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+The equation of racism with speciesism is offensive. There is no foundation for racism because there is no morally relevant distinction between members of different races. Humans engage in moral reflection – a key difference between them and animals. |
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+Cohen 86, professor at the University of Michigan Medical School, New England Journal of Medicine (Carl, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research” 314:865-869, |
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+The first error ts the assumption, often explicitly defended, that all sentient animals have equal moral standing. Between a dog and a human being, according to this view, there is no moral difference; hence the pains suffered by dogs must be weighed no differently from the pains suffered by humans. To deny such equality, according to this critic, is to give unjust preference to one species over another; it is "speciesism." The most influential statement of this moral equality of species was made by Peter Singer: The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. The sexist violates the principle of equality by favoring the interests of his own sex. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case. This argument is worse than unsound; it is atrocious. It draws an offensive moral conclusion from a deliberately devised verbal parallelism that is utterly specious. Racism has no rational ground whatever. Differing degrees of respect or concern for humans for no other reason than that they are members of different races is an injustice totally without foundation in the nature of the races themselves. Racists, even if acting on the basis of mistaken factual beliefs, do grave moral wrong precisely because there is no morally relevant distinction among the races. The supposition of such differences has led to outright horror. The same is true of the sexes, neither sex being entitled by right to greater respect or concern than the other. No dispute here Between species of animate life, however between (for example) humans on the one hand and cats or rats on the other~-~-the morally relevant differences are enormous, and almost universally appreciated. Humans engage in moral reflection; humans are morally autonomous; humans are members of moral communities, recognizing just claims against their own interest. Human beings do have rights; theirs is a moral status very different from that of cats or rats. |
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+Equating racism and sexism with speciesism diverts our focus from the discovery of a solution to those inequalities |
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+Nicoll and Russell 01, Professor of Integrative Biology at Berkeley and Department of Physiology-Anatomy at Berkeley, Ph.D. in physiology from Stanford (Charles S. and Sharon M., “Why Animal Experimentation Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research”, ed. E.F. Paul and J. Paul, p. 161-162)//dodo |
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+Some advocates for animals, including Singer, do not believe that animals deserve to have rights in the same sense that we accord them to humans. so Instead, they argue that because animals meet their criteria of "moral relevance," they are entitled to equal moral consideration with human beings. If we are willing to exploit animals in any way, we should be willing to do likewise to people since humans are not more "morally relevant" than animals. When we regard animals to be less than our moral equals, we are practicing a kind of interspecies discrimination that these advocates call "speciesism," an attitude they analogize to types of intraspecies discrimination such as sexism and racism. Richard Ryder claims credit for coining the term "speciesism" in 1970.51 In 1985 the term was defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "discrimination against or exploitation of certain animal species by human beings, based on an assumption of mankind's superiority."52 Singer has stated that "speciesism ... is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species."53 To support the correctness of their opinion about the immorality of speciesism, animal activists claim that it is comparable to discrimination on the basis of sex or race. We object strongly to this kind of equation. To quote Cohen again, "this argument is worse than unsound: it is atrocious."54 Sexism and racism are not justifiable because normal men and women of all racial and ethnic groups are, on average, intellectually and morally equal, and their behavior can be judged against the same moral standards. Animals do not have such equivalence with humans. To deny rights or equal consideration on the basis of sex or race is immoral because all normal humans, regardless of sex, ethnicity, or race, can claim the rights and considerations that they deserve, and they know what it means to be unjustly denied them. No animals have these abilities. Speciesism, as defined by Ryder and Singer, is a normal kind of discrimination displayed by all social animals, but racism and sexism are widely considered to be morally indefensible practices. By equating racism and sexism with speciesism, Ryder and Singer degrade the struggle to achieve racial and sexual equality. 55 In addition to having this ethical problem, the concept of speciesism is also biologically absurd; we consider this below. |
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+The alternative is to acknowledge human’s moral superiority. Human morals are key to structure, animals don’t work within a moral standing |
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+Engelhardt 01, Professor of Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, Professor of Philosophy at Rice University, and Member of the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the Baylor College of Medicine. (H. Tristram, JR., “Why Animal Experimentation Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research”, ed. E.F. Paul and J. Paul, p. 179)//dodo |
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+Moral philosophy explores what it means to act rightly and to pursue the good. It must determine how one can be sure that one knows rightly what one ought to do. In approaching such challenges, it is persons as moral agents who must determine the appropriate balancing of goods and harms, pleasures and pains. Due to the plurality of visions of the right and the good, and because of the need to reflect on how appropriately to weigh competing moral sentiments, intuitions, appeals, visions, and projects (including different approaches to the proper use of animals), a general secular morality that is rationally justified has an unavoidably second-order character. Philosophical moral reflection addresses, criticizes, and arranges the various claims of the various competing moralities. It reflectively determines which moral claims govern, when, and how. The results of such reflections about morality are grounded in moral agents as final adjudicators of competing moral understandings. Persons have their cardinal place in secular morality, in part because of the controversies at the roots of secular morality. These moral controversies include disputes regarding the moral standing of animals as well as the comparative standings of various species. For instance, how does one compare the moral standings of gorillas, dolphins, whales, pigs, rattlesnakes, and roaches? Humans, and humans alone, can assess all arguments and reflections concerning the moral comparability of humans and animals. Human primates have the capacity, self-consciously, to advance arguments about the moral life and to act on an examined understanding of moral probity. In contrast, other animals (such as nonhuman primates, whales, dolphins, etc.) may in some sense be self-conscious, but nevertheless give no clear evidence of the ability to frame a reflectively articulated understanding of moral probity. Morality is articulated from the perspective of reflective, self-conscious moral agency, a perspective that even higher-order animals cannot realize. It is from this perspective, enjoyed by humans, that the use of animals must be assessed. |