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+Without fanfare and recognition, our ballistic missile submarines patrolled the oceans of the Cold War in silent vigil, undetected and invulnerable, ready to strike, to deter our adversaries, and reassure our allies. And just as quietly, they set the standard for strategic deterrence and became the dominant leg of our strategic deterrent triad - our "ultimate insurance policy." As Colin Powell said on the occasion of the completion of the strategic submarine force's 3,000th patrol by USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), "…the Cold War was won especially by…America's Blue and Gold crews manning America's nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine fleet…no one has done more to prevent conflict, no one has made a greater sacrifice for the cause of Peace, than… America's proud missile submarine family. You stand tall among all our heroes of the Cold War." Today, the Cold War has been over for a decade, and in its wake we have emerged as the only true superpower in the international arena. At the same time, the world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The predictable, monolithic world we once faced has now been replaced by a multi-polar world of greater uncertainty - uncertainty in the hills of the Balkans, the streets of Somalia, the deserts of Iraq, and the bunkers of North Korea. And despite our singular superpower status, we find ourselves in a world of more diverse, asymmetric threats. Strategic Nuclear Policy Deterrence of both aggression and coercion is a cornerstone of our national security strategy. Our strategic nuclear forces serve as the most visible and important element of our commitment to this principle. Although the risk of massive nuclear attack has decreased significantly, and the role of nuclear weapons in our national military strategy has diminished, deterrence of major military attack on the United States and its allies, especially attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, remains our highest defense priority. Our National security strategy reaffirms that: "Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons." - A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998 Strategic Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Environment As outlined in our National Military Strategy, although our Nation is at peace and the Cold War has ended, there remain a number of potentially serious threats to national security, including regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and "wild cards." Russia still possesses, and continues to modernize, their substantial strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Because of the deterioration of their conventional forces and severe economic turmoil, Russia has placed increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia has made great progress toward creation of a stable democracy, but that transition is not assured. Hence our strategic forces serve as a hedge against the possibility of Russia's reemergence as a threat to the U.S. and its allies. Although China possesses a much smaller nuclear force, it is modernizing its strategic forces, and we cannot discount the emergence of China as a potential threat. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose the greatest threat to global stability and security and the greatest challenge to strategic deterrence. The issue may not be whether weapons of mass destruction will be used against the West by a rogue nation or transnational actor, but where and when. Accordingly, our present strategic force's mission reflects continuity with the past: "To deter major military attack on the United States and its allies; and if deterrence fails, to employ forces," while simultaneously providing support to the geographic Commanders-in-Chief for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. Strategic Force Structure To deter a broad range of threats, our National Security Strategy requires a robust triad of strategic forces. Both the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review have reaffirmed the wisdom of preserving a complementary strategic triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Each leg of the triad contributes unique attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk: Intercontinental ballistic missiles provide prompt response, bombers provide flexibility, and submarines provide survivability. Together they comprise a robust deterrent that complicates a potential adversary's offensive and defensive planning. The triad is also a synergistic force that provides protection against the failure of any single one of its legs. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will continue to carry the largest portion of our strategic power, regardless of whether they are subject to START I or START II treaty ceilings. With approximately two-thirds of the force at sea at any one time, the SSBN force is the most survivable leg of the triad, providing the United States with a powerful, assured, retaliatory capability against any adversary. Submarines at sea are stabilizing; by contrast, submarines in port are more vulnerable and could offer an extremely lucrative target in time of crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable arms control scenario, the United States must preserve a large enough SSBN force to enable two-ocean operations, with sufficient assets to ensure a retaliatory force at sea capable of dissuading any adversary in a crisis. Because the Russian Duma has failed to ratify the START II treaty, we have a Congressional mandate to maintain our strategic forces at START I levels. At the same time, the TRIDENT I, C4 missile is already beyond its design service life and can only be sustained at substantial cost and considerable risk to the middle of the next decade. Consequently, we have recently sought Congressional authority to transition the strategic submarine commitment from an 18-boat, mixed-missile force to a 14-boat, all TRIDENT II, D5 missile force. Backfit of four TRIDENT submarines to carry the D5 missile is the most cost-effective means to ensure a reliable sea-based deterrent well into the next century. A modernized 14-boat, two ocean, all D5 missile force is in many ways a more robust, credible, and reliable deterrent than the present 18-boat force. Our strategic forces, particularly our strategic submarines, are postured to provide an assured response capability to inflict unacceptable damage to a