "subversive." Although he was acquitted, he continued to campaign for the freedom of others who were persecuted or muzzled during the Cold War. "It is clear still today that freedom of speech and of thinking can be attacked in the United States without the intellectual and moral leaders of this land raising a hand or saying a word in protest or defense," he wrote in 1952. "Than this fateful silence there is on earth no greater menace to present civilization." The NAACP was listed as a subversive organization in several states, too, which helps explain why Jeff Sessions thought it was Communist-inspired. Therefore members had to either keep their affiliation hidden — in violation of the law — or register with the government, which subjected them to still further harassment. And when students at South Carolina State College for Negroes protested the interrogation of NAACP members on campus, the students were investigated themselves. In short, if you didn’t have freedom of speech, you couldn’t counter any other injustice. That’s a lesson that some of today’s student activists — and some college administrators — seem to have forgotten. Although courts have consistently found campus speech codes unconstitutional, hundreds of colleges continue to discipline students for saying the wrong thing. Faculty members, too, have come under fire. During the wave of protests that swept campuses last fall, students at Duke University called for the dismissal of professors who "perpetuate hate speech that threatens the safety of students of color." At Emory University, students demanded "repercussions or sanctions for racist actions performed by professors." Let me be clear: If students think a faculty member is racist, they have every right to say so. But nobody has a right to limit someone else’s speech, via institutional prohibitions or star chambers or anything else. That’s precisely what white America tried to do to the NAACP and other African-Americans. We insult their memories when we silence one another in the name of racial justice, which will never be served by the restriction of free speech.
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1 -Newark
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1 -CP Text—Public Colleges and universities in the US ought to restrict hate speech
2 -McElwee 13: Sean McElwee. “The Case for Censoring Hate Speech.” July 12, 2013. Alternet. http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/case-censoring-hate-speech. RW
3 -The negative impacts of hate speech do not lie in the responses of third-party observers, as hate speech aims at two goals. First, it is an attempt to tell bigots that they are not alone. Frank Collins —the neo-Nazi prosecuted in National Socialist Party of America v Skokie (1977) — said, “We want to reach the good people, get the fierce anti-Semites who have to live among the Jews to come out of the woodwork and stand up for themselves." The second purpose of hate speech is to intimidate the targeted minority, leading them to question whether their dignity and social status is secure. In many cases, such intimidation is successful. Consider the number of rapes that go unreported. Could this trend possibly be impacted by Reddit threads like /r/rapingwomen or /r/mensrights? Could it be due to the harassment women face when they even suggest the possibility they were raped? The rape culture that permeates Facebook, Twitter and the public dialogue must be held at least partially responsible for our larger rape culture. Reddit, for instance, has become a veritable potpourri of hate speech; consider Reddit threads like /r/nazi, /r/killawoman, /r/misogny, /r/killingwomen. My argument is not that these should be taken down because they are offensive, but rather because they amount to the degradation of a class that has been historically oppressed. Imagine a Reddit thread for /r/lynchingblacks or /r/assassinatingthepresident. We would not argue that we should sit back and wait for this kind of speech be “outspoken” by positive speech, but that it should be entirely banned. American free speech jurisprudence relies upon the assumption that speech is merely the extension of a thought, and not an action. If we consider it an action, then saying that we should combat hate speech with more positive speech is an absurd proposition; the speech has already done the harm, and no amount of support will defray the victim’s impression that they are not truly secure in this society. We don’t simply tell the victim of a robbery, “Hey, it’s okay, there are lots of other people who aren’t going to rob you.” Similarly, it isn’t incredibly useful to tell someone who has just had their race/gender/sexuality defamed, “There are a lot of other nice people out there.” Those who claim to “defend free speech” when they defend the right to post hate speech online, are in truth backwards. Free speech isn’t an absolute right; no right is weighed in a vacuum. The court has imposed numerous restrictions on speech. Fighting words, libel and child pornography are all banned. Other countries merely go one step further by banning speech intended to intimidate vulnerable groups. The truth is that such speech does not democratize speech, it monopolizes speech. Women, LGBTQ individuals and racial or religious minorities feel intimidated and are left out of the public sphere. On Reddit, for example, women have left or changed their usernames to be more male-sounding lest they face harassment and intimidation for speaking on Reddit about even the most gender-neutral topics. Those who try to remove this hate