Summary

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  • Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Cites

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1		-Countries should require nuclear power plant operators to (1) improve media understanding of nuclear security issues through frequent engagement, non-technical briefing materials, and their inclusion in nuclear security exercises that demonstrate concepts and principles in action and (2) encourage the nuclear industry, nongovernmental experts, and governments to issue a joint statement in support of key steps to improve global nuclear security
2		-Solves corruption and deliberation
3		-NSGEG 13 Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group, "Promoting Greater Transparency for Effective Nuclear Security," 2012 AZ
4		-A major challenge is using language to explain nuclear issues that a general audience can understand. The public and policymakers cannot simply be told that a facility is protected in accordance with a design basis threat. This term is too esoteric for non-experts. Different approaches are needed to convey information to citizens and policymakers at the local, state, and national levels that account for their different levels of knowledge and concern and differing roles and responsibilities. Another significant problem is the real and perceived divisions that exist between experts, nuclear energy companies, and governments. The public is more likely to view actions taken by companies to improve nuclear safety and security as legitimate if governments accept companies’ assurances and outside experts publicly agree with the companies’ course of action. This type of agreement among all the major stakeholders can build confidence and provide assurances to the public and policymakers. Assisting and educating the media in covering nuclear security issues is an important key to building confidence among these constituencies. The media is the main conduit of information for the public on these issues, but limited governmental communication, conflicting expert views, and the search for sensationalism can often influence reporting. Organizers of the 2014 NSS need to engage with journalists on the objectives of the summit and the importance of the nuclear security issue as early as possible. A year out from the summit, they should consider holding an interdisciplinary meeting (government, industry, experts, international governmental organizations, and regulators) to talk about the key issues. These discussions should not be overly focused on technical information. Information should be provided in plain language to convey the importance of the issues and to place them in a public and policy context. NSS nations and operators also can utilize emergency response exercises that regularly occur at nuclear facilities as ready-made venues for showing journalists what actions are being taken to ensure the safety and security of nuclear power plants and materials. The goal should be to show that cooperation among key parties is taking place, people are doing their jobs, and the issue is not static. Waiting until the summit arrives and forcing journalists to respond, without advance preparation, to a two-day, high profile, technical event makes it difficult to effectively communicate the importance of key issues. Recommendation 11: Convene regular interdisciplinary meetings of government officials, industry representatives, nuclear regulators, and nuclear security experts to foster stronger cooperation among responsible actors and promote better communication among them. The first should be held six months to a year before the 2014 NSS. Recommendation 12: Improve media understanding of nuclear security issues through frequent engagement, non-technical briefing materials, and their inclusion in nuclear security exercises that demonstrate concepts and principles in action. Recommendation 13: Encourage the key stakeholders—nuclear industry, nongovernmental experts, and governments—to issue a joint statement in support of key steps to improve global nuclear security
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6		-Past initiatives prove that information sharing solves
7		-NSGEG 13 Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group, "Promoting Greater Transparency for Effective Nuclear Security," 2012 AZ
8		-The NSS also has been a catalyst for the creation of nuclear security centers of excellence around the globe. The premise of some centers is to improve nuclear security in the country that supports them. Others can and should be more than just nationallyfocused and also play a role in supporting nuclear security information sharing. For example, one or more of the centers could create a model facility or simulation that could be used for evaluating nuclear security and transparency concepts on a national, regional, or international basis. These centers also could assemble nuclear security practitioners or a secretariat of experts to provide peer review of security approaches that are submitted for assessment. Related, the centers could be used to accredit the experts that will perform the assessments on IAEA IPPAS missions in order build expertise and allow for more assessments to be performed per year. Informal information exchanges have proven valuable in other ad hoc initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). The NSS, GINCT, and Global Partnership share the common attributes of limited membership, voluntary reporting, and lack of a formal institutional grounding. In addition, there are regional nuclear organizations, including in South America and Europe, that exchange information across borders that could be used as models for regional information sharing. Despite information sharing shortcomings in the current regime, there are ways the existing structures can be used to make the system more effective and transparent.

EntryDate

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1		-2016-09-11 18:11:51.0

Judge

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1		-Michael OKrent

Opponent

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1		-Brentwood KM

ParentRound

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1		-3

Round

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1		-5

Team

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1		-La Canada Zhao Neg

Title

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1		-SEPOCT - Transparency CP

Tournament

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1		-Loyola