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... ... @@ -1,19 +1,0 @@ 1 -The advocacy of free speech assumes that all voices have equal access, when in reality power inequities shape who can speak what 2 -Boler 2k Megan Boler (Professor in the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto and editor of Digital Media and Democracy), "All Speech is Not Free: The Ethics of "Affirmative Action Pedagogy," Philosophy of Education, 2000 3 -All speech is ... limiting dominant voices. 4 - 5 -AND, the problems within free speech are structural and largely produced via white patriarchal hegemony. Exclusion in discursive spheres happens on the level of subject creation – some marked subjects have less legitimacy than others. 6 -Patton 04 (Dr. Tracey Owens Patton is the director of African American and Diaspora Studies and a professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming. Dr. Patton's area of expertise is critical cultural communication and rhetorical studies.2004 Reflections of a Black Woman Professor: Racism and Sexism in Academia, Howard Journal of Communications, 15:3, 192-194, Accessed 6/27/16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170490483629) 7 -The first narrative ... disenfranchised occur frequently. 8 - 9 -Nagging and disrupting the white-male hegemonic institutions in the academy creates a disruption of the language game that exists in the academy. Only by antagonizing the principles of exclusion can we disorient the habitual spaces of whiteness which is a prerequisite to combatting other forms of oppression 10 -Patton 04 (Dr. Tracey Owens Patton is the director of African American and Diaspora Studies and a professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming. Dr. Patton's area of expertise is critical cultural communication and rhetorical studies.2004 Reflections of a Black Woman Professor: Racism and Sexism in Academia, Howard Journal of Communications, 15:3, 197-198, Accessed 6/27/16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170490483629) 11 -Through my personal ... set of struggles. 12 - 13 -Thus the alt is to reject the aff and reorient discourse spaces through a method of disempowering historic ethics and endorsing feminist epistemology. Social norms are internalized and become a source of comfort; rejecting social norms is associated with discomfort and unhappiness. The feminist killjoy embraces this discomfort in an attempt to disrupt the social order – unhappiness is key. 14 -Ahmed 10 Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010 15 -To be unseated ... We must learn. 16 - 17 -Only when we are free from our masculine restrictions can we then solve for hate speech and its violence against bodies deemed as Other 18 -Hatfield et al. 5 Hatfield, Katherine L., Schafer, Kellie, Stroup, Christopher A., 2005, Atlantic Journal of Communication, “A Dialogic Approach to Combating Hate Speech on College Campuses”, acc. 7/11/16, School of Communication Studies Ohio University, Speech Communication and Dramatic Arts Central Michigan University, School of Communication Studies Ohio University, pp. 43 19 -Owen (1998) wrote that ... the hate messages. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,7 +1,0 @@ 1 -There’s a contradiction within government policy —- restricting free speech may be unconstitutional, but not doing so causes public colleges to lose federal funding under Title IX 2 -Title IX order on campus ‘harassment’ violates rights, free speech advocates say By Bradford Richardson - The Washington Times - Sunday, May 1, 2016 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/1/title-ix-harassment-order-seen-as-free-speech-thre/ 3 -Several free speech ... this federal overreach.” 4 - 5 -State cuts have led tuition to spike harming the ability to students to enter college, especially those who come from low income backgrounds or are people of color – The impact is a blow to the national economy because a college degree is a crucial internal link to working in a skilled job, decreasing health care costs, and bringing greater wealth to local communities 6 -Mitchell et al 16 (Report published by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; authors were Michael Mitchell (State Budget and Tax), Michael Leachman (State Budget and Tax), and Kathleen Masterson, "Funding Down, Tuition Up: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Quality and Affordability at Public Colleges", http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up,) 7 -Years of cuts ... higher education funding. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,30 +1,0 @@ 1 -====Text: Indigenous communities should individually decide for themselves whether they want to prohibit the production of nuclear power in their territory commonly known as the United States. ==== 2 - 3 - 4 -====Competition: Mutually exclusive: they decide for themselves, so they don’t actually necessarily ban. The perm is severance. Individually implies that the policy of the action is grouped. Competes through net benefits.==== 5 - 6 -====I’ll defend the CP as unconditional.==== 7 - 8 -====The Counterplan solves better than the plan: consultation leads to the best policies for each clan. Thomas 95 ==== 9 -EDWARD K. THOMAS, 1995 (PRESIDENT CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE TLINGIT AND HAIDA INDIAN TRIBES OF ALASKA, May 18, 1995, http://www.archive.org/stream/biataskforcehear00unit/biataskforcehear00unit'djvu.txt) 10 -The opportunity for Tribes to participate in the reorganization process was greatly increased by holding the various meetings close to their Tribal headquarters. Many tribal leaders and Tribal members did attend the meetings and many testified at the times set aside on each agenda for hearing testimony. Witnesses either spoke on the business of the day or on the reorganization plan and the reorganization planning process. Their testimony helped Task Force members in their decision-making. We were better able to understand how they felt on many very important reorganization issues. Their testimony did make a difference in our final product. That is why Tribal consultation is important. Tribes, more than anyone else, know what is best for them. They know better than anyone what policies would be bad for them. 11 - 12 -====Legal discourse about Native populations can never escape the web of coloniality ~~:21 sec~~==== 13 -**Gehres 01** (Edward D. Gehres III*, "Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse," Hein Online, 2001, Online, Accessed 8/20/16, Pages 163. *Associate, Arnold and Porter, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 2001, University of Virginia School of Law; MA., 1996, The Graduate School of Political Management at The George Washington University; A.B., 1994, University of Michigan.) 14 -The application of these constructs of European derived legal discourse to the issue of a congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity reveals that despite intermittent advances in policy that have strengthened tribal sovereignty, the vestiges of colonial legal reasoning still hold strong influence in American legal thought. What has emerged with the instantaneous congressional and judicial reactions to the public backlash surrounding the empowerment of a few Indian nations is the "neo-colonial impulse" in policymaking. The reapplication of backward looking colonial images of Indian nations and culture, combined with the fundamental misconception that Indian nations should not participate in the policymaking surrounding their own sovereign powers of government, has produced a situation that could pose significant threats to the stability of enterprise development efforts by subjecting tribal governments to coercive and frivolous lawsuits from states and citizens seeking redress from the supposedly "unfair" advantages possessed by Indian nations. Tribal governments readily acknowledge that creative solutions must be sought to establish limited waivers and disclosure requirements concerning a tribe's sovereign immunity so that entities dealing with Indian nations will have proper protections and fair notice. Tribal governments need to decide for themselves how much sovereign immunity they must cede and under which circumstances this should be done. The proper scope of their waiver and disclosure requirements ought to reflect the input of their bilateral partners in government and enterprise development, but the ultimate decision over these inherent sovereign powers ought to rest with those possessing them. The perceptions fueled by the misunderstanding of recent economic development success and the fear and anger that have arisen as a result of new Indian empowerment must cede to the creation of new theories for the future of federal-Indian relations. 15 - 16 -====Previous consultation processes prove—Consultation processes make clans full partners in the process—the plan merely continues the legacy of colonization. Chino 95 ==== 17 -WENDELL CHINO, 1995 (MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE, HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.archive.org/stream/biataskforcehear00unit/biataskforcehear00unit'djvu.txt) 18 -The Joint Tribal BIA Tribal Department of the Interior Advisory Task Force on the reorganization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs task force was chartered on December 20, 1990 by the Secretary of the Interior. The charter was to develop baseline goals and plans for reorganization to strength the BIA's administration of Indian programs. The creation of the task force was based on a congressional mandate in response to tribal concerns that the Department of the Interior was planning to move forward with the reorganization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs prior to appropriate participation and consultation with Indian tribes. The initial task force charter was for 2 years and was extended an additional 2 years by the Secretary of the Interior on November 18, 1992, in order to en- sure that the task force's efforts were tribally driven; yet, at the same time, a joint partnership effort — 36 of the 43 members of the task force were tribal members, 5 were BIA employees and 2 were Department of the Interior employees. The 36 members were 3 rep- resentatives from each of the Bureau's 12 area locations who were nominated by the tribes and appointed by the Secretary. The task force was led by cochairpersons representing the tribal and Federal partnership. The Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs was named the Federal cochair by the Secretary, and the tribal representatives elected Wendell Chino, President of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, the tribal cochair. The task force held its first of 22 meetings on January 22 through 24 1991, in Crystal City, VA. During the 4 years of its charter every effort was made to con- duct its meetings in different administrative areas to allow as many local tribes to participate as possible. To further ensure that this effort was tribally driven several steps were taken: One, time was set aside at each meeting to listen to the concerns and comments of the tribal leaders; two, tribal task force members were made responsible and held accountable for meeting with their respective tribes; three, each BIA area appointed Federal coordina- tors to facilitate ongoing consolidated sessions with the tribes; four, all tribes were invited to submit written comments for task force consideration. As a result of this participatory consultation process, tribes have been full partners in the recommendations presented. 19 - 20 -====Bringing indigenous views back into the picture is necessary for global survival.==== 21 - **Suagee 92** Dean B. Suagee, 1992 (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009) 22 -The global environmental crisis has more than adequately demonstrated that business as usual will not and cannot ensure global survival. What is needed is a fundamental shift in consciousness, and this means that the views of indigenous peoples — our laws and rules and relationships to the natural world — have to be brought back into the picture. 23 - 24 -===Grouping NB=== 25 - 26 -====Some indigenous people see waste facilities as good. To clarify, my argument is not that all groups should do this, but they need the option- the aff denies that.==== 27 -**Gover et al**, Kevin, and Jana L. Walker (Native American Attorneys at Gover, Stetson and Williams). "Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country." University of Colorado Law Review 63 (1992): 933. 28 -The second and more controversial issue facing tribes involves the use of reservation lands as sites for commercial solid and hazardous waste disposal facilities. Looking at the waste industry as a form of economic development, in many respects it can be a good match for tribal communities. The industry is usually willing to pay the costs of developing new projects without requiring a tribe to put any cash up front. Since most tribes just do not have the money to independently fund large-scale economic development, this makes the industry attractive to Indian communities desperate for development. The waste industry needs isolation and an abundance of land, and, again, because of the overall lack of tribal economic development, undeveloped land is a resource that many tribes have. The waste industry also provides numerous opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled workers, including training in the construction and environmental compliance fields. On most reservations, unemployment is extremely high and opportunities for training Indians very limited. Finally, the waste industry is and must be recognized as an indispensable and legitimate part of the services sector of the economy, and as such, can be an extremely profitable form of development for tribes. All of this means that, under certain circumstances, a solid or hazardous waste disposal project may represent a viable and appropriate form of industrial development for some tribes and can provide extraordinary opportunities for economic development on some reservations. It is not appropriate for every community, and we certainly are not urging tribes to site waste facilities on their reservations. Each tribe must decide for itself if it is interested in such development. Our intent is merely to put things in a more honest perspective and to describe one process that, when and if a tribe seriously considers a commercial waste proposal, it can use to evaluate the proposal effectively and, if it's feasible, plan for its development. 29 - 30 -====Implications. A) Grouping indigenous identities together is much worse- you don’t take into account particularities, which turns case since you just reify native violence by not acknowledging this. B) Also, it does not matter that you read specific authors who do not want nuclear power on their land- that’s just a reason they should ban individually, which solves the aff. But you shouldn’t impose this on other groups.==== - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,37 +1,0 @@ 1 -====We should use the academic setting to facilitate change, rather than roleplaying as policymakers we should take this chance to challenge the heteronormative structures that pervade the Academy.