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+Giving international law moral force is a critical part of the colonial project. International law allows colonialism to hide itself – by faking its own death – and by giving it new tools to function. |
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+Jackson 09 Marissa Jackson, “Neo-Colonialism, Same Old Racism: A Critical Analysis of the United States’ Shift toward Colorblindness as a tool for the Protection of the American Colonial Empire and White Supremacy”, Berkeley Journal of African-American Law and Policy, Volume 11, 2009. |
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+So long as it is perceived to be dead and irrelevant, colonialism can transform itself, and continue to operate without obstruction. Like racism, colonialism depends on its death for its survival - this is its paradox. When formal colonialism was the acknowledged status quo, it was glorified. Today, *164 international law has recognized the rights of nations to self-determination and the formal colonial era is decidedly over. n38 However, to label the present day as the post-colonial era can be misleading. n39 Outside of the context of formal colonialism, neo- would be a more appropriate prefix. n40 Ania Loomba makes the excellent observation that "a country may be both postcolonial (in the sense of being formally independent) and neo-colonial (in the sense of remaining economically and/or culturally dependent) at the same time." n41A now-independent nation may be post-colonial in the formal sense even if it still struggles against foreign economic exploitation and political intervention. Indeed, as evidenced by the composition of the UN Security Council, and the balance of power in international financial institutions, the world's great powers wield great economic and political influence over former colonies - now known as third world countries, and have constructed a complex system by which these former colonies remain subjects. n42 As Robin D. G. Kelley declares, "the official apparatus might have been removed, but the political, economic, and cultural links established by colonial domination still remain with some alterations." n43 This is the nature of colonialism. Colloquially speaking, it "fakes its own death" so that it can adopt a new identity and continue to shape social and legal order. The American empire wields its economic and political power in this way to advance its interests in the world, and the white American majority veils its complex racial order in the same way, internally, to protect its position of power and advance its interests within the nation. |
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+Theories must take into account their historical and social conditions – anything else fails since it assumes the wrong starting point for a moral theory. Theories that are colorblind don’t take into account the social background that all theories are embedded in – a social background of racism – this makes their theories a tool of racism |
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+Walsh 4 (Kenneth, Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal) “COLOR-BLIND RACISM IN GRUTTER AND GRATZ” Boston College Third World Law Journal, Volume 24 No 2, 2004. Review of RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2003. Pp. 213. AT |
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+In his book, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva alerts readers to the danger that a color-blind ideology will soon pervade discussions of race in the United States.157 The mechanisms of color-blind racism allow whites to advance positions that assure the perpetuation of white privilege.158 Under this color-blind guise, the arguments opposing affirmative action sound reasonable and moral.159 Yet individuals employ the frames, style, and story lines of color-blind racism to mask the fact that blacks still hold a second-class status and in America.160 Thus, color-blind racism facilitates the perpetuation of racial inequality by obscuring the fact that there is even a problem to fix.161 |
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+Specifically, international law fails to account for the racist history of international law – their legal positivism is historically embedded in colonialism |
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+Kayaoǧlu 10 Legal imperialism: sovereignty and extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China. 2010 |
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+European colonial expansion was also important for the development of nineteenth-century sovereignty. In the process of this expansion, legal positivism became an imperial legal episteme in influencing initially British and later Western imperial ideas and policies. Western imperial, particularly British encounters with Asian societies further developed and consolidated the norms and practices of sovereignty that first appeared in legal positivist understandings and discourses. Jurists and legal scholars as policymakers and advisers were integral to the development of agenda of imperial encounter. In these encounters, the practices of the British state and the ideas of British jurists clarified, crystallized, and consolidated the concept of sovereignty doctrine in part to exclude Asian entities from it. The rise and decline of British extraterritoriality illustrates how construction of positive law and nineteenth-century sovereignty severely limited the authority claims of non-Western states within their territorial domains. The British extraterritorial empire was the most organized, extensive, and durable (Table i), British courts operated in Japan (six around the mid-188os), the Ottoman Empire (sixty-six in 1900), and China (twenty-six in 1926).' In the early years, the courts had simple procedures, and British citizens in these countries were denied many of the legal rights British citizens enjoyed at domestic British courts. It was usually one man, the consul, who belonged to the executive branch rather than the judiciary, who rendered the decision. Throughout the nineteenth century the courts and their procedures evolved and became more elaborate, in part to bridge the gap between justice rendered in the British domestic and extraterritorial courts. Eventually, the courts had their own substantial codes as well as codes for civil and criminal