Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[4]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[5]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[4]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2016-09-25 12:54:35.43
	1	+2016-09-25 12:54:35.0

Caselist.CitesClass[5]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,123 @@
	1	+==Framework ==
	2	+Epistemology comes before all other ethical foundations because labeling things moral or immoral is just a function of our knowledge because we must know how to determine whether an action is immoral or moral. And, a priori reasoning is impossible so the only epistemologically sound basis for Morality is experience.
	3	+
	4	+
	5	+====Schwartz^^ ^^====
	6	+The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible. This is an empirical claim.
	7	+And, all experiences are based on the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure.
	8	+
	9	+
	10	+====Nagel^^ ^^====
	11	+I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just ~~is a~~ sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then it is at least possible that I have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be motivated to reduce pain for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.
	12	+Since people see their own happiness as good, they must see it as good for all people
	13	+
	14	+
	15	+====Sayre-McCord^^ ^^====
	16	+In valuing something (my happiness or my rational nature, say), there must be something I see as good about it. Whatever that feature is, it cannot be simply it being mine or my getting it, since obviously plenty of things that are mine, or that I do get, are not valuable at all. However, whatever other feature it might be will be a property potentially possessed by things that are not mine. For instance, if what is good about my happiness (according to me) is how it feels, then I am committed to thinking that this same feeling, if enjoyed by someone else, is good as well
	17	+Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being
	18	+Reasons to prefer:
	19	+First, Governments must use util.
	20	+
	21	+
	22	+====Goodin^^ ^^====
	23	+Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all.That is enough to allow~~s~~ public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure that the payoff will do to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.
	24	+Second, Personal reductionism identity is true
	25	+Brain studies show that no continuous identity exists. If the brain was split, we would create two spheres of consciousness.
	26	+
	27	+
	28	+====Shoemaker 1^^ ^^ ====
	29	+Third, the fission thought experiment proves that personal identity isn't absolute. Shoemaker 1^^ ^^ By way of explanation, consider the case Parfit uses in support of his claim that identity is not what matters: fission (Ibid., 254–255). Suppose both of my brain hemispheres are functional duplicates of the other, and that each of my other two triplet brothers has suffered irreversible brain damage. A brilliant neuro surgeon can transplant one of my brain hemispheres into ~~my triplet brothers~~ each brother, and so each survivor (we will stipulate) will be fully psychologically continuous with me upon waking up. What has happened to me? If we lack the "no branching" clause, we are forced to say that, because both brothers are psychologically continuous with me, they are both me. But then (given the transitivity of identity) both survivors would also have to be identical to each other, which seems obviously false (although see Belzer 2005 for doubts about this assertion). So to avoid violating this transitivity requirement, we simply have to stipulate in our criterion of personal identity that, if the relations in which identity consists may hold one-many, they must obtain uniquely for identity itself to obtain. But then what has happened to me in fission? It seems I cannot survive as both, so the identity relation does not obtain between me and the survivors. In addition, there simply is no non-arbitrary reason why it should obtain between me and just one of the survivors, so the only remaining option is that I do not survive fission (see Parfit 2001, 42; see also Brink 1997b, 140–141). But is this like an ordinary case in which I don't survive, i.e., like death? Clearly not: both survivors will seem to remember my thoughts and experiences, they will fulfill intentions I had in action, they will have the same beliefs/desires/goals as me, and their characters will be exactly like mine. Indeed, it will be just as if I had survived. Everything that matters in ordinary survival (or nearly everything), therefore, is preserved in fission, despite the fact that the identity relation is not. What ~~T~~his must mean~~s~~, then, is that the identity relation just is not what matters (or is not what matters very much) in survival; instead, what matters ~~is~~ has to consist in psychological continuity and/or connectedness (what Parfit calls "Relation R"). As long as that relation holds between me-now and some other person-stage —
	30	+And Reductionism means that utilitarianism is true.
	31	+
	32	+
	33	+====Gruzalski ^^ ^^====