speech have been criticized from left and right. At Slate, Jillian York writes, “While the campaigners on this issue are to be commended for raising awareness of such awful speech on Facebook’s platform, their proposed solution is ultimately futile and sets a dangerous precedent for special interest groups looking to bring their pet issue to the attention of Facebook’s censors.” It hardly seems right to qualify a group fighting hate speech as an “interest group” trying to bring their “pet issue” to the attention of Facebook censors. The “special interest” groups she fears might apply for protection must meet Facebook's strict community standards, which state: While we encourage you to challenge ideas, institutions, events, and practices, we do not permit individuals or groups to attack others based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or medical condition. If anything, the groups to which York refers are nudging Facebook towards actually enforcing its own rules. People who argue against such rules generally portray their opponents as standing on a slippery precipice, tugging at the question “what next?” We can answer that question: Canada, England, France, Germany, The Netherlands, South Africa, Australia and India all ban hate speech. Yet, none of these countries have slipped into totalitarianism. In many ways, such countries are more free when you weigh the negative liberty to express harmful thoughts against the positive liberty that is suppressed when you allow for the intimidation of minorities. As Arthur Schopenhauer said, “the freedom of the press should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every anonymity.” However, with the Internet the public dialogue has moved online, where hate speech is easy and anonymous. Jeffrey Rosen argues that norms of civility should be open to discussion, but, in today's reality, this issue has already been decided; impugning someone because of their race, gender or orientation is not acceptable in a civil society. Banning hate speech is not a mechanism to further this debate because the debate is over. As Jeremy Waldron argues, hate speech laws prevent bigots from, “trying to create the impression that the equal position of members of vulnerable minorities in a rights-respecting society is less secure than implied by the society’s actual foundational commitments.” Some people argue that the purpose of laws that ban hate speech is merely to avoid offending prudes. No country, however, has mandated that anything be excised from the public square merely because it provokes offense, but rather because it attacks the dignity of a group—a practice the U.S. Supreme Court called in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) “group libel.” Such a standard could easily be applied to Twitter, Reddit and other social media websites. While Facebook’s policy as written should be a model, it’s enforcement has been shoddy. Chaim Potok argues that if a company claims to have a policy, it should rigorously and fairly enforce it. If this is the standard, the Internet will surely remain controversial, but it can also be free of hate and allow everyone to participate. A true marketplace of ideas must co-exist with a multi-racial, multi-gender, multi-sexually-oriented society, and it can.
4 -
5 -Hate speech normalizes physical and psychological violence and renders educational spaces null and void—it should be banned: the right to free speech is contingent, not absolute
6 -• Makes physical violence more likely—empirically proven
7 -• Causes psychological harms
8 -• Makes educational spaces null and void
9 -• Normalizes oppressive practices
10 -• Easy to reject from a position of privilege
11 -Heinze 14: Eric Heinze, professor of law and humanities at Queen Mary university of London. March 31, 2014. Nineteen arguments for hate speech bans—and against them. Free Speech Debate. Free speech scholar Eric Heinze identifies the main arguments for laws restricting hate speech and says none are valid for mature Western democracies. http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/nineteen-arguments-for-hate-speech-bans-and-against-them/. RW
12 -On all sides of the debate, we can agree that speech is necessary for democracy. Governments ought not to abridge speech willy-nilly. They must show how the speech in question poses a genuine danger. In the case of hate speech, has any such menace been shown? In my book Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, I reject the classical liberal defences of free speech, let alone newer libertarian ones. I argue that the strongest case for free speech is grounded on specifically democratic principles, which must not be confused with Millian, liberal ones. I cannot reproduce that thesis here, but will briefly respond to some familiar claims raised by the bans’ advocates. 1. The ‘anti-absolutist’ argument: ‘No rights are absolute. Rights must be limited by respect for others, and by the needs of society as a whole. The British Lord Bhikhu Parekh writes, “Although free speech is an important value, it is not the only one. Human dignity, equality, freedom to live without harassment and intimidation, social harmony, mutual respect, and protection of one’s good name and honour are also central to the good life and deserve to be safeguarded. Because these values conflict, either inherently or in particular contexts, they need to be balanced.” There are, moreover, many regulations of speech to which no one objects, punishing, for example, commercial fraud, graffiti, or courtroom perjury. Hate speech bans are no different.’
