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... ... @@ -1,26 +1,0 @@ 1 -Interpretation: Debaters who have attended at least 1 bid tournament must disclose all of the positions they have read full text on the 2015-2016 NDCA wiki. 2 - 3 -Violation: 4 - 5 -Net benefits: 6 - 7 -1. Education 8 - 9 -a. Evidence Quality – Disclosure creates a public information database which streamlines case writing and encourages debaters to find the best evidence on the topic. 10 -Nails 13 (Jacob, NDT Policy Debater at Georgia State University), “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third Party Disclosure)”, NSD Update, 10/10/2013 DD 11 -I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. 12 -b. Incentivizes Research – Disclosure allows debaters to craft specific responses to their opponent’s positions which promotes deep discussion. 13 -Nails 13 (Jacob, NDT Policy Debater at Georgia State University), “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third Party Disclosure)”, NSD Update, 10/10/2013 DD 14 -In theory, the increased quality of information could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. 15 -c. Argument Responsibility – Disclosure discourages cheap shot strategies which rely on obfuscation to win rounds. 16 -Nails 13 (Jacob, NDT Policy Debater at Georgia State University), “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third Party Disclosure)”, NSD Update, 10/10/2013 DD 17 -Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments. I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. If these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies. A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round. 18 -2. Evidence Ethics – Full text disclosure allows debaters to ensure that evidence has been accurately tagged and cut. 19 -Tambe and Ghandra 14 (Arjun, ToC Quarterfinalist) and (Akhil, Three time ToC qualifier), “Evidence Ethics in LD Debate: A Proposal by Akhil Ghandra and Arjun Tambe”, VBriefly, 10/24/2014 DD 20 -First, we think debaters should disclose the full text of their positions on the NDCA wiki. Many articles have already been written on the importance of disclosure, so we won’t repeat those arguments here. However, we think disclosure can help address the issue of miscutting or fabricating evidence since debaters can verify whether a piece of evidence read by their opponent has been cut ethically by reading the article the evidence is cut from. Full text disclosure would also elevate the quality of disclosure. Providing the first and last three words of an article can make it difficult to reconstruct a debater’s case since not everyone has access to all the databases articles may have been accessed from. Full text disclosure expands access to debaters’ evidence. 21 - 22 -3. Accessibility 23 - 24 -a. Resource Inequality – Full text disclosure puts everyone on an equal playing field by ensuring that debaters with fewer resources can still access evidence cut from expensive online libraries and databases. 25 - 26 -b. Prep Burden – Larger schools have the ability to scout more rounds at tournaments by virtue of the fact that they have larger teams and more connections on the circuit. Disclosure solves because it gives everyone access to the same intelligence. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,7 +1,0 @@ 1 -Counter plan text: The United States federal government should require police departments to hire more diverse police officers to represent the community. 2 -Fifield 16. Jen. Jen Fifield is a demographics reporter at Stateline. Before joining Pew, Fifield spent five years covering state, county and city policy and politics for The Frederick News-Post in Maryland and education for The Gazette of Montgomery County. In those roles, she won several regional journalism awards for investigative, political, education and feature reporting. In 2015, she was named a fellow in the Ravitch Fiscal Reporting Program at the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. She hails from Arizona, where she got her start freelancing for local newspapers. She graduated with honors from Arizona State University’s Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication.. “Does Diversifying Police Forces Reduce Tensions?” The Pew Charitable Trust. MCM. 3 -As police-involved shootings have increased tensions between police and black communities across the country, some law enforcement agencies have put out similar calls for help in hopes of recruiting a more diverse force as one way to re-establish community trust. Leaders in Indianapolis, Minneapolis and Knoxville, Tennessee, recently refocused their efforts to attract and hire more minorities. There are two major reasons why law enforcement struggles to recruit minorities, Jones-Brown said. When police treat communities like they are all criminals, they don’t want to be part of the agency. And when police enforce low-level crimes in communities of color, many people end up with criminal records that disqualify them from applying. In Knoxville, past recruiting efforts had little success, said David Rausch, the chief of police. Of the 386 sworn officers there, 358 are white. The lack of diversity could be the result of a lack of qualified minority candidates, Rausch said. But it also could be because of a stigma attached to police by the minority community, which has worsened with recent events across the country. Diversity, especially in leadership, can improve problem-solving and increase innovation, said Patrick Oliver, who runs a criminal justice program at Cedarville University, in Ohio, and worked in law enforcement for 27 years. Diversity at the top also can prevent a culture of racial bias. Managers set expectations and policies, and supervise officers, Oliver said. Communities see diverse police departments as more legitimate and are more likely to take ownership in policing when a department is diverse, a 2000 study found. Having a good racial mix debunks stereotypes among officers, said Tammie Hughes, the assistant chief of police in Dallas. It also shows children in the community that “if she can be a police officer, I can be a police officer, too. Once you plant those seeds, they have something they can look forward to doing.” 4 - 5 -Department diversity builds trust and prevents racial stereotypes, this is necessary and achievable reform 6 -Weitzer 15. Ronald. Ronald Weitzer is professor of sociology at George Washington University in Washington, DC. He is the author of Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern Ireland and co-author of Race and Policing in America: Conflict and Reform. “Diversity Among Police Officers is Key, But It Won’t Solve the Problems With Policing.” The Guardian. MCM. 7 -But it can pay major dividends in other ways. In one poll of 1,791 Americans that I and a colleague conducted for our book, Race and Policing in America, more than 70 of blacks, Hispanics and whites in the United States believed that a city’s police department should have a similar racial composition to the city. The same study found that very few blacks and Hispanics (only 5) want most officers who work in their neighborhoods to be exclusively of the same race as the residents, and instead most people prefer to see racially-mixed teams of officers patrolling their streets. . Importantly, such diversity can help to build trust and confidence in the police: the more a police department reflects the composition of the local population, the higher the department’s reputation among residents, which can provide a foundation to build further trust, coupled with other needed reforms. It also helps, in majority-black or majority-Hispanic cities, if the chief of police comes from that community as well because, as the public face of the department, he or she can allay suspicions when controversial incidents occur in a way that white police chiefs may not be able to do. A diverse police force can also help to decrease the sense that individuals are being stopped and questioned solely because of their race. This clearly applies when the officers and citizens are of the same race, but even encounters between white officers and minority citizens may be perceived as less racialized when the department has a critical mass of minority officers. A representative police force can, in other words, have symbolic benefits that enhance the overall status of a police department and also reduce the perception that actions, such as stops or searches, are based on racial profiling. Most police chiefs realize the advantages of a department that represents the local community, but there are big challenges in recruiting more minority officers. Many Hispanics and African Americans are reluctant to consider a career in law enforcement – not surprising, given the history of policing in America coupled with more recent events. Highly-publicized incidents like the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson and Eric Garner in New York only make it more difficult for police departments to recruit minority officers. Recruiters can have some success, however, if they broaden their outreach efforts to include churches and community centers – and if there are pre-existing positive relationships between the police and residents in those minority neighborhoods where community policing has already taken root, which can be built on. Although troubled interactions between minorities and police garner most of the headlines, there are neighborhoods in American cities where working-class and middle-class black and Hispanic residents – including youths – have better relationships with the authorities than on average, as I found in a study of Washington DC neighborhoods. It is in these communities that the police can enhance their recruitment efforts and achieve at least some success. Racial diversification is one crucial ingredient in a larger program of reform that is required to improve police departments throughout the country. A representative police force is not a panacea – but it is a positive reform, and an achievable one. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,14 +1,0 @@ 1 -The AFF’s feminist standpoint inherently legitimates a gender duality by defining women as a distinct social and biological group with certain characteristic experiences. The AFF divides the world into male and female. 2 -Ferguson 91 – (Kathy E. Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii “Interpretation and Genealogy in Feminism” Signs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 1991), pp. 322-339). DRD. 3 - An important tension within current feminist theory is that between articulating women's voice and deconstructing gender. The creation of women's voice, or a feminist standpoint, or a gynocentric theory, entails diving into a world divided between male and female experience in order to critique the power of the former and valorize the alternative residing in the latter. It is a theoretical project that opposes the identities and coherencies contained in patriarchal theory in the name of a different set of identities and coherencies, a different and better way of thinking and living. The deconstruction of gender entails stepping back from the opposition of male and female in order to loosen the hold of gender on life and meaning. This theoretical project renders gender more fragile, more tenuous, less salient as both an explanatory and an evaluative category. The creation of a women's point of view is done in order to reject the male ordering of the world; the deconstruction of gender is done in order to reject the dualism of male and female.' Efforts to give voice to a women's perspective sometimes emphasize the need to speak with and listen to women, and other times go on to call on women's perspective to provide direction for political change. In both approaches the arguments usually call for some founding source for women's experiences: sexuality and reproduction, the political economy of the gendered division of labor, the practices of mothering, the telos of nature, or divine inspiration. Sometimes the defining category is conceptualized biologically or innately, suggesting an essentialist form of argument in which the meaning of women's lives is lodged in the body or the psyche. Other times essentialism is eschewed in favor of a historical account in which "woman" or "women" is/are produced through and against the operation of political, economic, and social forces. Whether the arguments emphasize what women do or what women are, the construction of the category "women's experience" calls for some coherent notion of what sorts of persons and what sorts of experiences count as fundamental. Realizing that the foundation they seek may not apply to all women or exclude all men, expressions of women's voice usually call for respect for differences among women (and sometimes among men as well), but the logic of the search for a founding experience tends to elide difference nonetheless. The deconstructive project comes to the defense of difference, in opposition to "the founding of a hysterocentric to counter a phallic discourse."2 The deconstruction of gender is done in the name of a politics of difference, an antifoundationalism defending that which resists categorization, which refuses to be corralled in the categories of male and female. While nearly all feminist theory at some level opposes binary opposition, the deconstructivists are the most radical in their call for an opposition to sexual dualism itself in the name of "the multiplicity of sexually marked voices," or relationships that "would not be a-sexual, far from it, but would be sexual otherwise: beyond the binary difference that governs the decorum of all codes? 4 -This exclusion is dangerous – gender identifications beyond the binary are privatized and problematized. This marginalization prohibits any tangible solution to gender discrimination. 5 -Hope 12 - (Hope PR specialist and journalist “A Penis and a Dress: Why the Gender Binary Needs to Go Away” Huffington Post). DRD. 6 -We're looking at biological sex and gender in all the wrong ways. The solution? We need to raze the binary gender system entirely. A lofty, pie-in-the-sky goal, perhaps, but one that we're entirely capable of achieving. What purpose does aligning biological sex with societal ideas of gender norms serve, anyway? Why should someone with a penis be outfitted in blue and get toy trucks while someone with a vagina gets shuffled off to ballet class and squeezed into frilly dresses? Monitoring someone's psychosexual development might be important for health reasons, but policing their gender certainly is not. How do our constructs of "maleness" and "femaleness" contribute to a better world? They don't. Medical treatment, such as hormone therapy and surgery to more closely match bodies with an authentic sense of self, is currently the right decision for some people, but our existing, binary gender system makes it impossible to determine whether any of those people might feel more at home in the bodies in which they were born if only we backed away from trying to assign labels and behaviors to match our genitals. It's likely that some people would not want physical alterations if we taught everyone from birth that the body you were given doesn't dictate what childhood and adult expressions and activities you can engage in. In fact, not only would life get infinitely more accepting for transgender folks, but doing away with gender labels would solve millennia-old problems like misogyny, for one. Listen closely: Can you hear the glass ceiling shattering? Envision a society where less emphasis is placed on body parts to describe identity. Imagine a world where someone with a penis can wear dresses every day if this person desired. Gender-neutral bathrooms and department stores and professional sports become the rule rather than the exception to it. Children can choose to wear whatever they want, play with whatever toys they prefer, and "It's a baby!" replaces the gender-assigned announcement that proud parents send out. We let our children identify themselves, or not, as they grow, and do not impose gendered rules on their tiny, vulnerable, developing senses of self.After all, the biological spectrum is much more varied than just "man" or "woman"; when you factor in hormonal, chromosomal, and physical makeup, you get all sort of natural variations of sex that could, and probably would, translate into many different genders if only we allowed for it. If we shook the very foundations of our limiting, binary-gendered society, we're likely to see a very colorful array of confident, creative, beautiful people who span the range of internal and outward gender identity and expression. We're getting closer in Western thought to at least allowing our children to re-identify when the labels we've placed on them don't match their own self-identification, but we continue to fail at backing the conversation up to the point in time when we looked at our little embryo via ultrasound and decided whether we wanted to know the gender. Who cares what color we paint the nursery walls? We should reinvent our society so that our children can express themselves freely without the constraints of gender. Until we get rid of "male" and "female" as pillars of personhood, we will never see a solution to the discrimination waged against those who do not fit cleanly into the existing and limiting categories. 7 - 8 -The alt is to deconstruct gender by rejecting the male/female binary which perpetuates heteronormativity as the only “proper” form of existence. This disempowers women by stressing a dependence on men for existence. 9 -Mirabelli 12 – (Rebecca “My Anatomy, Your Sex: Deconstructing the sex/gender binary and heteronormativity through the isolation of gender from sexuality” http://youngchicagoauthors.org/girlspeak/blog/essays-articles/my-anatomy-your-sex-deconstructing-the-sexgender-binary-and-heteronormativity-through-the-isolation-of-gender-from-sexuality-by-rebecca-mirabelli). DRD. 10 -In a patriarchal society that encourages heteronormative behaviours, we are persuaded to believe that human sexuality is trapped not only within the dichotomy of male and female genders, but within the subtext of heteronormality. The appropriation of conventional male or female behaviours, for the queer community, becomes essential in a society where a nuance of homophobia produces anxiety through being branded a dyke or fag. However, this appropriation occurs within the heterosexual community as well, in response to the fear of being exiled from the heterosexual in-crowd. For both these groups, the assumption is that one’s behaviour, and gender, is pre-determined by one’s genitals. In other words, one’s genitals determine the ways in which one performs sex. In other words, there is no gender outside of sex. In light of this, the deconstruction of the sex/gender binary is crucial. In this essay, I plan to dismantle the naturalization of heterosexuality (and ultimately the sex/gender binary) by creating three new sexual orientations that are variations of heterosexuality while focusing primarily on gender identities: the lesbian-heterosexual, the gay-heterosexual, and the bi-heterosexual. What happens to heterosexuality when we think outside of two genders? That’s a question I aim to investigate in this paper. In doing so; however, I do not intend to take any form of homosexuality out of queer; I am taking a constructively pro-gay stance to scrutinize the binaries surrounding sex and gender, but am also attempting to create more options around gender and sexuality for both women and men.In this paper, I use the didactic essays of Adrienne Rich and Judith Butler to assist my deconstruction of heterosexual hegemony and the sex/gender binary, and to also demonstrate the relevancy of my three new sexual orientations. In Rich’s article, Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Existence, she focuses primarily on the lesbian response to heteronormativity. Her ideas; however, are applicable to the deconstruction of the sex/gender binary in regards to heteronormativity, seeing that she is “examining heterosexuality as a political institution which disempowers women although I argue men as well” (227). Rich argues against the obligation of heterosexuality stating that women do not need to depend on men as social and economic supports and further calls for a greater understanding of lesbian experiences. In her article, Rich identifies her concept of the lesbian continuum as a “range—through each woman’s life and throughout history—of woman-identified experience, not simply the fact that a woman has had or consciously desired genital sexual experience with another woman” (239). She also focuses on lesbian existence as a breaking down of taboos and “the rejection of a compulsory way of life” (ibid).Judith Butler’s article Imitation and Gender Insubordination focuses more broadly on gender—as opposed to Rich’s article which deals with lesbians exclusively—and the limitations one faces using “identity categories which tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes” (Butler 308). Butler uses the concept of drag to critique gender. She argues; however, that drag is not a “putting on of a gender that belongs properly to some other group….since there is no ‘proper’ gender” (312). What she means by there is no proper gender, is that gender is not a ‘being’ but a way of ‘doing’. In other words, gender is something one does rather than something one is. Butler argues that sexuality can never be fully expressed, meaning that it is never constant; it is constantly changing. Similarly, she claims that gender “is a performance that produces the illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core” (317) which demonstrates how difficult it is to separate sex and gender seeing that many people constitute gender as the result of sex and vice versa. Ultimately, Butler attempts to destabilize heterosexuality in a similar way that I aim to, and that is to “invert and displace” (318) the ways gender and sexuality are intertwined saying that we should work “sexuality against identity” (ibid). Compulsory heterosexuality, the lesbian continuum, and gender performativity are concepts from Rich’s and Butler’s articles that I plan to take up and explore in order to deconstruct and destabilize heteronormativity and the gender/sex binary.The influence of the sex/gender dichotomy on sexuality can be depleted through the isolation of gender as an independent factor unrelated to sex. By “working sexuality against identity” (Butler 318) gender becomes its own construct and not the result of sex. By saying that gender can be isolated from sex, I am really saying that we are separating the anatomical aspect of sexuality from gender identity. This suggests that heterosexuality describes the anatomical way, and not the gendered way, one performs sex. In relation to Butler’s argument, heterosexuality, in this case, becomes something ones does and not how one is or identifies. In the naturalization of heterosexuality, to identify as a heterosexual means to appropriate the norms and expected behaviours associated with being ‘straight’. In a deconstructionist view, when isolating gender from sex, one can still identify as a heterosexual (penis-vagina copulation; anatomy), but one’s behavioural identity or gender is unrelated to the way one prefers to perform sex. By doing so, we are making room for an infinite amount of genders seeing that we are breaking down the binary and creating opportunities for multiplicity. Ultimately, the existence of more than two primary genders, as compared to the two primary sexes considered normative, becomes established. When trying to deconstruct the sex/gender binary, with new combinations being created, such as lesbian-, gay-, and bi-heterosexuality, there becomes the possibility of six genders. By promoting plurality we are further destabilizing the