potential enemy. Our strategic plans provide a wide range of options to ensure our Nation can react appropriately to any provocation, rather than being limited to an "all or nothing" response. Additionally, our forces are postured such that we have the capability to respond promptly to any attack, without relying upon "launch on warning" or "launch under attack." The high flexibility, survivability, and diversity of our strategic forces are designed to complicate any adversary's offensive and defensive planning calculations. With the end of the Cold War, the United States has changed dramatically our strategic force posture: Our strategic forces no longer target other countries during normal peacetime operations. Our strategic bombers and their supporting tankers have not been on alert since 1991. Our Strategic Submarine Force, while positioned at sea for survivability, patrols under more relaxed and flexible conditions of alertness. Strategic Force Reductions From an historical perspective, the end of the Cold War has brought dramatic change to our strategic forces. Cooperative threat reduction, arms control, Presidential initiatives, and numerous confidence-building measures have brought about many positive developments in the strategic postures of the U.S. and Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, we have reduced our strategic nuclear systems by over 50 percent and non-strategic nuclear systems by over 75 percent. We have reduced the number of people involved in our strategic forces by approximately one-half and the number of military bases supporting them by approximately 60 percent. While overall defense spending has declined roughly 11 percent since the end of the Cold War, strategic force costs have dropped from eight percent of DoD's total obligation authority in 1990 to less than three percent today. This represents a pretty good "peace dividend" and a cost-effective premium on our Nation's "ultimate insurance policy." These changes also reflect a new, constructive relationship between the United States and Russia - a relationship in which stability is a central consideration. Stability is the most important criterion to satisfy as we proceed down the glide slope to lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Dr. Thomas Schelling, a noted writer on international strategic matters has written: "The dimension of 'strength' is an important one, but so is the dimension of 'stability' - the assurance against being caught by surprise, the safety in waiting, the absence of a premium on jumping the gun." Because of their stabilizing attributes of survivability and assured response, strategic submarines will play an increasingly prominent role in future START environments. Both the Nuclear Posture Review and Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed the importance of 14 TRIDENT SSBNs each equipped with 24 D5 missiles as a part of the START II-compliant nuclear force structure. These capital ships will form the backbone of the Nation's strategic nuclear force well into the 21st century. The SSBN Contribution: Survivable Deterrence The TRIDENT submarine provides a formidable array of capabilities to the National Command Authorities (NCA). As previously mentioned, these ships are the most survivable leg of the triad. Additionally, TRIDENT submarines provide unsurpassed reliability. To date there have been nearly 3,500 SSBN patrols which account for almost 130,000 man-years spent on patrol; at the same time the D-5 missile system has established an unprecedented record of 85 consecutive successful test flights. In addition to survivability, several specific characteristics of this formidable platform make it an indispensable part of our Nation's triad: Responsiveness. Because of its survivability, the TRIDENT weapon system can be effective under any strategic scenario. SSBNs can provide a sufficiently prompt response to meet any required mission, but their attack can be delayed as desired. Because TRIDENT submarines cannot be preempted, they are inherently stabilizing. There is no need to "use them or lose them." Response is assured, thus providing a highly credible deterrent. |
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+So to respond to my colleagues who ask, what is the enemy,'' I say, true; today we cannot define precisely what the enemy is or will be. We can say, however, that we will fail in our responsibility in this Congress if, once again, we allow the armed forces to be unprepared for the enemies that may emerge. In fact, as I will argue today, a failure to support a strong military in the present historical circumstances would be even more unfortunate and more unforgivable than in the past for two reasons. First, today the United States is the only Nation able to protect the peace. In the past we were fortunate that allies were able, often by the narrowest of margins, to hold the line while we belatedly prepared for war. Bismarck once said: God protects fools, and the United States.'' Today, no one else is capable either of preventing conflict from arising in the first place, or of responding decisively if a major threat to the peace does occur. While I trust in God, I believe God has given us the tools we need to keep peace, and it is our task to use them wisely. Second, and perhaps most importantly, if we fail in our responsibility to maintain U.S. military power, the United States, and, indeed, the world as a whole, may lose an unprecedented opportunity to construct an era of relative peace that could last for many, many years. Today, our military strength is the foundation of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable, will not decisively erode global stability. As such, our military strength is also a means of preventing the growth of one or more new powers that could, in time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy we do not now foresee. Because of this, the very limited investment required to maintain our military strength, though somewhat larger than we are making right now, is disproportionately small compared to the benefits we, and the rest of the world, derive from it. My fellow Missourian, Harry S Truman, stated this clearly: We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war.'' These two premises, that the United States alone is able to protect the peace, and that adequate, visible U.S. military power may prevent new enemies from arising in the future, are, it seems to me, the cornerstones of a sound strategy for the years to come. |