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-Util f/w |
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-==Advantage – Proliferation== |
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-====The continued use of HEU threatens the stability of NPT in the status quo. ==== |
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-Cole J. **Harvey 10**, Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 11-29-2010, "At Sea Over Naval HEU: Expanding Interest in Nuclear Propulsion Poses Proliferation Challenges,"NTI, a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges/"http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges//a |
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-However, uranium enriched to about 90 (or considerably less) can also |
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-AND |
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-material from safeguards could erode confidence in the NPT regime among other states. |
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-====Current international treaty loopholes encourage the proliferation of weapons grade uranium. Action by the US would decrease existing stockpiles. ==== |
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-**Thielmann 12** Greg Thielmann, Wyatt Hoffman. Theilmann is Senior Fellow at The Arms Control Association. "Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge" Threat Assement Brief. ACA. July 26, 2012. |
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-Non-nuclear-weapons-state members of the NPT are obligated to accept |
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-AND |
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-nuclear weapons states only invites accusations that a double standard is being applied. |
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-====Don't fret, the alternative to HEU maintains the efficacy of the US fleet. ==== |
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-Cole J. **Harvey 10**, Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 11-29-2010, "At Sea Over Naval HEU: Expanding Interest in Nuclear Propulsion Poses Proliferation Challenges," No Publication, a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges/"http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges//a |
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-Highly enriched uranium has been the fuel of choice for the U.S. |
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-AND |
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-could utilize naval HEU production as a front for a nuclear weapons program. |
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-====US involvement is key to an international movement to stop the use of HEU in developing navies. ==== |
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-Alan J. **Kuperman and** Frank N. Von **Hippel 14**, 3-21-2014, "Highly Enriched Danger," New York Times, a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/opinion/highly-enriched-danger.html?_r=1"http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/opinion/highly-enriched-danger.html?_r=1/a |
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-Still, it would be worth it. If the United States converted to L |
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-AND |
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-and war with the use of such weapons," he added. |
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-==Advantage Indo-Pakistan == |
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-====India already is developing nuclear powered submarines ==== |
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-**Rt International 16**, 4-19-2016, "India tests 1st nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine," RT International, a href="https://www.rt.com/news/340146-arihant-nuclear-submarine-trial/"https://www.rt.com/news/340146-arihant-nuclear-submarine-trial//a |
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-India's first submarine capable of firing nuclear ballistic missiles, the INS Arihant, is |
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-AND |
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--4 missiles or 12 smaller short-range K-15 missiles. |
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-====Two countries close to war – US pressure is key to peace. ==== |
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-Tom **Hussain 16**, journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst based in Islamabad., 3-3-2016, "Are India and Pakistan heading for a nuclear showdown?," No Publication, a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/india-pakistan-heading-nuclear-showdown-160303053541342.html"http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/india-pakistan-heading-nuclear-showdown-160303053541342.html/a |
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-Thus South Asia is being transformed into a strategic theatre containing three nuclear powers, |
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-AND |
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-wilted under immense pressure from the US, which had just invaded Afghanistan. |
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-====*A war in South Asia remains eminent as a result of dehumanization caused by nuclear development ==== |
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-Tom **Hussain 16**, journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst based in Islamabad., 3-3-2016, "Are India and Pakistan heading for a nuclear showdown?," No Publication, a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/india-pakistan-heading-nuclear-showdown-160303053541342.html"http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/india-pakistan-heading-nuclear-showdown-160303053541342.html/a |
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-India has since muddied the waters by talking up a military doctrine called "Cold |
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-AND |
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-that a nuclear exchange in South Asia is merely a matter of time. |