sex/gender binary created from heteronormativity. Since “heterosexuality naturalizes itself through setting up certain illusions of continuity between sex and gender” (Butler 317), by depleting this continuity we are making room for variation and creating space for fluidity.In order to deconstruct the normalcy of heterosexuality as the primary sexuality, I introduce three new sexual orientations—lesbian-heterosexuality, gay-heterosexuality, and bi-heterosexuality—which denote the separation between gender identity and sexual performance. Rich’s concept of the lesbian continuum influenced the construction of these new identities. Borrowing the idea of a range or spectrum of woman-identified experience (Rich 239), I decided to focus mainly on the scale of gendered-experience and the variance between gender at one end of the spectrum (extreme performance of masculinity) and at the other (extreme performance of femininity). Through this, gender becomes a fluctuation as it loses all sense of rigidity seeing that masculinity and femininity can become transfixed within each other. The isolation of gender from sex, evident in these three sexual orientations, deconstructs heteronormative sexuality by illustrating that one’s sexual orientation is not determinative of gender; they are separate. The three sexual orientations are literal representations of the gendered-experience spectrum with gay-heterosexuality demonstrative of the extreme performance of masculinity, lesbian-heterosexuality representative of the extreme performance of femininity, and bi-heterosexuality signifying any and all space in between the two.The lesbian-heterosexual is a biological woman who has sex with biological men but is attracted to femme-men, or men who associate with feminine-gendered behaviour. In other words, she is anatomically heterosexual, but her attraction to the female gender establishes her, behaviourally, as a lesbian. Similar to what Rich argues, by associating the homosexual (gender) with the heterosexual (sex), we are “challenging the erasure of lesbian existence….while also challenging the distortion of the experience of heterosexual women” (227). This exemplifies that the sex/gender binary is not only being deconstructed, but by intermixing homosexuality and heterosexuality, the homo/hetero dichotomy is being challenged as well. Ultimately, meaning that the lesbian, or homosexual, experience is not being dominated or expunged by heteronormativity. The production of the lesbian-heterosexual also subverts the notion that “women are ‘innately’ sexually oriented only to men” and that the “lesbian is simply acting out of her bitterness toward men” (229). Subverting women’s vocation as ‘for men only’ challenges the idea of compulsory heterosexuality. Furthermore, by combining lesbian experience with heterosexual desire, heteronormative opposition to homosexuality is being dismantled. Also, by choosing to be heterosexual but with a man who encompasses feminine values, women are opposing the belief that “heterosexuality is…the ‘sexual preference’ of ‘most women’” (ibid). Compulsory heterosexuality suggests that women have an inclination to prefer heterosexual relations with men because of “a mystical/biological heterosexual inclination” (232); however, by creating the lesbian-heterosexual, I am able to deconstruct the naturalization of heterosexuality by suggesting that gender plays an intrical part in appeasing women’s impulses. In other words, although heterosexuality may be a “‘preference’ or ‘choice’ for women” (239), these women are given autonomy in the sense that they are able to ‘choose’ the gender identity of their male partner.In comparison to the lesbian-heterosexual, the gay-heterosexual is a biological male who has sex with biological females but is attracted to butch-women, or women who associate with masculine-gendered traits. He is anatomically a heterosexual but his attraction to the masculine establishes him as gay, performatively. When Butler says “there is no ‘proper’ gender, a gender proper to one sex rather than another” (Butler 312) she is arguing that heteronormativity has inscribed masculinity as belonging to male and femininity as belonging to female. This idea is taken apart with the gendered-experience scale seeing that ‘gender’ can be performed by either sex at any location on the spectrum. Gender becomes malleable and unidentifiable seeing that “there will be passive and butchy femmes, femmy and aggressive butches, and both of those, and more” (315). What this means is that with the isolation of gender, there is a breaking down of stereotypes so that classification of a dyke or fag becomes impossible, especially since there can be soft-core dykes and masculine fags. When “there is no breakage, no discontinuity between ‘sex’ as biological facticity and essence, or between gender and sexuality” (317) then not only are binaries inseparable, but heterosexual values becomes normative and naturalized, and anything in opposition to heteronormativity becomes the inferior other. When gender is separated from sex, gendered behaviour can determine a man/woman’s preference for his/her partner (of the same sex)’s gender. In other words, when a heterosexual man prefers butch behaviours in his female partner, his ‘gay’ gender determines how masculine a woman must be in order for him to be attracted to her.In relation to both lesbian-heterosexuality and gay-heterosexuality, the lack of constancy between extreme feminine and extreme masculine genders allows for me to construct the third sexual orientation of the bi-heterosexual. In other words, bi-heterosexuality is constructed when the idealized ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ genders shift from being fixed to ambiguous—since ‘bi’ becomes a combination of both. Bi-heterosexuality is the ultimate deconstruction of the naturalization of heterosexuality since it argues against unchanging genders stating that there is a possibility to ‘be’ either, or, or both. Arguably, “the prospect of being anything….seems to be more than a simple injuction to become who or what we already are” (307). Butler suggests that ‘being’ something—straight, lesbian, gay, bi, etc—assumes or pre-determines who or what we are simply by stating it. However, the bi-heterosexual isn’t a presupposition of being attracted to both sexes. In a deconstructionist view, the bi-heterosexual is a heterosexual man or woman who is not attracted to just masculine or feminine behaviours, but a conglomeration of both sometimes of equal or lesser values for either. For example, a bi-heterosexual woman attracted to a man who encompasses both feminine and masculine behavioural traits might seek a partner who is professional dancer, but who is also a bar bouncer or doorman. This example contains two occupations that encompass both extreme ends of the spectrum, but I argue that the bi-heterosexual not only is attracted to both extreme sides of masculinity and femininity but is defined by their preference for a fluctuating combination of both genders.In the creation of these sexual orientations I am not diminishing the very real oppressions and experiences by members of the queer community. I am merely attempting to envision a world outside of restrictive binaries in which identity is not defined by who one has sex with or how one has it. It is not my intention to deplete homosexuality through associating it, and ultimately combining it, with heterosexuality, but to argue against defining homosexuality by its location of opposition to heterosexuality. I am trying to prevent and ultimately stop the defining process of comparing sexuality, gender, etc. against its predetermined other because when we identify what something is compared to what it is not then we begin to discriminate. Through the construction of the lesbian-, gay-, and bi-heterosexual I am not only opposing compulsory heterosexuality, heteronormative responses to homosexuality, and the sex/gender binary, but I am creating a space for women and men equally where both alike are not exposed to the degradation and anti-liberationist behaviours they face from the heteronormative opposite sex. In this paper I do not speak towards the location of trans-identified persons; however, I do believe that the gender society recognizes him/her as, and the gender he/she identifies as should be coalesced. Although ultimately these sexual orientations are not one hundred percent applicable to the trans community, I do believe that when regarding the subject of their gender and sexuality that gender should be isolated from sex. Otherwise, anatomy dictates—as heteronormativity determines—the gender a trans-person identifies with. In other words, dividing gender from sexuality allows the trans-community some agency, seeing that their gender and sexuality will not be judged against each other to repress individual experience.In this essay I have introduced three new sexual orientations which gravitate around the concept of separating gender from sexuality. In doing so, this allows for an expansion in gender identification as it is not being limited to representing and being equal to however many sexes are universally recognized. Be it two, three, four, or five sexes, or even more, there does not need to be equality between how many sexes there are and how many genders, especially since gender is constantly in a state of change. I argued that I am not attempting to de-gay queer in any way, shape, or form, or spoke towards the trans-community. By limiting my focus on the necessity of deconstructing dichotomies oppressive to all genders and sexualities, I attempt to create vagueness about what gender really is. With regards to the gendered-experience, gender can never be truly identifiable seeing that, except for at the ends of the spectrum where extreme masculinity and femininity reside, gender is one large miscellany of the feminine and masculine and there can be no capitulation of it to sex if it cannot be pinpointed or defined. The lesbian-heterosexual, gay-heterosexual, and bi-heterosexual are sexual orientations that circulate around the idea that gender can be and is separated from sex. To ‘be’ heterosexual is to copulate with male/female anatomical genitals. To ‘be’ is a way of identification which Butler argues oppresses with the very statement of the ‘I am’; in part, I agree seeing that ‘being’ straight means to comply with the requirements of heteronormativity. Separating gender from sex allows autonomy to be given to the individual experience seeing that there can never be only two genders when gender is always a creation and re-creation of itself. So what happens to heterosexuality when we think outside of two genders? It becomes ubiquitous by dismantling into nothing. 11 -And, the K comes first because by challenging the representations of the AC, it acts as a prior question. Since our dominant assumptions change the way we view the world, the epistemology of the aff is flawed if it is rooted in oppression. 12 -Brown 12, Catrina. “Anti-Oppresion Through a Postmodern Lens: Dismantling the Master’s Conceptual Tools in Discursive Social Work Practice.” Critical Social Work. 2012. 13 - 14 -Writing out the social reflects subjectivism, whereby implicitly or explicitly the individual becomes a transcendental subject (Smith, 1999). When experience is treated as though it were outside social construction, outside the social, we lose the history of its construction; we lose how it was put together, how it was socially organized. Decontextualized, dehistoricized, and depoliticized approaches to subjectivity, and experience, produce a politics of the personal. A critical reflexive epistemology recognizes that beginning anti-oppressive practice with pre-constituted social categories such as gender, race, class, or ableism means that we have begun with a process which is decontextualized, dehistoricized, and depoliticized. This means the central concepts themselves remain intact, separated from their social construction. Dominant assumptions about gender, race, and/or class, for example, may go unquestioned and may in fact be simply reinscribed. We have begun with the masters tools - these dominant foundational social categories are organized within dominant discourses and dominant social relations. We keep them alive in part by living them as they were constructed, thereby naturalizing them, making them inevitable. The subsequent subjectivism and essentialism, is ironic, inadvertent, not the intent. Anti-oppression discourse must tackle this because it is may potentially retrench oppression rather than challenge dominant social discourse and dominant social relations of power. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,9 +1,0 @@ 1 -The aff’s use of civil suits focuses on punishing individual perpretators of violence – this obscures the endemic violence of police forces 2 -Feldman 15 (Leonard Feldman, Hunter College, CUNY) “Police Violence and the Legal Temporalities of Immunity” LADI 3 -On the same day the Department of Justice declined to prosecute Ferguson Missouri Officer Darren Wilson for civil rights violations in the shooting death of Michael Brown, it issued a scathing report as part of a “Pattern and Practice” investigation of the entire police force. Concerning the former—the decision not to prosecute—while this paper has focused on the legal grey hole of civil litigation for civil rights violations, it is possible to detect similar forms of legal immunity in the high thresholds for prosecution established by 18 U.S.C. § 242. The legal reasoning overlaps 25 with that in civil litigation because in the criminal cases the courts use the same standard of “objective reasonableness” developed in the civil cases (Graham, Garner, and Scott) to establish that a rights violation occurred. While there is no qualified immunity defense (according to the Supreme Court in Pearson) there is a higher willfulness standard (and “specific intent” requirement) for proving a violation that similarly works to shield police.55 (Campaign Zero, discussed below, recommends eliminating the willfulness standard for Federal Civil Rights prosecutions of police officers.56) Perhaps the Court felt less compelled to erect barriers to criminal prosecutions (as opposed to civil litigation) since it assumed that federal prosecutors’ discretion would accomplish the very same objective. Concerning the latter—the Department of Justice’s report on the entire police force of Ferguson, as well as the complicity of judges and city officials—it offers the promise of constraining police use of force by using the threat of litigation to address broader and deeper policies and practices. As Coates argues, “the focus on the deeds of alleged individual perpetrators, on perceived bad actors, obscures the broad systemic corruption which is really at the root.”57 Similarly, Madar writes, “far more useful are the DOJ Civil Rights Division’s root-and-branch interventions into violently dysfunctional police forces, triggered by ‘patterns and practices’ of systematic rights violations rather than any one particular incident.”58 Moving beyond both law and sovereignty narrowly construed, enables attention to what Harmon describes as the “problem of regulation” and the role of “other institutions and sources of law in regulating the police.”59 As Harmon shows, police use of force is embedded in a dense but also permissive regulatory environment running the gamut from administrative rules to employment and collective 26 bargaining law to state level licensing regulations. Consent decrees, Memoranda of Understanding and Collaborative Agreements all emerge out of or in the shadow of Department of Justice “pattern or practice” investigations, aiming to change policies and practices at the department level. Furthermore, even tools such as quantitative benchmarking can be deployed in the service of structural reform: A DOJ study cited by Rushin of the Washington D.C. police force contrasted what they discovered to be 15 rate of excessive force incidents as compared to a benchmark “‘well-managed and supervised police department’ that should only expect about 1 or 2 percent of all incidents to involve excessive use of force.”60 And in Cincinnati, Shatmeier describes successful police department reform in the wake of a Department of Justice “pattern or practice” investigation through consent agreements that relied on “experimentalist regulation.”61 4 -The aff assumes that police violence can be addressed by bringing it under the control of law – in fact, the law is the apparatus legitimating police violence. Civil suits only identify “operational errors” committed by the police, fail to convict police, and excuse and reinforce the violence of the policing apparatus itself. 5 -Simon Behrman 11 (Simon Behrman, ) Police killings and the law – International Socialism, 1-4-2011 LADI 6 -Ever since the late 1970s some on the left have declared that Britain is either in or on the cusp of a police state.5 Yet even after the miners’ strike, various pieces of draconian anti-terrorist legislation and other attacks on civil liberties, the British state remains very much a capitalist democracy. Nevertheless, during this period the use of firearms has become ever more widespread in the police force. It was little noticed, for example, that during the 1990s police forces up and down the country began regularly deploying Armed Response Vehicles (ARV), equipped with a huge stock of firepower.6 The impetus for this began when the IRA bombing campaign came to the mainland. Indeed, the weaponry introduced including live firearms, plastic bullets and CS gas were all road-tested first in Northern Ireland. The point is that just as these developments in police practice have outlived the Irish “emergency”, so too a state of emergency appears to be becoming a more permanent feature of policing policy which has in turn led to a justification for retaining and expanding the right of the police to use lethal force. Examples where “unprecedented” circumstances have been claimed as justification for the use of police-state tactics are mass detentions of anti-capitalist protesters and the threat of suicide bombers. It is very likely that as social instability caused by the economic crisis develops this too will be claimed as justification for the continued use of “emergency” powers. Of course, Marx and Engels argued that capitalist democracy was a major advance over feudalism and offered to the working class a far better terrain on which to fight than other, more authoritarian, forms of capitalist rule. Yet throughout his writings, from “On the Jewish Question” in 1843 right through to the Critique of the Gotha Programme over 30 years later, Marx highlighted two crucial aspects of capitalist democracy. First, democracy and equality in the political sphere mask the massive inequalities that exist in the economic domain where capital operates a dictatorship over labour. Second, as Lenin put it, capitalist democracy provided “the best possible political shell of capitalism”.7 Because the working class poses such a potentially powerful threat to the dictatorship of capital, relying on rule by consent rather than by violence is always the preferred tactic of bourgeois rule. But, and this is the key point, the monopoly on the use of violence that the dictatorship of capital exercises through its state means that killings by the police, along with other forms of state terror, can be accommodated without violating the norms of capitalist democracy. This is achieved via the rule of law, specifically the legal form that, as the Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis argued, shares the same structure as the commodity form. My argument here is that certain police-state tactics such as extra-judicial killings have become possible without the loss of legitimacy and rule by consent conferred by governing under the rule of law. Instead law itself has become a perfect vehicle for such tactics. In short, police violence must be understood not as a departure from capitalist democracy but as a function of it. From policing by terror to policing by consent In spite of the shocking nature of recent killings by the police, it is important to recognise that throughout their history the police have frequently used extreme violence against suspects, bystanders, demonstrators and workers on strike. The violence deployed by the modern police is in fact far less than that of their predecessors of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Douglas Hay has described how the British ruling class of that period imposed their authority through state terror.8 From 1688 until 1820 the death penalty was extended from about 50 offences to over 200, most involving crimes against property.9 Executions were bloody public spectacles intended to instil fear into the lower classes. An additional element of this strategy involved armed members of the local gentry, the yeomanry and special constables. If those ad hoc forces failed to keep order they were reinforced by the deployment of the military around the country. This became increasingly necessary with the intensification of riots in the countryside as the effects of the birth of modern capitalism began to bite. Following in the wake of this brute force, judges would be sent into the affected areas to dispense summary justice. The causes of the riots and the need for the ruling class to impose terror on the populace were rooted in a massive transformation of economic relations during the 18th century. This represented a concerted shift from the remnants of feudalism towards capitalism. Brutal methods were necessary for the ruling class during a period that saw a massive theft from the poor in a process described by Marx as the “primitive accumulation of capital”.10 The new bourgeoisie seized common lands through successive Enclosure Acts, thus impoverishing and starving the local peasantry who relied on these to support and feed themselves. Enclosure had two effects—forcing the rural poor to resort to poaching and scavenging on the estates of the rich, and pushing increased numbers of them from the land into the cities to seek work. The uprooting of communities in the countryside and the chaos of expanding cities with a lack of housing and work for the new arrivals led to social instability fed by anger and desperation from those who had been dispossessed. This period of transition saw the ruling class deploy a combination of forms of rule inherited from the feudal period, and new forms that better suited a capitalist society. An inheritance from feudalism was the use of terror tempered by mercy. The huge increase in crimes punishable by the death penalty was in fact accompanied by a comparative reduction in its actual use. More often those sentenced to death were encouraged to seek clemency from either the king or the property owner against whom they had committed the offence. Assuming they demonstrated a suitable amount of humility, they would be shown mercy and their sentence commuted. Note that in this arrangement law and socio-economic relations appear in one and the same guise. The same person who held a higher social position to you could also at their discretion prosecute you. Following conviction they could accept or reduce the punishment. Sometimes the property owner would negotiate with the convict terms for doing work on their land in exchange for dropping the prosecution. In effect, this was not the rule of law but instead naked class power adorned with some of the rituals of law. In like manner, the application of physical force was not governed by law, but rather by expediency. Once a riot broke out the armed forces of the state were permitted to use whatever force was necessary to restore the king’s peace. This worked up to a point when dealing with the rural poor. For the landed gentry, the debilitating injuries and killing of the local peasants did