	34	+Utilitarianism and the Reductionist View of Persons Parfit concludes his discussion of distributive moral principles by claiming that, "when we cease to believe that persons are separately existing entities, the Utilitarian view becomes more plausible. Is the gain in plausibility great, or small? My argument leaves this question open" (p. 342). In contrast, I have argued that the Reductionist View strongly supports the utilitarian account of desert and distributive justice. The argument has two aspects. One is the recognition of the utilitarian emphasis on secondary rules, including principles of distributive justice and policies of desert. These rules, principles, and policies are treated within the utilitarian account as if they have self-standing, whereas in fact they are justified on the principle of utility which alone has self-standing within the utilitarian program. The other aspect of the argument involves the recognition that the utilitarian's dual treatment of secondary principles dovetails with the dual account of the nature of persons on the Reductionist View: persons exist, yet their existence just involves bodies and interrelated mental and 18. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 177. This content downloaded from 24.17.201.107 on Fri, 18 Dec 2015 06:36:34 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Gruzalski Parfit and Utilitarianism 771 physical events, and a complete description of our lives need not claim that persons exist. Furthermore, a body, brain, and interrelated series of mental and physical events are more fundamental and basic than the person whose existence just consists in them, much as the citizens and the territory are more fundamental and basic than the nation whose existence just consists in them. This corresponds precisely with the utilitarian account, for utilitarianism treats persons as fundamental and separate existents, while grounding this treatment on the impersonal elements of pain, suffering, happiness, and contentment. Because utilitarianism accurately reflects in this way the true nature of persons, it is much more plausible than has been previously recognized. In addition, since many of the current competitors to utilitarianism presuppose that the person is separate from the body, brain, and interrelated mental and physical events, it follows that these views err by being too personal and are therefore implausible. It follows that when we cease to believe that persons are separately existing entities, utilitarianism becomes significantly more plausible than any of its person centered theoretical competitors.
	35	+
	36	+
	37	+==Plan Text: United States Federal Government ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power for Nuclear Propulsion Reactors using highly enriched uranium ==
	38	+**Nuclear propulsion reactors are largest consumer of HEU**
	39	+**Mian et Al 16** Zia Mian, Michael Schoeppnerfrank Von Hippel 45, 8-6-1945, "Banning the production of highly enriched uranium," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a href="http://thebulletin.org/banning-production-highly-enriched-uranium9266"http://thebulletin.org/banning-production-highly-enriched-uranium9266/a
	40	+The biggest remaining challenge to ending non-weapon uses of HEU involves the largest annual consumer—naval reactors that propel submarines, aircraft carriers, and icebreakers. This is an issue that has received relatively little attention in the past Nuclear Security Summits, and it involves only four countries: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and India. France fuels its naval reactors with low-enriched uranium (LEU) containing less than 20 percent uranium 235, and it is believed that China does so as well. The United States accounts for more than half of the HEU used in naval reactors. It is only recently, however, that the US National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Naval Reactors (ONR) has been willing to discuss the possibility of converting to LEU. In January 2014, in response to a question from the House Armed Services Committee, the ONR stated that it might be possible over 10 to 15 years to develop an LEU fuel that would make conversion possible.
	41	+Japan each built a single civilian nuclear cargo ship but found they were not economically competitive.14
	42	+
	43	+
	44	+==Advantage – Proliferation==
	45	+
	46	+
	47	+====The continued use of HEU threatens the stability of NPT in the status quo. ====
	48	+Cole J. **Harvey 10**, Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 11-29-2010, "At Sea Over Naval HEU: Expanding Interest in Nuclear Propulsion Poses Proliferation Challenges,"NTI, a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges/"http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges//a
	49	+However, uranium enriched to about 90 (or considerably less) can also
	50	+AND
	51	+material from safeguards could erode confidence in the NPT regime among other states.
	52	+
	53	+
	54	+====Current international treaty loopholes encourage the proliferation of weapons grade uranium. Action by the US would decrease existing stockpiles. ====
	55	+**Thielmann 12** Greg Thielmann, Wyatt Hoffman. Theilmann is Senior Fellow at The Arms Control Association. "Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge" Threat Assement Brief. ACA. July 26, 2012.