==== 2 -**Elias 2003** (John Elias, Professor at San Francisco University, Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 45, no. 2/3/4, p. 64, 2003) 3 -Akin to organized religion and the biomedical field, the educational system has been a major offender. Wedded to disseminating the idea that heterosexuality is the ultimate and best form of sexuality, "Schools have maintained, by social custom and with reinforcement from the law, the promotion of the heterosexual family as predominant, and therefore the essence of normal. From having been presumed to be ‘normal,’ heterosexual behavior has gained status as the right, good, and ideal lifestyle" (Leck, 1999, p. 259). School culture in general is fraught with heteronormativity. Our society has long viewed queer sexualities as ". . . deviant, sinful, or both, and our schools are populated by adolescent peers and adult educators who share these heterosexual values" (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 55). Simply put, heteronormativity and sexual prejudice pervade the curriculum at the elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels (for examples of this and ways of intervening, see: Adams, Bell, and Griffin, 1997; Letts and Sears, 1999; Lovaas, Baroudi, and Collins, 2002; Yep, 2002). Besides the hegemonic hold schools have had regarding a heterosexual bias, school culture continues to devote much energy to maintaining ". . . the status quo of our dominant social institutions, which are hierarchical, authoritarian, and unequal, competitive, racist, sexist, and homophobic" (Arnstine, 1995, p. 183). While there has been modest success in addressing various forms of prejudice in schools (Kumashiro, 2001), what is sorely lacking is serious attention to how the intersections of race, class, sexuality and gender are interwoven and dialectically create prejudice (e.g., racism, classism, and hetero~~sexism~~). Schools would be an ideal site to interrogate, and begin to erode, the kind of hegemony upon which heterosexism rests and is supported. To date, not much is being done in a systematic fashion to disrupt the ways in which U.S. schooling has perpetuated such hierarchies. It seems to me that sexuality education is ripe for the opportunity to challenge heterosexism in school culture; however, public school-based sexuality education is presently in serious crisis, as it has turned mostly to the business of pushing for abstinence- only sexuality education. According to federal legislation, states that accept funding for this form of sexuality education require that young people are taught to abstain from sexual activity until they get married. This has numerous implications for relationship construction; a more in-depth description and analysis of this form of sexuality education will follow later in this essay. 4 - 5 - 6 -====Debate is education. This is a critical site to interrogate heterosexuality ==== 7 -**Elia 03 **Elia, Professor @ San Francisco University, 2003. (John, Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 45, no. 2/3/4, p. 64, JCE) 8 -Akin to organized religion and the biomedical field, the educational system has been a major offender. Wedded to disseminating the idea that heterosexuality is the ultimate and best form of sexuality, "Schools have maintained, by social custom and with reinforcement from the law, the promotion of the heterosexual family as predominant, and therefore the essence of normal. From having been presumed to be ‘normal,’ heterosexual behavior has gained status as the right, good, and ideal lifestyle" (Leck, 1999, p. 259). School culture in general is fraught with heteronormativity. Our society has long viewed queer sexualities as ". . . deviant, sinful, or both, and our schools are populated by adolescent peers and adult educators who share these heterosexual values" (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 55). Simply put, heteronormativity and sexual prejudice pervade the curriculum at the elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels (for examples of this and ways of intervening, see: Adams, Bell, and Griffin, 1997; Letts and Sears, 1999; Lovaas, Baroudi, and Collins, 2002; Yep, 2002). Besides the hegemonic hold schools have had regarding a heterosexual bias, school culture continues to devote much energy to maintaining ". . . the status quo of our dominant social institutions, which are hierarchical, authoritarian, and unequal, competitive, racist, sexist, and homophobic" (Arnstine, 1995, p. 183). While there has been modest success in addressing various forms of prejudice in schools (Kumashiro, 2001), what is sorely lacking is serious attention to how the intersections of race, class, sexuality and gender are interwoven and dialectically create prejudice (e.g., racism, classism, and hetero~~sexism~~). Schools would be an ideal site to interrogate, and begin to erode, the kind of hegemony upon which heterosexism rests and is supported. To date, not much is being done in a systematic fashion to disrupt the ways in which U.S. schooling has perpetuated such hierarchies. It seems to me that sexuality education is ripe for the opportunity to challenge heterosexism in school culture; however, public school-based sexuality education is presently in serious crisis, as it has turned mostly to the business of pushing for abstinence- only sexuality education. According to federal legislation, states that accept funding for this form of sexuality education require that young people are taught to abstain from sexual activity until they get married. This has numerous implications for relationship construction; a more in-depth description and analysis of this form of sexuality education will follow later in this essay. 9 - 10 -===K story === 11 - 12 -====The entirety of the aff is predicated on solving and saving lives – i.e. stopping extinction, and any body count under util calculus – and while these are noble feats the obsession with ending death adheres to the futurist agenda of the squo. Futurism, using the idea to save lives and fear the death drives, only furthers the obsession with heteronormative reproduction and marginalized queer sex. ==== 13 - 14 -====Notions of preserving some sort of future for our species valorize reproductive, heterogenital sex, while subordinating queer sex to nothing more than "meaningless acrobatics." This impregnates heterosexuality with the future of signification, necessitating violence against queerness.==== 15 -**Edelman 2004** (Lee Edelman, Prof. English at Tufts University, "No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive," 2004, pp. 11-13) 16 -Charged, after all, with the task of assuring "that we being dead yet live," the Child, as if by nature (more precisely, as the promise of a natural transcendence of the limits of nature itself), excludes the very pathos from which the narrator of The Children of Men recoils when comes upon the –nonreproductive "pleasures of the mind and senses." For the "pathetic" quality he projectively locates in nongenerative sexual enjoyment – enjoyment that he views in the absence of futurity as empty, substitutive, pathological – exposes the fetishistic figurations of the Child that the narrator pits against it as legible in terms of identical to those for which enjoyment without "hope of posterity" so peremptorily dismissed" legible, that is, as nothing more than "pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins." How better to characterize the narrative project of Children of Men itself, which ends, as anyone not born yesterday surely expects form the start, with the renewal of our barren and dying race through the miracle of birth? After all, as Walter Wangerin Jr., reviewing the book for the New York Times, approvingly noted in a sentence delicately poised between description and performance of the novel’s pro-creative ideology: "If there is a baby, there is a future, there is redemption." If, however, there is no baby and in consequence, no future, then the blame must fall on the fatal lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments understood as inherently destructive of meaning and therefore as responsible for the undoing of social organization, collective reality, and, inevitably, life itself. Given that the author of The Children of Men, like the parents of mankind’s children, succumbs so completely to the narcissism – all pervasive, self-congratulatory, and strategically misrecognized – that animates pronatalism, why should we be the least bit surprised when her narrator, facing the futureless future, laments, with what we must call as straight face, that "sex totally divorced from procreation has to become almost meaninglessly acrobatic"? Which is, of course, to say no more than that sexual practice will continue to allegorize the vicissitudes of meaning so long as the specifically heterosexual alibi of reproductive necessity obscures the drive beyond meaning driving the machinery of sexual meaningfulness: so long, that is, as the biological fact of heterosexual procreation bestows the imprimatur of meaning-production on heterogenital relations. For the Child, whose mere possibility is enough to spirit away the naked truth of heterosexual sex – impregnating heterosexuality, as it were, with the future of signification by conferring upon it the cultural burden of signifying futurity – figures our identification with an always about-to-be-realized identity. It thus denies the constant threat to the social order of meaning inherent to the structure of Symbolic desire that commits us to pursuing fulfillment by way of a meaning unable, as meaning, either to fulfill us or, in turn, to be fulfilled because unable to close the gap in identity, the division incised by the signifier, that "meaning," despite itself. 17 - 18 - 19 -====The rhetoric of "survival" or "fighting against the future" implicitly valorizes the Child and subsequently reproductive sex. This kind of heteronormative discourse constructs a temporal operation to which queerness is inherently antagonistic.==== 20 -**Lippert 08 **Lippert - University Assistant in American Studies @ the University of Vienna – 2008 (Leopold, Utopian Contemporaries: Queer Temporality and America, thesis, November. ~~PDF Online @~~ othes.univie.ac.at/2818/1/2008-11-26'0303723.pdf) Accessed 07.02.11 jfs 21 -Edelman opens his book with what he modestly terms "a simple provocation" (Future, 3), and what encapsulates the futility of an affirmative and assimilationist queer politics. He argues "that queerness names ~~...~~ the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism" (Future, 3), and reveals the implicitly homophobic discourse of all the Obamas and O’Sullivans who are fighting for the future of our children and our grandchildren. The futurist bias towards heteronormativity has been fueled, as Judith Butler points out, by "fears about reproductive relations" ("Kinship", 21), by uncanny anxieties over the prospect that queer citizenship may interfere with a nation "imagined for fetuses and children" (Berlant, Queen, 1), and by the fundamental antithesis that the queer and the child embody. The principal concern of futurist America, then, is the fate of its offspring, expressed in a fearful inquiry: "What happens to the child, the child, the poor child, the martyred figure of an ostensibly selfish or dogged social progressivism?" (Butler, "Kinship", 21). Edelman recognizes that the mythical child – is the epitome of a heteronormative future-oriented social – can only be saved by a "marriage of identity to futurity in order to realize the social subject" (Future, 14), which leads him to the ensuing claim that only the linear temporal process of "ever aftering" ("After", 476, emphasis in the original) can keep "society alive" ("After", 476). Heteronormative America, accordingly, is constituted through its own posterity, through a temporal operation to which queerness is inherently antagonistic. In an imagined community that relies on futurism as its life-giving engine, then, "the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form" (Edelman, Future, 4). 22 - 23 - 24 -====Heteronormativity instills a fundamental fear of impurity in society; this amplifies systemic violence against queerness and places our species on a trajectory towards omnicide. ==== 25 -**Sedwick 1990** (Eve Sedgwick, Professor of English CUNY, "Epistemology of the Closet," 1990, pp. 127-130.) 26 -From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorray, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or 27 - 28 -===Alt=== 29 - 30 -====Vote negative as an act of flourishing via traversing material conditions are the only imaginable way to transgress our constant desire of filling the Lack — allowances of ambivalence and risk allow for us to move through desire-filled states and into a world of pure pleasure==== 31 -**Berlant and Edelman 14 **(Lee, Professor of English at Tufts, Laura, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, "Sex, or the Unbearable," pg 10-12 shr) 32 -I never suggested that flourishing involves a "simple" self- evidence in happiness that demands a detachment from "the bad life": flourishing involves traversing material conditions and then the affective sense of thriving, which is something different from and often incoherently bound to scenes and modes of living. This is why the materially "good life" might not be accompanied by a sense that life is good, why "good sex" might not be something one would want to repeat: without allowing for ambivalence, there is no flour- ishing. It therefore entails a complex navigation of life and noise, and the will to achieve it calls for practices and tendencies beyond mere accommodation to the world’s and our own negativity. Like- wise it isn’t quite right to call psychoanalytic processes "structure" in contrast to the rule of misrule that marks ongoing modes of social domination: both domains of repetition structure, in that they are scenes in which subjects and scenes assume forms that have pre- dictable, not determined, impacts. Structure is a process, not an imprint, of the reproduction of life.¶ De-antinomizing structure and the everyday, for example, one no longer has to see sex only as expressing a relation of power, or someone’s singular pleasures, or the shattering activity of the drives. We wouldn’t have needed Rubin to help us calm down and think about sex, and to think about affirming what’s threatening about it either, if we did not need to figure out how sex reproduces normativity while predictably disorganizing assurance about why we want what we want and what our variety of attachments mean; at the same time, not quite knowing ourselves, we demand all sorts of things on behalf of the appetites, such as the right to anonymity, ag- gression, acknowledgment, pleasure, relief, protection, and, often, repair. Fantasy, formally speaking, is not what glosses over this craziness but that which makes it possible to move within it— sometimes in the blindingly glossy sense of optimism Lee proposes but more formally in the sense its setting provides that ambivalent, incoherent, proximate forces can be moved, moved through, and with. These processes of exposure to power, norm, and desire are structuring in their very variety and variation. As I wrote recently in an essay about the work of Leo Bersani and David Halperin, "When in a romance someone has sex and then says to the lover, ‘You make me feel safe,’ we understand that she means that there’s been an emotional compensation to neutralize how unsafe and close to the abject sex makes her feel. ‘You make me feel safe’ means that I can relax and have fun where I am also not safe, where I am too close to the ridiculous, the disgusting, the merely weird, or—simply too close to having a desire. But some situations are riskier than others, as the meanings of unsafe sex change according to who’s having the sex" (Berlant 2009, 266). That’s where the politics comes in.¶ So when I say that I want to dedramatize our conceptual and em- bodied encounters with sex, I don’t mean that I want to live in the pastoral sex world of Shortbus (Mitchell 2006), cruising like a happy puppy sniffing around a sea of interesting crotches. To some degree Lee is right that my stance is a way of making peace with misrecog- nition. Making peace with it, it seems to me—being a realist of sorts as well—gives us a shot at displacing sex from its normative func- tion as the mechanism of emotional cohesion that sustains aggres- sive heteronormativity. But also, since misrecognition is inevitable, since the fantasmatic projection onto objects of desire that crack you open and give you back to yourself in a way about which you might feel many ways will always happen in any circuit of reciprocity with the world, why fight it? The question is where we move the dramatics of projection, what we can make available for changing their imaginary shape and consequence. I take cues from Lacan and Cavell to see sex as part of a comedy of misrecognition at the same time as it also can be a tragic drama of inflation and deflation. But "comedy" is a technical term here; it does not point to what’s funny or what feels good. Comedy stages explosive and implosive prob- lems of adjustment that are fundamentally affective and political— and survivable, if not affectively too bearable, even beyond the limit. 