not disturb their lives or livelihoods on their increasingly large estates. Moreover, the only weapon the peasantry could deploy against the force of the state was their own ability to organise and fight. But face to face against a much better armed and organised military force, they were invariably beaten. With the growth of the working class in the cities the balance of class forces changed. The urban working class living closer together in built up areas were better able to organise and defend themselves. At the 1819 “Peterloo” massacre in Manchester, for example, the crowd numbered possibly up to 150,000, larger than any riot or uprising since the English Revolution almost two centuries earlier. In addition, many of the protesters had been carrying out practice drills for weeks in advance. With just 1,000 troops and 400 constables, the authorities would only be able to break up the protest through the use of extreme violence, and so it was. Men, women and children were stampeded by horses, sabred and whipped relentlessly through the streets of Manchester. The attack that began shortly before 2pm lasted well into the evening, at the end of which at least 11 were dead and about 500 injured. Peterloo exposed the limits of the strategy of terror deployed against the working class. Such concentrated violence caused a major scandal that shocked even sections of the middle classes and the establishment. Moreover, the violence failed to subdue the emerging movement for political and civil rights. Instead it led to a growing number of demonstrations, riots and strikes culminating in the great Chartist movement for manhood suffrage. The Chartists were responsible for, among other things, organising in 1842 the first general strike in history. This new form of resistance was not as easy to deal with as a riot. After all one cannot literally beat a mass of workers back to work. Also, if too many are incapacitated by police and military violence, the capitalists will suffer in the immediate term through fewer workers being able to work. Indeed, the level of violence was far less than in previous uprisings such as Peterloo and at Merthyr in previous decades. The sentences handed out to Chartists were minimal compared with earlier reckonings by the ruling class. No one was sentenced to death and most convictions for rioting or other crimes were punished with terms of imprisonment of a few months up to a few years, although the leading agitators were treated more harshly, many of them sentenced to transportation or much longer jail terms. The fear of the power of the working class also led the government to concede a number of reforms such as the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, which led initially to lower food prices, and the Factory Act 1847 limiting working hours. This was in contrast to the pattern during the 18th century where the ruling class was able to steal wealth from the poor at an ever increasing rate. It was also during this period that the military began to be replaced by the police as the primary tool for enforcing public order. The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 established the force in the capital. In response to the first Chartist agitation, the 1839 County Police Act was enacted allowing the formation of regional police forces. The fear of disorder from demobilised soldiers returning from the Crimean War led to the 1856 County and Borough Act which established police forces across the whole of the country. This period during the mid-19th century represents British capitalism maturing from the more brutalist primitive accumulation of capital into a settled capitalist democracy. Central to this process was the development of the rule of law as the primary method of enforcing order. Legally regulated state violence was replacing naked class terror. The police force was founded on the principle of “citizens in uniform”. In other words, they were bound by the same laws as anyone else. They were also made structurally independent from the control of either politicians or individual members of the ruling class. Thus they were also bound by law in a manner unlike that of the yeomanry or other military forces, whose authority came directly from the Crown and the socio-economic power exercised in localities by the landed gentry and aristocracy. The establishment of the police was part and parcel of a move away from a form of class rule which saw little separation between economic and juridical power. Within decades the state assumed a monopoly on the application of criminal law and, with the police, a monopoly over the use of violence. This accruing of power by the state at first alarmed sections of the ruling class, which is why many of them initially opposed the setting up of a police force. But it quickly became clear that the use of physical force by the capitalist state would not be deployed against property rights, but against labour and the poor. In his classic work on the birth of the prison, Michel Foucault shows convincingly how the move from the application of the power of the king to the power of law provided a more efficient and less risky form of social control. The messy system in force during the later feudal period could lead to: the fear of the uproar, shouting and cheering that the people usually indulge in, the fear that there would be disorder, violence, and outbursts against the parties, or even against the judges… Before the justice of the sovereign, all voices must be still.11 The final word uttered by an apparently neutral and rational law was far more effective in silencing the oppressed. The police became legitimised as “embodiments of impersonal, rational authority”, as opposed to the naked class power of the yeomanry.12 What Foucault glosses over is the fact that this change was a direct result of a set of new economic relationships. The feudal order rested on an ideology of a class born to rule; thus their authority and their right to dispense “justice” was unquestionable. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, rule on the basis of a series of contractual relations. Economic exploitation is rooted in the payment of wages for labour power. This has the effect of normalising exploitative relations such as in the expression: “A fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.” Equally, the rule of law is predicated on notions of fairness, reasonableness and equivalence. Phrases such a “paying the price” for committing a crime, or “let the punishment fit the crime” illuminate this aspect of law. This is quite distinct from feudalism when punishment was a demonstration of the “majesty” and power of the monarch, the nobility or the church. The contractual nature specific to capitalist exploitation finds its equivalent in legal relations. Phil Cohen identifies the police as the first branch of the British state to develop an ideological as well as a purely repressive function…to protect the institutions of private property, and to enforce statutory norms of public order primarily designed to ensure the free circulation of commodities, including the commodity of labour power.13 At first the urban working class had to be disciplined into accepting these norms. Violence between police and local working class communities, defending what they considered as their own territory, was a common feature right up to World War One. But over time there was a “gradual ideological penetration of ‘The Law’ into the basic conditions of working class life”.14 Cohen explains this as a result of social changes in the composition of the working class. While there may be some truth in that, referring to the police as “The Law” also illustrates something else. Unlike their predecessors, the police were not just deployed to put down riots and other major disturbances, but also assigned to manage everyday order in the community. Criminologists sometimes describe this as a dual role involving “parking tickets and class repression”.15 As a result the law and “The Law” gradually came to be seen as indispensable to a well-ordered society, irrespective of class, politics or economics. In short, an ideology of “police fetishism” developed.16 I would argue that this is a direct result of two other fetishes closely linked together—that of law and commodities. Pashukanis In his 1924 book, Law and Marxism, Pashukanis developed what has become known as the “commodity form” theory of law. In it he sought to explain the legal form as one inherently tied to the commodity form. He begins his analysis using the same methodology as Marx does in Capital: “In as much as the wealth of capitalist society appears as ‘an immense collection of commodities’, so this society itself appears as an endless chain of legal relations”.17 What these two sets of relationships—commodity exchange and legal relations—have in common is the notion of the autonomous egoistic individual. When commodity owners go to market to engage in trade, they must each recognise in the others their exclusive right of ownership over their commodities; otherwise they cannot expect their own rights to be so recognised. Thus the basic principle of commodity exchange, the freedom of every seller freely to dispose of their property, gives rise to the concept of universal and equal rights, which is an ideological misrepresentation of capitalist relations as a whole, but one that accurately reflects the actual material conditions in which subjects under capitalism find themselves. The claim of one commodity owner on all others to recognise his own rights as such creates a subjective, and thus seemingly natural, desire to recognise those same rights in others. From this starting point Pashukanis is able to make the following analogy with law: “The legal subject as representative and addressee of every possible claim, the succession of subjects linked together by claims on each other, is the fundamental legal fabric which corresponds to the economic fabric”.18 Thus just as we have the market in which every buyer and seller comes metaphorically brandishing their commodities to exchange, so the law is a regulated market of legal subjects haggling over their respective bundles of rights. The rule of capital is thus also necessarily the rule of law. In “On the Jewish Question” Marx argued that the bourgeoisie emancipated the state from economics and religion by placing it (the state) above society, and thus giving it the appearance of being independent and above the classes.19 As Pashukanis expresses it: By appearing as a guarantor, authority becomes social and public, an authority representing the impersonal interest of the system… Thus there arises, besides direct unmediated class rule, indirect reflected rule in the shape of official state power as a distinct authority, detached from society.20 This provides a theoretical underpinning for the transition from naked class rule to rule by law that I discussed earlier. Commodities and legal relations did, of course, exist in many pre-capitalist societies. But in the same way that a society where free alienation of property raises the commodity to its highest and most generalised level, where exploitation becomes mediated via the legal contract, ie where the exploited worker “figures as a legal subject disposing of his labour power as a commodity”, so also legal relations reach their highest form under conditions of generalised commodity exchange: “The legal form attains universal significance, legal ideology becomes the ideology par excellence, and defending the class interest of the exploiters appears with ever increasing success as the defence of the abstract principle of legal subjectivity”.21 The crucial import of Pashukanis’s analysis is that he is able to reveal how the specific form of social regulation under capitalism, that is rights-based law, is able successfully to transform the subjective needs of the ruling class into an objective set of relationships for society as a whole, by means of which the coercive role of law is then in turn subjectivised (internalised) by the rest of us. The dispersal of responsibilities At first blush it may seem counter-intuitive to apply a theory of law that identifies the logic of equivalence and autonomous egoistic individualism to the application of lethal force by the state against unarmed individuals. However, if we take at look at how the police are able to justify their actions in law, the relevance of Pashukanis will become apparent. There was no disputing the fact that de Menezes was neither armed when he was shot, nor was he a terrorist. How could this wilful and unnecessary taking of life not result in any legal sanction? Crucially, the failure to bring any individual or group of police officers to justice over the de Menezes killing was a result of the dispersal of responsibilities created by law.22 This process rests upon the principle of the autonomous egoistic individual who functions as the commodity owner and legal subject par excellence. In much the same way that the market economy appears as an impersonal and naturalistic process involving an endless chain of buyers and sellers, so law functions in a similar way as each individual stands in relation to all others owing certain duties and possessing certain rights. One of the aspects of the operation which was highlighted in the inquest into de Menezes’s death was the police’s bronze, silver, gold structure used for firearms, and other emergency operations. This structure was developed by the Metropolitan Police in order to develop clear command, following the, from their point of view, catastrophic failure of organisation during the Broadwater Farm riots in 1985.23 One aspect of this system highlighted in the de Menezes inquest was that it removed many crucial strategic and tactical decisions from the officers on the ground and placed them instead in the hands of commanding officers situated miles away in a room in New Scotland Yard. This led to several crucial mistakes in the operation that meant that police officers on the ground missed several opportunities safely to stop de Menezes before he entered the Tube. But it also reinforced the dispersal of responsibilities in such a way that none of the commanding officers, nor any of the officers on the ground could be held criminally liable for the decisions made. This is one reason why the Metropolitan Police as a corporate entity could be successfully prosecuted under health and safety legislation, but that no individual officer was answerable in law for the mistakes made and the decisions taken. A similar conclusion was reached in the Police Ombudsman’s report into the 2003 killing of Neil McConville, a teenage joy-rider in Northern Ireland.24 According to the Ombudsman, the failure to appoint a Bronze Commander in charge on the ground was a critical factor leading to the death of McConville. Thus the officers who carried out the operation were exonerated from blame. On the other hand the senior officers who held the positions of Silver and Gold Commander respectively were merely reprimanded for bad management. Because they were not on the ground and did not fire any shots they were not culpable either. Several senior police officers testified during the de Menezes inquest that one of the concerns the Metropolitan Police had when developing the Kratos policy was that the armed police officer on the ground would be very hesitant in executing a suspect without warning without legal safeguards to protect themselves. During Kratos training members of the specialist firearms unit SO19, who would be assigned to carry out the executions, expressed fears that they would be held both morally and legally responsible, particularly should anything go wrong. It was for this reason that the role of the Designated Senior Officer (DSO) was created within the Kratos policy. The idea was that in a situation where police officers found themselves confronted by a suspected suicide bomber, the DSO, situated in New Scotland Yard, would be responsible for giving the order to shoot. This would take the pressure off the police officers who would actually have to carry out such an extreme and violent act. But surely this then places full legal responsibility on the DSO? Not so, according to the evidence presented to the de Menezes inquest. For the DSO, Commander Cressida Dick, did not give any such order; indeed, her last order to the SO19 officers before they descended into the Tube was ambiguous. The SO19 officers ended up using deliberately lethal force, due to what they claimed was a reasonable judgement based on de Menezes’s behaviour, and coupled with the reports they had received from surveillance officers, senior officers and the DSO during their briefings that morning and throughout the tracking of de Menezes. The responsibility for the killing was thus dispersed amongst the dozens of police officers involved in the operation. Not only does this dispersal of responsibilities create almost insurmountable problems in holding the police accountable, but it also reinforces the logic of capitalism in which bad things result from the market—unemployment, starvation, recessions etc—not because any individual capitalists are responsible but because that is just the way the system involving countless autonomous egoistic individuals operates. The Metropolitan Police declared eight months after the killing of de Menezes that Kratos remained “fit for purpose”; the Stockwell shooting had merely been a result of some operational errors.25 Equally, in the case of McConville, the Ombudsman’s recommendations stressed the importance of clear policies, training and command for operations involving potentially lethal force.26 The report reserved its concluding comment for criticising commanding officers for a lack of effective management.27 In both these cases the issue under consideration was not posed as one of an agent of the state walking up to a member of the public and, without warning, shooting them in the head, or one of a police officer using a semi-automatic rifle to deal with an alleged juvenile delinquent. Rather the issue was considered to be a lack of efficient organisation. It was to this logic of managing barbaric acts through law that Hannah Arendt was referring in her description of the “banality of evil”.28 The “reasonableness” of police killings Ever since the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) the police have been recognised in law as possessing certain special powers, which the rest of us do not have, such as the right to stop and search and detain individuals. However, in terms of the use of force, in the eye of the law they remain neither more nor less than “citizens in uniform”. In other words legally they are to be held to account for taking another person’s life in much the same way as you or me. The law offers us two main defences for killing someone. The first is the common law of self-defence. The second is contained in Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, which states that “a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large”. This obviously refers mainly to the police, but it also applies to any one of us confronted by someone committing a criminal act, eg a burglar in our home. The key term common to both this statutory provision and the defence of self-defence is “reasonableness”. In order to uphold a defence to a charge of murder or manslaughter, one needs to prove two things—that the force used was both necessary and proportionate. If someone attempts to grab my wallet, it will be necessary for me to use physical force to stop them. If someone merely threatens to steal my wallet tomorrow, it would not be necessary for me physically to attack or restrain them. Assuming that I am actually being mugged, the question then arises as to the level of force I can legitimately apply. If in this scenario I push the thief to the ground then that would probably be considered a proportionate degree of force. If I took out a knife and stabbed them in the chest, then that would almost certainly be considered disproportionate. However, if the thief produces a gun when robbing me, the use of a knife might be considered proportionate and legitimate. A key principle evident in the law here is that of balance and rational calculation. I may only do to you something that can be measured as equivalent to the danger posed by you. In each and every case where the police shoot a suspect dead, they always claim that they feared deadly and imminent danger from the victim. So the police officers who shot de Menezes “honestly believed” that he was an armed suicide bomber, and therefore shooting him in the head was a reasonable and proportionate response. In law, the fact that they were subsequently shown to be mistaken does not vitiate their claim as to what their subjective fear was at the time they shot him. It was on the same basis that the case against members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) charged with one of the shoot to kill incidents in 1982 was dismissed. The judge in that case, Lord Justice Gibson, argued that the police had reacted reasonably given the potential danger they faced from known members of the IRA. Indeed, notoriously, he went a step too far by commending the defendants for bringing the murdered IRA suspects to the “final court of justice”. Although, in an unprecedented move, he subsequently had to retract his remarks from the bench, the logic expressed fits perfectly the way in which the devaluation of the lives of suspects allows the police to justify the use of extreme violence against them. The jurisprudence has tended to judge what is reasonable from the subjective standpoint of the police officer who has applied lethal force.29 This then places a disproportionate emphasis on the testimony of the police officer concerned. Again Lord Justice Gibson makes the point crystal clear: The question whether there was the necessary criminal intention is not to be judged…by the standard of what one thinks one would have done or should have done had one been in that situation. The question is: has the Crown proved beyond any reasonable doubt what was the actual state of mind, belief and understanding of the accused police officers in the heat and anxiety of the moment, faced, as they understood it, with but a fleeting second to decide and to act…30 This justification was repeated in almost exactly the same terms more than two decades later to justify the murder of de Menezes morally and legally. When placed in the context of the potential threat from terrorists the criteria of what might be considered reasonable are widened considerably. Instead of the law acting as a restraint upon the police officer, the yardstick by which to measure the legitimate extent of lethal force applied by the police has instead been judged on the basis of the extent of the potential violence committed by the terrorist. The hyperbole that surrounds the “war on terror”, a war whose end cannot be envisaged in a world racked by imperialism, is largely responsible for investing in the concept of a reasonable use of force, a pre-emptive dimension based on quasi-apocalyptic expectations of what terrorists are capable of carrying out. An academic writing on the experience in Northern Ireland points out how the concept of proportionality became so fluid that it facilitated the use of lethal force by law enforcement agents for almost any crime even if it was only a vague notion of a terrorist crime… This has had the profound subsidiary effect that security forces were enabled to engage with supposed terrorists in situations that would enable them the full protec-tion of the law due to the elasticity and elusiveness of the concept of “reasonableness”. 