	56	+Non-nuclear-weapons-state members of the NPT are obligated to accept
	57	+AND
	58	+nuclear weapons states only invites accusations that a double standard is being applied.
	59	+
	60	+
	61	+====US involvement is key to an international movement to stop the use of HEU in developing navies, including in Russia and India====
	62	+Frank Von **Hippel 14**, 4-9-2014, "United States opens to the possibility of using LEU in its future naval reactors," IPFM Blog, a href="http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/04/united_states_opens_to_th.html"http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/04/united_states_opens_to_th.html/a
	63	+The implications of a U.S. commitment to shift to LEU fuel for
	64	+AND
	65	+of miscalculation and war with the use of such weapons," he added.
	66	+
	67	+
	68	+==Advantage - South China Sea==
	69	+
	70	+
	71	+====Tensions are high now as China increases its security rhetoric around US allies ====
	72	+Tim **Daiss 16**, 5-29-2016, "China To Send Nuclear-Armed Submarines To Pacific To Counter U.S., Beijing Claims," Forbes, a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/05/29/china-to-send-nuke-armed-submarines-to-pacific-to-counter-us-beijing-claims/2/~~#3499d2d27b96"http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/05/29/china-to-send-nuke-armed-submarines-to-pacific-to-counter-us-beijing-claims/2/~~#3499d2d27b96/a
	73	+One can't help but question the timing of the Chinese submarine report, released just
	74	+AND
	75	+-thirds of all LNG demand comes from the Asia-Pacific region.
	76	+
	77	+
	78	+====Nuclear subs are uniquely what sustain US naval militarism ====
	79	+**Majumbar, writer for National Interest, 15
	80	+**Dave Majumbar, writer for National Interest, "Nuclear Submarines: America's New Aircraft Carriers?" Apr 7 2015, National Interest
	81	+
	82	+A new class of nuclear-powered guided missile submarines could be the key to
	83	+AND
	84	+noticed by nations that would build A2/AD environments," Hendrix said.
	85	+
	86	+
	87	+====The US has maintained hegemony in the area but not for long. As long as submarine warfare is k2 US control, conflict is inevitable. ====
	88	+Minnie **Chan 16**, 7-23-2016, "China and US in silent fight for supremacy beneath waves of South China Sea," South China Morning Post, a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1985071/china-and-us-silent-fight-supremacy-beneath-waves-south"http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1985071/china-and-us-silent-fight-supremacy-beneath-waves-south/a
	89	+Brackets are from article
	90	+The Pentagon said China was also developing an improved,
	91	+AND
	92	+war. "I hope China will not follow it," he said.
	93	+
	94	+
	95	+====Chinese influence is key to prevent Taiwan independence ====
	96	+**Li 07**
	97	+~~He Li, Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College, Boston ENTER THE DRAGON? China's Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf~~
	98	+Latin America has been a major battleground of the "foreign policy war" between
	99	+AND
	100	+China and Taiwan has been intensified in a region far away from Asia.
	101	+
	102	+
	103	+====Taiwan independence will spark US-China Nuke war====
	104	+**Lowther**, staff reporter in Washington D.C., 20**13**
	105	+(William, "Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report" Taipei Times: Online: Mar 16, 2013:
	106	+http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211)
	107	+Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China
	108	+AND
	109	+and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region."
	110	+
	111	+
	112	+====Goes global and nuclear ====
	113	+Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, "The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America", http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf)
	114	+- A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate
	115	+- AND
	116	+- for competition
	117	+o Can embrace other forms of knowledge production while self imposing action
	118	+
	119	+
	120	+==U/v==
	121	+1. Evaluate T through reasonability with a metric of demonstrating in-round abuse A) It's impossible to prepare a counter interp to every permutation of words giving the neg free access to the ballot. Winning defense should allow the aff to get to substance. C) The neg has no burden to be topical, meaning the neg is arbitrarily advantaged.
	122	+2. T is an RVI for the aff because other wise T is a no risk issue and non reciprocal .Key to preventing frivolous T interps and preserving substantive education.
	123	+5. No 2NR theory or metatheory – A) It skews my time because I only have 3 minutes to respond to 6 minutes so they're always advantaged and

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-09-25 12:54:37.839

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Mountainview DZ

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+4

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+4

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Interlake Ma Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Util AC v3

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Valley