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-==1AC== |
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-===Framework=== |
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-====Presume aff and err aff because: a) time skew b) adaptability. Prefer theoretical presumption.==== |
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-====I value morality because ought implies a moral obligation. ==== |
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-====The inescapable starting point of morality is that individuals are rational agents by submitting to a normative principle. Two warrants. ==== |
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-**Ferrero, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, 2009** |
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-**Luca, "Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency", Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, January 19th, Online: **https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/pubs/ferrero-constitutivism.pdf**, Accessed November 14 – MG ** |
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-3.1 The initial appeal of the shmagency objection rests on the impression that |
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-it's a question of how we evaluate ethical claims in the first place. |
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-Outweighs: |
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-A. |
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-B. |
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-C. |
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-D. |
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-E. |
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-Impacts: |
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-A. |
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-B. |
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-====Reason is universal. A - A reason for you must also be a reason for me.==== |
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-**Velleman, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006** |
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-**(J. David, "A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS," 2006, accessed Dec. 1, MG)** |
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-In Kant's view, being a person consists in being a rational creature, both |
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-attractive vantage point of some kind. |
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-B. Meta-constraints. |
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-Impacts: |
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-A. |
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-B. |
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-The standard is consistency with universal reason. Independently, prefer the framework: |
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-====Rational willing determines what is an action versus a series of fragmented events. Roedl. ==== |
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-Sebastian Roedl. Prof. Of Philosophy, University of Leipzig. "Two Forms of Practical Knowledge and Their Unity" in Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 239.
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-"We can give a more specific description of the consciousness of temporal unity that |
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-we would never be able to pursue personal projects; it's over demanding. |
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-A. |
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-B. |
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-====Impact calculus: ==== |
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-====State key. The framework entails an omnilateral will or a higher authority to deal with rights conflicts. ==== |
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-Ripstein, Arthur. "Kant on Law and Politics." University of Toronto Law School. http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/Kant_on_law.pdf. |
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-Kant's point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke's familiar claim that people |
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-does, and so does not require an explicit act of instituting it. |
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-====AFF first on risk of offense. ==== |
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-===Contention=== |
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-====First, public officials like police officers must act for public ends- they are contractually bound and that is where they derive their authority. Ripstein 16.==== |
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-Ripstein, Arthur. "Reclaiming Proportionality (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2016)." Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2016, doi:10.1111/japp.12238. professor of law and of philosophy at the University of Toronto JZ *brackets for gender* |
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-Nonetheless, there is something troubling about vigilantes and vigilantism. There is a question |
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-of proportionality. It might be asked why this public standpoint is required. |
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-====Immunity hinders essential tort litigation. ==== |
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-**Sheng, associate in Davis Polk's Litigation Department, practicing in the Menlo Park office, law clerk to the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2012** |
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-**Philip, "An "Objectively Reasonable" Criticism of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983", Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law, March 1st, Accessed November 10th, Online: **http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1459andcontext=jpl** – MG ** |
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-Apart from the concerns that (I) the Court is affording law enforcement officers |
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-to whether and when cases on point arc needed to overcome qualified immunity. |
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-====Second, tort law captures the unique responsibility to other persons while maintaining freedom to pursue one's own conception of the good. Ripstein 4.==== |
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-**Ripstein, Professor of Law at the University of Toronto, 2004** |
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-**Arthur, "Tort, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort", Fordham Law Review, Online: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3975andcontext=flr** |
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-All of these effects that one person might have on another are consistent with each |
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-to your ability to set and pursue your own conception of the good. |