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+==Framework: == |
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+====Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail: ==== |
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+====1. There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing. BUTLER: ==== |
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+(Judith Butler. 1992. "Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism" Feminists Theorize the Political) |
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+"In a sense, the subject is constituted through an ,,exclusion and,,differentiation, |
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+AND |
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+the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself." |
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+ |
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+====A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can't guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. MILLS: ==== |
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+Charles W. Mills, "Ideal Theory" as Ideology, 2005 |
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+"An idealized social ontology. Moral~~ity~~ theory deals with the normative |
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+AND |
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+superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds." (168) |
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+ |
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+====B. Analytic.==== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Second, discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence. HÄGGLUND:==== |
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+"THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS" MARTIN HÄGGLUND |
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+"Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence ~~does~~ is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence ~~it~~ stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the "ethico-theoretical decision" of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of "alienation," and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any "positive" term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its "other." Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls "undecidability." With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking "undecidable," since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, ~~or~~ political ~~decision~~, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a ~~is~~ constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary "spec- trality." A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general "hauntology" (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional "ontology" that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an "economy of violence" where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call "lesser violence." Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay "Violence and Metaphysics," but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are ~~is~~ implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and there can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better." (46-48) |
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+3 Impacts: |
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+**====A. Analytic. ====** |
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+ |
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+**====B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence. HÄGGLUND 2:====** |
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+"THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS" MARTIN HÄGGLUND |
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+"A possible objection here is that we must striv~~ing~~e toward |
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+AND |
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+idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence." (49) |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====3. The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy. MOUFFE: ==== |
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+"The Democratic Paradox" by Chantal Mouffe 2000 DD |
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+"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions |
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+AND |
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+antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104) |
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+====Analytic==== |
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+====Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, the standard is concerned with the procedures of agonistic pluralism, not ends. MOUFFE 2:==== |
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+(Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. "The Democratic Paradox") |
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+"To avoid any confusion, I should specify that, contrary to some postmodern |
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+AND |
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+, while accepting them, fight for conflicting interpretations." |
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+Prefer additionally: |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====First, educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism. RICKERT: ==== |
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+(Thomas, ""Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World", JacOnline Journal,) |
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+"This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing |
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+AND |
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+is more aggressive than the desire to serve the other" (48) |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Second, double bind analytic: ==== |
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+====A. Analytic. ==== |
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+====B. Analytic. ==== |
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+==Offense== |
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+===Soft Power=== |
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+ |
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+====There are two types of energy production – soft energy and hard energy. Soft energy is localized and facilitates community involvement. ==== |
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+**Lovins, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute; energy advisor to major firms and governments in 65+ countries for 40+ years; author of 31 books and 600 papers; and an integrative designer of superefficient buildings, factories, and vehicles, 1976** |
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+**(Amory B., "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?", Foreign Affairs, October Issue, Online: **http://courses.washington.edu/pbaf595/Readings/Lovins_1976.pdf**, Accessed September 8 – MG)** |
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+**There exists today a body of energy technologies that have certain specific features in common ** |
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+**AND** |
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+to end-use needs**: a key feature that deserves immediate explanation.** |
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+===Advocacy=== |
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+ |
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+====Thus, I affirm the prohibition of the production of nuclear power as a rejection of hard power and as a move toward soft power.==== |
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+===Contention 1: Nuclear Reactors are Centralized=== |
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+====The nuclear power lobby tries to disguise the facts but nuclear power's high costs require a centralized system. This is deeply rooted in a hard energy grid system where energy is produced by large, inflexible reactors. ==== |
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+**UCS, nonprofit science advocacy organization based in the United States, 2011** |
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+**(Union of Concerned Scientists, "Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies (2011)", Online: http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/cost-nuclear-power/nuclear-power-subsidies-report~~#.V9I56SgrK00, Accessed September 5 – MG)** |
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+These legacy subsidies are estimated to exceed seven cents per kilowatt-hour (¢/kWh |
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+AND |
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+that have declined as the aging, installed capacity base is fully written off |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Nuclear reactors require centralized infrastructure from waste disposal to regulation.==== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+**====Paperiello, Regional administrator of Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011====** |
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+**(CJ, "Essential infrastructure: national nuclear regulation", Health Phys., January, Online: **http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21399415**, Accessed September 9th – MG)** |
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+In order for nuclear power to expand to many countries that do not currently have |
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+AND |
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+material infrastructure can promote the safe and secure worldwide growth in nuclear power. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Centralization not democratic.==== |
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+**Lovins 2, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute; energy advisor to major firms and governments in 65+ countries for 40+ years; author of 31 books and 600 papers; and an integrative designer of superefficient buildings, factories, and vehicles, 1976** |
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+**(Amory B., "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?", Foreign Affairs, October Issue, Online: **http://courses.washington.edu/pbaf595/Readings/Lovins_1976.pdf**, Accessed September 8 – MG)** |
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+Such dirigiste autarchy is the first of many distortions of the political fabric. While |
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+AND |
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+the sector may be paramilitarized and further isolated from grass-roots politics. |
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+ |
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+===Contention 2: Empowerment=== |
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+ |
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+====The soft energy grid empowers the marginalized and gives them a voice in an agonistic democracy. ==== |
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+**Lovins 2, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute; energy advisor to major firms and governments in 65+ countries for 40+ years; author of 31 books and 600 papers; and an integrative designer of superefficient buildings, factories, and vehicles, 1976** |
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+** (Amory B., "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?", Foreign Affairs, October Issue, Online: **http://courses.washington.edu/pbaf595/Readings/Lovins_1976.pdf**, Accessed September 8 – MG)** |
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+The soft path has novel and important international implications. Just as improvements in end |
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+AND |
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+eco-development from the bottom up, particularly in the rural villages. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+===Contention 3: Technocracy=== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====The risky, esoteric, and highly technical nature of nuclear power demands elitism. A ban on nuclear reactors is the first step away from hard energy.==== |
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+**Lovins 3, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute; energy advisor to major firms and governments in 65+ countries for 40+ years; author of 31 books and 600 papers; and an integrative designer of superefficient buildings, factories, and vehicles, 1976** |
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+** (Amory B., "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?", Foreign Affairs, October Issue, Online: **http://courses.washington.edu/pbaf595/Readings/Lovins_1976.pdf**, Accessed September 8 – MG)** |
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+Any demanding high technology tends to develop~~s~~ influential and dedicated constituencies of |
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+AND |
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+both social and energy priorities in a lasting way that resists political remedy. |