31 It has sometimes been argued that the problem is simply one of English law being out of step with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which applies a more rigorous or objective test in judging the “honest belief” of the police officer.32 However, in a case from 2001 concerning yet another lethal shooting of an unarmed suspect by the police the same court held that “it is not for the court to substitute its own opinion of the situation for that of a police officer who was required to react in the heat of the moment”.33 As Clair de Than points out, this judgment has the effect of placing even greater emphasis on the subjective testimony of the police officer: “It does not have to be a reasonable mistake, merely an honest one”.34 The vague concepts of reasonableness and proportionality, which are integral to law, are given detail and weight by reference to the perceived enormity of the crime that may take place, in order to justify an extra-judicial policy of shoot to kill. In this way the context of what is considered reasonable is shifted towards more brutal policing methods. This paradigm shift, of which Kratos is a part, is born of an increased use of exceptional measures. This leads many to claim that what is needed is a return to a firmer rule of law in order to resist the tendency to resort to states of emergency to fight the “war on terror”. But this is a category mistake, for states of emergency are not departures from law, but are rooted within it. In a footnote, Pashukanis says that when it comes to times of heightened revolutionary struggle, we can observe how the official machinery of the bourgeois state apparatus retires into the background as compared with the volunteer corps of the fascists and others. This further substantiates the fact that, when the balance of society is upset, it seeks salvation not in the creation of a power standing above society, but in the maximal harnessing of all forces of the classes in conflict.35 This passage is problematic as it suggests that the ruling class can simply and consciously put aside the law for its own preservation. If this were so, then it would seem to negate his central point about law’s roots in the objective relations of capital, relations in which they themselves dominate. Mark Cowling identifies the problem as that of “the idea of equivalence and the idea of class terror coming into conflict with one another”.36 Pashukanis is right that at the most acute phases of class struggle, such as existed in Russia in 1917 or Italy a few years later, the ruling class does act in the way he describes. But in order to understand the ever closer and more permanent relationship between law and the state of exception, we must look beyond Pashukanis. What has become increasingly evident over the last century has been the fact that in most cases the ruling class is able to manage its way through crises not by abandoning law, but rather by extending its reach. The “state of exception” Giorgio Agamben argues that the “state of exception”, which has with increasing frequency been used to justify extreme departures from the liberal norms of the rule of law, is in fact a function of law itself.37 Here Agamben is drawing on the work of two critics of capitalist democracy; from the right Carl Schmitt who argued that the state of exception is the necessary foundation of sovereign power38 and from the left Walter Benjamin who posited that “’the state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”.39 Indeed, as long ago as 1851 Marx identified the apparent anomaly of states of exception being written into law in his critique of the liberal-democratic French Constitution of November 1848.40 There are many problems in Agamben’s work, particularly his ahistorical attempt to explain the state of exception as a feature of all human civilisations stretching back to antiquity and beyond. Indeed, in this he departs from all his key influences—Schmitt, Benjamin, Arendt, Foucault—by ignoring the specificity of how power is exercised in modernity. Nonetheless, his work offers some very useful insights by developing the relationship between law and the state of exception that is merely hinted at in Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History”. In doing this Agamben provides a necessary corrective to the idealised celebration of the rule of law that exists amongst the liberal left and indeed among a significant portion of the Marxist left.41 It has become a feature of modern capitalist democracies to call in aid tactics which violate the norms of the rule of law, yet which are justified on the basis of defending the rule of law against existential threats, real or imagined. After almost a decade of the “war on terror” examples are familiar and numerous—Guantanamo Bay, extraordinary rendition, water-boarding, control orders, etc. This argument has, of course, also been used by the police when they claim that they are facing “unprecedented circumstances” which necessitate the deployment of more brutal tactics. The danger in this approach was recognised more than 30 years ago by the ECtHR, when the court ruled that there were limits to the use of national security in justifying extreme methods, even, or perhaps especially, legal ones: The Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.42 And, in words that brought a cheer from every civil libertarian, Lord Hoffman famously declared in a case which struck down New Labour’s policy of detention without trial of terrorist suspects that “the real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these”.43 However, the decision of the House of Lords in that case was not that it was illegal for the government to detain without trial per se, but that the policy was discriminatory, as it did not apply to British citizens, thus breaching the principle of equivalence. The government responded with control orders, which to date stand in law. In mainstream discussions of the problem of the state of exception, it is presented as a contradiction which exposes the gap between the self-identity of liberal democratic societies and the abuses committed by certain governments or state agencies. For Agamben, on the other hand, the state of exception is in fact a latent yet integral function of sovereignty, embodied as much in capitalist democracy as in fascist and other authoritarian political systems. Agamben argues that the claim by the state of the need to protect itself, and wider society, against perceived threats requires it to regularly impose sanctions which fall outside the rule of law. The contradiction thus emerges in that the rule of law can only be protected by regularly going outside the rule of law. Agamben gives as an example the Nazi state, which throughout its existence did not abolish the liberal Weimar constitution, but merely suspended it at regular intervals.44 Thus, legally, the “lawlessness” of the Nazis was in fact rooted in the liberal constitutional Weimar Republic. And in a perverse piece of legal formality, just prior to being sent to the death camps German Jews were stripped of their citizenship, precisely so that they would not be covered by the normal legal rights of other citizens.45 In a like manner, although at a far lower level of barbarism, in Britian shoot to kill has evolved from an unofficial and ad hoc tactic into a policy of extra-judicial killing in the form of the Kratos policy. The ability of the police to act beyond the bounds of the rule of law has, paradoxically, become written into law. This creates a space around the suspected suicide bomber, where the norms of criminal law and police practice are suspended. Yet its status as an official policy, implemented without violating the norms of governmental procedure, grounds this extra-legal policy within the framework of the law. One police officer has attempted to justify Kratos on the basis that it authorises not shoot to kill but the right to take action which, “in order to save life, may have to take life”.46 Echoes here of the infamous comment made by a senior US Army officer during the Vietnam War: “It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it.” This barbaric contradiction in terms recurs throughout the arguments used to justify draconian anti-terrorist measures. The rule of law must be suspended in order to preserve the rule of law. The situations in which the police adopt lethal force are often described as “unprecedented”, with suspects as “dangerous”, “desperate”, “won’t be taken alive”, etc. In striking the balance between the reasonable use of force and the perceived danger posed by the suspect, the mean point gets moved to an extremity. A senior member of the security forces explained how the language of necessity was used to justify lethal force in Northern Ireland: “Was it a decision to kill those people? I don’t think it would have been phrased like that. Somebody would have said, ‘How far do we go to remove this group of terrorists?’ and the answer would have been, ‘As far as necessary’.”47 Similar arguments were used by the Nazis and other totalitarian regimes in the cause of maintaining stability and the security of the state. Indeed, it was this logic that led Schmitt from a critical defender of the Weimar Republic into a supporter and theorist for the Nazis. In the conflict between human rights and security, the latter must always trump the former, for without security there cannot be a social framework strong enough to support human rights. This is but a concrete expression of Agamben’s point that It is as if the judicial order contained an essential fracture between the position of the norm and its application, which, in extreme situations, can be filled only by means of the state of exception, that is, by creating a zone in which application is suspended, but the law, as such, remains in force.48 Agamben allows us to grasp the interrelationship between law and the state of exception, and thus fill the gap left in Pashukanis’s formulation. In attempting to answer the question as to why the evolution of an official shoot to kill policy has met with relatively little outcry compared to the scandal that followed the killings by the RUC in the early 1980s, Agamben’s work illuminates the essential role of law in grounding and thus normalising exceptional and brutal police tactics. The retreat of the organised working class and the concomitant decay in politics have left a gap that has been occupied by law. Benjamin’s injunction that we confront “states of emergency” with a real state of emergency is a call to reject the confines of the rule of law when faced with state violence. The failure to do so leads one into accepting the legal form on which the legitimacy of state violence rests. This is precisely the mistake made by EP Thompson and his followers who argue that the rule of law is a “universal good” which supposedly transcends capitalism.49 A crucial aspect missing from Agamben’s analysis is an understanding of what grounds law and the state of exception, as well as what makes these concepts evolve over time. Instead he points to a highly obscure figure in early Roman law, homo sacer (sacred man), as a recurring figure in Western societies.50 The homo sacer refers to someone who “may be killed, but not sacrificed.” In other words, this person has no value—their life may be taken away without legal sanction. Thus, Agamben argues, the homo sacer is representative of those targeted by the law under a state of exception as being beyond the protection of the law. But Agamben is not able to explain why certain groups or individuals are capable of becoming homo sacer and others not. Indeed, he goes so far at one point as to suggest that today we may all be homines sacri.51 He appears to argue (Agamben is obscure at the best of times) that anyone who poses a threat to the state, or whom the state merely perceives as a threat is liable to become the homo sacer. If this is so it raises the question of why the working class as a whole or even significant sections of it have not been subjected to this process. The reason why this is so is because the always present, if hidden, power of the working class cannot be legislated or terrorised away. Working class organisation can be smashed, but the latent power of the working class is impossible to eliminate. To place any powerful group in society within the category of the homo sacer would fundamentally destabilise the rule of capital. Thus Nazi terror on the streets was necessary politically to break the power of the organised left and the trade unions before those sections of the working class could be made the homo sacer. Nonetheless, even under fascism capital cannot escape the logic of the legal form that, as Pashukanis convincingly argues, is the necessary guarantor of commodity exchange. Thus the fetish of legal formalities that pervaded Nazi rule is not the anomaly it at first appears. The racist content of Nazi law was, of course, qualitatively different than that which exists under capitalist democracy, and all the gains achieved by the working class such as collective bargaining rights were abolished. Yet the basic legal form remained because the economic base of capitalism remained. Not only did the Nazis keep to the legal niceties of the constitutional state, but the working class continued to sell their labour power on the basis of a contractual exchange with employers. For this reason when the demand for labour exceeded supply during the late 1930s, particularly in the construction industry, wages went up in some cases by 30 percent.52 So while the homo sacer is flawed as an analysis of the generalised form of capitalist rule, as a metaphor it does provide a very useful way of understanding how the police, in the example under discussion here, are able to kill without being legally culpable. Indeed, it would seem to reinforce Pashukanis’s theory by identifying the extent to which legal rights are co-determinate with the measuring of value. Subjects who are from the point of view of the state expendable or individually dangerous can be made into homines sacri, at the mercy of the state’s monopoly of violence. This can certainly apply to, for example, refugees, terrorist suspects or other “subversives”. The process by which such lives are devalued, and the way in which the law colludes in this is discussed next. Suspect Communities Contrary to the claims made by the Metropolitan Police following the killing of de Menezes that terrorist attacks on the Tube were unprecedented, the very first bombing of the London Underground took place more than a century earlier in 1883. At first the Irish were blamed, although later it transpired that the bomb had been the work of anarchists. As a result, the police and the press began targeting the Jewish community, which was identified as a hotbed of anarchist refugees from Eastern Europe. The barrister Richard Harvey has drawn the obvious analogy with Harry Stanley, Diarmuid O’Neill, Neil McConville and Jean Charles de Menezes. What all had in common was membership, or perceived membership, of communities which had been viewed as and thus targeted as suspect. Once it was Jewish communities who were perceived as a breeding ground for anarchist violence, followed by the Irish community harbouring Republican terrorists; today it is Muslim communities supposedly encompassing Al Qaida sympathisers that fulfil the role of a suspect community.53 In this demonisation of minority communities lie the origins of the elite police squads tasked with the use of lethal force. The Special Irish Branch was set up to fight the Irish Republican Fenian movement in the 1880s. This has since changed its name to the less offensive sounding, though no less offensive in deed, Special Branch. It was officers from SO19 of the Special Branch that carried out the killings of O’Neill, Stanley and de Menezes. Paddy Hillyard coined the term “suspect community” to describe a sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being “problematic”. Specifically in terms of policing, individuals may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrong doing, but simply because of their presumed membership of that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors may serve to delineate the sub-group.54 Muslims, as a suspect community, are often portrayed as anti-Enlightenment and thus anti human rights, threatening a “civilised” way of life.55 But, as the authors of a recent study at London Metropolitan University argue, it is also symptomatic of a discourse of “anti-rationality” of the suspect community as fanatical and immune to reason or argument.56 In the case of Neil McConville, shot dead in April 2003 by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the justification for his death was created after the event, by suggestions fed by the PSNI that he was variously linked to paramilitaries or drug gangs. In the days following the killing of McConville headlines in the press included allegations of involvement in these criminal activities, all of which were completely untrue. The same thing happened with Harry Stanley, when a list of his previous, spent criminal convictions was read out to the inquest into his death despite their complete irrelevance to the circumstances surrounding the shooting. Again, with de Menezes, the police circulated smears in the media about alleged drug use and his immigration status. Of course none of these allegations were intended to justify the police’s actions per se; their aim was to associate the victims with certain groups who would be considered of lesser value—criminals, drug dealers/users, illegal immigrants—thus devaluing their claim to a legal right not to be murdered by the state. As Hillyard points out: Once dehumanised, people can be viewed with ethical indifference and moral questions are of no concern to the police carrying out their tasks. The police are only doing their job. As violence has become increasingly concentrated under state control, moral responsibility is replaced by a technical responsibility.57 De Menezes was neither Muslim nor from the Middle East. What set off the chain of events which led to his death was the misidentification of him by the police surveillance team as a “North African male”. Likewise, Harry Stanley was shot dead by armed police to whom it had been reported that he had an Irish accent when in fact he was Scottish. What these two examples show is the way in which the suspect community is defined by appearances, by superficial attributes.58 This reverses the normal modus operandi of policing whereby evidence or hard intelligence is the prerequisite for the use of force. Moreover, the fact that in both these cases the victim was misidentified simply points up the extent to which perceived membership of the suspect community is sufficient to give rise to an “honest belief” by police that lethal use of force is necessary and proportionate. Had Stanley not had an “Irish” accent or de Menezes a darkish skin, both would probably still be alive today. And as we saw above, “honest belief” forms the basis for the legal defence of police officers who kill unarmed or innocent suspects. In this insidious manner racist and cultural stereotypes become legal justifications for the taking of life by state agents. Hillyard has pointed out how the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 (PTA) effectively introduced a “dual system of criminal justice”, one system operating under the PTA and the other under ordinary criminal law. As a result a dichotomy developed between terrorist suspects and “ordinary decent criminals”.59 Today we face a similar separation between those subjected to recent anti-terrorist legislation as distinct from regular criminal law.60 This distinction functions within both law and a broader social context, with one reinforcing the other. The threat from terrorists is exaggerated by politicians and media alike. This in turn creates a greater sense of fear of violence about the suspect community in general, and that small minority seeking to use violence in particular. This dynamic then provides a platform for the introduction of ever more draconian laws, and brutal police methods. The argument from the police and others is that the threat from Al Qaida is wholly Muslim just as the threat from the IRA was mostly Irish, and thus it is reasonable to target those communities. Yet we must not forget that this “dual system” is not one of completely distinct and hermetically sealed areas of law. The foundational principles of the rule of law do not permit such a thing. Norms, legal tests and police practice are constantly migrating between the two. Think, for example, of how anti-terror legislation has been used to detain protesters or to stop and search individuals suspected of petty crimes. The state of exception and its associated policing strategies become the norm. Hillyard’s detailed study on how violence targeted the Irish community comes to this conclusion: It is commonplace to counter-pose the rule of law to the abuse of power or acts of violence. Law, from this perspective, is seen as the antithesis of violence… But this dichotomy is false… Law is…an integral part of the repression and organisation of state violence.61 Conclusion In hindsight, the period lasting from the later half of the 19th century through to the 1960s saw the proliferation of various mechanisms that in a thousand strands bound the working class ideologically to capitalism. In Gramscian terms, hegemony was manifested in aspects of civil society such as education, culture, community identity, civic projects, etc. The police were successfully woven into this apparatus as a necessary, if not necessarily benign, method of preserving social cohesion. But, as Reiner puts it, “when neoliberalism unravelled this complex of subtle, hidden controls, the thin blue line turned out to be a Maginot line”.62 Thus, on the one hand, the role of the police in maintaining order within capitalist democracy has not altered fundamentally in the last 150 years or so. Yet, on the other hand, the retreat of the organised working class in the face of neoliberalism has revealed the violence that exists at the heart of policing and the rule of law. The problem has been that throughout this period the ideology of the rule of law has become ever stronger, and indeed has been taken up by sections of the left as the solution to the problem of police violence. My aim here has been to demonstrate, using Pashukanis’s commodity-form theory of law, Agamben’s work on the state of exception and Hillyard’s description of suspect communities, how the law as such (not merely particular laws or legal systems) is complicit in legitimising police violence, even at the extreme end involving the deliberate killing of innocent people. 