33 - 34 - 35 -====The Ballot is a performative act – the ballot is a discourse exercising binding power. Every ballot matter – repetition is what confers power on the performative act. ==== 36 -**Butler 93 **Butler, noted for her studies on gender and teaches composition and rhetoric at Berkeley, 93 (Dr. Judith, ‘Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex’) pp. 225 LRP 37 -Performative acts are forms of authoritative speech: most performatives, for instance, are statements that, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and exercise a binding power.4 Implicated in a network of authorization and punishment, performatives tend to include legal sentences, baptisms, inaugurations, declarations of ownership, statements which not only perform an action, but confer a binding power on the action performed. If the power of discourse to produce that which it names is linked with the question of performativity, then the performative is one domain in which power acts as discourse. Importantly, however, there is no power, construed as a subject, that acts, but only, to repeat an earlier phrase, a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence and instability. This is less an "act," singular and deliberate, than a nexus of power and discourse that repeats or mimes the discursive gestures of power. Hence, the judge who authorizes and installs the situation he names invariably cites the law that he applies, and it is the power of this citation that gives the performative its binding or conferring power. And though it may appear that the binding power of his words is derived from the force of his will or from a prior authority, the opposite is more true: it is through the citation of the law that the figure of the judge's "will" is produced and that the "priority" of textual authority is established. Indeed, it is through the invocation of convention that the speech act of the judge derives its binding power; that binding power is to be found neither in the subject of the judge nor in his will, but in the citational legacy by which a contemporary "act" emerges in the context of a chain of binding convention. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,9 +1,0 @@ 1 -====The aff’s rhetorical performance is premised on the idea of a rational subject with free will who can act upon the law – this normative model of subjectivity is bureaucratic control itself – its essential meaning is the infliction of pain and death==== 2 -**Schlag 90**~|Stanford Law Review November, 1990 Essay "NORMATIVE AND NOWHERE TO GO" Pierre Schlag ~~FNa1~~ Copyright © 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior (https://www.pravo.unizg.hr/'download/repository/SchlagSLR.pdf) A.B. 3 -All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games — utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image — its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal ~~*188~~ thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death — at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative APPEAL of normative legal thought systematically TURNS US AWAY from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic — its own FANTASTIC UNDERSTANDING of the political and moral scene. n59 Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices — academic and otherwise. 4 - 5 -====We endorse the kritikal strategy of queer pessimism but reject their normative legal project. Affirm the 1ac rhetorical strategy but reject the plan – refusing the temptation to support normative legal thought opens up space to recognize the brutality beneath the liberal humanist mask of the state==== 6 - 7 -====It’s vital that you refuse all reasonable value to their normative legal project – allowing them case leverage is the most effective means of deflecting critical interrogation of normative legal thought ==== 8 -**SCHLAG 91**~| PIERRE, "Symposium THE CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY ARTICLES NORMATIVITY AND THE POLITICS OF FORM" (http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3741andcontext=penn'law'review) A.B. 9 -It is apparent that virtually all aspects of normative legal thought are suited to the rhetorical reproduction and maintenance of the sovereign individual subject. As Charles Fried put it, "~~b~~efore there is morality there must be the person. We must attain and maintain in our morality a concept of personality such that it makes sense to posit choosing, valuing entities — free, moral beings." n259 This insistence of normative legal thought on the importance of a morally competent, normative subject is quite consonant with the rhetorical construction of the legal thinker as a sovereign individual subject. Indeed, this rationalist rhetorical construction is at once a prefigurement and the entailment of what Fried calls "choosing, valuing entities — free moral beings." The normative enterprise of norm-selection and norm-justification, with their emphases on choice orientation, value orientation, and prescription, is keenly suited to keeping the sovereign individual subject in the driver's seat. Likewise, the single-norm, conclusion-oriented character of legal thought, with its FIXATION ON END-PRODUCTS and its requirements that these end products be non-paradoxical, non-contradictory, complete, self-sufficient, discrete, separable, and transsituational, is conducive to deflecting any serious interrogation of either the rhetorical practices, forms, or processes that constitute the sovereign individual subject or his rhetorical enterprise: Hence, we are drawn toward the meticulous dissection and examination of what the legal subject has produced and whether these END-PRODUCTS have been produced in the right (non-contradictory, non-paradoxical, linear, authority-driven) way. And in turn, this orientation draws attention away from the legal subject who is producing all this stuff in the first place. n260 The action-deferring and reader-centered character of normative legal thought likewise ensure that no serious challenge is posed to the identity or character of the sovereign individual subject. The ~~*901~~ texts of normative legal thought are supposed to have their effect by appealing to the choice and the intellectual faculties of the reader. The texts are supposed to honor the reader's already preformed views, ideas, prejudices, and aesthetic representations of social and political life. There is to be no overt disabling or subversion of her identity or role. For instance, within the rationalist rhetoric of contemporary legal thought, it is permissible to write articles about Derridean deconstruction of legal thought — but to actually practice Derridean deconstruction will simply evoke resistance, misunderstanding, and incomprehension. The expectation is that any author will, of course, explain and justify any significant departure from the default positions and will refrain from any rhetorical exercise that might actually require active change on the part of the reader. Finally, the adversarial advocacy orientation of normative legal thought — which is attributable, at least in part, to the conflation of the role of lawyer and legal academic — does much to insulate the sovereign individual subject and its rhetorical supports from scrutiny. Because so many legal academics understand their legal thought to be positional in character — on behalf of some (intangible, often very worthy but poorly identified) client-surrogate, much of legal thought is produced within the explicit context of adversarial advocacy among academics and is devoted to advancing or defeating this or that position. Many normative legal thinkers understand themselves to be engaged in "passionate advocacy" on behalf of some cause. Now admittedly, there is no tribunal listening; no one is empowered to put all this normative passion into effect. But this does not mean that this passionate advocacy is therefore without effect: on the contrary, it often succeeds in BRACKETING ANY SERIOUS QUESTIONING of the rhetorical systems that enables such aimless passionate advocacy to be produced in the first place. Indeed, when one is engaged in passionate arguments to an imagined tribunal, the last thing one will do is question the argumentative structures that allow the arguments to be framed and presented in the first place. Not only does normative legal thought conduce to the maintenance of the sovereign individual subject and his rationalist rhetoric, but one can see the reverse process at work as well. Indeed, if normative thought occupies so much attention in the legal academy; if normative legal thought seems like the obvious, the "natural" thing to do; if the "what should we do?/what should the law be?" question seems so legitimate, so important; and if normative legal thought seems veritably like law itself, it is because the rhetorical ~~*902~~ situation — the default settings — have already enabled us, constituted our discourse, and configured our roles so that we will produce normative legal thought. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,19 +1,0 @@ 1 -====They think that countries can ever do something in the interest of queer bodies, but the state is always anti-queer. The aff’s faith in legal reforms makes violence inevitable inevitable because the world is founded on the abuse and domination over queer bodies ==== 2 -**The Mary Nardini gang 2009** (criminal queers from Milwaukee, Wisconsin "toward the queerest insurrection" 2009) 3 -A fag is bashed because his gender presentation is far too femme. A poor transman can’t afford his life-saving hormones. A sex worker is murdered by their client. A genderqueer persyn is raped because ze just needed to be "fucked straight". Four black lesbians are sent to prison for daring to defend themselves against a straight-male attacker.1 Cops beat us on the streets and our bodies are being destroyed by pharmaceutical companies because we can’t give them a dime. Queers experience, directly with our bodies, the violence and domination of this world. Class, Race, Gender, Sexuality, Ability; while often these interrelated and overlapping categories of oppression are lost to abstraction, queers are forced to physically understand each. We’ve had our bodies and desires stolen from us, mutilated and sold back to us as a model of living we can never embody. 1 Free the New Jersey 4. And let’s free everyone else while we’re at it. Foucault says that "power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies." We experience the complexity of domination and social control amplified through heterosexuality. When police kill us, we want them dead in turn. When prisons entrap our bodies and rape us because our genders aren’t similarly contained, of course we want fire to them all. When borders are erected to construct a national identity absent of people of color and queers, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. VII The perspective of queers within the heteronormative world is a lens through which we can critique and attack the apparatus of capitalism. We can analyze the ways in which Medicine, the Prison System, the Church, the State, Marriage, the Media, Borders, the Military and Police are used to control and destroy us. More importantly, we can use these cases to articulate a cohesive criticism of every way that we are alienated and dominated. Queer is a position from which to attack the normative - more, a position from which to understand and attack the ways in which normal is reproduced and reiterated. In destabilizing and problematizing normalcy, we can destabilize and become a problem for the Totality. 4 - 5 -====The political will fail – moving within the state causes a sense of pacification where the left believes they have done good while still upholding the existing inequalities—turns case==== 6 -**Mieli 80 (Mario Mieli, **leader in the Italian gay movement, "Towards a gay communism" 1980, https://libcom.org/library/gay-communism-mario-mieli, MMV) 7 -I believe that homosexuals are revolutionary today in as much as we have overcome politics. The revolution for which we are fighting is among other things the negation of all male supremacist political rackets (based among other things on sublimated homosexuality), since it is the negation and overcoming of capital and its politics, which find their way into all groups of the left, sustaining them and making them counter-revolutionary. My arsehole doesn't want to be political, it is not for sale to any racket of the left in exchange for a bit of putrid opportunist political 'protection'. While the arseholes of the 'comrades' in the groups will be revolutionary only when they have managed to enjoy them with others, and when they have stopped covering their behinds with the ideology of tolerance for the queers. As long as they hide behind the shield of politics, the heterosexual 'comrades' will not know what is hidden within their own thighs. As always, it is only rather belatedly, in the wake of the 'enlightened' bourgeoisie, that the left-wing groups have begun to play the game of capitalist tolerance. From declared hangmen, and a thousand times more repugnant than the hustlers and fascists, given all their (ideological) declarations of revolution, the activists of these groups have transformed themselves into 'open' debaters with homosexuals. They fantasise about becoming well-meaning and tolerant protectors of the 'deviant', in this way gratifying their own virile image, already far too much on the decline, at a time when even the ultra-left have suddenly to improvise 'feminist' representatives for 'their' women. Moreover, the fantasy of protectors helps them to exorcise the problem of the repression of their own homoerotic desire. Under it all, the activists of the left always hope to become good policemen. They do not know that real policemen get in there more than they do, and that when this happens, they make love precisely with us gays. When will there be a free homosexual outlet for the activists of the ultra-left ? 8 - 9 -====Their constructions force the queer body into endless violence and exclusion through exile==== 10 -**Mary Nardini gang 2009** (criminal queers from Milwaukee, Wisconsin "toward the queerest insurrection" 2009) 11 -In the discourse of queer, we are talking about a space of struggle against this totality - against normalcy. By "queer", we mean "social war". And when we speak of queer as a conflict with all domination, we mean it. V See, we’ve always been the other, the alien, the criminal. The story of queers in this civilization has always been the narrative of the sexual deviant, the constitutional psychopathic inferior, the traitor, the freak, the moral imbecile. We’ve been excluded at the border, from labor, from familial ties. We’ve been forced into concentration camps, into sex slavery, into prisons. The normal, the straight, the american family has always constructed itself in opposition to the queer. Straight is not queer. White is not of color. Healthy does not have HIV. Man is not woman. The discourses of heterosexuality, whiteness and capitalism reproduce themselves into a model of power. For the rest of us, there is death. In his work, Jean Genet1 asserts that the life of a queer, is one of exile - that all of the totality of this world is constructed to marginalize and exploit us. He posits the queer as the criminal. He glorifies homosexuality2 and criminality as the most beautiful and lovely forms of conflict with the bourgeois world. He writes of the secret worlds of rebellion and joy inhabited by criminals and queers. Quoth Genet, "Excluded by my birth and tastes from the social order, I was not aware of its diversity. Nothing in the world was irrelevant: the stars on a general’s sleeve. the stock-market quotations, the olive harvest, the style of the judiciary, the wheat exchange, flower-beds. Nothing. This order, fearful and feared, whose details were all inter-related, had a meaning: my exile." 