Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[20]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[21]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[20]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-09-12 05:16:15.484
	1	+2016-09-12 05:16:15.0

Caselist.CitesClass[21]

Cites

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	1	+Taiwan’s nuclear program is key to nuclear coop with China that ensures safety
	2	+Hongyi lai 12 “taiwan-mainland china energy ties: cooperation and potential conflict” Asia Program Special Report May 2012 AT
	3	+Taiwan has a much longer experience with nuclear power than mainland China. Taiwan started to use nuclear power in 1977, fourteen years ahead of the mainland. It has considerable experience in the construction and safe operation of nuclear power plants. In 2010, nuclear power accounted for 8.3 percent of energy production in Taiwan. In contrast, nuclear power constituted merely 0.8 percent of the mainland’s energy consumption back in 2008.11 Taiwan can thus provide useful experience for the mainland and cooperate with the mainland in the use and development of nuclear power.12 In the wake of Japan’s nuclear power station explosions and leakage in March 2011, the mainland and Taiwan have paid more attention to the issue of nuclear safety. In May 2011, at the CrossStrait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, the mainland and Taiwan jointly proposed to establish information sharing mechanisms to ensure the safety of nuclear power.13
	4	+
	5	+Unsafe Chinese reactors cause nuclear terror
	6	+Joe Mcdonald 16 (Joe Mcdonald, ) China's nuclear power ambitions sailing into troubled waters, No Publication 7-31-2016 AT
	7	+"The security concerns are clear: such reactors would be tempting targets for military or terrorist attacks," Edwin Lyman, a nuclear specialist for the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, said in an email. "Maintaining the full contingent of security officers necessary to effectively deter attack would not be feasible." Other perils include stormy seas—the South China Sea is buffeted by powerful seasonal typhoons—and the need to exchange radioactive fuel at distant sites. CGN says its seaborne unit will have "passive safety," or features that function without moving parts or outside power, such as control rods that drop by gravity in an emergency. No commercial reactor operates with such features. "There are questions about how reliable passive safety systems will be in extreme conditions," Lyman said. CGN wants to simplify operations by requiring refueling only once every three years instead of the industry standard of 18 months, Luk said. That would require more highly enriched fuel, with the amount of the U-235 isotope raised to as much as 10 percent from the typical 4.5 percent. "If it were seized by terrorists or someone else, that would be a big problem," he said.
	8	+Nuclear war
	9	+Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science and Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis)
	10	+War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-09-12 05:16:15.916

Judge

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	1	+Phillips, Steele, JOvering

Opponent

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	1	+Brentwood RY

ParentRound

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	1	+7

Round

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	1	+Octas

Team

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	1	+La Canada Zhao Neg

Title

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	1	+SEPOCT - DA - China Reactors

Tournament

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	1	+Loyola