7 -Vote negative as to subvert the law – we ought to study the law not to use it, but to free humanity from it 8 -De Boever, 2006 (grammar modified) (Arne De Boever, Professor of American Studies at the School of Critical Studies at the California Institute of the Arts, Overhearing Bartleby: Agamben, Melville, and Inoperative Power, Parrhesia Number 1, 2006, 142-162) 9 -According to Agamben, we should aim to study the law in order to deactivate it. He refers to this study as a kind of play: “One day,” he writes teleiopoetically, “humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but free them from it for good.”42 As will be clear, there is no contradiction in the passage I just quoted between messianism and secularism. The perspective is decidedly postsecular: instead, the puppet of historical materialism has the dwarf of theology within; but once the puppet starts moving, and we begin to play the game of chess (which is, after all, a game of sovereignty) this materialist-theological activity is overcome into the messianic or postsecular thought of inoperativity. It is interesting to note that in The Time that Remains, Agamben cites a poem as a “concrete example” of messianic time.43 The poem, a sestina by Arnaut Daniel, is presented by Agamben as “an organism or a temporal machine that, from the very start, strains toward its end.”44 Thus, “a kind of eschatology occurs within the poem itself.” But this is not what Agamben is after. He notes that “for the more or less brief time that the poem lasts, it has a specific and unmistakable temporality”45 that is different from the time of the eschaton. This other time is produced, Agamben argues, by the peculiar formal characteristics of the poem: What is peculiar to the sestina is that the status of the repeated end words changes, in the sense that the homophony of the final syllables that you typically get in rhymed poems, is replaced by the reappearance of the six end words in the six stanzas, in a complex but equally regulated order. At the end, the tornada recapitulates the end words by dispersing them within its three lines translation slightly modified.46 This will ultimately lead into a grand hypothesis formulated at the end of the fourth chapter: that rhyme is “the messianic heritage that Paul leaves to modern poetry.”47 Whether we agree with this or not, it is important to point out that Agamben’s example of messianic time, which also contains his solution to the problematic link between sovereignty and bare life that he criticizes in Homo Sacer, is a poem. This illustrates the larger argument that I have been making in these pages, namely that Agamben’s thought is crucially a literary-political thought. It is a literary thought that, in its political force, cannot be articulated within the limits of political science. Thus, it oscillates between the literary and the political and demands to be studied comparatively, across the disciplines. Such a comparative study would not realize the destruction of disciplines, but rather their deactivation and inactivity, their inoperativity. As I have argued above, the task of thinking inoperativity is a task that concerns us all. In contemporary situation that is dominated by the conflictual binary oppositions of a Schmittian concept of the political, we have all taken position in between beings-withrights and beings-without-rights, Jews and non-Jews, Muslims and non-Muslims, terrorists and non-terrorists, Benjamin scholars and non-Benjamin scholars, Agamben scholars and non-Agamben scholars – we have all become non-non-Agamben scholars. In a world in which we are all non-non-terrorists (how else to describe myself when my phone-calls may be tape-recorded even though I am not a terrorist?), the thought of inoperativity can present itself is a powerful alternative to power’s abuse of the state of exception. But is this thought of inoperativity also more than a thought? What would a practice of inoperativity look like? Who would be its agents? There is Bartleby, of course, who resists any easy appropriation into the either/or of legal divisions. There is Toshevski, whose Free Territory-project unworks the state of Macedonia by creating zones in which free creative performance activists are invited to think the law as freedom. There is Agamben, also, who in a January 2004 article entitled “No to Bio-Political Tattooing”48 announced (much to my dismay!) that he had cancelled the course he was scheduled to teach at New York University later that same year because of a new law that required whoever wants to go to the United States with a visa to be fingerprinted and photographed when they enter the country. In February 2006, a letter was published in the New York Review of Books, 49 in which a group of scholars of constitutional law and former government officials (Ronald Dworkin, Kathleen M. Sullivan, and others) expressed their concern about how the Bush administration’s National Security Agency’s domestic spying program violated existing law. Finally, I want to bring to your attention an extremely interesting case, dating from 1990, which shows that inoperativity can also be practiced by the sovereign him/herself. When King Baudouin of Belgium was faced with giving his assent to a bill that would liberalize Belgium’s abortion laws, he explained that he was unwilling to give official endorsement to what he found personally objectionable. (Baudouin was deeply religious; he and his wife Queen Fabiola did not have children.) Instead, he chose to abdicate his throne on the day he was expected to sign the bill. A state of exception was declared; the law was passed. The following day, Baudouin went back to work. These “extraordinary” (as Kalyvas would have it)50 acts of subversion, whether they are committed before, within, or next to the law, show how the thought of inoperativity can also be a political practice. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,9 +1,0 @@ 1 -Qualified immunity prevents frivolous lawsuits that deter police action, threatening public safety 2 -Rosen 05 (Michael, attorney in San Diego at Fish and Richardson PC, an intellectual property law fIrm. In 2003-2004 he served as a law clerk to The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.) “A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for its Improvement” Golden Gate University Law Review Volume 35 | Issue 2 Article 2, 2005 LADI 3 -It is hard to deny that the more time police officers spend at trial defending their conduct, the less time they spend patrolling the streets, the more money their departments expend in their defense, and the more frequently the officers will second-guess certain behaviors in the heat of the moment. These drawbacks may well be justified for the sake of society's prevention of tortious and unreasonable conduct on the part of law enforcement agents. Nevertheless, police agencies, Supreme Court justices, and some scholars highlight the important role that qualified immunity can play in reducing unnecessary costs and in improving deterrence of crime. In its amicus brief in support of the Saucier petitioner, NAPO addressed several concerns related to costs and deterrence.47 It began by asserting that officers currently face too many lawsuits related to their conduct, litigation that generally is resolved in their favor and therefore wastes taxpayer time and money. It pointed to an "ever increasing number of lawsuits against law enforcement officers" and the threat that increase poses to the general public interest.49 The increased threat of lawsuits, according to this argument, deters effective police performance, thereby diminishing public safety:o NAPO referred to Justice Scalia's assertion in Anderson v. Creighton5l that permitting frivolous lawsuits against law enforcement to go to trial "entaiHs substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties."·2 Several scholars echo NAPO's concerns. Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer describe the fears of the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,53 explaining that such litigation works its evils by deterring officers through the threat of personal liability. Barbara Armacost notes that such liability begets poor law enforcement, which in turn harms the very people the officers are sworn to protect. 54 The chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy's Legal Instruction Unit echoes these sentiments. 55 Thus, at least in theory, the proliferation of lawsuits appears to involve serious risks to agents as well as the public. Of course, this entire edifice hangs on the assumption that law enforcement agents regularly face personal liability for their conduct when acting under color of law. Fallon and Meltzer challenge this premise. 57 They contend that in most situations, the police department and/or the officers' union make use of a legal defense fund while the officer need not expend a penny of his or her own.58 Thus, Fallon and Meltzer contend that the entire policy argument rests on a false assumption. Nonetheless, despite the unlikelihood of an officer facing personal liability, frivolous litigation imposes serious secondary costs on his or her conduct. First, contributions or premiums paid to a legal defense insurance plan will likely increase with the amount of litigation the officer faces. Second, the officer's career may endure a stain or stigma despite a victory on the merits of an excessive force case. Third, the department, as the officer's employer, may impose discipline, whether formal or informal, on any officer's involvement in litigation, whether successful or unsuccessful. Suspensions or unpaid leave may accompany lawsuits faced even by officers who are ultimately victorious in court. Thus, litigation indeed affects officers' conduct, in the heat of the moment, whether reasonably or not.59 This effect dovetails with a growing tendency toward "depolicing" that has become prevalent in several of America's urban cores.60 According to many officers, recent years have seen an increase in lawsuits and informal complaints brought against law enforcement, a correlate tendency in departments to steer officers away from necessarily risky conduct in do-ordie situations, and a concomitant decline in officer morale. 61 In 1981 in the State of California,"2 residents placed 8,686 complaints against peace officers, of which 1,552 or 18 were ultimately sustained.63 In 2000, Californians recorded 23,395 complaints, of which 2,395 or 10 were sustained. 64 This ballooning of claims - in particular unsuccessful ones - is as troubling as it is dramatic. The Oakland, California, Citizens Police Review Board ("CPRB") embodies this deterrent effect.66 This board provides an independent forum in which aggrieved citizens can register their complaints about police conduct. 67 At the same time, Detective Jesse H. Grant, who has had personal experience appearing before the CPRB, notes that complaints, more than 80 of which were not sustained in 2002, impose a serious deterrent effect on police conduct. 68 Officers now more than ever think twice and act conservatively - although not necessarily safely - when engaged in violent altercations with or apprehensions of dangerous suspects. 69 Ironically, the presence of entities like the CPRB undermines the justification for excessive force lawsuits to begin with: by providing an avenue for voicing grievances over police conduct, such boards obviate some of the need for civil actions. Moreover, they reflect the deterrent effect that wide-open public access to disciplinary bodies can breed. Thus, there exist significant reasons for the courts to grant some kind of immunity to law enforcement officials in order to ensure the contin- ued quality of their work. By increasing the threat of litigation, frivolous lawsuits can serve to deter officers' reasonable conduct, thus imperiling public safety and upending the delicate balance society seeks between forcefully fighting crime and respectfully treating all citizens. 4 -Police disengagement causes massive spikes in crime that kill far more people than the police themselves 5 -Heather Mac Donald 16 (Heather Mac Donald, Thomas W. Smith fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor to City Journal, ) The Ferguson effect, Washington Post 7-20-2016 LADI 6 -The most controversial aspect of my new book, “The War on Cops,” is my claim that violent crime is up in many American cities because officers are backing off of proactive policing. I have dubbed this double phenomenon of de-policing and the resulting crime increase the “Ferguson effect,” picking up on a phrase first used by St. Louis’s police chief. Violence began increasing in the second half of 2014, after two decades of decline. The Major Cities Chiefs Association convened an emergency session in August 2015 to discuss the double-digit surge in violent felonies besetting its member police departments. The violence continued into fall 2015, prompting Attorney General Loretta Lynch to summon more than 100 police chiefs, mayors and federal prosecutors in another emergency meeting to strategize over the rising homicide rates. Arrests, summonses and pedestrian stops were dropping in many cities, where data on such police activity were available. Arrests in St. Louis City and County, for example, fell by a third after the shooting of Michael Brown. Misdemeanor drug arrests fell by two-thirds in Baltimore through November 2015. Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel told Lynch that his officers were going “fetal”: “They have pulled back from the ability to interdict,” he said. “They don’t want to be a news story themselves, they don’t want their career ended early, and it’s having an impact.” 2015 closed with a 17 percent increase in homicides in the 56 largest cities, a nearly unprecedented one-year spike. Twelve cities with large black populations saw murders rise anywhere from 54 percent in the case of the District to 90 percent in Cleveland. Baltimore’s per capita murder rate was the highest in its history in 2015. Robberies also surged in the 81 largest cities in the 12 months after the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mo. In the first quarter of 2016, homicides were up 9 percent and non-fatal shootings up 21 percent in 63 large cities, according to a Major Cities Chiefs Association survey. Chicago is a prime example of the Ferguson effect. Stops were down nearly 90 percent in the first part of this year compared with last year. Shootings citywide through July 17 were up 50 percent compared with the same period in 2015; shootings were up 87 percent compared with the same period in 2014. In Austin, on the West Side, shootings are up 220 percent compared with 2014. Through July 19, 2,234 people have been shot in the city, averaging one an hour during some weekends. Yesterday, a 6-year-old girl was seriously wounded in her abdomen while sitting on her porch, when a violent shoot-out between three cars broke out; she is one of at least 21 children younger than 13 shot so far this year, including a 3-year-old boy shot on Father’s Day who is now paralyzed for life. (One would have assumed, pursuant to the Black Lives Matter narrative, that racist cops were responsible for a significant portion of those shootings, given that their victims have been overwhelmingly black. In fact, Chicago cops shot 11 people, all armed and dangerous, through July 19, comprising 0.5 percent of all shootings.) This crime increase, I argue, is due to officers’ reluctance to engage in precisely the proactive policing that has come under relentless attack as racist. For the past two years, activists, academics, the press and many politicians have charged that pedestrian stops and low-level public order enforcement (also known as “broken windows” policing) are little more than biased oppression of minority citizens. That political message is accompanied by increasing tension on the street, inflamed by the persistent allegation that racist officers are the biggest threat facing young black males today. A garden-variety Black Lives Matter march that I attended last November on Fifth Avenue in New York featured “F–––the Police,” “Murderer Cops” and “Racism Is the Disease, Revolution Is the Cure” T-shirts as well as “Stop Police Terror” signs. Officers working in urban areas are now routinely surrounded by angry crowds when they question a suspect or make an arrest. “In my 19 years in law enforcement, I haven’t seen this kind of hatred towards the police,” a Chicago cop who works on the South Side told me in May. “People want to fight you. ‘F––– the police. We don’t have to listen,’ they say.” A police officer in Los Angeles’s Newton Division reports: “Our officers are getting surrounded, cursed and jeered at every time they put handcuffs on someone.” Officers continue to rush to crime scenes after someone has already been victimized, sometimes getting shot at in the process. But in that large area of discretionary policing that aims to prevent crime before it occurs — getting out of a squad car at 1 a.m., for example, to question someone who appears to have a gun or may be casing a target — many officers are deciding to drive on by rather than risk a volatile, potentially career-ending confrontation that they are under no obligation to instigate. “Every cop today is thinking: ‘If this stop goes bad, I’m in the mix,’ ” says Lou Turco, president of the Lieutenants Benevolent Association in New York City. An officer in South Central Los Angeles described the views of his fellow cops: “Guys and gals in coffee shops are saying to each other: ‘If you get out of your car, you’re crazy, unless there’s a radio call.’ ” That officers would lessen their discretionary engagement under this barrage of criticism and hatred is both understandable and inevitable. Policing is political. If a powerful segment of society sends the message that proactive policing is bigoted, the cops will eventually do less of it. This is not unprofessional conduct; it is how the calibration of police legitimacy is supposed to work. Cops, moreover, are human. In a speech last October at the University of Chicago law school, FBI Director James Comey said that officers in one big city precinct had recounted being surrounded and taunted from the moment they made a pedestrian stop. “’We feel like we’re under siege, and we don’t feel much like getting out of our cars,’ ” they told him. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that proactive policing is down. Remember, such policing is discretionary. Cops don’t have to do it. And they have been told not to do it by activists and the media, who accuse them of racism for making stops in high-crime areas. The only surprise is that many of those same activists are now accusing the cops of not “doing their job,” as a result of which “people are dying,” in the words of Black Lives Matter activist Shaun King. This is the same King who launched a petition in 2014 demanding that Attorney General Eric Holder “meet with local black and brown youth across the country” who were being oppressed by “broken windows” policing and pedestrian stops. The connection between de-policing and crime increases has been documented before. A 2005 study of de-policing after the anti-cop riots in Cincinnati in 2001 by University of Washington economist Lan Shi, for example, found a significant increase in felony crime caused by the drop-off in officer engagement. Acknowledging the connection between de-policing and crime is unacceptable, however, to those who reject the idea that data-driven, proactive policing can lower crime. To be sure, no one has conducted randomly controlled experiments to confirm that the current crime spike in urban areas is the result of officers reverting to a reactive style of policing. But no other explanation fits the timing of the post-Ferguson crime increase. As Comey said last October, de-policing “is the one explanation that does explain the calendar and the map and that makes the most sense to me.” University of Missouri, St. Louis, criminologist Richard Rosenfeld reached the same conclusion in a study of the post-Ferguson crime increase for the Justice Department: “The only explanation that gets the timing right is a version of the Ferguson effect,” he told the Guardian in May. The crime increase is real, driven by officer disengagement, and is resulting in more black lives being lost. 7 -Turns the case – increase in crime swamp prison reform efforts 8 -Jason Willick 15 (Jason Willick, ) Violent Crime Wave Could Swamp Prison Reform, American Interest 9-2-2015 LADI 9 -We aren’t criminologists at Via Meadia, so we won’t wade into the fierce debate about whether or not the “Ferguson effect” is real. In any case, focusing tightly on the relationship between crime and the protests over the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Freddie Gray strikes us as too narrow an approach. Even as these protests gained a lot traction this past year, the public had already begun to turn against many of the harsher elements of the U.S. criminal justice system, from stop-and-frisk to draconian prison sentences. Many state and local governments—including some of the ones mentioned in the Times story—have been scaling back certain tough-on-crime policies for the last several years. Theories about the sources of the 2015 crime boomlet abound, but we wouldn’t be surprised if changes in criminal justice policy have played a role, at least in some cities. It may well be the case that the nationwide crime crackdown that began in the 1970s—as destructive as it was for many communities—really did help keep a lid on the crime rate. And it may well be that the steps taken toward reform in states like California—as salutary as they may be, overall, as a matter of policy—have caused urban crime to rise somewhat. For the purposes of public opinion, however, it may not matter whether the statistics in the Times article can be traced to the ‘Ferguson effect,’ changing prison policies, the availability of guns, or simple random variation. As we’ve written before, this is America’s prison reform moment. Politicians on both sides are united around the moral and fiscal imperative of curbing mass incarceration—and in particular, enacting more charitable policies toward drug and other nonviolent offenders. However, we only got here because the country has enjoyed historically low—and steadily falling—crime rates for the past decade. If the latest crime boomlet turns into a boom, the criminal justice reform consensus could evaporate in a heartbeat—no matter what the source of the boom may be. Posted: Sep 2, 2015 9:11 AM - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,17 +1,0 @@ 1 -Courts are overworked in the squo—judges are at the edge and one big push collapses the judiciary. 2 -Gersham 15 Jacob Gershman “Federal Judge Says His Overworked Colleagues Bench Close to Burnout” Wall Street Journal November 12th 2015 3 -Judges in federal trial courts have for some time expressed concern about the ever-growing backlog of civil cases. The workload complaint from the judiciary appears to be getting more urgent. The chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California says he fears his colleagues are reaching a breaking point. In an interview with a local news channel, Chief U.S. District Judge Morrison England said he and the five other judges on his bench are sometimes working more than 80 hours a week trying to make a dent in the pile of pending cases. “The active judges that I’ve spoken to are starting to say, ‘I don’t want to do this anymore,’ or they’re leaving the bench, because it’s just too much,” Judge England told KCRA 3 in Sacramento. “We’re doing everything we possibly can to try to come up with new and inventive ways to get the cases out. But, we’re at a crisis point.” The number of cases filed per judge in California’s Eastern District has been almost twice the national average, according to recent statistics. The court has 5,880 civil cases pending as of the end of 2014, according to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. That’s a slight increase over the year before and works out to just under a thousand pending cases per judge. Judge England told The Wall Street Journal earlier this year that some of his cases are nearly a decade old, including a suit that’s imperiled because a key witness recently died. The California district isn’t the only jurisdiction stretched thin. WSJ reported that a combination of factors are contributing to a backlog in federal trial courts across the nation. The reasons include population shifts, politics and a surge in the number of federal prisoners. The article noted that only Congress can create new judge positions (or move them from slower-growing regions to faster-growing ones), but efforts to hire more judges have met political resistance. 4 - 5 -Judicial resources are overstretched but qualified immunity doctrine allows quick dismissal of frivolous suits – the plan would clog the courts 6 -Putnam and Ferris 92 (Charles Putnam, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General, J.D. 1985, University of Connecticut. Charles Ferris, J.D. 1992, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire.)