12 - 13 -====Vote negative to position the AC as a site of failure as a radical means of rejecting normative notions of success and productivity ==== 14 -**Halberstam 11.** J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 2 15 -In this book I range from children’s animation to avant-garde performance and queer art to think about ways of being and knowing that stand outside of conventional understandings of success. I argue that success in a heteronormative, capitalist society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation. But these measures of success have come under serious pressure recently, with the collapse of financial markets on the one hand and the epic rise in divorce rates on the other. If the boom and bust years of the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first have taught us anything, we should at least have a healthy critique of static models of success and failure. Rather than just arguing for a reevaluation of these standards of passing and failing, The Queer Art of Failure dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live. Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world. Failing is something queers do and have always done exceptionally well; for queers failure can be a style, to cite Quentin Crisp, or a way of life, to cite Foucault, and it can stand in contrast to the grim scenarios of success that depend upon "trying and trying again." In fact if success requires so much effort, then maybe failure is easier in the long run and offers different rewards. What kinds of reward can failure offer us? Perhaps most obviously, failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods. Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers. And while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life. As Barbara Ehrenreich reminds us in Bright- sided, positive thinking is a North American affliction, "a mass delusion" that emerges out of a combination of American exceptionalism and a desire to believe that success happens to good people and failure is just a consequence of a bad attitude rather than structural conditions (2009: 13). Positive thinking is offered up in the U.S. as a cure for cancer, a path to untold riches, and a surefire way to engineer your own success. Indeed believing that success depends upon one’s attitude is far preferable to Americans than recognizing that their success is the outcome of the tilted scales of race, class, and gender. As Ehrenreich puts it, "If optimism is the key to material success, and if you can achieve an optimistic outlook through the discipline of positive thinking, then there is no excuse for failure." But, she continues, "the flip side of positivity is thus a harsh insistence on personal responsibility," meaning that while capitalism produces some people’s success through other people’s failures, the ideology of positive thinking insists that success depends only upon working hard and failure is always of your own doing (8). We know better of course in an age when the banks that ripped off ordinary people have been deemed "too big to fail" and the people who bought bad mortgages are simply too little to care about. In Bright-sided Ehrenreich uses the example of American women’s application of positive thinking to breast cancer to demonstrate how -dangerous the belief in optimism can be and how deeply Americans want to believe that health is a matter of attitude rather than environmental degradation and that wealth is a matter of visualizing success rather than having the cards stacked in your favor. For the nonbelievers outside the cult of positive thinking, however, the failures and losers, the grouchy, irritable whiners who do not want to "have a nice day" and who do not believe that getting cancer has made them better people, politics offers a better explanatory framework than personal disposition. For these negative thinkers, there are definite advantages to failing. Relieved of the obligation to keep smiling through chemotherapy or bankruptcy, the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life in the United States. From the perspective of feminism, failure has often been a better bet than success. Where feminine success is always measured by male standards, and gender failure often means being relieved of the pressure to measure up to patriarchal ideals, not succeeding at womanhood can offer unexpected pleasures. In many ways this has been the message of many renegade feminists in the past. Monique Wittig (1992) argued in the 1970s that if womanhood depends upon a heterosexual framework, then lesbians are not "women," and if lesbians are not "women," then they fall outside of patriarchal norms and can re-create some of the meaning of their genders. Also in the 1970s Valerie Solanas suggested that if "woman" takes on meaning only in relation to "man," then we need to "cut up men" (2004: 72). Perhaps that is a little drastic, but at any rate these kinds of feminisms, what I call shadow feminisms in chapter 5, have long haunted the more acceptable forms of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than negativity, rejection, and transformation. Shadow feminisms take the form not of becoming, being, and doing but of shady, murky modes of undoing, un- becoming, and violating. 16 - 17 -====Failure is a viable strategy and an artform of its own==== 18 -**Halberstam 11.** J. J. Judith Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 5 19 -Illegibility, then, has been and remains, a reliable source for political autonomy. —James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State Any book that begins with a quote from SpongeBob SquarePants and is motored by wisdom gleaned from Fantastic Mr. Fox, Chicken Run, and Finding Nemo, among other animated guides to life, runs the risk of not being taken seriously. Yet this is my goal. Being taken seriously means missing out on the chance to be frivolous, promiscuous, and irrelevant. The desire to be taken seriously is precisely what compels people to follow the tried and true paths of knowledge production around which I would like to map a few detours. Indeed terms like serious and rigorous tend to be code words, in academia as well as other contexts, for disciplinary correctness; they signal a form of training and learning that confirms what is already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow for visionary insights or flights of fancy. Training of any kind, in fact, is a way of refusing a kind of Benjaminian relation to knowing, a stroll down uncharted streets in the "wrong" direction (Benjamin 1996); it is precisely about staying in well-lit territories and about knowing exactly which way to go before you set out. Like many others before me, I propose that instead the goal is to lose one’s way, and indeed to be prepared to lose more than one’s way. Losing, we may agree with Elizabeth Bishop, is an art, and one "that is not too hard to master / Though it may look like a disaster" (2008: 166–167). In the sciences, particularly physics and mathematics, there are many examples of rogue intellectuals, not all of whom are reclusive Unabomber types (although more than a few are just that), who wander off into uncharted territories and refuse the academy because the publish-or-perish pressure of academic life keeps them tethered to conventional knowledge production and its well-traveled byways. Popular mathematics books, for example, revel in stories about unconventional loners who are self- schooled and who make their own way through the world of numbers. For some kooky minds, disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and blind ~~unscripted~~ fumbling might yield better results. In 2008, for example, The New Yorker featured a story about an oddball physicist who, like many ambitious physicists and mathematicians, was in hot pursuit of a grand theory, a "theory of everything." This thinker, Garrett Lisi, had dropped out of academic physics because string theory dominated the field at that time and he thought the answers lay elsewhere. As an outsider to the discipline, writes Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Lisi "built his theory as an outsider might, relying on a grab bag of component parts: a hand-built mathematical structure, an unconventional way of describing gravity, and a mysterious mathematical entity known as E8."1 In the end Lisi’s "theory of everything" fell short of expectations, but it nonetheless yielded a whole terrain of new questions and methods. Similarly the computer scientists who pioneered new programs to produce computer-generated imagery (CGI), as many accounts of the rise of Pixar have chronicled, were academic rejects or dropouts who created independent institutes in order to explore their dreams of animated worlds.2 These alternative cultural and academic realms, the areas beside academia rather than within it, the intellectual worlds conjured by losers, failures, dropouts, and refuseniks, often serve as the launching pad for alternatives precisely when the university cannot. This is not a bad time to experiment with disciplinary transformation on behalf of the project of generating new forms of knowing, since the fields that were assembled over one hundred years ago to respond to new market economies and the demand for narrow expertise, as Foucault de- scribed them, are now losing relevance and failing to respond either to real-world knowledge projects or student interests. As the big disciplines begin to crumble like banks that have invested in bad securities we might ask more broadly, Do we really want to shore up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments, or might we rather take this opportunity to rethink the project of learning and thinking altogether? Just as the standardized tests that the U.S. favors as a guide to intellectual advancement in high schools tend to identify people who are good at standardized exams (as opposed to, say, intellectual visionaries), so in universities grades, exams, and knowledge of canons identify scholars with an aptitude for maintaining and conforming to the dictates of the discipline. This book, a stroll out of the confines of conventional knowledge and into the unregulated territories of failure, loss, and unbecoming, must make a long detour around disciplines and ordinary ways of thinking. Let me explain how universities (and by implication high schools) squash rather than promote quirky and original thought. Disciplinarity, as de- fined by Foucault (1995), is a technique of modern power: it depends upon and deploys normalization, routines, convention, tradition, and regularity, and it produces experts and administrative forms of governance. The university structure that houses the disciplines and jealously guards their boundaries now stands at a crossroads, not of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, past and future, national and transnational; the crossroads at which the rapidly disintegrating bandwagon of disciplines, subfields, and interdisciplines has arrived offer a choice between the university as corporation and investment opportunity and the university as a new kind of public sphere with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, and in thought and politics. A radical take on disciplinarity and the university that presumes both the breakdown of the disciplines and the closing of gaps between fields conventionally presumed to be separated can be found in a manifesto published by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in 2004 in Social Text titled "The University and the Undercommons: Seven Theses." Their essay is a searing critique directed at the intellectual and the critical intellectual, the professional scholar and the "critical academic professionals." For Moten and Harney, the critical academic is not the answer to encroaching professionalization but an extension of it, using the very same tools and legitimating strategies to become "an ally of professional education." Moten and Harney prefer to pitch their tent with the "subversive intellectuals," a maroon community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of "rigor," "excellence," and "productivity." They tell us to "steal from the university," to "steal the enlightenment for others" (112), and to act against "what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that founded, and with the force of law refounds, society" (113). And what does the undercommons of the university want to be? It wants to constitute an unprofessional force of fugitive knowers, with a set of intellectual practices not bound by examination systems and test scores. The goal for this unprofessionalization is not to abolish; in fact Moten and Harney set the fugitive intellectual against the elimination or abolition of this, the founding or refounding of that: "Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society" (113). Not the elimination of anything but the founding of a new society. And why not? Why not think in terms of a different kind of society than the one that first created and then abolished slavery? The social worlds we inhabit, after all, as so many thinkers have reminded us, are not inevitable; they were not always bound to turn out this way, and what’s more, in the process of producing this reality, many other realities, fields of knowledge, and ways of being have been discarded and, to cite Fou- cault again, "disqualified." A few visionary books, produced alongside disciplinary knowledge, show us the paths not taken. For example, in a book that itself began as a detour, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999), James C. Scott details the ways the modern state has run roughshod over local, customary, and undisciplined forms of knowledge in order to rationalize and simplify social, agricultural, and political practices that have profit as their primary motivation. In the process, says Scott, certain ways of seeing the world are established as normal or natural, as obvious and necessary, even though they are often entirely counterintuitive and socially engineered. Seeing Like a State began as a study of "why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of ‘people who move around,’" but quickly became a study of the demand by the state for legibility through the imposition of methods of standardization and uniformity (1). While Dean Spade (2008) and other queer scholars use Scott’s book to think about how we came to insist upon the documentation of gender identity on all govern- mental documentation, I want to use his monumental study to pick up some of the discarded local knowledges that are trampled underfoot in the rush to bureaucratize and rationalize an economic order that privileges profit over all kinds of other motivations for being and doing. