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Summary

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1 +Counter plan text: Public colleges and universities should prohibit the distribution of fake news.
2 +
3 +Fake news stories are rapidly increasing, legitimate news sources are adopting these stories
4 +Uberti 16 (David, a CJR staff writer and senior Delacorte fellow), “The real history of fake news,” Columbia Journalism Review, 12/15/16 DRD.
5 +In an 1807 letter to John Norvell, a young go-getter who had asked how to best run a newspaper, Thomas Jefferson penned what today would make for a fiery Medium post condemning fake news.¶ “It is a melancholy truth, that a suppression of the press could not more compleatly sic deprive the nation of its benefits, than is done by its abandoned prostitution to falsehood,” the sitting president wrote. “Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle.”¶ That vehicle grew into a commercial powerhouse in the 19th century and a self-reverential political institution, “the media,” by the mid-20th. But the pollution has been described in increasingly dire terms in recent months. PolitiFact named fake news its 2016 “Lie of the Year,” while chagrined Democrats have warned about its threat to an honest public debate. The pope compared consumption of fake news to eating feces. And many of the wise men and women of journalism have chimed in almost uniformly: Come to us for the real stuff.¶ “Whatever its other cultural and social merits, our digital ecosystem seems to have evolved into a near-perfect environment for fake news to thrive,” New York Times CEO Mark Thompson said in a speech to the Detroit Economic Club on Monday. The broader issue driving the paranoia is the tardy realization among mainstream media that they no longer hold the sole power to shape and drive the news agenda.¶ ¶ A little bit of brake-tapping may be in order: It’s worth remembering, in the middle of the great fake news panic of 2016, America’s very long tradition of news-related hoaxes. A thumbnail history shows marked similarities to today’s fakery in editorial motive or public gullibility, not to mention the blurred lines between deliberate and accidental flimflam. It also suggests that the recent fixation on fake news has more to do with macro-level trends than any new brand of faux content.¶ Macedonian teenagers who earn extra scratch by concocting conspiracies are indeed new entrants to the American information diet. Social networks allow smut to hurtle through the public imagination—and into pizza parlors—at breakneck speed. People at or near the top of the incoming administration have shared fake news casually. And it’s appearing in news organizations’ own programmatic ads
6 +
7 +College students are disproportionately at risk for believing illegitimate news stories
8 +Borchers 16 (Callum, Reporter — Washington, D.C.) “A harsh truth about fake news: Some people are super gullible,” The Washington Post, 12/5/16 DRD.
9 +A Stanford University study published Tuesday concluded that many students, from middle school through college, struggle to discern what is legitimate reporting and what is not. The Wall Street Journal summarized some of the most alarming findings:¶ Some 82 percent of middle-schoolers couldn’t distinguish between an ad labeled “sponsored content” and a real news story on a website. . . . More than two out of three middle-schoolers couldn’t see any valid reason to mistrust a post written by a bank executive arguing that young adults need more financial-planning help.¶ And nearly four in 10 high-school students believed, based on the headline, that a photo of deformed daisies on a photo-sharing site provided strong evidence of toxic conditions near the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan, even though no source or location was given for the photo.¶ Lest you think this kind of naiveté is unique to millennials, consider some of the fake news stories that have caught on in the general population recently. In October, a Twitter joke about an Ohio postal worker who was supposedly tearing up pro-Trump absentee ballots fooled Rush Limbaugh, Matt Drudge and Jim Hoft. A week before the election, Sean Hannity got taken in by a made-up report that President Obama, Michelle Obama and Elizabeth Warren had unfollowed Hillary Clinton on Twitter. Some fabricated stories have been truly bizarre and wildly far-fetched yet have still duped people who read them — or at least, been embraced and used by some readers. On Tuesday, the New York Times unspooled the way “dozens of made-up articles about Mrs. Clinton kidnapping, molesting and trafficking children” in the back rooms of a D.C. pizzeria called Comet Ping Pong gained traction.¶ The misinformation campaign began when John Podesta’s email account was hacked and his emails were published by WikiLeaks during the presidential campaign. Days before the election, users on the online message board 4Chan noticed that one of Mr. Podesta’s leaked emails contained communications with Comet Ping Pong owner James Alefantis discussing a fund-raiser for Mrs. Clinton.¶ The 4Chan users immediately speculated about the links between Comet Ping Pong and the Democratic Party. Some posited the restaurant was part of a larger Democratic child trafficking ring, which was a theory long held by some conservative blogs. That idea jumped to other social media services such as Twitter and Reddit, where it gained momentum on the page “The_Donald.” A new Reddit discussion thread called “Pizzagate” quickly attracted 20,000 subscribers. . . .¶ Soon, dozens of fake news articles on sites such as Facebook, Planet Free Will and Living Resistance emerged. Readers shared the stories in Saudi Arabia and on Turkish and other foreign language sites.¶ Some of the people who share fake news stories on social media surely know they are spreading fiction. They just like to imagine a world that conforms to their views. Or something.¶ Others are genuinely conned, either because they don't know how to tell the difference between real and fake news or because they don't care to try. Deception may drive the creation of fake news; gullibility helps create a market for it.