“DEFENDING A MALIGNED DEFENSE: THE POLICY BASES OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE IN ACTIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983” BRIDGEPORT LAW REVIEW QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE Volume 12 Number 3 Spring 1992 LADI 7 -A second policy consideration present in section 1983 litigation and furthered by the qualified immunity defense is the limiting of overdeterrence. Increasingly, courts are sensitive to the possibility that state and local government officials, because they are so often targets of section 1983 actions, are being improperly deterred in the performance of their duties.1 " The Supreme Court's absolute and qualified immunity decisions demonstrate its desire to reduce not only the incidence of official liability but the financially burdensome costs of defense, as well.14 National resources are obviously scarce, yet increasing numbers of section 1983 actions are being filed in overburdened federal courts. Reducing the load of these cases on the court system is a third essential policy consideration. Some courts have questioned whether the abundance of section 1983 cases in federal courts is an efficient use of judicial resources in light of the perception that many such actions are of questionable merit."6 The Supreme Court has thus encouraged the use of summary judgment where courts are faced with such cases. For instance, in Butz v. Economou, 7 the Court held: Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity.... In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits.18 The courts' use of summary judgment and other procedural devices is thus an important safety measure for both the courts and defendants facing suit. Finally, because it creates a monetary damages action for constitutional violations, section 1983 may encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to push a number of constitutional provisions to their outer limits. The presence of further incentives, such as the availability of attorney's fees, creates an additional inducement to plaintiffs' lawyers who may read the Constitution too expansively. Such incentives tend to propagate constitutionally trivializing actions. The avoidance of these constitutionally unworthy cases is the fourth major objective of the qualified immunity defense in section 1983 litigation.'9 The Court voiced this concern in Baker v. McCollan.20 In Baker, the Court held that "section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law."'" To protect against such trivialization, the United States Supreme Court has established that merely negligent conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause and is therefore not actionable under section 1983.2 8 -Court clog kills US tech innovation 9 -Kirk 6, Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, 3-24-6 (Michael, American Intellectual Property Law Association) 10 -I am writing to you on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) regarding the pending immigration reform legislation that would transfer jurisdiction over immigration appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We believe that such broadening of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction would seriously hinder the court’s ability to render high quality, timely decisions on patent appeals from district courts, and patent and trademark appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This runs directly counter to the present efforts of Congress to otherwise reform and improve this nation’s patent system. We take no position on other specific elements of the legislation or on the underlying need for immigration reform. Our concern focuses solely on the proposed shift in appellate jurisdiction, which we believe will do more harm than good. AIPLA is a national bar association whose approximately 16,000 members are primarily lawyers in private and corporate practice, in government service, and in the academic community. AIPLA represents a wide and diverse spectrum of individuals, companies, and institutions involved directly or indirectly in the practice of patent, trademark, copyright, and unfair competition law, as well as other fields of law affecting intellectual property. Our members represent both owners and users of intellectual property, and have a keen interest in an efficient federal judicial system. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established in 1982 after more than a decade of deliberate study and Congressional consideration. The Hruska Commission (chaired by Senator Roman Hruska) conducted a study lasting nearly three years before recommending to Congress the establishment of a national appeals court to consider patent cases. It took two Administrations, several Congresses, and a number of hearings in both the House and Senate before legislation establishing the Federal Circuit was finally enacted. Over the past 26 years the Court, through its thoughtful and deliberate opinions, has made great progress in providing stability and consistency in the patent law. Removing immigration appeals from the general jurisdiction of the twelve regional Courts of Appeals and centralizing it in the Federal Circuit is an enormous change. Leaving aside the impact, both pro and con, on the affected litigants, the Federal Circuit is simply not equipped to undertake the more than 12,000 requests for review of deportation orders that twelve courts now share each year. The Federal Circuit currently has no expertise or experience in the field of immigration law. While the legislation envisions adding three judges to the twelve currently on the Court, we have serious concerns whether this increase will be adequate. Judge Posner has calculated that, even with the three additional judges proposed in the legislation, each of the fifteen Federal Circuit judges would be responsible for about 820 immigration cases per year, on the average—an incredibly large number that we believe will have a significant adverse impact on the remainder of the court’s docket. It seems inevitable that the proposed legislation will have a dramatic, negative impact on Federal Circuit decisions in patent cases and appeals from the USPTO. Such an increased caseload will necessarily delay decisions in these appeals, which in turn will cause uncertainty over patent and trademark rights and interfere with business investments in technological innovation. Beyond mere delay, the Federal Circuit's ability to issue consistent, predictable opinions in patent cases will be complicated by an increase in the number of judges. If conflicts in panel opinions increase, the inefficient and often contentious en banc process will have to be used more often, further adding to the overall burden on the court. Business can effectively deal with decisions, positive or negative, but it cannot deal with protracted uncertainty caused by inconsistent opinions or long delays in judicial review. Demand for reform of the patent system has been the topic of considerable public debate of late. Congress held extensive hearings on this subject last year, and more are scheduled in coming weeks. The House is currently considering legislation that would dramatically change the patent statute, and we understand that patent reform legislation may soon be introduced in the Senate as well. It would be unfortunate for Congress to inadvertently compound the challenges facing the patent system by weakening the ability of the Federal Circuit to give timely and consistent consideration to patent cases. 11 -Innovation solves great power war 12 -Taylor 4 – Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Mark, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 4/1/2004, http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor) 13 -I. Introduction Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. At the very least, they describe it is an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. Technology also lowers information and transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state. However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. Finally, Buzan and Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place. 14 -Court clog harms the economy—it’s bad for business—it also hinders justice and rights protections which turns the case 15 -Leahy 12 16 -Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT). “Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Nominations Of Mary Elizabeth Phillips To The Western District Of Missouri And Thomas Owen Rice To The Eastern District Of Washington.” March 6th, 2012. http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-the-nominations-of-mary-elizabeth-phillips-to-the-western-district-of-missouri-and-thomas-owen-rice-to-the-eastern-district-of-washington 17 -While consensus judicial nominations are stalled without a final vote by the Senate, millions of Americans across the country are being harmed by delays. The American people and our Federal courts cannot afford these unnecessary and damaging delays. As the ABA president noted last week: “Backlogs mean justice delayed in cases involving protection of individual rights, advancement of business interests, compensation of injured victims and enforcement of federal laws. Longstanding vacancies on courts with staggering caseloads impede access to the courts. They create strains that, if not eased, threaten to reduce the quality of our justice system. They erode confidence in the courts’ ability to uphold constitutional rights and render fair and timely decisions. Delay at the federal courts puts people’s lives on hold while they wait for their cases to be resolved. Businesses face uncertainty and costly holdups, preventing them from investing and creating jobs. In sum, judicial vacancies kill jobs. Justice delayed, as the famous maxim goes, is justice denied. It’s bad for business, it’s unfair to individuals, and it slows government enforcement actions, which ultimately costs taxpayers money.” - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,5 +1,0 @@ 1 -CP – Disarm the Police 2 -Counterplan text: The United States federal government should disarm police on patrol. 3 -Solves police shootings and improves officer safety 4 -Smithsimon 15 (Gregory, Associate Professor of Sociology @ Brooklyn College) “Disarm the Police,” Metropolitics, 09/29/2015 LADI 5 -Efforts to reform police behavior fall short by design however if they don’t fundamentally change the power dynamic between police and people who are most intensively policed. “Community policing tends to turn all neighborhood problems into police problems,” Vitale (2015) notes in an Al Jazeera open editorial. Law enforcement’s tools of arrest and physical force are limited ways to deal with community problems. Unarmed public-safety officers would be better able to do the work that most of them join the force to do in the first place, instead of being put into contentious situations with community residents that end badly and make no one safer. The British practice what researchers call “policing by consent” (Tilley 2008). Could today’s cops do their jobs like all other civil servants do, on the basis of respect for their position, not their sidearm? Most cops could do their jobs better freed from the weapon that is a barrier between themselves and the people they are to protect. Over a dozen countries have unarmed police—not just Britain, the best-known example, but Iceland (where a third of residents own guns, but the police patrol unarmed), Ireland (neighbor to a decades-long bombing campaign), and Norway, even after a terrorist attack against a summer camp. (Noack 2015) The disparities in civilian deaths are absurd: police here killed about 1,000 people 10 last year,11 while the police in Great Britain fired their guns three times all year—and killed no one.12 What’s more surprising is what we forget when people say that the police need guns because they do a dangerous job: it’s more dangerous because of their guns. Surveys of police who are unarmed find that their concerns include not only danger to civilians, but the psychological harm done to police who fire weapons, and a belief that arming police makes officers’ jobs more dangerous (Squires and Kennison 2010). Thirty police were killed in the US in 2014, while a police officer was last killed in Great Britain in 2012. Even accounting for the UK’s smaller size, a dozen cops would have died on the job in that time if they faced the rates of American police “protected” by their weapons. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,22 +1,0 @@ 1 -Representations of “free speech” exclude the cognitively disabled by predicating the concept of freedom and independence on spoken voice. The 1ACs valorization of speech marginalizes those who rely on other forms of communication. 2 -Ashby 11. Christine. Professor at Syracuse University, Degree in Leadership and Communications. “Whose ‘Voice’ is it Anyway?: Giving Voice Qualitative Research Involving Individuals that Type to Communicate.” Disabilities Study Quarterly. MCM. 3 -One of the critical questions facing Disability Studies is how to make central the voices of individuals with disabilities in research? In this paper, I interrogate the idea of "voice" in critical, qualitative research and its application to research involving individuals who do not use speech as their primary mode of expression. How do critical, qualitative research and theories of voice position participants whose means of expression challenge traditional notions of normative participation? I first problematize the premise of giving voice generally and then present four key issues, which include a) the question of competence for individuals who do not use speech, b) hearing silence, c) agency and voice, and d) broadening the conceptualization of voice beyond speech. I conclude with implications for qualitative researchers and others interested in facilitating voice for individuals using alternative forms of expression. The celebration and representation of voices, rather, implies endowing speaking subjects with a special significance. Giving voice to subjects includes the representation of individuals and groups who have been muted and marginalized. It implies the expression of their unique experience, usually through the reproduction of personal testimony and narrative. The authors describe celebration of voice as "endowing speaking subjects with a special significance." While the message is clearly about empowerment and representation of marginalized perspectives, this passage also highlights a key challenge. Representation centers on speech. Spoken voice is clearly privileged in American culture. Where, then, does that leave individuals who do not speak or for whom speech is not always reliable? Consider the following example. During an observation in Jacob's eighth grade English class, Jacob was scheduled to present a poster and report on a famous nineteenth invention with his partner Diana. When it was their turn to present to the class, Jacob stood up and walked to the front with Diana. She handed Jacob the paper and he held it out in front of himself. Diana read the paper and turned back and forth between the class and Jacob who was standing to her right. Diana talked about the invention of the bicycle in 1890 and stated that it was important because they did not have bicycles before that. Jacob laughed and clucked quietly. As the presentation continued, there was muttering and snickering from students in the class. Diana read another page about the invention of the washing machine and then they were done. One of the male students in the class sarcastically shouted out, "Good job Jacob." Several other students cheered as Diana and Jacob took their seats. Jacob never spoke or participated in the presentation in any way other than holding the paper on which the material was written. I am sure he participated in the development of the project and the writing of the text, but that was not evident during the oral presentation. With no means of complex expression available to him in class, he was effectively silenced, rendered voiceless and unable to present himself as a thinking, capable member of the class. In an attempt to have Jacob present "without support" he was unable to present at all. His ideas and perspectives were never accessible to his peers. Normative conceptions of performance, participation and independence clearly impact the opportunities provided to individuals with disabilities. Some people with disabilities will always need the support of another person to communicate and make themselves heard. Traditional liberal theory leaves individuals labeled with cognitive disabilities outside the ranks of "citizen" (Erevelles, 2002). This often results from an emphasis on independence and utilitarian principles of liberal theory. In keeping with the idea of a self-sufficient, rational being as the ideal of American individualism, disability studies scholars have recognized that "the autonomous individual is imagined as having inviolate boundaries that enable unfettered self-determination, creating a myth of wholeness" (Thomson, 1996, p. 32). In western culture, independence is prized over interdependence and social good comes from "one's individual utility, intrinsic ability and personal performance with society being enriched when individuals attain their personal ends" (Kliewer, 1998, p. 3). People considered to have cognitive disabilities, some of whom may never be able to function in ways that are considered independent according to Western traditions, are often seen or constructed as less then fully human. I would argue, however, that none of us operates truly independently and that the idea of inviolate boundaries is a myth for everyone. Unfortunately, if you require support from others to dress, or move or communicate those dependencies become justification for exclusion from the ranks of the American ideal and perhaps from the ranks of those who have a "voice" that merits attention. If we continue to conceptualize voice as speech, certain individuals with disabilities will always be constructed as being without one. If we only listen to a normative voice (Mazzei, 2009), one that looks and sounds familiar, we will recreate that which we already "know." However, if we think of voice more broadly as the ability to express oneself and be heard by others, that can encompass typed text, non-verbal communication, gestural communication or silence, which leaves the door open for a more expansive conceptualization of participation and engagement. Mazzei (2009) argues for an orientation of "listening in the cracks," hearing voice in all aspects of interaction, from the words spoken — or typed — to the gestures and silences. Listening for the unvoiced and the differently voiced can be messy, uncomfortable work, but it creates the opportunity for a fuller, richer understanding. 4 -Ableism is a tactic of oppression that permeates all forms of discrimination – categorization based on normative biological standards justifies every form of discrimination and violence. 5 -Siebers 9 Tobin Siebers (Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan), “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, 10/28/9, Lecture, http://disabilities.temple.edu/media/ds/lecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc 6 -Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority. 7 - 8 -Perception of difference as negative impacts how we understand what constitutes valuable discourse. Disabled speech isn’t perceived as politically meaningful speech – that turns case 9 -Zelinger 7/7 (Julie Zeilinger: a freelance author from the Barnard College class of 2015. Mic.com: “6 Forms of Ableism We Need to Retire Immediately” published July 7th, 2015. Accessed July 24th, 2015. http://mic.com/articles/121653/6-forms-of-ableism-we-need-to-retire-immediately)TheFedora 10 -Nearly 1 in 5 people in the United States has a disability, according to a 2012 Census Bureau report. Yet many forms of discrimination against the disability community not only persist, but are actually largely normalized and even integrated into our culture's very understanding (or, more accurately, disregard) of disabled people's experiences. Ableism refers to "discrimination in favor of able-bodied people," according to the Oxford English Dictionary. But the reality of ableism extends beyond literal discriminatory acts (intentional or not) to the way our culture views disabled people as a concept. Ableism is also the belief that people with disabilities "need to be fixed or cannot function as full members of society" and that having a disability is "a defect rather than a dimension of difference," according to the authors of one 2008 Journal of Counseling and Development article on the topic, as reported by Feminists with Disabilities. This interpretation of difference as defect is the true root of ableist acts that cause far too many to feel marginalized, discriminated against and ultimately devalued in this society. Here are just six forms of this behavior that, though largely normalized, need to be retired immediately. 1. Failing to provide accessibility beyond wheelchair ramps Source: Getty Perhaps the most obvious form of discrimination people with disabilities face is the inability to access places and services open to their able-bodied counterparts — even with laws in place to prevent such inequality. As Tumblr user The (Chronically) Illest noted, while most people think "just putting wheelchair ramps everywhere" is sufficient, true accessibility accommodates all types of disabilities — not just physical disabilities that specifically bind people to wheelchairs. Accommodations can also include "braille, seeing-eye dogs/assistant dogs, ergonomic workspaces, easy to grip tools, closed captions ... class note-takers, recording devices for lectures" and other services and alterations. Though accessibility is certainly a matter of convenience and equity, a lack of accessible resources can impact the very wellbeing of people with disabilities. Individuals with disabilities have reported not being able to receive health care because their providers' facilities weren't accessible, and one study found that women with disabilities particularly face increased difficulty accessing reproductive health care, just to name two examples. 2. Using ableist language Source: Getty Ableism has become undeniably naturalized in the English language. Many people not only use words like "crazy," "insane" or "retarded" without a second thought, but many adamantly defend their use of these terms, decrying anybody who questions their right to do so as too "politically correct" or "sensitive." But this personal defense fails to recognize that ableist language is not about the words themselves so much as what their usage suggests the speaker feels about the individuals they represent. "When a critique of language that makes reference to disability is not welcome, it is nearly inevitable that, as a disabled person, I am not welcome either," Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg wrote in a 2013 Disability and Representation article. But beyond individual feelings, ableist language can contribute to a foundation of more systemic oppression of people with disabilities as a group. "If a culture's language is full of pejorative metaphors about a group of people," Cohen-Rottenberg continued, that culture is more likely to view those individuals as less entitled to rights like "housing, employment, medical care, education, access, and inclusion as people in a more favored group." 