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,12 +1,0 @@ 1 -====Why would you ever want to use becoming-woman? Deleuze grossly calls woman "sexuality itself" and orients the woman as a simulacrum to be appropriated for the becoming-man and eliminates female subjectivity–turns case==== 2 -**Jardine 84** (Alice Jardine, "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others)", SubStance, Vol. 13, No. ¾, Issue 44-45, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3684774, P 52-54, //Accessed 9/10/16 GK) 3 -With D + G, however, none of these reasonings about becoming woman hold sway. There are, of course, overlappings (as, for example, with "There is a becoming-woman in writing" ~~DLS, p. 55~~), but they are few. For here, what is involved is le devenir femme de tout le monde, the becoming woman of every one everything, the whole world. With D + G, "to become woman" is less a metaphor for describing a certain social or textual process than a true meta morphosis-one thinks of Kafka's Gregor Samsa waking up as a bug. This is mainly because D + G's imperative "to become woman" has very little to do with women, at least not with women as D + G perceive them, as caught up within a Western binary machine over which they cannot and will never have control. In order not to lose sight of how and why this is so, it is essential to remember that the devenir, "becoming," for D + G, is a process, one which cannot be described or put into motion by any of our current conceptual machinery: "To become is never to imitate, nor to conform oneself to a model, whether it be of justice or of truth. There is no term from which one departs, nor one to which one arrives or should arrive. Nor are there two terms which are inter changeable. The question 'what's become of you?' is particularly stupid. Because as someone becomes, what he becomes changes as much as he does" (DLS, p. 8). With "becoming" there is no past or future and certainly no present there is no linear history: "In becoming, it is more a matter of involuting: this is neither regressing nor progressing" (DLS, p. 37). "Becoming" is topological, geological, geographical, not historical ~~DLS, p. 48~~. "Becoming," for D + G, means becoming caught up in a process of osmosis (not metaphor) with de-anthropologized and de-identitized entities - women, infants, animals, foreigners, the insane - in order to resist the dominant mode of representation represented by any majority. "People are always thinking of a majority future (when I'm grown up, when I'm in power . . ). When really the problem is one of a becoming-minority: not to act like, not to do like or imitate the infant, fool, woman, animal, stutterer, or foreigner, but to become all that, in order to invent new forces or new weapons" (DLS, p. 11). This osmosis maintains no identities, no images. To be caught up in a "becoming animal" means that one will resemble neither Man nor the Animal, but, rather, that each will "deterritorialize" the other. The final stage of"becoming" is to become "imperceptible" - beyond any percipion as historically required for Man to master the world - or woman. This does not mean, however, that all of these becomings are in a relationship of equality one to the other. The need for one or the other, in fact, changes according to the binary machine one is "escaping" from, and, in all cases, the "becoming woman" always has, over all the others, what D + G call a "particular introductory power" (MP, p. 304), a status as "first quantum" (MP, p. 342). "However, if all becomings are already molecular ~~as opposed to molar~~, including the becoming-woman, it should also be said that all becomings begin and pass through the becoming-woman. It's the key to the other becomings" (MP, p. 340). Again, this is not to say that "becoming woman" has anything to do with women per se. D + G's becoming woman is one "which is not ~~to be~~ confused with women, their past or future, and it is necessary that women enter into this becoming in order to exit from their past, their future, their history" (DLS, p. 8). We are not talking about men and women here, because they can only exist in the Western binary machine. It is, rather, a question "not ~~of~~ man and ~~of~~ woman taken as sexual entities, held in a binary apparatus, but ~~of~~ a molecular becoming, the birth of a molecular woman in music, the birth of a molecular sonority in a woman" (DLS, p. 122). Why then do D + G privilege the word woman? First, as they explain through a series of unanalyzed stereotypes, because it is "sexuality itself" which is the ultimate, uncontrollable becoming, when it can manage to escape immediate Oedipalization. ("Sexuality passes through the becoming-woman of~~the~~ man and the becoming-animal of the human" ~~MP, p. 341~~.) But also because, as "introductory power," "Woman" is both the closest to the category of "Man" as majority, and yet she remains a distinct minority. D + G explain that the notions of majority and minority here should not be opposed in any purely quantitative way: "Let us suppose that the constant or standard is Man- any white-male-adult-city-dweller-speaking a standard language-European-heterosexual (the Ulysses of Joyce or of Ezra Pound). It is obvious that "the Man" has the majority, even if he is less numerous than the mosquitoes, children, Blacks, peasants, homosexuals . . . etc." (MP, p. 133). The problem is not to gain, or accede to, the majority, but to become a minority; and this is particularly crucial for women if they desire to remain radical, creative, without simply becoming (a) Man: The only becoming is a minority one. Women, regardless of their number, are a minority, definable as a state or sub-set; but they only create by rendering possible a becoming, of which they do not have the ownership, into which they themselves must enter, a becoming-woman which concerns all of mankind, men and women included. (MP, p. 134) The woman who does not enter into the "becoming woman" remains a Man, remains "molar," just like men: Woman as a molar entity must become woman, so that man as well may become one or is then able to become one. It is certainly indispensable that women engage in molar politics, in terms of a conquest which they conduct from their organization, from their own history, from their own subjectivity: "We as women . ." then appears as the subject of the enunciation. But it is dangerous to fall back upon such a subject, which cannot function without drying up a spring or stopping a flood. The Song of life is often struck up by the driest women, animated by resentment, by the desire for power and by cold mothering. .. . (MP, p. 339) That is, woman (with her obligatory connotations: "transparent force, innocence, speed," ~~MP, p. 354~~ is what Man (both men and women: "virility, gravity," ~~MP, p. 354~~) must become. There must be no "becoming man" because he is always already a majority. "In a certain way, it's always 'man' who is the subject of a becoming. . .. A woman has to become woman, but in a becoming-woman of all of mankind" (MP, p. 357). That is, Man is always the subject of any becoming, even if "he" is a woman. A woman who is not a "woman-become" is a Man - and a subject to that extent and to that extent only. Woman is never a subject but a limit - a border of and for Man - the "becoming woman" is l'avenir de l'homme tout entier- the future of all Mankind. For D + G, She is what the entire world must become if Man men and women - is truly to disappear. But to the extent that women must "become woman" first (in order for men, in D + G's words, to "follow her example"), might that not mean that she must also be the first to disappear? Is it not possible that the process of "becoming woman" is but a new variation of an old allegory for the process of women becoming obsolete? There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations. A silent, mutable, head-less, desire-less, spatial surface necessary only for His metamorphosis? Physicists say: Holes are not the absence of particles, but particles going faster than light. Flying anuses, rapid vaginas, there is no castration. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mille Plateaux. Most important theorists have a repertory of exemplary fictions, fictions that they call upon frequently to interact with their specific theories in creative if predictable ways. Between the scene of Lacanian psychoanalysis and that of Lol V. Stein's ravishing, for example, the privileged rapport is one of repetition: for Lacan, Marguerite Duras understood and repeated his teachings without him.19 Or, between the invagination of Derrida's e'criture and that of the narrator in Maurice Blanchot's L'Arrit de mort, what is privileged is the process of mime: for Derrida, Blanchot understood his writings with him, inseparably.20 D + G's exemplary fiction writers include Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Pierre Klossowski, and Michel Tournier—to mention only a few. What all of these writers' texts share with those of D + G is the surface quality of their figures: the privileged modality of relationship between the configurations of Deleuzian becoming and those of fiction is allegory. This is made most clear through Deleuze's essay on Tournier's 1967 novel, Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique. 21 There it is no longer a question of whether Duras's Lol, as hysterical body, is or is not a subject of narrative; of whether Blanchot's J. and N., as organs of a hysterical text, are or are not simply new angles for modernity. For here it is a question of Speranza, a true Body-without-Organs: a woman who is not a woman but a female figure (an island), a space to be unfolded, molded, into new configurations for the metamorphosis of Man. 4 - 5 -====Becoming woman can never escape the gendered rhetoric that creates the patriarchal exclusion. The aff is rooted in the androcentric project and cant overcome the exclusion of the female body in their female body and ultimately has an end that is gendered or it fosters a subjectivity in which the female body cant survive ==== 6 -**Shukin 2k **NICOLE SHUKIN Becoming-Woman Now VERENA ANDERMATT CONLEY 2000 Full book "Deleuze and Feminism" Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook: Colebrook is a professor of English at University of Pennsylvania. Ian Buchanan is the Director of the Institute for Social Transformation Research based at University of Wollongong.EBSCO Host DOA 10/7/16 KAE-GK 7 -Deleuze’s ‘pragmatism’, his preference for becomings generated on surfaces, leads him to favour sites of extreme potency, or, in machinic parlance, motor power. His affirmation of creative force is reflected in a culinary fetish: of food that secretes power and prowess, metonyms for the ‘liberated elements’ in what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘the body without organs’ (1987: 260). Deleuze’s favourite things, furthermore, connote a virility of force and a blood-lust for becomings that are peculiarly male gendered. Unverifiably, but arguably, brain, tongue and marrow emit a muscular and raw masculinity. Considering Deleuze’s philosophical renovation of the self as an assemblage that scatters and reconvenes, a composition ever on the move, it is indeed hard to imagine him nurturing a taste for duck or fish, for meals consisting of whole organisms. Indirectly linked with the richness of his favourite foods is an emphasis on intensity as a valid ontology and the belief that molecular units of potency, or ‘kinematic entities’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 255), are capable of disrupting systems of control and capture, state and family apparatuses. This aspect of the thinking of Deleuze verges upon a romanticisation of the involuntary that threatens to exclude embodied women. One can trace the notion of the involuntary to Proust and Signs, where Deleuze links it to what he calls ‘the virtual’: ‘Proust asks the question: how shall we save the past as it is in itself? It is to this question that involuntary Memory offers its answer . . . This ideal reality, this virtuality, is essence, which is realized or incarnated in involuntary memory’ (Deleuze 1972: 60). In A Thousand Plateaus, to my mind, the involuntary turns into a relatively submerged quality associated with everything that resists regulatory apparatuses. Yet it is not at the site of the involuntary so much as at its unexpected conciliation with the regulatory implied by his virile tastes that feminisms need to be on the alert. Deleuze’s investment in the involuntary contains ethnographic overtones that are significant to a critical feminist reading. From what can be gleaned from his interviews with Parnet, Deleuze distinctly favours the raw over the cooked. Deleuze disagreed strongly with the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss and his ‘institution of the totem’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 237). Yet the text of A Thousand Plateaus continuously invokes phenomena that evade domestication – or cooking – by Western culture: ‘nomad thought’, ‘primitive societies’, ‘the East’, war machines, music, packs, swarms, tribes, anomalies, becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal, -vegetable, -mineral, -molecular, sadomasochism, drugs, and so on. For this reason it is not amiss to resort to the very interpretations that Deleuze took issue with to explore a contrast Deleuze and Guattari stage between ‘nonvoluntary transmutation’ and domestication (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 269). It is because Levi-Strauss reduced different myths to the single structural paradigm, of the raw and the cooked, that Deleuze dis- agreed with his methodology, just as he disagreed with Freud’s absorption of a multiplicity of experiences into the Oedipal triangle. As Levi-Strauss writes: I propose to show that M1 (the key myth) belongs to a set of myths that explain the origin of the cooking of food . . . that cooking is con- ceived of in native thought as a form of mediation; and finally, that this particular aspect remains concealed in the Bororo myth, because the latter is in fact an inversion, or a reversal, of myths originating in neighbouring communities which view culinary operations as media- tory activities between heaven and earth, life and death, nature and society. (Levi Strauss 1969: 64–5) Fire and cooking, Levi-Strauss continues, are ‘the origin of man’s mortality’ (164); cooking instigates not just the nature/culture divide, but also the loss of an innate or immanent power of immor- tality retained by raw food. Also of importance to my purposes here is the connection Levi-Strauss finds in the myths between women and food: ‘~~I~~t is worthy of note that in the myths just discussed the sexual code should be apparent only in its masculine references . . . When the references are feminine, the sexual code becomes latent and is concealed beneath the alimentary code’ (269). It is my contention that the thinking of Deleuze contains a mythological or affective component that can be read according to the interpretations of Levi-Strauss. Deleuze seeks a power of immanence and ‘the movement of the infinite’ in becomings and machinic assemblages which are largely cast as involuntary (281). A broad division is set up in A Thousand Plateaus between an intense ‘nomadology’ (the raw) and domestic, regulatory structures (the cooked), a distinction that is unexpectedly reminiscent of nature/ culture binaries. Finally, Deleuze and Guattari never address the overdetermined historical, mythological, or affective associations between the female gender and domesticity, between women and cooked food. For this reason, gender remains to a great extent latent in A Thousand Plateaus. 