13 -The ‘not speech’ argument: ‘The crudest hate speech is not really speech at all. It is merely the kind of “inarticulate grunt” that can legitimately be banned because it forms, in the words of US Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”’
14 -The ‘Weimar’ (or ‘snowball’) argument: ‘Democracy under the Weimar Republic or the former Yugoslavia show that too much free speech leads to atrocities. Some offensive remarks may, on the surface, appear harmless. But seemingly innocuous offences snowball into more pernicious forms. Once speech reaches a Nazi-like extreme, it becomes too late to avert the dangerous consequences.’
15 -The ‘direct harm’ argument: ‘Hate speech can cause psychological harm, just as hate-motivated violence causes physical harm. Children who are called “nigger”, “Paki”, or “queer” suffer just as much as when they are physically bullied. For adults, verbal abuse can render workplace, educational or other environments unbearable.’
16 -The ‘indirect harm’ argument: ‘The harms of hate speech do not manifest in a conventionally empirical sense. From some phenomenological and socio-linguistic perspectives, hateful expression is “illocutionary”, i.e. not merely denoting hatred but enacting discrimination, and “perlocutionary”, disseminating adverse psychological effects regardless of any materially evident impact. Anthony Cortese describes a “cultural transmission theory”, whereby cultures “pass hate on to each succeeding generation, making intolerance “normal or conventional.” Hate speech germinates intolerance, not through discrete, causally traceable chains of events, but through cumulative effects.’
17 -The ‘hate crime’ argument: ‘The bans are necessary because hate speech is commonly connected to hate-based acts of murder, battery, rape, assault, and property theft or damage.’
18 -The ‘disproportionate impact’ argument: ‘It’s easy for those in privileged positions to oppose hate speech bans. They do not bear the brunt of hatred. But “individual freedom” looks different from the viewpoint of historically vilified groups.’
19 -
20 -DA turns Case—hate speech causes less discursive participation
21 -Horne 16: Solveigh Horne, Minister of children and equality in Norway. “hate speech—a threat to freedom of speech.” March 8, 2016. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/solveig-horne/hate-speech~-~-a-threat-to_b_9406596.html. RW
22 -
23 -Hate speech in the public sphere takes place online and offline, and affects young girls and boys, women and men. We also see hate speech attacking vulnerable groups like people with disabilities, LGBT-persons and other minority groups. Social media and the Internet have opened up for many new arenas for exchanging opinions. Freedom of speech is an absolute value in any democracy, both for the public and for the media. At the same time, opinions and debates challenge us as hate speech are spread widely and frequently on new platforms for publishing. Hate speech may cause fear and can be the reason why people withdraw from the public debate. The result being that important voices that should be heard in the public debate are silenced. We all benefit if we foster an environment where everybody is able to express their opinions without experiencing hate speech. In this matter we all have a responsibility. I am especially concerned about women and girls being silenced. Attempts to silence women in the public debate through hate speech, are an attack on women’s human rights. No one should be silenced or subjected to threats when expressing themselves in public. Women are under-represented in the media. In order to get a balanced public debate it is important that many voices are heard. We must encourage women and girls to be equal participants with men. Hate speech prevents women from making their voices heard. I also call upon the media to take responsibility in this matter. In some cases the media may provide a platform for hate speech. At the same time, I would like to stress that a liberal democracy like Norway strongly supports freedom of speech as a fundamental right.
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