3. Able-bodied people failing to check their privilege Source: Getty It may not seem like a big deal in the moment, but able-bodied individuals fail to recognize the privilege of having access to every and any space accessible. As Erin Tatum points out at Everyday Feminism, plenty of people may not directly discriminate against people with disabilities but effectively do so by using resources allocated for them. For example, many able-bodied people use handicapped bathroom stalls or take up space in crowded elevators, rather than taking the stairs and leave room for people with disabilities who don't have other options, without a second thought. While these actions may not be the product of ill will, they are evidence of the way able-bodied privilege manifests in our society. There's a general cultural notion that "disability is something inherently negative," Allie Cannington, a board member of the American Association of People with Disabilities, told Mic. "There's a level of silencing that happens, and erasing of the disabled experience as an important experience because able-bodied experiences are the privileged experiences in our society." 11 - 12 -The alternative is to conceptualize speech as encompassing more than just traditional conversation. Recognizing the importance and existence of non-verbal communication is key to deep understanding and inclusion of people with disabilities. 13 -Ashby 11. Christine. Professor at Syracuse University, Degree in Leadership and Communications. “Whose ‘Voice’ is it Anyway?: Giving Voice Qualitative Research Involving Individuals that Type to Communicate.” Disabilities Study Quarterly. 14 -¶ People considered to have cognitive disabilities, some of whom may never be able to function in ways that are considered independent according to Western traditions, are often seen or constructed as less then fully human. I would argue, however, that none of us operates truly independently and that the idea of inviolate boundaries is a myth for everyone. Unfortunately, if you require support from others to dress, or move or communicate those dependencies become justification for exclusion from the ranks of the American ideal and perhaps from the ranks of those who have a "voice" that merits attention. If we continue to conceptualize voice as speech, certain individuals with disabilities will always be constructed as being without one. If we only listen to a normative voice (Mazzei, 2009), one that looks and sounds familiar, we will recreate that which we already "know." However, if we think of voice more broadly as the ability to express oneself and be heard by others, that can encompass typed text, non-verbal communication, gestural communication or silence, which leaves the door open for a more expansive conceptualization of participation and engagement. Mazzei (2009) argues for an orientation of "listening in the cracks," hearing voice in all aspects of interaction, from the words spoken — or typed — to the gestures and silences. Listening for the unvoiced and the differently voiced can be messy, uncomfortable work, but it creates the opportunity for a fuller, richer understanding.¶ section¶ Facilitating Agency in Research Methods¶ The issues raised in this article have implications and import both to educators and researchers. Broadening the conceptualization of voice in the classroom is emancipatory for people who do not speak. The emphasis on verbal speech leaves many non-speaking people with disabilities further marginalized in their school and classroom communities. When speech is considered the only, or at least, preferred, way to express one's wants and ideas, that can limit the access and support provided for those individuals who communicate in nontraditional ways. 15 - 16 -Representations must precede policy discussion – they determine what is politically thinkable. 17 -Crawford 02 — Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21 18 -Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument. 19 - 20 -The rhetoric of disability promotes a culture of discrimination; by challenging the innocuous, we can change the widespread acceptance of ableist thinking. 21 -Cherney 11 James L Cherney, former college debater, PhD in Communication and Culture @ Westminster, and undergraduates in Public Speaking, Body Rhetoric, and the Disability Rights Movement; “The Rhetoric of Ableism”; Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol 31 No 3; 2011; accessed 07/31/2015; http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606. 22 -As Disability Studies continues its exploration of disability in society, scholars have paid growing attention to the rhetoric of disability. This scholarship approaches the subject from different angles, but it generally works with similar premises including the position that rhetoric can shape the way disability is understood and (in)forms its political implications. These studies range from considering how rhetoric crafts disability to examining how ideas of disability impact theories of rhetoric. Brenda Jo Brueggemann explores how rhetoric constructs the disability of deafness, revealing how Hearing culture oppresses Deaf culture.1 Jay Dolmage shows how contemporary histories have "imported exclusion into the classical world" and oversimplified the complex views of disability that informed that era's influential theories of rhetoric.2 James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson's Embodied Rhetorics collects several works covering the terrain between these studies.3 I seek to build upon these authors' valuable work by continuing to examine rhetoric but turning to a related yet different focus: I analyze ableism instead of disability. While disability and ableism clearly relate, I consider attending to the latter to be similar to studying racism instead of race. Neither project makes sense without the other, and arguably studying disability has greater potential for promoting awareness and emancipatory politics, but studying ableism promises unique results such as identifying the identical mechanisms that propagate different types of discrimination. In this essay I analyze ableism as a rhetorical problem for three reasons. First, ableist culture sustains and perpetuates itself via rhetoric; the ways of interpreting disability and assumptions about bodies that produce ableism are learned. The previous generation teaches it to the next and cultures spread it to each other through modes of intercultural exchange. Adopting a rhetorical perspective to the problem of ableism thus exposes the social systems that keep it alive. This informs my second reason for viewing ableism as rhetoric, as revealing how it thrives suggests ways of curtailing its growth and promoting its demise. Many of the strategies already adopted by disability rights activists to confront ableism explicitly or implicitly address it as rhetoric. Public demonstrations, countercultural performances, autobiography, transformative histories of disability and disabling practices, and critiques of ableist films and novels all apply rhetorical solutions to the problem. Identifying ableism as rhetoric and exploring its systems dynamic reveals how these corrective practices work. We can use such information to refine the successful techniques, reinvent those that fail, and realize new tactics. Third, I contend that any means of challenging ableism must eventually encounter its rhetorical power. As I explain below, ableism is that most insidious form of rhetoric that has become reified and so widely accepted as common sense that it denies its own rhetoricity—it "goes without saying." To fully address it we must name its presence, for cultural assumptions accepted uncritically adopt the mantle of "simple truth" and become extremely difficult to rebut. As the neologism "ableism" itself testifies, we need new words to reveal the places it resides and new language to describe how it feeds. Without doing so, ableist ways of thinking and interpreting will operate as the context for making sense of any acts challenging discrimination, which undermines their impact, reduces their symbolic potential, and can even transform them into superficial measures that give the appearance of change yet elide a recalcitrant ableist system. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,27 +1,0 @@ 1 -1NC 2 -1NC – Hate Speech PIC 3 -Counter plan text: AFF actors should remove any restrictions on constitutionally protected speech, and ban the usage of hate speech 4 -McConnell 12. Reed E. Mcconnell is a writer. “Why Harvard’s Hate Speech Policies Are Necessary.” The Harvard Crimson. 5 -It wasn’t until I read the Crimson article about the free speech wall the next day that I learned that it was supposed to serve as a statement against Harvard’s limitations on free speech, which a member of the Libertarian Forum summarized as disallowing students from saying “discriminatory things,” but which actually consist very specifically of a ban against hate speech. In fact, the College Handbook states explicitly that, “speech not specifically directed against individuals in a harassing way may be protected by traditional safeguards of free speech.” I find the Libertarian Forum’s dedication to complete freedom of speech, regardless of whether or not the speech is harassment, alarming and indicative of a larger, troubling trend in American society.¶ Our nation is obsessed with the concept of freedom. The majority of U.S. citizens seem to think of theirs as the freest of all countries, and any perceived attack on this freedom is seen as a sacrilegious desecration of the Constitution, America’s holy book. However, laws, including those in the Bill of Rights, exist for a reason—to protect citizens. The provision of freedom of speech serves, accordingly, to protect people from being punished for their ideas and beliefs. However, this freedom can backfire and end up punishing people not for their ideas but for their identities when hate speech comes into play. There must be a carefully thought-out balance between freedoms and restrictions of speech in order to create a society where citizens not only feel free to express themselves, but also are free from fear and violence.¶ The most common argument I have encountered for unrestricted free speech on college campuses is that if we prohibit people from saying certain things, they will simply never talk about them. As a result, their prejudice and oppression—the problems that we are trying to stamp out in the first place with restrictions on speech—will continue quietly, unchecked. However, the argument goes, if we allow people to express these thoughts openly, then there will be discussion about them that leads to greater understanding. This was the view expressed by the member of the Harvard Libertarian Forum quoted in the article, and one that I think is fundamentally misguided.¶ There certainly should be dialogue around issues of racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression. If someone has prejudices, a good way to erase these prejudices can indeed be to engage in dialogue with that person in order to understand where their attitude is coming from and educate them about the moral and logical fallacies of their prejudice. But there is also a need to protect people from having violence perpetrated against them. When someone calls a black person the “n” word out of hatred, he or she is not expressing a new idea or outlining a valuable thought. They are committing an act of violence. Speech has great power. It can—and often does—serve as a tool to marginalize and oppress people. Laws that restrict hate speech simply seek to prevent violence against marginalized, oppressed groups in order to prevent them from becoming further marginalized and oppressed.¶ There are freedoms to do things, and there are freedoms from things. When our freedom to speak our mind impinges on someone’s freedom from fear, or on someone’s right to feel safe in their community, then that freedom should not stand unregulated in any group that wishes to create a safe and respectful society for its members. We cannot create a respectful learning environment at our university if students from marginalized groups feel that their administration condones acts of violence against them. University regulations against hate speech are entirely necessary for maintaining respect and dignity among the student body, and Harvard’s policies to this end are well thought-out and fair—and certainly not worthy of protest. 6 - 7 -Hate speech poses a direct threat to the oppressed. Banning it is necessary to promote inclusiveness. 8 -Taylor summarizes Waldron, 12, Why We Should Ban “Hate Speech”, American Renaissance, summarizing Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Harvard University Press, 2012, 292 pp., 26.95. 8/24/12, http://www.amren.com/features/2012/08/why-we-should-ban-hate-speech/ **Note – Taylor does not agree with but is summarizing Waldron’s position //LADI 9 -First, Professor Waldron declares that “we are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions, and we are embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these sorts of differences.” Western societies are determined to let in every sort of person imaginable and make them feel respected and equal in every way. “Inclusiveness” is something “that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.” Therefore, what would we make of a “hate speech” billboard that said: “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in”? Or one with a picture of Muslim children that said “They are all called Osama”? Or posters that say such things as “Muslims out,” “No blacks allowed,” or “All blacks should be sent back to Africa”? Professor Waldron writes that it is all very well for law professors and white people to say that this is the price we pay for free expression, but we must imagine what it must be like for the Muslim or black who must explain these messages to his children. “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these materials?” Professor Waldron insists that a “sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good,” like pretty beaches or clean air, and is so precious that the law should require everyone to maintain it: Hate speech undermines this public good . . . . It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like . . . . It creates something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good. Professor Waldron tells us that the purpose of “hate speech” is to try to set up a “rival public good” in which it is considered fine to beat up and drive out minorities. 10 -1NC – Hate Speech DA 11 -Current protections against hate speech are working – on campus harassment is decreasing nationally now. 12 -Sutton 16 Halley Sutton, Report shows crime on campus down across the country, Campus Security Report 13.4 (2016), 9/9/16,http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/casr.30185/full //LADI 13 -A recent report released by the National Center for Education Statistics found an overall decrease in crimes at educational institutions across the country since 2001. The overall number of crimes reported by postsecondary institutions has dropped by 34 percent, from 41,600 per year in 2001 to 27,600 per year in 2013. The report, titled Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2015, covers higher education campuses as well as K–12 schools and includes such topics as victimization, teacher injury, bullying and cyberbullying, use of drugs and alcohol, and criminal incidents at postsecondary institutions. The report found significant decreases in instances of bullying, harassment due to sexual orientation, and violent crime at all levels of education. The number of on-campus crimes reported at postsecondary institutions in 2013 was lower than in 2001 for every category except forcible sex offenses and murder. 14 - 15 -Unrestricted free speech perpetuates hate speech and invites violence. 16 -Arthur 12. Joyce. Founder of FIRST, Activist, Author, Journalist. “Should Hate Speech be a Crime?” New Internationalist Magazine. 17 -Hate speech is a public expression of discrimination against a vulnerable group (based on race, gender, sexual orientation, disability etc) and it is counter-productive not to criminalize it. A society that allows hate speech to go unpunished is one that tolerates discrimination and invites violence. Decades of hateful anti-abortion rhetoric in the US led to assassinations of providers, because hate speech is a precursor to violence.¶ Hate speech has no redeeming value, so we should never pretend it occupies a rightful spot in the marketplace of ideas, or has anything to do with ‘rational debate’. Challenging hate speech through education and debate is not enough. Governments have a duty to protect citizens and reduce discrimination and violence by criminalizing hate speech. 18 - 19 -Removing restrictions on free speech allows hate speech – hate speech IS free speech 20 -Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh,No, There’s No “hate Speech” Exception to the First Amendment, The Washington Post, 5/7/15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.05cfdd01dea4 //LADI 21 -I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) 22 -Hate speech leads to a genocidal increase in crimes against marginalized groups. 23 -Greenblatt 15 Jonathan Greenblatt, When Hateful Speech Leads to Hate Crimes: Taking Bigotry Out of the Immigration Debate, Huffington Post, 8/21/15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-greenblatt/when-hateful-speech-leads_b_8022966.html //LADI 24 -The words used on the campaign trail, on the floors of Congress, in the news, and in all our living rooms have consequences. They directly impact our ability to sustain a society that ensures dignity and equality for all. Bigoted rhetoric and words laced with prejudice are building blocks for the pyramid of hate. Biased behaviors build on one another, becoming ever more threatening and dangerous towards the top. At the base is bias, which includes stereotyping and insensitive remarks. It sets the foundation for a second, more complex and more damaging layer: individual acts of prejudice, including bullying, slurs and dehumanization. Next is discrimination, which in turn supports bias-motivated violence, including apparent hate crimes like the tragic one in Boston. And in the most extreme cases if left unchecked, the top of the pyramid of hate is genocide. Just like a pyramid, the lower levels support the upper levels. Bias, prejudice and discrimination — particularly touted by those with a loud megaphone and cheering crowd — all contribute to an atmosphere that enables hate crimes and other hate-fueled violence. The most recent hate crime in Boston is just one of too many. In fact, there is a hate crime roughly every 90 minutes in the United States today. That is why last week ADL announced a new initiative, #50StatesAgainstHate, to strengthen hate crimes laws around the country and safeguard communities vulnerable to hate-fueled attacks. We are working with a broad coalition of partners to get the ball rolling. 25 -Hate speech causes minority students to drop out, which means the only narrative within colleges will be that of the white male – that turns case. 26 -A.D.L. 13. Anti-Defamation League. “Responding to Bigotry and Intergroup Strife on Campus: Guide for College and University Administrators.” Defamation League. MCM. 27 -University and college officials need to demonstrate to all how the institution's interests are at stake when minority students fear assault or insult, leading to demoralization and high dropout rates. Even though many existing speech codes have failed in court, campus administrators should not be prevented or inhibited to act and speak out against racist, sexist, homophobic or anti-Semitic expression. Campus administrators should not tolerate or accept abusive discourse without a vigorous response. Those who misuse their freedom of expression to offend, demean or insult members of the academic community need to comprehend that their words are unacceptable in a civilized atmosphere, whether or not they are protected by the First Amendment. While administrators at private institutions have more freedom of action to regulate behavior than do their counterparts at public institutions, both can and should provide firm and unambiguous leadership in this area. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,9 +1,0 @@ 1 -Counter plan text: Public colleges and universities should prohibit the distribution and production of fake news. 2 - 3 -Fake news stories are rapidly increasing, legitimate news sources are adopting these stories 4 -Uberti 16 (David, a CJR staff writer and senior Delacorte fellow), “The real history of fake news,” Columbia Journalism Review, 12/15/16 DRD. 5 -In an 1807 letter to John Norvell, a young go-getter who had asked how to best run a newspaper, Thomas Jefferson penned what today would make for a fiery Medium post condemning fake news.¶ “It is a melancholy truth, that a suppression of the press could not more compleatly sic deprive the nation of its benefits, than is done by its abandoned prostitution to falsehood,” the sitting president wrote. “Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle.”¶ That vehicle grew into a commercial powerhouse in the 19th century and a self-reverential political institution, “the media,” by the mid-20th. But the pollution has been described in increasingly dire terms in recent months. PolitiFact named fake news its 2016 “Lie of the Year,” while chagrined Democrats have warned about its threat to an honest public debate. The pope compared consumption of fake news to eating feces. And many of the wise men and women of journalism have chimed in almost uniformly: Come to us for the real stuff.¶ “Whatever its other cultural and social merits, our digital ecosystem seems to have evolved into a near-perfect environment for fake news to thrive,” New York Times CEO Mark Thompson said in a speech to the Detroit Economic Club on Monday. The broader issue driving the paranoia is the tardy realization among mainstream media that they no longer hold the sole power to shape and drive the news agenda.¶ ¶ A little bit of brake-tapping may be in order: It’s worth remembering, in the middle of the great fake news panic of 2016, America’s very long tradition of news-related hoaxes. A thumbnail history shows marked similarities to today’s fakery in editorial motive or public gullibility, not to mention the blurred lines between deliberate and accidental flimflam. It also suggests that the recent fixation on fake news has more to do with macro-level trends than any new brand of faux content.¶ Macedonian teenagers who earn extra scratch by concocting conspiracies are indeed new entrants to the American information diet. Social networks allow smut to hurtle through the public imagination—and into pizza parlors—at breakneck speed. People at or near the top of the incoming administration have shared fake news casually. And it’s appearing in news organizations’ own programmatic ads 6 - 7 -Fake news is constitutionally protected 8 -Oyez no date Oyez, (IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law), “New York Times Company v. Sullivan,” last accessed 2/7/17. 9 -Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,16 +1,0 @@ 1 -Despite scientific consensus, fake news regarding GM harms is rampant and carried by journalists. 2 -Entine 12 (Jon, contributor), “Scientists, Journalists Challenge Claim That GM Crops Harm The Environment,” Forbes, 10/12/12} 3 -A recent study by noted organic researcher Charles Benbrook of Washington State University published in Environmental Sciences Europe claimed that pesticide use in the US has increased substantially since the introduction of genetically modified crops 16 years ago. The research was ballyhooed by anti-GM activists and carried uncritically by many mainstream journalists. The Genetic Literacy Project's Jon Entine has the background story.¶ The recent hullabaloo over the controversial Seralini GM maize study and questions about the safety of foods made from genetically modified crops has obscured another line of attack on biotechnology: claims that GM crops are environmentally unfriendly.