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1 +Harvard Westlake
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1 +Their fear of “aggression” causes us to fight defensive wars, which causes more casualties and failure
2 +Tracinski 02 (Robert, Received his undergraduate degree in Philosophy from the University of Chicago and studied with the Objectivist Graduate Center and Editorial Director of the Ayn Rand Institute) “The Prophets of Defeatism,” Ayn Rand Institute, 8/16/02 DRD
3 +The American press seems to have contracted Black Hawk Down Syndrome, a malady in which reporters and editorialists, whose military experience consists largely of watching Hollywood war movies, project a hand-wringing fear of American military failure. These reactions may seem bizarre after a period of extraordinary military success, but they do make sense ~-~- because the very same organizations promoting this defeatism also promote the policies that would actually lead to defeat.¶ After an American helicopter was shot down in Afghanistan at the beginning of last week's battle in Shah-e-Kot, the media was awash in references to "Black Hawk Down," the recent film about a bloody 1993 military mission in the Somalian city of Mogadishu, which went awry when an American helicopter crashed. When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was forced to field inane questions about parallels with that battle, The New York Times reported that Rumsfeld was "working hard to exorcise the ghosts of Mogadishu." But it is the press, not the Pentagon, that is plagued by the ghosts of Mogadishu.¶ A typical expression of this defeatism is a March 6 analysis in the Los Angeles Times, which agonizes that "The fierce combat unfolding in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan is ... taking the U.S. military into precisely the sort of conditions that felled the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s." America, it says, is "knowingly plunging ahead in areas where it is most vulnerable," and "Special operations forces are engaged in risky combat and searches in and around caves ~-~- something Pentagon officials said in the early days of the war they wanted to avoid at all costs." Risky combat? How unexpected.¶ This is just a sample. Since Sept. 11, for example, The New York Times has warned that defeating the Taliban would not be as easy as the Gulf War against Iraq ~-~- then warned that a new war against Iraq would not be as easy as the defeat of the Taliban. The only constant is the newspaper's confident prediction of U.S. military failure.¶ Why does the press systematically ignore America's history of military success, obsessing instead over a few failures? Note that these failures all have the same cause: political restrictions that deprived our soldiers of the tools they needed to win. Take Mogadishu. In the "Black Hawk Down" scenario, the disaster was not caused by the mere downing of a helicopter. It was caused by the Clinton administration's refusal to authorize the use of armor and AC-130 gunships, which would have provided crucial support for our soldiers. The reason? The politicians did not want to appear to be "escalating" our involvement, for fear of sinking into a "quagmire" ~-~- and they were afraid that the use of gunships would cause civilian casualties among the enemy. Does any of this sound familiar? These are the same demands commentators are making on our military today in Afghanistan. Win the war, but don't get involved in fighting on the ground, don't take any casualties, and above all, don't cause any civilian deaths, because that would be bad PR. The press is especially certain about this last point, because they will make sure that any civilian deaths ~-~- an unavoidable by-product of war ~-~- are splashed over the front pages and presented as evidence of American barbarity. Or take the other bogeyman of American military failure: Vietnam. Our military was told that it could not eliminate the source of the enemy's power by invading North Vietnam. Instead, our soldiers were ordered to fight a defensive war of attrition, while we bombed the enemy ~-~- not to destroy his capabilities, but merely to bring him to the bargaining table. Sound familiar? This is the strategy we have helped foist on Israel in its current war with terrorists. This is why, for example, the Israelis bomb empty Palestinian Authority offices, not to kill enemy soldiers or destroy Yasser Arafat's ability to fight, but merely to "pressure" him to return to the "peace process." Similarly, commentators in the press have warned us that we have to fight the War on Terrorism with an eye on world opinion, in consultation with our squeamish European allies and our hostile Arab coalition, that we have to avoid civilian casualties and coddle al-Qaeda prisoners to maintain the "moral high ground." The only kind of war they think it is proper to wage is a restricted, non-lethal, self-effacing conflict. It is no wonder that these same people fear that the war will end in failure. On their terms, it would.