8 - 9 -====Vote neg as an act of aborting the 1AC and pass the aff through the revolting corporeal threshold. This abjection is a method of embracing difference and diving into the unknown prism of our consciousness of the female body==== 10 -**Bono 05** (Paola Bono, "The Abjection of the Female Body: Hell as a Metaphor for Birth," 2005, http://arts. monash.edu.au/cclcs/research/papers/ //Accessed 10/14/16 GK) 11 - 12 -A new-born baby, really just born, the umbilical cord not yet cut; naked and crying, its face screwed up in the effort. Still dirty with blood and mucus, marks of its passage through the physical, corporeal threshold it has crossed to come to life. Carnal threshold, vagina of the mother's body, whence it comes, in whose womb it has grown - living matter on its way to being; so that the traces of that body still show on its little body. Some of you might remember this image: one of Benetton's "scandalous" ads, which some years ago did in fact provoke scandalized reactions, at least in Italy. Because it was being used for commercial ends, because it exploited childhood - nay, babyhood, for mercenary purposes. Or so the argument went. While childhood and exploitation would seem to have nothing to do with those babies who appear in numberless ads for diapers and baby-food; there has never been such an outcry in those cases. But then those babies are so pretty, so smiling and, most important, so clean! A further criticism (perhaps not spelled out exactly in these terms, but certainly this was its meaning) maintained that the ad violated - again, for those reproachable commercial ends - a most important and sacred moment, the moment of birth. And here I think is a crucial point, a truth at the core of those scandalized reactions: in the concept of the sacred, and in the focus on birth. The reasons given for it may strike one as hypocritical, but the spontaneous recoiling in disgust was sincere. What that image signified was birth in its "improper" physical reality, showing its traces on the baby's body dirty of the con/fusion with the mother's body. Mucus, blood, the wet stickiness of the carnal threshold, con/fusion: elements which, in Kristeva's term, we could recognize as belonging to the category of the abject. Because they are secretions, because they are inscribed in a borderline area: between the outside and the inside of the body, between the undefined self and other of the pre-natal dyad. It was an indecent image which exposed a secret everybody knows, the secret of an event everybody has experienced. It was unheimlich, uncanny in its familiarity and in its bringing to conscious attention what was and should have remained buried in the unconscious. Building upon Freud's notion of the uncanny as taboo, and referring to anthropological research, especially Mary Douglas' on purity and contamination, Kristeva in Powers of Horror identifies abjection - "one of those violent, dark revolts of being" (Kristeva 1982: 1) - as the horror of not knowing the borders of the self, a primary uncanny originated in the fertility and generative power of the mother's body. Like abjection, pregnancy and the pre-natal period are borderline phenomena, they are a space-time of con/fusion, bodily co-existence (coincidence) of identities which it links in a vital and deadly relation, at the same time preparing their separation and distinction. Space-time which both confuses and produces one and another identity, questioning that subject/object demarcation on which the delusive stability of the self is founded. Forever threatened by the frailty of a boundary built on the originary void of loss and on the impossible refusal of corporeality, the subject experiences in the feeling of abjection the uncertainty of its identity; the risk - fear and desire - of falling back into that space-time where it grew, which it left in order to be. Rejected, repressed, expelled, yet inevitably present and forever to be kept at bay, the abject physically inhabits those areas of the body which will become erotogenic zones, in that tension and coincidence between attraction and revulsion which also - especially - marks the female/maternal body. Borderline, marginal areas; and, Mary Douglas reminds us, "all margins are dangerous. ~~So that~~ we should expect the orifices of the body to symbolyse its especially vulnerable points". Eyes, mouth, nose, anus, genitals. And their secretions, which "by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundary of the body" (Douglas 1966: 121). Tears, saliva, vomit, mucus, faeces, urina, sperm, menstrual blood. As though in "horrendous excremental drains" (Camporesi, 1991: 12), in counter-Reformation Catholic culture these bodily secretions characterize the post-Tridentine hell, obscene site of a promiscuous and chaotic carnality; a vision which lasts until the 19th century, as Pietro Camporesi shows in The Fear of Hell. Images of Damnation and Salvation in Early Modern Europe, where he explores and analyzes the figurations of hell in art and literature. Thus, in the "oafish underworld" of Belli's sonnets - he argues - this vision becomes "almost a Tartarean version of birth ex-putri" (Camporesi 1991: 12, 13), where the phantasma of the great collective body of humanity, the archaic belief in a fertile death, a pregnant death, the nursemaid of new life, the sense of continuity in death-life re-emerged. The hidden shadow of the one belonging to the many reappeared, as did the sense of a fatal, cyclical rotation, an uninterrupted pendulum between life and death, between decomposition and rebirth (Camporesi 1991: 13-14). Continuity is not a reason for hope, in the awareness of belonging to the cycle of being; on the contrary, it engenders horror for the corrupting, destructive confusion of the self, a condition of imperfect and improper not-being-anymore. Imperfect and improper like the not-yet-being of the pre-natal period, spent in the closed, red, pulsating space of the mother's womb: suffocation and protection, dreaded hell and longed for Nirvana which in this longing is inhabited by the death drive. The womb is a liminal space, which must necessarily be crossed to come into the world; as in a rite of passage, this limen is ambiguously connoted, it is not-life and not-death. Analysing the liminal phase of rites of passage, Victor Turner remarks that its symbolism draws upon both "the biology of death, decomposition, catabolism" and "processes of gestation and parturition" (Turner 1967: 96); thus the same symbols - huts and tunnels, for instance - signify both the maternal womb and the tomb. While stressing the positive value attributed by Turner to the transitional liminal phase as a field of open potentialities, Paola Cabibbo underlines this "coincidence of opposing processes and notions ~~which~~ characterizes the peculiar unity of liminality; it is neither this nor that, and yet it is both this and that" (Cabibbo 1993: 13). Or, to use Turner's own words again, the subjects of a rite of passage "are neither living nor dead from one aspect, and both living and dead from another. Their condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the customary categories" (Turner 1967: 97). Ambiguity, confusion: abjection. But in a socially and culturally created rite of passage there is no return to the limen between the before and after of initiation, once the subject has been re-defined and re-demarcated in a new social and subjective space. Abjection, on the contrary, is the recurring, threatening sensation of an incurable instability of the self, it is the radical and repeated questioning of the integrity of the subject. It finds expression in the body, in the secretions which crossing its boundaries exceed it, in its hollows, crevices, orifices. Sites of expulsion and - for example in the case of food - of incorporation; borderline sites of horror and pleasure, of abjection. Kristeva writes: We may call it a border: abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it - on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger. But also, abjection itself is a compromise of judgment and affect, of condemnation and yearning, of signs and drives. Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which the body becomes separated from another body in order to be - maintaining that night in which the outline of the signified vanishes and where only the imponderable affect is carried out (Kristeva 1982: 9-10). And she goes on to argue that the abject is the violence of mourning for an 'object' that has always already been lost. ~~...~~ It takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken away - it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, and death (Kristeva 1982: 15). In the fear and desire of being overwhelmed by that lost body is a form of the feeling of abjection, which in many cultures is expressed and contained through rituals of purification. Rituals: because the abject borders upon - coincides with, says Kristeva - the sacred. With the interdictions against the danger of its contamination, the abject lays at the roots of the sacred. "As abjection - so the sacred" (Kristeva 1982: 19) is the title of a passage where she briefly looks at the modes of purification in religion, from so called primitive religions to Jewish monotheism to Christianity: exclusion and taboo, transgression, sin - then to suggest that in our culture the abject finds expression and containment in writing. "Outside of the sacred, the abject is written" - she maintains, talking of "the aesthetic task - a descent into the foundations of the symbolic construct - ~~which~~ amounts to retracing the fragile limits of the speaking being, closest to its dawn, to the bottomless 'primacy' constituted by primal repression" (Kristeva 1982: 18). Literature can thus be seen as an exploration of the abject; metaphorization of lack and fear so that the self can come to life again in signs (see Kristeva 1982: 38). In a century marked by the process of secularization, but also traversed by a renewed need of the sacred, writing becomes "a cache for suffering"; in the unbearable instability of the boundary between subject and object, "the narrative is what is challenged first"; its linearity is shattered up to the scream of a language which resembles violence and obscenity. The descents into hell of Céline's and Lispector's writing are the collapsing of narration into that crying-out theme which, coinciding "with the incandescent states of a boundary-subjectivity ~~...~~ called abjection", is according to Kristeva "the crying-out theme of suffering-horror" (Kristeva 1982: 140-41). In the journey towards the origins, where life and death meet, where the danger and pleasure of the loss of self are intertwined, in literature as well the feeling of abjection often becomes embodied in the female/maternal body. Already signified in religions and myths, revisited by psychoanalysis, the mother and the maternal are the privileged figure of the inextricable proximity of life and death at the centre of the symbolic construction. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,13 +1,0 @@ 1 -====Institutions operate in hyper-masculine ways in order to further patriarchal control – We must reorient our political rhetoric in order to disrupt this system ==== 2 -**Clark, Esteemed author of feminist studies, 04 **( Mary E., Fall 2004, Women and Language, "Rhetoric, Patriarchy and War: Explaining the Dangers of "Leadership" in Mass Culture", Pg. 21-28, ProQuest Research Library, 7/7/14, CH) 3 -I begin by questioning the notion that patriarchy is a "natural" or "inevitable" form of human society. By "patriarchy" I do not mean a community or society where males hold political positions as spokespersons for the whole and often are adjudicators of local disputes. This "male function" is common in tribal and indigenous societies. But men's power over others is severely limited and generally held only at the pleasure of the entire group, especially the elder women.' Patriarchies, rather, are those much larger societies where not only is there gender dominance; they also are highly class-structured, with a small, powerful elite controlling the rest of society. A short history of these entities is necessary to understand today's dilemma. Rigidly controlled patriarchies have evolved and disintegrated at many times and in many places in the past few millennia of human existence—which, being the era of written history, is the condition of humankind most familiar to us. But, as I have argued elsewhere5 this was an unknown political condition throughout earlier human existence, when small, egalitarian, highly dialogic communities prevailed. Even today, small remnants of such societies still exist in corners of the planet that escaped the socially destructive impact of Western colonization. Modern Western "democracies" arc, in fact, patriarchal in structure, evolving out of the old, male-dominated aristocracies of late-Medieval Europe. Those historic class/caste hierarchies were legitimized by embedded religious dogma and inherited royal authority. Together, church and monarch held a monopoly of physical and economic power, creating politically stable, albeit unjust, societies. During the gradual development of the religious Reformation, coupled with the Enlightenment's concept of the "individual citizen," emerging egalitarian ideas threatened to destabilize the social coherence of patriarchal regimes. At the same time, principalities and dukedoms were fusing into kingdoms; kingdoms, in turn, were joining together as giant nation states. The United Kingdom was formed of England, Wales and Scotland—each a fusion of local earlier dukedoms. City States of Italy fused rather later. Bismarck created the "Second Reich" out of diverse German-speaking princedoms in the 1870s. And, adding to this growth in the sheer size of patriarchies there was a doubling of populations every couple of generations. Nation-states emerged as "mass cultures," with literally millions of persons under the control of a single, powerful government. The centralized physical power possessed by most of these several industrializing European nations matched or exceeded that of ancient Rome. To achieve coherence of such societies demanded a new legitimating force to create a broad base of support among giant, diverse populations. The erosion of the belief that classes were a god-given, "natural" state of affairs was hastened by the introduction of low-cost printing and rapidly growing levels of literacy (both necessary to underpin the new Industrial Age). These politically equalizing forces unleashed a host of social discontents that had to be controlled. The old religious threats of damnation or excommunication were fast losing their force, and new legal systems circumscribed the absolute powers of monarchs to control social behavior. This very cacaphony of voices threatened the stability of the new giant states. The "solution," of course, was to take control of the public dialogue, to define the legitimate "topics of conversation." This is the primary role of political "leadership" in today's mass societies, and that leadership uses two major tools to wield its influence: rhetoric and the mass media. 