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-====Even a limited nuclear change would cause soot release- killing agriculture and billions of people as a result. My evidence is very specific to Indo/Pak. Toon et al^^ ^^ '08==== |
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-Figure 3a indicates changes in global average precipitation and temperature as a function of soot emission, as calculated with the help of a modern version of a major US climate model.6,8 A relatively modest 5 teragrams of soot, which could be generated in an exchange between India and Pakistan, would be sufficient to produce the lowest temperatures Earth has experienced in the past 1000 years—lower than during the post-medieval Little Ice Age or in 1816, the so-called year without a summer. With 75 Tg of soot, less than half of what we project in a hypothetical SORT war, temperatures would correspond to the last full Ice Age, and precipitation would decline by more than 25 globally. Calculations in the 1980s had already predicted the cooling from a 150-Tg soot injec- tion to be quite large.3 Our new results, however, show that soot would rise to much higher altitudes than previously believed—indeed, to well above the tops of the models used in the 1980s. As a result, the time required for the soot mass to be reduced by a factor of e is about five years in our simula- tions, as opposed to about one year as assumed in the 1980s. That increased lifetime causes a more dramatic and longer- lasting climate response. The temperature changes represented in figure 3a would have a profound effect on mid- and high-latitude agriculture. Precipitation changes, on the other hand, would have their greatest impact in the tropics.6 Even a 5-Tg soot injection would lead to a 40 precipitation decrease in the Asian mon- soon region. South America and Africa would see a large diminution of rainfall from convection in the rising branch of the Hadley circulation, the major global meridional wind sys- tem connecting the tropics and subtropics. Changes in the Hadley circulation's dynamics can, in general, affect climate on a global scale. Complementary to temperature change is radiative forc- ing, the change in energy flux. Figure 3b shows how nuclear soot changes the radiative forcing at Earth's surface and com- pares its effect to those of two well-known phenomena: warming associated with greenhouse gases and the 1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest in the 20th century. Since the Industrial Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the energy flux by 2.5 W/m2. The transient forcing from the Pinatubo eruption peaked at about −4 W/m2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). One implication of the figure is that even a regional war between India and Pakistan can force the climate to a far greater degree than the greenhouse gases that many fear will alter the climate in the foreseeable future. Of course, the durations of the forcings are different: The radiative forcing by nuclear-weapons-gen- erated soot might persist for a decade, but that from green- house gases is expected to last for a century or more, allow- ing time for the climate system to respond to the forcing. Accordingly, while the Ice Age–like temperatures in figure 3a could lead to an expansion of sea ice and terrestrial snow- pack, they probably would not be persistent enough to cause the buildup of global ice sheets. Agriculture responds to length of growing season, tem- perature during the growing season, light levels, precipita- tion, and other factors. The 1980s saw systematic studies of the agricultural changes expected from a nuclear war, but no such studies have been conducted using modern climate models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the decrease in length of the growing season—the time between freezing temperatures—for the second summer after the release of soot in a nuclear attack.6,8 Even a 5-Tg soot injection reduces the growing season length toward the shortest average range observed in the midwestern US corn-growing states. Earlier studies concluded that for a full-scale nuclear conflict, "What can be said with assurance . . . is that the Earth's human pop- ulation has a much greater vulnerability to the indirect effects of nuclear war ~~including damage to the world's agricultural, transportation, energy, medical, political, and social infra- structure~~, especially mediated through impacts on food pro- ductivity and food availability, than to the direct effects of nu- clear war itself." As a result, "The indirect effects could result in the loss of one to several billions of humans."4 Because the soot associated with a nuclear exchange is in- jected into the upper atmosphere, the stratosphere is heated and stratospheric circulation is perturbed. For the 5-Tg injec- tion associated with a regional conflict, stratospheric temper- atures would remain elevate~~ temperatures~~ by 30 °C after ~~for~~ four years.6–8 The resulting temperature and circulation anomalies would re- duce ozone columns by 20 globally, by 25–45 at middle latitudes, and by 50–70 at northern high latitudes for per- haps as much as five years, with substantial losses persisting for an additional five years.7 The calculations of the 1980s gen- erally did not consider such effects or the mechanisms that cause them. Rather, they focused on the direct injection of ni- trogen oxides by the fireballs of large-yield weapons that are no longer deployed. Global-scale models have only recently become capable of performing the sophisticated atmospheric chemical calculations needed to delineate detailed ozone-de- pletion mechanisms. Indeed, simulations of ozone loss fol- lowing a SORT conflict have not yet been conducted. |
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-O/W: |
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-specific to indo/pak conflict |
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-isolates multiple independent warrants: i.e. rainfall and agriculture- so mitigation of one does not decrease the probability |
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-scientific study rather than blind assertions |