4 +
5 +Resolve is the THE determiner of American hegemony – it’s key to deterrence and conflict effectiveness – anything else just prolongs violence
6 +Eyago ‘5 7 / 8 / 05 Political Commentary – Sound Politics Reporter http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State
7 +Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war. I am angry at people, who through their words, and efforts contribute to the injury and death of our soldiers, who provide encouragement to the enemy, who weaken our efforts and prolong the war, who, for political gain put our soldiers, our people, and our nation at greater risk. There is a LOT of anger going on. Many times it is inappropriately acted upon. Islamists are angry, so they blow up people. Conservatives are angry so they advocate indiscriminate retaliation. Liberals are angry so they advocate undermining the war. All this anger is misdirected. We can see how the killing of innocents is wrong, but sometimes we cannot see how allowing innocents to be killed is wrong. One should seriously consider the impacts of certain types of dissention in this country before embarking on said dissentious course. I have many issues with the war in Iraq, but I will focus on just a couple. When President Bush pronounced to the world that he would defeat terrorism, he made a promise. He promised that he would not only pursue the terrorists wherever they may be, but he promised to go after the countries that enable those terrorists. When the UN made resolution after resolution against Iraq those too were promises. The difference comes in whether one follows up a promise or not. You see, no one embarks on a major undertaking with the expectation of losing. The choices any person or group are almost always predicated on the fact that the reward exceeds the price or risk. Hitler would not have invaded Czechoslovakia unless he though he could get away with it. He would not have invaded Poland unless he though he could get away with it. The success of those events and reaction of Europe convinced him that he could press on and take all of Europe. Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait unless he thought he could get away with it. He would not have defied the UN unless he though he could get away with it. In those cases, the acting party decided that they could attain their goals using the methods employed. The same thing goes for the terrorists. They methods they employ are based on the expectation of ultimate success. The methods they employ are also based on their own capabilities, capabilities that stem from the support of governments both passive and active, the support of moneyed benefactors, and the support of powerful influencers such as media and high profile personalities. This brings me back to promises made. Part of the reason these terrorists became so bold is that there were few significant reprisals for their actions. In the same way Hitler moved on Poland and Hussein defied the UN, Al Qaeda flew planes into our buildings. Ultimately it was because they could and that the reprisals had insufficient deterrent effect. Now, when President Bush announced that he would pursue the nations that supported terrorism, he basically set the stage for action. The choice was, rattle the saber and hope it is enough, or draw the saber and demonstrate our commitment to living up to our promises. It is fair to debate whether Iraq was the best choice for an operation, but the stage had also been set there as well. With promises being made at the UN, the choice was to continue to prove that promises meant nothing or to prove that they did. I believe that the lack of consequences in the past was a key factor in the terrorist activity leading up to and including 9/11. Without the resolve to back up our promises, our enemies will be emboldened to act. It does not get any simpler than that. Iraq was a promise kept. Now, some people want us to renege on that promise and others. That is a dangerous position to be advocating. The thing is, the debate about Iraq belongs BEFORE we took action. And that debate DID occur. It occurred BEFORE the war. And the result was overwhelmingly in FAVOR of action. The congress granted President Bush the authority to act. The fact that they did not like his decision is moot. If they did not trust his ability to act, they were wrong to have given him the authority to do so. NOW they are wrong for challenging his decision after the fact. That brings us back to the concept of one's expectation of the results of one's actions. In many cases throughout history, the winner of a conflict was not always the one with the bigger army, the better equipment, and the best trained, or any of those factors. The winner quite often was the one with the greater will to win. Wars are won by will in far greater weight then in anything else. I would say that will is THE determining factor in success in any conflict. Obviously will is not enough. A greater force can sap the will of another army, but not always. The revolutionary war was won by will, not by military might. Vietnam was lost by will not by military might. And, Iraq will be won or lost by will alone. The consequences of this outcome will have long lasting impacts on the security of our nation. At this point, it does not matter whether we should have gone into Iraq. The fact is we are there now. We either complete the job and fulfill our promises to rebuild that nation and leave it with a stable and free society or we cut and run and have the world know with certainty that our word is null and void and that we have no resolve. That is the stakes. That is the goal of the terrorists: to prove they have resolve, to prove that we do not. Their victory will ensure increased attacks on all nations because the terrorists will have unimpeachable proof that their tactics will ultimately succeed. Bombings, beheadings, gross atrocities will be the weapons of choice in the future. Tactics that have been proven to bring down the mighty. If will is the factor that determines the outcome, then will is the place where we must consider here and now. As far as our enemy is concerned, we MUST make them believe that they cannot succeed. We MUST make them sure that WE will prevail. We MUST prove to them that their tactics are ineffectual. There is a down side to that. Once an enemy realizes their tactics are not succeeding, they will change them. With an enemy of