procedures, enforcement, and appeals.' British jurists and bureaucrats at the Colonial Office prepared these rules. As the number of courts increased, the British government organized them in a legal hierarchy. For example, the British Supreme Court at Istanbul was the highest British court in the Ottoman Empire, and the British Supreme Court at Shanghai was the highest British court in China. These supreme courts acted as the first level of appellate courts in their respective geographical regions, in the Levant and East Asia. For example, appeals in cases from the British courts in Japan and Korea were heard at Shanghai, The Privy Council in London was the final appellate court of the British extraterritorial courts. With this extensive and organized presence, the British extraterritorial empire operated for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in those non-Western states lacking formal colonial governments. Legal imperialism is the extension of a state's legal authority into another state and limitation of legal authority of the target state over issues that may affect people, commercial interest, and security of the imperial state, Extraterritoriality was quintessential legal imperialism; it extended Western legal authority into non-Western territories and limited non-Western legal authority over Western foreigners and their commercial interest, The production and maintenance of extra-territorial legal authority required both a legal framework to deny non-Western law and sovereignty and also the material capability to defend these extraterritorial court systems against the non-Western elites and populations who became increasingly uncooperative and even hostile to these courts. |
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+Colonialism is the violent negation of the worthy of those who are conquered. The colonial project renders the colonized invisible to hide its violent exploitation of the colonized. |
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+Hayes et al: Floyd W. Hayes III Fanon: a critical reader. Ed. Lewis Ricardo Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. “Fanon, Oppression and Resentment: The Black Experience In the United States.” 1996. |
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+Fanon points out that in the colonial situation the primary thrust of the Master in relation to the Slave is not for the sake of recognition but for work. The colonized are dehumanized, their humanity effaced, not simply for the sake of the colonizer's ego satisfaction but for the purpose of the colonized's exploitation (Pn 179 / BS 220). What colonialism seeks to hide from view, to render invisible about itself, is the grounding fact of its possibility: that colonialism is predicated only on force and fraud. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all exemplify their states of nature in terms of non-European states of being. The fact that force and fraud are the only virtues necessary in the Hobbesian state of nature (the state of "warre') reveals rather that a readier representation of the contractualists' "natural state" is not "the savage peoples of the Americas" and the like (Hobbes: ch. 13) but the colonial condition imposed by Europeans (geographically or racially) upon those deemed non-European. Colonialism is operationalized at both the material and the representational levels. Materially colonialism seeks to strengthens domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation. Representationally, it seeks to sustains the identity of the ideological or discursive image it has created of the colonized and of the depreciated image the colonized have of themselves. Colonialism thus undertakes at the latter level to extend and maintain a veiling, to affect a strategic invisibility on the pan of the colonized: to maintain invisibility socially and politically so as to minimize the costs of economic reproduction. and labor enforcement. Through normalization, colonialism is able to hides from view its constitutive forms of domination. and exploitation. By making the relations and practices of dominance seem standard, normal, and given, colonialism creates as "acceptable" its central social expressions of degradation and dehumanization, rendering unseen the fact that it makes people what they are not. Colonialism is quite literally untruth, an untruth which to sustain itself must be hidden from view. Fanon speaks of this as "the lie of the colonial situation" (Sr 115 / ADC 128), a lie that infects the colonized who to survive find that they are "hardly ever truthful before the colonizer" (114 /127). Thus, like modernity more generally, colonialism is a condition of extreme ambivalence, imposing a structure, an order of things, it inevitably is incapable of sustaining. Drawn to an order, a scheme of classification, it at once cannot sustain because it is both mis- and unrepresentative of a people the very being of whom it negates, the colonial condition face its impending disorder with differentiation and division, separation and subordination, manipulation and mystification - in short, with fraud and force (sec ch. 4 of Black Skin; see also Bauman). It is in this sense that Fanon sees himself as engaged analytically, critically, in a form of unveiling. |
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+This modern global order of Euro-American domination is justified by the Western colonial philosophical tradition which requires a destructive reading of philosophical texts to resist. From our privileged standpoint we have a choice: we can either sustain and replicate this evil or fight it. Vote neg to choose resistance. |
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+Serequeberhan Tsenay, Prof. Philosophy. Morgan State University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Critique of Eurocentrism.” Pg. 154-57 |