¶ The latest salvo in the GM wars was launched by professor Benbrook. A fierce and respected critic of crop biotechnology, Benbrook claims the public data shows that pesticide use has steadily increased in the US since GM crops were introduced in the 1990s.¶ News coverage of the Benbrook study was motley and often highly politicized. There was the expected selective presentations from anti-GM journalists such as Tom Laskawy at Grist, Tom Philpott at Mother Jones and at organic publisher Rodale. But more disappointing was the botched context provided by more mainstream sources. Reuters, for example, echoed Benbrook’s views uncritically, blaring in a headline that “GMO crop technology backfires.”¶ Within days of the first wave of media coverage, the more responsible press weighed in and contextualized analysis emerged. Keith Kloor, the respected Slate contributing writer, offered his analysis of how many reporters misplayed the story out of the gate.¶ Former University of California Davis scientist Steve Savage, who had nice things to say about Benbrook, put the organic advocates claims in a different perspective, and reached a far different conclusion. He viewed the extremely modest multi-year increase in the use of some pesticides—less toxic versions than ones used previously—as a sign of significant environmental progress.¶ The blog Big Picture Agriculture broke down Benbrook’s numbers and found that pesticide use is actually falling on a yield per acre basis—in accord with what biotech proponents have claimed would happen—but warned that trouble may lie ahead.¶ Environmental consensus emerging on relative safety of GM crops¶ Benbrook’s broadside aside, what’s most interesting as the debate unfolds are signs that a scientific consensus is gradually but surely emerging that GM crops do not pose unmanageable environmental threats. Supporters and critics of biotech crops agree that crops bred for a natural resistance to pests harm biodiversity less than conventional crops because glyphosate, the pesticide used in conjunction with GM crops, is less persistent in the environment and less toxic to animals.¶ As New Scientist noted this week conservationists who were once diehard opponents have sharply reduced their vitriolic opposition. It noted, for example, that in 2004, the International Union for Conservation of Nature called for a halt to the release of GM organisms, but by 2007 it had published a report saying there was “no conclusive evidence of direct negative impacts on biodiversity of GMOs that have been commercially 4 -Opposition to GMOs among millenials is on the rise – widespread misinformation campaigns have mislead consumers 5 -Singal 16 (Jesse, Senior editor for New York Magazine) “Millennials Have Bad Views on GMOs,” New York Magazine, 12/08/16 DD 6 -As the numbers show, almost half of those in the 18-to-29 age range believe genetically modified foods pose health risks. Drilling down to more specific results, a fifth and a fourth of millennials believe, respectively, that genetically modified foods will “very likely” lead to health problems or create problems for the environment. None of these beliefs reflect the consensus of scientists. On GM foods, a long-standing campaign of misinformation from some environmental activists has severely misled concerned consumers. As the headline of Will Saletan’s must-read long article on the subject puts it, “The war against genetically modified organisms is full of fearmongering, errors, and fraud.” GM foods are safe to eat, and while like any agricultural technology GMOs need to be deployed responsibly, they also don’t pose any unique, undue threat to the environment. (I would guess millennials are also overestimating the health benefits of eating foods marked “organic,” but at least that term has a specific, well-defined meaning according to the federal government, as opposed to labels like “natural” or “all-natural” and so on, which can often be effectively meaningless, except as a near-religious mark of symbolic purity.) There’s a tiny bit of good news, at least, if you look at this chart: Younger people are significantly more likely to follow vegetarian or vegan diets, though the numbers are still quite low. Here, there’s some actual science to back up the decision, given studies showing that heavy meat consumption — particularly red meat — is associated with an increased risk of mortality. It’s unfortunate so many more millennials are hung up on GM and organic foods than on reducing their meat intake. It isn’t a mystery why: Young people are probably a lot more likely to identify as environmentalists and/or to go out of their way to explore healthy eating, and if you start hanging out with or talking to people with these interests, you’ll likely encounter a lot of loudly communicated social norms and expectations in opposition to genetically modified foods. That doesn’t mean that there are sound scientific reasons to shun GMOs, though. 7 -American opposition kills the dispersal of GMO technology – College students are key 8 -Kelly 16 (Julie, a food writer in Orland Park, Ill), “Anti-GMO Students Bruise a Superbanana,” The Wall Street Journal, 3/14/16 DRD 9 -Student activists at Iowa State University are up in arms after researchers offered to pay them almost a thousand bucks to eat some genetically modified bananas. The bananas, created by an Australian scientist, contain high levels of beta carotene, which converts to vitamin A when eaten.¶ Vitamin A deficiency, which can cause blindness, stunting and even death, is a devastating problem throughout the developing world. In Uganda roughly 40 of children under age 5 are vitamin-A deficient, according to a 2011 health survey.¶ The hope is that fortified superbananas could help prevent such malnutrition. To test their efficacy, Iowa State students were offered $900 to eat the bananas for four days during three trial periods, then have their blood tested to measure vitamin absorption. The research is led by ISU professor Wendy White, an expert on vitamin A-enriched crops.¶ But some of the healthy, well-fed college students in America’s heartland were outraged. In February they delivered a petition with more than 57,000 signatures to the university to oppose the so-called human feeding trials. The petition was also delivered to the Seattle headquarters of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which is investing more than $2 billion to improve agriculture in the developing world, including through the banana project.¶ “While we can all support the rights of Ugandans to have access to safe, nutritious, and culturally appropriate food, Ugandans have expressed increasing concern that genetically-modifying bananas are not meant to serve that purpose,” a group of students wrote in the Ames Tribune. “Instead, many suspect the GM bananas to be an attempt to corporately capture the domestic seed market.”¶ They sound like they’re trying to save an organic garden in Berkeley. “Those students are acting out of ignorance,” Jerome Kubiriba, the head of the National Banana Research Program in Uganda, tells me. “It’s one thing to read about malnutrition; it’s another to have a child who is constantly falling sick yet, due to limited resources, the child cannot get immediate and constant medical care. If they knew the truth about the need for vitamin A and other nutrients for children in Uganda and Africa, they’d get a change of heart.”¶ He’s more optimistic than I am. Genetically engineered crops are anathema to the far left. An article last year in the Ecologist called the fortified bananas “a globe-trotting case of biopiracy,” and said the project’s secret ambition is profit—“to enter the international banana trade, setting itself up as the United Fruit of the 21st Century.” A field-trial in Uganda of a different genetically modified banana, one designed to resist wilt, is protected by barbed-wire fences and security guards. Three years ago in the Philippines anti-GMO protesters destroyed fields of vitamin A-enhanced Golden Rice.¶ Prof. White insists that the ISU study will go on—despite protests to deny the advances of biotechnology to the people who need it most. “It would be great to see small farmers in Africa benefit from genetic engineering technology specific to their customary crops, such as cassava and banana,” says Kevin Folta, a plant geneticist at the University of Florida. “Solutions exist, but are slow to deploy, and much of that comes from resistance borne in the industrialized world.”¶ For any lucky American college student to take part in that resistance is, well, bananas.¶ 10 - 11 -GMOs are key to avoiding collapse of food production systems – population increase and warming render traditional modes of production insufficient 12 -McKie 11 (Robin, science and technology editor for the Observer), (Beddington, Sir John UK’s chief scientist, Senior Adviser at the Oxford Martin School, and was previously Professor of Applied Population Biology at Imperial College London, and the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser from 2008 until 2013) “Genetically modified crops are the key to human survival, says UK’s chief scientist,” The Guardian, 1/22/11 DRD. 13 -Genetically modified crops are the key to human survival, says UK's chief scientist¶ Sir John Beddington argues that moves to block GM crops on moral grounds are no longer sustainable¶ Moves to block cultivation of genetically modified crops in the developing world can no longer be tolerated on ethical or moral grounds, the government's chief scientist, Sir John Beddington, has warned. He said the world faced "a perfect storm" of issues that could lead to widespread food shortages and public unrest over the next few decades. His warning comes in the wake of food riots in north Africa and rising global concern about mounting food prices.¶ "A number of very important factors are about to change our world," said Beddington, an expert in population biology. "Its population is rising by six million every month and will reach a total of around 9,000 million by 2050. At the same time, it is estimated that by 2030 more than 60 of the population will be living in cities and will no longer be involved in growing crops or raising domestic animals. And on top of that the world's population is getting more prosperous and able to pay for more food."¶ Beddington said these factors indicated that the world was going to need 40 more food, 30 more water and 50 more energy by the middle of the century – at a time when climate change was starting to have serious environmental impacts on the planet, flooding coastal plains, spreading deserts and raising temperatures. "We could cut down tropical rain forests and plant crops on the savannahs to grow more food, but that would leave us even more vulnerable to the impact of global warming and climate change. We needed these regions to help absorb carbon dioxide emissions, after all."¶ Beddington said humanity had to face the fact that every means to improve food production should now be employed, including widespread use of new biotechnological techniques in farming. He stressed that no harm should be inflicted on humans or the environment. His remarks were made in advance of publication tomorrow of a major report, "The Future of Food and Farming".¶ His office's report is a specific attempt to highlight moves that could halt devastation of the planet. Crucially, the report will be presented tomorrow not just to the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), but also to the Department for International Development, which directs UK foreign aid. Beddington said he would present details of his office's report in Washington next month. He also hoped it would be debated at other events, including the G8 and G20 summits.¶ He emphasised the role of modern biotechnological techniques, including GM crops, in the future of global food production. "There will be no silver bullet, but it is very hard to see how it would be remotely sensible to justify not using new technologies such as GM. Just look at the problems that the world faces: water shortages and salination of existing water supplies, for example. GM crops should be able to deal with that."¶ Such remarks will enrage many environmental groups, who believe it is wrong for the west to impose a technology it has developed on the third world. But Beddington was adamant about the benefits of GM crop technology. "Around 30 of food is lost before it can be harvested because it is eaten by pests that we never learnt how to control. We cannot afford that kind of loss to continue. GM should be able to solve that problem by creating pest-resistant strains, for example. Of course, we will have to make sure these crops are properly tested; that they work; that they don't harm people; and that they don't harm the environment."¶ GM crops alone would not be sufficient to hold off widespread starvation, he added. No single approach would guarantee food security for humanity for the rest of the century. A widespread approach, including the development of proper sustainability, protecting fish stocks and changes to patterns of consumption, was also critical, he said. "This report was set up to find out if we can feed nine billion people sustainably, healthily and equitably. We can, but it will take many different approaches to crack the problem."¶ Timing was crucial. "In 2008 food prices rocketed to their highest level for decades. People said it was just a one-off, but last year what happened? Wheat prices saw their fastest ever increase. The era of declining food prices is over and we have to face that," he added.¶ Almost a billion people now suffer serious food shortages and face starvation. "It is unimaginable that in the next 10 to 20 years that there will not be a worsening of that problem unless we take action now, and we have to include the widest possible range of solutions. 14 -Food shortages cause extinction 15 -Brown 09 (Lester, US environmental analyst, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, and founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute) “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May 2009 DD 16 -For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy—most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures—forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding Purchase the digital edition to see related sidebar. Many of their problems stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world’s leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six). Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases—such as polio, SARS or avian flu—breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,11 +1,0 @@ 1 -Link 2 -The aff demonizes political correctness. They use the term to belittle oppression and get away with racism, sexism, and ableism. 3 -Serano 16. Julia Serano Author of Whipping Girl (now in 2nd edition!), Outspoken (her latest book!), and Excluded: Making Feminist and Queer Movements More Inclusive. juliaserano.com. "Prejudice, 'Political Correctness,' and the Normalization of Donald Trump.” Medium. 4 -To put it another way, “political correctness” is not an ideology, nor is it a specific set of behaviors. It is simply a slur that people utter when they want to dismiss an expression of social justice activism that they do not like. One person’s “political correctness” is another person’s common decency or righteous activism. It is also crucial to note that, while many people resent activist attempts to change social norms, we are not the only ones engaged in such actions: Those who harbor prejudices are also constantly trying to assert and/or change social norms, albeit in the opposite direction. And yet, these latter attempts do not face similar scrutiny or smearing. If I promote gender-neutral restrooms or pronouns, I will be dismissed as being “politically correct,” whereas North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory (who championed HB2, the law that criminalizes trans people who use public restrooms) is never described as “politically correct” (even though he has clearly engaged in political attempts to enforce a social norm of his own creation). When college students in 2015 tried to protest and no-platform Germaine Greer (an extreme and outspoken transphobe) people called it political-correctness-run-amok, but conservative protesters who attempt to protest and no-platform transgender activists (as happened to me in 2004) are never dismissed as “politically correct.” This asymmetry, along with its vagueness and inconsistent usage, is why I detest the term “political correctness,” and why I think we should all stop using it. From my vantage point, there are bigots who are pushing for social norms that conform to their beliefs, and social justice activists who are pushing for social norms that conform to our beliefs. And the population at large will have varied opinions about whether any given social norm is worthy or unworthy, advantageous or disadvantageous. 5 -Impact 6 -Kumar 13. Hari Stephen. Director, Instructional and Curricular Design Services; Associate Director of the Teaching and Learning Collaborative. “White Times: Five Keys to American Racism.” Kinetic Now. MCM. 7 -Such a view means that people will often respond to any critique of cultural racism or institutional discrimination or systematic inequality or even actual bigoted encounters with either “it’s not as bad as it used to be” or “that has nothing to do with race, you’re the one bringing up race.” People will also dismiss outright any historical analysis of racism, saying things like “slavery ended 150 years ago, get over it,” as if long-standing patterns of racism simply disappeared overnight with the passing of a law. In combination with abstract liberalism, this also means people will dismiss critiques of “white-on-black” crime by often bringing up instances of “black-on-white” crime as a way of abstractly equating the two without considering deeper contexts. This is also a key factor in how people defend themselves from any involvement in racist practice: they will often say “I’m not a racist” and proceed to provide examples such as “I have black friends” or “I am part Hispanic” and so on, to demonstrate that since they clearly are not absolute and extreme racists then they cannot be racist at all. 8 -Alt 9 -The alternative is to acknowledge that political correctness is a concept that is an effective tool in identifying bigotry. 10 -Croft 15. Adam. News Editor at The Branding Iron. “Why Being ‘PC’ Matters.” The Branding Iron. MCM. 11 -These days the notion of “political correctness” carries a pretty negative connotation. Sixty-one percent of Americans believe America is becoming too politically correct, according to a poll from Rasmussen Reports, making political correctness less popular than the president, whose approval rating is just over 50 percent. On Facebook I routinely see posts claiming America is becoming too politically correct and comments railing against the fact that cultural mainstays of yesteryear have been abandoned for being offensive. People mourn the loss of the ‘Dukes of Hazzard’ while proudly referring to Caitlin Jenner as a man, all under the guise of “fighting politically correct nonsense.” A grown man on my Facebook feed defended his use of the slur “retard,” because he’s “always used that word.” Just this week one of our best writers was scorned for pointing out the overt racism in Pinedale’s Rendezvous celebration. People act as though being “PC” is an unnecessary annoyance that threatens their very way of life. They act as though it’s a disease spreading from liberal coastal states into their neat, conservative homes in landlocked vacuums. However, everyone so vehemently opposed to political correctness makes the same mistake when critiquing political correctness: they make it about themselves. You see, we as a society do not choose to remove certain words from our vernacular at random. A secret committee of liberal politicians doesn’t meet once a year and decide red-face pageants are racist just to stick it to the good people of Pinedale. In fact, we as a society remove language, symbols or practices from our societal discourse when groups identify those elements as offensive, or when they decide they don’t want to be identified by certain terminology anymore. Moreover, you do not have any say in whether or not those terms are offensive if you do not belong to the group those terms affect. At that point, you’re in a position of privilege. For example, the man on my Facebook feed that used the R-word had no right to defend that word’s use as he is not a member of the group that word affects. He comes from a background of privilege, as someone who has never dealt with the negative connotations of that term. He doesn’t know what it’s like to be bullied by the use of that word. Instead, he should have recognized he has no frame of reference when it comes to that term, and left it to disabled persons to determine whether or not it is appropriate. So, when you “take a stand” against political correctness by sharing a picture of a confederate flag, using the R-word or referring to transgender individuals by the wrong pronoun, you’re not fighting for your right to say whatever you want. That right will always be there. You’re just proving that you are inconsiderate of the wishes of subjugated groups to self-identify. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Damus
- Caselist.RoundClass[3]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -3 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2016-11-19 16:11:00.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 --- - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 --- - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -4 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Damus
- Caselist.RoundClass[4]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -4 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2016-12-02 16:25:12.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA
- Caselist.RoundClass[5]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -5 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2016-12-02 16:27:01.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA
- Caselist.RoundClass[6]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -6 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2016-12-02 16:28:04.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -3 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA
- Caselist.RoundClass[7]
-
- EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-01-15 00:27:45.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -VBT
- Caselist.RoundClass[8]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -7 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-01-15 00:28:53.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -VBT
- Caselist.RoundClass[9]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -8 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-01-15 00:30:38.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -CPS
- Caselist.RoundClass[10]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -9 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-18 19:07:14.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -na - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -na - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -na
- Caselist.RoundClass[11]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -10 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-18 19:08:25.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA
- Caselist.RoundClass[12]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -11 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-18 19:36:33.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA
- Caselist.RoundClass[13]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -12 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-18 19:37:24.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -3 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -NA