this nature, that could result in greater atrocities than we have yet seen. Yet, even then we must prevail. We must continue to demonstrate OUR resolve and OUR willingness to see this to the end and DEFEAT them. Since they have shown little regard for decency and life, since they have shown that our very existence is provocation to them, no amount of diplomacy or concessions will achieve an end satisfactory to our nation. The only solution is the demonstration of our willingness to defeat them despite their tactics. Our goal is to defeat the will of the enemy. His goal is to defeat ours. Any indication that the enemy's will is faltering will bolster our own will. However, the opposite is true as well. Any indication that our will is faltering will embolden the enemy's will. Unfortunately, from the very first minute of this conflict, parts of our country have shouted from the very mountain tops just how little will they have to win the war. They demonstrate clearly for our enemies that we don't want to fight. They give clear indication that enemy tactics are successful. In effect, they give aid and comfort to the enemy and spur them on to continued fighting because they tell the enemy in clear messages that if they continue in their tactics, the United States will be defeated. As I said before, the debate about whether we go to war is over. We are now at war, and the ONLY debate we should have is on what tactics are most appropriate for prosecuting that war. It is marginally fair to state that you are unhappy about our decision to go to war, but beyond that, anything else will embolden the enemy. Think very long and about what is at stake here. It is almost IMPOSSIBLE to be pro America while actively dissenting on ongoing conflict. It is bordering on treason for a public official to undermine the war effort, the Commander in Chief and the military publicly for all the world to see. We have started down this path, and there are but two choices: to win or to lose. There is no "suing for peace" with this enemy. Now, that does not mean you have to become militaristic and be a war monger. You can be a peacenik, but you need to consider that unless you want to see the United States harmed, you should cease criticism of the war itself until after it is won. There is plenty of time to castigate the people who made what you perceive as errors AFTER we have finished the job. However, if you persist in presenting disunity and a weakened resolve to the enemy, you take direct responsibility for the lives of all Americans, Iraqis and foreign terrorists that will die subsequently. The quickest way to end the war is to be united, to demonstrate unshakable resolve, and to have the enemy surrender. Or, YOU can surrender to the enemy. Anything else will just prolong the killing. This goes infinitely more so for our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.
8 +Hegemony decline causes extinction.
9 +Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13
10 +(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
11 +A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
12 +That turns case, war engenders worse forms of oppression and suppression of rights
13 +Goldstein 1—Prof PoliSci @ American University, Joshua, War and Gender , P. 412
14 +First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice". Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression/" The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.
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1 +2017-02-13 19:09:12.242
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1 +John Scoggin
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1 +Dougherty Valley KK
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1 +17
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1 +2
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1 +Immaculate Heart Dosch Neg
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1 +JANFEB - Heg DA
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1 +Stanford Invitational
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1 +2017-01-17 19:55:58.0
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1 +Greenhill SK
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Quarters
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Harvard Westlake
Caselist.RoundClass[17]
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2017-02-13 19:09:09.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +John Scoggin
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Dougherty Valley KK
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Stanford Invitational

Schools

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Independent (All)
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Sage Ridge (NV)
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Salpointe Catholic (AZ)
Sammamish (WA)
San Dieguito (CA)
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Santa Monica (CA)
Sarasota (FL)
Saratoga (CA)
Scarsdale (NY)
Servite (CA)
Seven Lakes (TX)
Shawnee Mission East (KS)
Shawnee Mission Northwest (KS)
Shawnee Mission South (KS)
Shawnee Mission West (KS)
Sky View (UT)
Skyline (UT)
Smithson Valley (TX)
Southlake Carroll (TX)
Sprague (OR)
St Agnes (TX)
St Andrews (MS)
St Francis (CA)
St James (AL)
St Johns (TX)
St Louis Park (MN)
St Margarets (CA)
St Marys Hall (TX)
St Thomas (MN)
St Thomas (TX)
Stephen F Austin (TX)
Stoneman Douglas (FL)
Stony Point (TX)
Strake Jesuit (TX)
Stratford (TX)
Stratford Independent (CA)
Stuyvesant (NY)
Success Academy (NY)
Sunnyslope (AZ)
Sunset (OR)
Syosset (NY)
Tahoma (WA)
Talley (AZ)
Texas Academy of Math and Science (TX)
Thomas Jefferson (VA)
Thompkins (TX)
Timber Creek (FL)
Timothy Christian (NJ)
Tom C Clark (TX)
Tompkins (TX)
Torrey Pines (CA)
Travis (TX)
Trinity (KY)
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Trinity Valley (TX)
Truman (PA)
Turlock (CA)
Union (OK)
Unionville (PA)
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University (FL)
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Valor Christian (CO)
Vashon (WA)
Ventura (CA)
Veritas Prep (AZ)
Vestavia Hills (AL)
Vincentian (PA)
Walla Walla (WA)
Walt Whitman (MD)
Warren (TX)
Wenatchee (WA)
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Westview (OR)
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Whitney (CA)
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Woodlands College Park (TX)
Wren (SC)
Yucca Valley (CA)