4 - 5 -====Using the state as an actor excludes the feminine ==== 6 -**Tickner, prof @ USC, 01** (Ann, 2001, "Gendering World Politics", p. 2, 7/8/14, CM) 7 - The title of this introduction, "Gendering World Politics," both reflects some of these changes and conceptualizes a worldview into which feminist approaches fit more comfortably. While international relations has never been just about relations between states, an IR statist focus seems even less justified today than in the past. International politics cannot be restricted to politics between states; politics is involved in relationships between inter- national organizations, social movements and other nonstate actors, trans- national corporations and international finance, and human-rights organizations, to name a few. Decrying the narrowness of Cold War IR, Ken Booth has suggested that the subject should be informed by what he calls a "global moral science" that entails systematic enquiry into how humans might live together locally and globally in ways that promote individual and collective emancipation in harmony with nature. He goes on to suggest that the state, the traditional frame for IR, "might be seen as the problem of world politics, not the solution."3 Since women have been on the peripheries of power in most states, this broad conception of world politics seems the most fitting disciplinary defi- nition in which to frame feminist approaches. Theirinvestigationsofpolitics from the micro to the global level and from the personal totheinternational, as well as their analyses as to how macro structures affect local groups and individuals, draw on a broad definition of the political. Using explicitly nor- mative analysis, certain feminists have drawn attention to the injustices of hierarchical social relations and the effects they have on human beings’ life chances. Feminists have never been satisfied with the boundary constraints of conventional IR.4 While women have always been playersininternational politics, often their voices have not been heard either in policy arenas or in the discipline that analyzes them. 8 - 9 -====Affirm the 1ac rhetorical strategy but reject the plan – refusing the temptation to support patriarchal state thought thought opens up space to recognize the brutality beneath the patriarchal underpinnings of the state==== 10 - 11 -====It’s vital that you refuse all reasonable value to their normative legal project – allowing them case leverage is the most effective means of deflecting critical interrogation of normative legal thought ==== 12 -**SCHLAG 91**~| PIERRE, "Symposium THE CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY ARTICLES NORMATIVITY AND THE POLITICS OF FORM" (http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3741andcontext=penn'law'review) A.B. 13 -It is apparent that virtually all aspects of normative legal thought are suited to the rhetorical reproduction and maintenance of the sovereign individual subject. As Charles Fried put it, "~~b~~efore there is morality there must be the person. We must attain and maintain in our morality a concept of personality such that it makes sense to posit choosing, valuing entities — free, moral beings." n259 This insistence of normative legal thought on the importance of a morally competent, normative subject is quite consonant with the rhetorical construction of the legal thinker as a sovereign individual subject. Indeed, this rationalist rhetorical construction is at once a prefigurement and the entailment of what Fried calls "choosing, valuing entities — free moral beings." The normative enterprise of norm-selection and norm-justification, with their emphases on choice orientation, value orientation, and prescription, is keenly suited to keeping the sovereign individual subject in the driver's seat. Likewise, the single-norm, conclusion-oriented character of legal thought, with its FIXATION ON END-PRODUCTS and its requirements that these end products be non-paradoxical, non-contradictory, complete, self-sufficient, discrete, separable, and transsituational, is conducive to deflecting any serious interrogation of either the rhetorical practices, forms, or processes that constitute the sovereign individual subject or his rhetorical enterprise: Hence, we are drawn toward the meticulous dissection and examination of what the legal subject has produced and whether these END-PRODUCTS have been produced in the right (non-contradictory, non-paradoxical, linear, authority-driven) way. And in turn, this orientation draws attention away from the legal subject who is producing all this stuff in the first place. n260 The action-deferring and reader-centered character of normative legal thought likewise ensure that no serious challenge is posed to the identity or character of the sovereign individual subject. The ~~*901~~ texts of normative legal thought are supposed to have their effect by appealing to the choice and the intellectual faculties of the reader. The texts are supposed to honor the reader's already preformed views, ideas, prejudices, and aesthetic representations of social and political life. There is to be no overt disabling or subversion of her identity or role. For instance, within the rationalist rhetoric of contemporary legal thought, it is permissible to write articles about Derridean deconstruction of legal thought — but to actually practice Derridean deconstruction will simply evoke resistance, misunderstanding, and incomprehension. The expectation is that any author will, of course, explain and justify any significant departure from the default positions and will refrain from any rhetorical exercise that might actually require active change on the part of the reader. Finally, the adversarial advocacy orientation of normative legal thought — which is attributable, at least in part, to the conflation of the role of lawyer and legal academic — does much to insulate the sovereign individual subject and its rhetorical supports from scrutiny. Because so many legal academics understand their legal thought to be positional in character — on behalf of some (intangible, often very worthy but poorly identified) client-surrogate, much of legal thought is produced within the explicit context of adversarial advocacy among academics and is devoted to advancing or defeating this or that position. Many normative legal thinkers understand themselves to be engaged in "passionate advocacy" on behalf of some cause. Now admittedly, there is no tribunal listening; no one is empowered to put all this normative passion into effect. But this does not mean that this passionate advocacy is therefore without effect: on the contrary, it often succeeds in BRACKETING ANY SERIOUS QUESTIONING of the rhetorical systems that enables such aimless passionate advocacy to be produced in the first place. Indeed, when one is engaged in passionate arguments to an imagined tribunal, the last thing one will do is question the argumentative structures that allow the arguments to be framed and presented in the first place. Not only does normative legal thought conduce to the maintenance of the sovereign individual subject and his rationalist rhetoric, but one can see the reverse process at work as well. Indeed, if normative thought occupies so much attention in the legal academy; if normative legal thought seems like the obvious, the "natural" thing to do; if the "what should we do?/what should the law be?" question seems so legitimate, so important; and if normative legal thought seems veritably like law itself, it is because the rhetorical ~~*902~~ situation — the default settings — have already enabled us, constituted our discourse, and configured our roles so that we will produce normative legal thought. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,37 +1,0 @@ 1 -Interpretation- if the affirmative defends overturning the clearly established clause of qualified immunity they must defend an alternate objective balancing test to replace the standard. 2 - 3 -====Oxford English Dictionaries defines limit as ==== 4 -http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american'english/limit 5 -a restriction on the size or amount of something permissible or possible 6 - 7 -====A "limit" on qualified immunity must create an objective balancing test.==== 8 -**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 98 ** 9 -(LORENZO COLSTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, and YOLANDA MICHELLE COLSTON, Individually and as Next Friend of Lauren Colston and Quinton Colston, Minor Children, Intervenors Plaintiff-Appellees, versus BRYAN BARNHART, Texas Department of Public Safety Officer; et al, Defendants, BRYAN BARNHART, Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-40634 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 146 F.3d 282; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16178 July 14, 1998, Decided) 10 -In this regard the Supreme Court also said: 11 -By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. 12 -B. Violation 13 -C-Standards 14 - 15 -====1. Legal precision- immunity jurisprudence always focuses on refining the balancing test ==== 16 -**Texas Law Review 04** 17 -(Texas Law Review February, 2004 82 Tex. L. Rev. 767 LENGTH: 15810 words NOTE: The Paradox of Qualified Immunity: How a Mechanical Application of the Objective Legal Reasonableness Test Can Undermine the Goal of Qualified Immunity*) 18 -In a series of decisions over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court of the United States has attempted to define the precise contours of qualified immunity in a manner that balances the competing interests inherent in damage suits against government officials. n9 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, n10 the Court defined the limits of qualified immunity in objective terms. The Court held that qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." n11 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that "reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid~~ed~~ excessive disruption of government and permit~~ed~~ the resolution of many insubstantial ~~*769~~ claims on summary judgment." n12 Five years after the Harlow Court announced the objective legal reasonableness test, the Supreme Court clarified the definition of clearly established law in Anderson v. Creighton. n13 According to the Anderson Court, "the contours of the right ~~the official is alleged to have violated~~ must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." n14 Finally, the Court further refined the objective legal reasonableness test in Siegert v. Gilley n15 by establishing a two-part algorithm for assessing a claim of qualified immunity: (1) taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the trial judge first must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation under current law; n16 (2) if the plaintiff fulfills this requirement, the judge then must determine whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable with reference to clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. n17 19 -They conflate two distinct concepts and policy actions of curtailing versus limiting- that causes confusion and mis-educates us about QI which kills topic education. 20 - 21 - 22 -====Legal precisions outweighs limits and ground —- it’s a prerequisite to effective policy education. Shannon.==== 23 -**Shannon 2** – Bradley Shannon, law at University of Idaho, January 2002 (Washington Law Review, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 65, Lexis 24 -The second answer to the question why we should care about the use of proper Rules terminology goes to the cost of using improper terminology even in seemingly trivial contexts. Understanding legal concepts is difficult enough without the confusion created when an inappropriate term is used to represent those concepts. And this is true regardless of how minor the misuse. In some sense, every misuse of legal language impedes the understanding - and, consequently, the progress - of the law. 25 -Key to predictability – laws and policies are based on legally precise definitions, so promotion laws are an entirely different set of laws concerning assistance for society at large – it’s a different literature base than the rest of the resolution, which makes it impossible to prep against the aff thus killing fairness. Also kills education because there’s no way for me to effectively engage the aff. 26 - 27 -2. Not specifying allows them to shift in the next speech out of whatever I read- I lose all of my counterplans and disads to the specific implementation of the aff. A limit can be interpreted in those three ways in addition to any subset of redefinitions under each policy- all of which are different in implementation ie limiting a particular procedure requires overarching change in the police system, limiting an aspect of the procedure is a change in the judiciary, and limiting scope is specific to organizations. Makes them a moving target because there is no true advocacy in the 1AC and I become prone to new extrapolations. Kills fairness- I literally can’t read anything. Kills education because we don’t get to discuss the merits of the implementation mechanism. 28 - 29 -====Circumvention means you can vote neg on presumption-If the aff doesn’t establish a new, objective test courts will circumvent the ruling and grant BROADER immunity- Pierson Proves ==== 30 -Rudovsky, Law @ Penn, 89 31 -(David, THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE RESTRICTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS., Copyright (c) 1989 The Trustees of The University of Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania Law Review NOVEMBER, 1989 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 23) 32 -The most recent statement of the controlling standard in Anderson v. Creighton n91 provides immunity to a fourth amendment claim where the legal principle upon which the claim is based is not clearly ~~*39~~ established or, even if the legal standard is clearly established (in this case the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment), if a reasonable police officer would have believed the conduct to be legal. n92 Furthermore, subjective bad faith or malice may not defeat the immunity claim. n93 Each element of the Pierson test is therefore negated: the officer need not have probable cause and she need not have acted in good faith. How did the Court get from Monroe and Pierson to Anderson? An analysis of the Court's qualified immunity opinions shows an overriding concern with protecting public officers from damages liability. In addition, the Court has responded to the conceptual difficulties inherent in a process that seeks to construct a unitary doctrine, applicable to a wide range of officials and to the entire spectrum of constitutional violations, by redefining the substantive definition of qualified immunity wherever existing doctrine would limit the defense. 33 - 34 -DTD 35 -RVI 36 -Ed 37 -CI - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,11 +1,0 @@ 1 -====Courts are on the brink now – judiciary vacancies are intact but clogged at historic levels ==== 2 -**Bannon 13 **Testimony: More Judges Needed in Federal Courts Alicia Bannon September 10, 2013 https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/testimony-federal-courts-need-more-judges Ms. Bannon received her J.D. from Yale Law School, where she was a Comments Editor of the Yale Law Journal and a Student Director of the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic.// DOA 11/4/16 KAE 3 -While the current high level of judicial vacancies partially explains this high per-judge burden, even if every existing vacancy were filled, the existing workload per sitting judge would still exceed historical levels, as reflected by the red line in Figure 2. In contrast, the green line estimates what per-judge caseloads would be if all 2009-2013 vacancies had been filled and Congress had created 85 additional district court judgeships (the number of additional permanent and temporary judgeships proposed in the Act). As Figure 2 demonstrates, authorizing these additional 85 judgeships is necessary to restore the number of pending cases per sitting judge to the level of the late 1990s. The growing workload in district courts around the country negatively impacts judges’ ability to effectively dispense justice, particularly in complex and resource-intensive civil cases, where litigants do not enjoy the same "speedy trial" rights as criminal defendants. For example, the median time for civil cases to go from filing to trial has increased by more than 70 percent since 1992, from 15 months to more than two years (25.7 months). Older cases are also increasingly clogging district court dockets. Since 2000, cases that are more than three years old have made up an average of 12 percent of the district court civil docket, compared to an average of 7 percent from 1992-1999. For a small company in a contract dispute or a family targeted by consumer fraud, these kind of delays often mean financial uncertainty and unfilled plans, putting lives on hold as cases wind through the court system. All too often, justice delayed in these circumstances can mean justice denied. These patterns of delay are starkly reflected in the districts for which additional judgeships are recommended, many of which lag behind the national average in key metrics. In the Eastern District of California, for example, the median time for civil cases to go from filing to trial is almost four years (46.4 months). This district would receive six additional permanent judgeships and one additional temporary judgeship under the Act. In the Middle District of Florida, over 23 percent of the civil docket is more than three years old. This district would receive five additional permanent judgeships and one additional temporary judgeship under the Act. The federal courts are a linchpin of our democracy, protecting individual rights from government overreach, providing a forum for resolving individual and commercial disputes, and supervising the fair enforcement of criminal laws. In order for judges to perform their jobs effectively, however, they must have manageable workloads. The Brennan Center urges Congress to promptly pass the Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, so as to ensure the continued vitality of our federal courts. 