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+From all of the above, then, Kant's historicopolitical texts - and, as I have argued elsewhere, the historical thinking of Hegel and Marx 77 and, by extension, the European philosophic tradition as a whole - is grosso modo grounded, minus its "dark horses," on a Eurocentric "pre-text”of the humanity/historicity of human existence as a whole, But why is it necessary to de-structively engage this "pre-text” or Idee? Why is this critical-negative project an indispensable aspect of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy? To begin with, as Kwame Anthony Appiah has correctly noted, we contemporary African philosophers/ and Westernized Africans in general, share by our training and educational formation, in the intellectual heritage of Europe. Consequently, we "see" ourselves and our contemporary situation, at least partially, through the lenses conferral to us in the transmissions of this heritage. Thus, to explore this shared heritage in regards to how it sees and conceptualizes our lived humanity is a necessary precondition to critically appropriating it. For as Frantz Fanon reminds us - lest we forget! - our sharing in this heritage it rather problematic, since it is transmitted to us through a dour stepmother who "restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from … giving free rein to its evil instincts" - a harsh "colonial mother11 who "protects her child from itself"7* Today, that part of our heritage which is African - or its residual -is no longer (at least in principle) considered "evil." In order to begin appropriating to ourselves that from which we were thus far protected, it is first necessary to clear the metaphysical grounding of all the evil that was said of us and done to us. It is not enough to say with Kwasi Wiredu that: “Indeed an African needs a certain level headedness to deal with some of these hinkers at all. Neither 1 Hume, nor Marx, displayed much respect for the black man, so whatever partiality the African philosopher may develop for these thinkers must rest mostly on considerations of the truth of their philosophical thought.” Indeed, to give proper consideration and appreciation to the "philosophical thought" expressed by these and other thinkers in the European tradition presupposes the critical destructive labor of seeing how "the truth" is skewed and skewered by the partiality it justifies. and in which it is enmeshed. The necessity for this undertaking, furthermore, is grounded in the fact that today Eurocentrism is the general consciousness of our age. It is not something that merely affects Europeans. As Marx noted in the German ideology, the dominant ideas of the ruling strata in a society are always, at any particular point in time, the dominating ideas of an age or historical period. Today in our global society the dominant ideas are the ideas through which Europe dominates the world. As Jose Rabasa has appropriately noted: “I must emphasize again that by Eurocentrism I do not simply mean a Tradition that places Europe as a universal cultural ideal embodied in what is called The West, but rather a pervasive |metaphysical | condition of thought* It is universal because it affects both Europeans and non-Europeans, despite the specific questions and situations each may address.” To critically engage in a destructive reading of the texts of the Occidental tradition as regards their views on non-European cultures is thus to critically appropriate that part of our own heritage which was violently "bestowed" on us by Europe. Not to do so would be to continue to inhabit a defunct intellectual horizon, whose material embodiesments that is, overt imperialism and colonialism. - have already been destroyed by the formerly colonized peoples of the world. Today, in our post colonial present, we face a more covert hegemony which functions and implements global Euro-American domination through the Westernized segments of formerly colonized peoples. For better or for worse, we who belong to the Westernized segments of formerly colonized societies occupy positions of relative power which can be utilized either to replicate Europe or to try and unleash the concrete and suppressed possibilities of our respective histories.10 For example, as 1 Lyotard has correctly observed: "The spread of struggles for independence since the Second World War and the recognition of new national names seem to imply a consolidation of local legitimacies” But this "spread of struggles for independence" only "seems to imply" the "consolidation of local legitimacies;" it is only a semblance, an appearance that hides the actuality that "new 'independent’ governments either fall in line with the market of world capitalism or adopt a Stalinist-style political apparatus.” In a similar vein, Castoriadis tells us that the West asserts "not that it … has. . . discovered the trick of producing more cheaply and more quickly more commodities, but that it. . . has| . . . discovered the way life appropriate to all human society." In making such a grandiose metaphysical assertion, the "unease”1 that "Western ideologues" might have fell is "allayed by the haste with which the 'developing' nations" or, more accurately* the Westernized elites of these nations greedily "adopt the Western 'model’ of society." What both Lyotard and Castoriadis are pointing to is the fact that the hegemonic replication of Europe, in our shared postcolonial present, is carried on by and incarnated in the human residue that is^ the Westernized elites left behind by the retreating colonial empires of Europe. In other words, the "fact that, in some particular domain, and to some particular end i.e., the scientific/technological control of nature,"" the West has achieved considerable success is taken, by the Westernized elites and their metropolitan mentors, as a sign of Europe's absolute metaphysical superiority to the rest of humanity). It is, grosso modo, this domineering theme that constitutes the Eurocentric consciousness of our postcolonial globe and, as we have seen in our reading of Kant, finds its speculative foundation in the Western tradition of philosophy.. More than through physical force, Euro-America today rules through its hegemony of ideas, "through its ‘models’ of growth and development, through the statist and other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” This is why Fanon concludes Le dames de la terre with a simultaneous calls to leave "old" Europe behind and engage in the concrete inventing and creating of our own lived historicity. But to heed, or even hear, Fanon’s call requires that we first recognize and de-structure the speculative metaphysical underpinnings of the Eurocentric constraints that have held us and still hold us – in bondage. This, in my view, is one of the most important and basic tasks of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy; its critical-negative project –the critique of Eurocentrism. |