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+Individuals must be considered to have a right to property, otherwise it’s impossible to consider them as volitional |
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+Kant, Immanuel. Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) 2nd Edition. by Immanuel Kant (Author, philosopher), Mary J. Gregor (Editor), Roger J. Sullivan (Introduction). Cambridge University Press 1996. 1797. NP 8/2/16. |
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+It is possible |
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+AND |
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+mine or yours. |
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+ |
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+The ability to lay claim to property rights necessitates the existence of a collective will that can have power over individuals |
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+Kant 2, Immanuel. Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) 2nd Edition. by Immanuel Kant (Author, philosopher), Mary J. Gregor (Editor), Roger J. Sullivan (Introduction). Cambridge University Press 1996. 1797. NP 8/2/16. |
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+Bracketed for gendered language |
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+When I declare |
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+AND |
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+a civil constitution. |
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+ |
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+Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. Put away your generic Kant answers – the aff uses Kantian political philosophy, not moral philosophy. |
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+RIPSTEIN : Arthur Ripstein. Force and Freedom, 2009. |
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+In the same way, the Universal Principle of Right abstracts from the maxim on which a person acts, focusing instead on the purely external relation between agents. As a principle of inner determination, a person’s maxim is fundamental. But it has no bearing on the outer obligations that one embodied person owes another. I wrong you if I interfere with your rights, regardless of what maxim I act on, but I do not wrong you by acting on an immoral maxim unless I interfere with your person or property.43 |
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+ |
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+I contend that public entities have an obligation to restrict some constitutionally protected free speech. |
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+First, hate speech relies on historical oppression, which obligates the state to intervene. |
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+Varden 10 Helga Varden (Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois) “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” May 22nd 2010 Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World Volume 3 of the series AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice pp 39-55 http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 JW |
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+Kant’s distinction between |
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+AND |
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+of all citizens. |