4 - 5 -====QI lets courts avoid pointless and redundant litigation – limits spike lawsuits, which triggers the impact. ==== 6 -**Ignall 94 **David J. Ignall (Associate, Wiley, Rein and Fielding, Washington, D.C. J.D., The College of William and Mary, 1991; B.A., Cornell University, 1987). "Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and Issues for the Trier of Fact." California Western Law Review: Vol. 30: No. 2, Article 2. (1994). http://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol30/iss2/2 // DOA 11/4/16 KAE 7 -On a motion for summary judgment concerning qualified immunity, the court should consider evidence with respect to qualified immunity differently than with respect to the merits. Even if the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to create a jury question on the merits, the defendant should be entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support a judgment as a matter of law against the defendant-i.e., sufficient to show that the defendant violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. If the ruling on the issue of qualified immunity mimics the ruling on the merits, the defense of qualified immunity is superfluous because it would be available only when the plaintiff would be unable to prove liability. The only protection left to the defendant is the ability to file an interlocutory appeal to argue that the plaintiff would be unable to prove liability on the merits. Because qualified immunity should be denied only when the plaintiff can prove as a matter of law that the defendant violated a constitutional right, the merits should never become an issue with respect to that defendant. If the defendant loses qualified immunity, he would necessarily be liable on the merits. By making qualified immunity the only issue, the court can focus the litigation so that qualified immunity can serve its purpose of protecting officials from the injustice of subjecting them to liability in the absence of bad faith and the diversion of official energy associated with defending a lawsuit. Thus, qualified immunity would truly be a shield to all but the truly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law. 8 - 9 -====That tips the scale – collapses the federal judiciary – it overburdens dockets and expansion won't keep pace. Outweighs the case – destroys the foundation of American justice and ensures unequal treatment – turns under their framework of processual application.==== 10 -**Oakley 96 **John Oakley, 1996 Oakley is a Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of California Davis. "The Myth of Cost-Free Jurisdictional Reallocation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 543, p. 52—63, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048447 11 -Personal effects: The hidden costs of greater workloads. The hallmark of federal justice traditionally has been the searching analysis and thoughtful opinion of a highly competent judge, endowed with the time as well as the intelligence to grasp and resolve the most nuanced issues of fact and law. Swollen dockets create assembly-line conditions, which threaten the ability of the modern federal judge to meet this high standard of quality in federal adjudication. No one expects a federal judge to function without an adequate level of available tangible resources: sufficient courtroom and chambers space, competent administrative and research staff, a good library, and a comfortable salary that relieves the judge from personal financial pressure. Although salary levels have lagged—encouraging judges to engage in the limited teaching and publication activities that are their sole means of meeting such newly pressing financial obligations as the historically high mortgage expenses and college tuitions of the present decade-in the main, federal judges have received a generous allocation of tangible resources. It is unlikely that there is any further significant gain to be realized in the productivity of individual federal judges through increased levels of tangible resources,13 other than by redressing the pressure to earn supplemental income.14 On a personal level, the most important resource available to the federal judge is time."5 Caseload pressures secondary to the indiscriminate federalization of state law are stealing time from federal judges, shrinking the increments available for each case. Federal judges have been forced to compensate by operating more like executives and less like judges. They cannot read their briefs as carefully as they would like, and they are driven to rely unduly on law clerks for research and writing that they would prefer to do themselves.16 If federal judges need more time to hear and decide each case, an obvious and easy solution is to spread the work by the appointment of more and more federal judges. Congress has been generous in the recent creation of new judgeships,17 and enlargement of the federal judiciary is likely to continue to be the default response, albeit a more grudging one, to judicial concern over the caseload consequences of jurisdictional reallocation. Systemic effects: The hidden costs of adding more judges. Increasing the size of the federal judiciary creates institutional strains that reduce and must ultimately rule out its continued acceptability as a countermeasure to caseload growth. While the dilution of workload through the addition of judges is always incrementally attractive, in the long run it will cause the present system to collapse. I am not persuaded by arguments that the problem lies in the declining quality of the pool of lawyers willing to assume the federal bench18 or in the greater risk that, as the ranks of federal judges expand, there will be more frequent lapses of judgment by the president and the Senate in seating the mediocre on the federal bench.19 In my view, the diminished desirability of federal judicial office is more than offset by the rampant dissatisfaction of modern lawyers with the excessive commercialization of the practice of law. There is no shortage of sound judicial prospects willing and able to serve, and no sign that the selection process-never the perfect meritocracy-is becoming less effective in screening out the unfit or undistinguished. Far more serious are other institutional effects of continuously compounding the number of federal judges. Collegiality among judges, consistency of decision, and coherence of doctrine across courts are all imperiled by the growth of federal courts to cattle-car proportions. Yet the ability of the system to tolerate proliferation of courts proportional to the proliferation of judges is limited, and while collapse is not imminent, it cannot be postponed indefinitely. Congress could restructure the federal trial and appellate courts without imperiling the core functions, but the limiting factor is the capacity of the Supreme Court to maintain overall uniformity in the administration and application of federal law. That Court is not only the crown but the crowning jewel of a 200-year-old system of the rule of law within a constitutional democracy, and any tinkering with its size or jurisdiction would raise the most serious questions of the future course of the nation. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,16 +1,0 @@ 1 -====Without qualified immunity, police will be unable to effectively enforce law.==== 2 -**King 16** Andrew (assistant prosecuting attorney) "KEEP QUALIFIED IMMUNITY…FOR NOW" July 1st 2016 Mimesis Law http://mimesislaw.com/fault-20lines/keep-qualified-immunity-for-now/11010 3 -If you want to see active policing plummet, tell law enforcement officers they will be civilly liable for conduct which no reasonable person could have foreseen was a violation of any rights! Here’s an idea. Let’s make Federal Appellate Court judges civilly liable for every decision they have reversed by the Supreme Court. Unlike cops, who have to make real time decisions affecting legal rights, often under life-threatening circumstances, judges have the luxury of time, law clerks and quiet, safe, well-appointed chambers to make sure their legal decisions are correct. Why shouldn’t they be accountable for rendering legal opinions the Supreme Court determines are wrong? The answer is, unlike cops, judges (like Newman) have, "…absolute immunity from Section 1983 damage actions for their ‘judicial’ acts." It’s disingenuous of Newman to advocate taking away "qualified" immunity from the police when the U.S. Supreme Court has already given "absolute" immunity to him. Law enforcement unions and associations such as ALADS must speak out to protect cops from malicious, politically motivated prosecutions and inflammatory anti-cop rhetoric which is slanted, inaccurate or just lies. Our strength comes from our numbers and our collective ability to band together to support each other and the rightness of the job all of us do to protect the public. Bill Otis agrees. Relatedly, Ken Scheidegger has some interesting thoughts on Judge Newman’s proposal, including suggesting that getting rid of qualified immunity in excessive force actions would be a bad idea because the defendant probably deserved it. I remember the "bitch-deserved-it defense" in my torts class. Doesn’t everyone? The majesty of the law. But of particular interest was Ken’s assertion that constitutional violations should be difficult to prove because they’re more serious. Ken is judging "seriousness" from the point of view of the officer, the person doing the depriving, rather than the defendant, the person who was deprived. If either the zoning inspector or the police officer negligently deprive you of your constitutional rights, haven’t you still been harmed? Yes is the answer. It’s simply a policy decision to ignore low-intensity deprivations under section 1983. What makes this issue particularly intractable is everybody’s at least partially right. Ignoring a raft of constitutional deprivations is unfair and, perhaps, even un-American. And wrongdoers should be held to account for their misdeeds. Yet, even in regular negligence cases, we give professionals, like doctors and lawyers, a different standard of care. So, it’s not ridiculous to give certain governmental agents like police officers a different, more forgiving standard of care. Plus, qualified immunity, along with other mechanisms, prevents and screens out a lot of frivolous litigation. And that cost of frivolous litigation otherwise would be socialized by taxpayers. Plus, in highly variable and discretionary jobs like policing, there is nearly daily opportunity for negligence to occur. So, under such a lower standard of culpability, departments might be essentially uninsurable or unable to effectively patrol. Contrary to how it may appear to some, a madman didn’t appear one day and set-up the doctrine of qualified immunity. It’s there for reasons that plenty of courts deemed to be important reasons. Judge Newman’s suggestion to tear the fence down because he fails to see the value was made without due consideration. Qualified immunity and its related doctrines might not be the best solution of all best possible worlds, but it is a solution. Let’s figure out a better one before tearing down the old one. 4 - 5 -====Litigation is high now, Qualified immunity is key to deterring crime—multiple warrants.==== 6 -**Rosen 5** Michael (attorney in San Diego at Fish and Richardson PC, an intellectual property law fIrm. In 2003-2004 he served as a law clerk to The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. He graduated from Harvard Law School in 2003) "A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for its Improvement" Golden Gate University Law Review Volume 35 Issue 2 Article 2 January 2005 http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1899andcontext=ggulrev 7 -It is hard to deny that the more time police officers spend at trial defending their conduct, the less time they spend pa- trolling the streets, the more money their departments expend in their defense, and the more frequently the officers will sec- ond-guess certain behaviors in the heat of the moment. These drawbacks may well be justified for the sake of society's pre- vention of tortious and unreasonable conduct on the part of law enforcement agents. Nevertheless, police agencies, Supreme Court justices, and some scholars highlight the important role that qualified immunity can play in reducing unnecessary costs and in improving deterrence of crime. 8 - 9 -====Low crime is key to soft power.==== 10 -**Falk 12** Richard (United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights) "When soft power is hard" Al Jazeera July 28th 2012 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/201272212435524825.html 11 -This unabashed avowal of imperial goals is the main thesis of the article, perhaps most graphically expressed in the following words: "The United States can increase the effectiveness of its military forces and make the world safe for soft power, America's inherent comparative advantage." As the glove fits the hand, soft power complements hard power within the wider enterprise of transforming the world in the United States' image, or at least in the ideal version of the United States' sense of self. The authors acknowledge (rather parenthetically) that their strategy may not work if the US continues much longer to be seen unfavourably abroad as a national abode of drugs, crime, violence, fiscal irresponsibility, family breakdown, and political gridlock. They make a rather meaningless plea to restore "a healthy democracy" at home as a prelude to the heavy lifting of democratising the world, but they do not pretend medical knowledge, and offer no prescriptions for restoring the health of the American body politic. And now, 16 years after their article appeared, it would appear that the adage, "disease unknown, cure unknown", applies. 12 - 13 -====Soft power solves extinction.==== 14 -**Lagon 11** Mark P. (International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State) "The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama" World Affairs Journal Sept/Oct 2011 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama~~#ER 15 - 16 -Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other new players on the international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to confront terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, pandemic disease, mass atrocity, or tyranny. Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, "the indispensible nation." Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as catalyst. That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of America’s foreign policy assets—particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egypt—suggests that he feels the country has so declined, not only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power. In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy. Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down—over Foggy Bottom objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrain’s, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones. To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be China. Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss. - EntryDate
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