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Cites

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1		-Counterplan Text: We advocate the entirety of the aff plan without the use of the words “structural violence”.
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3		-The counterplan is inherently competitive. Since we defend the entirety of the aff advocacy aside from a change in certain rhetoric a perm would be severance out of both the reps and the language of the 1AC.
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5		-Definition
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7		-They misunderstand the meaning of the term “structural violence”. It is a specific term of art used in the sociological field of peace research that has been widely discredited by both critics and the terms creator.
8		-
9		-Structural violence” is a term coined by Johan Galtung, it refers to violence where no single decision maker is responsible- like poverty which results from the global economy. Gatlung 12
10		-Galtung Institute 12
11		-(https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/network/groups/anything-galtung/forum/topic/understanding-galtungs-violence-triangle-and-structural-violence/)
12		-
13		-Theories of structural violence explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs (will be discussed later). Structural theorists attempt to link personal suffering with political, social and cultural choices. Johan Galtung’s original definition included a lack of human agency; that is the violence is not a direct act of any decision or action made by a particular person but a result of an unequal distribution of resources.Here, we must also understand “institutional violence”. “Institutional violence” is often mistaken for structural violence, but this is not the case. “Institutional violence” should be used to refer to violence perpetrated by institutions like companies, universities, corporations, organisations as opposed to individuals. The fact that women are paid less at an establishment than men is an act of direct violence by that specific establishment. It is true that there is a relationship with structural violence as there is between interpersonal violence and structural violence. And Structural violence is the most problematic area to be addressed for conflict transformation.
14		-
15		-Net Benefits
16		-Reliance on the vague concept of “structural violence” recreates oppression.
17		-Subpoint A: Theories of “structural violence” distract solutions to material conditions in favor of vague criticism of poorly defined systems. Existing structures will co-opt your criticism and the process trades off with more effective reforms.
18		-1.Structural violence obscures analysis necessary to reduce poverty and violence- this card is on fire. Boulding 77
19		-Kenneth Boulding, Prof Univ. of Michigan and UC Boulder, Journal of Peace Research 1977; 14; 75 p. Boulding p. 83-4
20		-
21		-Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ and ’positive peace’. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ’like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, -or it is ’like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modem world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ’threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ’breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the ’strain’ on a system is too great for its ‘strength’. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficulty to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these things, which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people’s behavior, not the ’real’ interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn’t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which, produce violence. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off ’it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a ’service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.
22		-
23		-2. Galtung’s theory of structural violence perpetuates the status quo of dominant states by offering an overly vague criticism of oppression. Lawler 89
24		-Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711
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26		-In the late 1960's Galtung's foundational model of peace research was subjected to considerable criticism as part of a general upheaval within the peace research community. A group of young, mostly Scandinavian, radicals employed a neo-Marxist perspective to attack the assumptions of symmetry and ideological neutrality that formed the core of Galtung's argument (Schmid 1968, 1970; Olsen and Jarvad 1969; Eckhardt 1971; Dencik 1982). Though their primary target was American conflict research and its contribution to the analysis of the Vietnam War, they questioned also Galtung's assumption that the path to peace lay in the principles of integration and cooperation. For the radicals, Galtung's approach neglected the political-economy of relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds and in its attempt to preserve a sym- metrical approach to violent conflict was guilty of 'idealistic universal- ism'. From the perspective of the oppressed, an argument for the further integration of the international system was tantamount to defending a status quo which reflected the interests of the dominant states and the beneficiaries of the world capitalist economy. Against this, the radicals called for a peace research that openly sided with the exploited and advocated the 'sharpening' of the various latent conflicts of interests that characterised global politics.
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28		-3. Resolving “structural violence” requires action by international powers, as they are the only bodies capable of amending existing “structures”. This reliance on current institutions preserves existing structures of dominance. Schmid 68
29		-Peace Research and Politics; Herman Schmid; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 217-232; 1968; Sage Publications; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423274
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31		-Peace research is an applied or 'oriented' science. An applied science has to be applied by somebody who has the power to apply it. In the case of peace research, this means there must be some kind of institutionalized link between peace re- searchers and decision-makers on the supranational level. Thus, the universalist ethos of peace research becomes operationalized into identification with the interests of the existing international system, that is the interests of those who have power 229 in the international system. So peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure, providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system. That is the institutional aspect of peace research. The theoretical frame of reference dominating peace research closely cor- responds to the institutional needs: the peace researcher/specialist is trained in an ideology of internationalism; he has learned how to solve conflicts, how to integrate a system, how to avoid manifest organized violence, how to prevent major uprisings against the system; and he believes that what is good for the system is in the long run also good for its elements. His concept of peace is essentially a negative one, stressing the need for stable peace,38 and the 'common interest' he will have to fall back on is the avoidance of catastrophe. His positive concept of peace is not sui generis but a negation of his negative peace concept. The essence of peace research is concentrated in the concepts of control of the international sys- tem to prevent major breakdowns, and integration of the international system to make it more stable. That is the ideological aspect of peace research. The institutional and the ideological aspects presuppose and condition each other. To become applied, peace research must meet the needs of the decision- makers. To satisfy their concern about stable peace, peace researchers must ally themselves with the decision-makers of the international system. Given this situation, change of the system can not be advocated by peace research. Structural change would be a threat to the power-holders of the international system. Only adaptive change within the system is possible.
32		-
33		-4. Theories of structural violence offer a one-sided mechanism of achieving equality in which instead of aiding the poor we focus primarily on bringing down the rich, resulting in a system that is technically equal but objectively destitute. Boulding 77
34		-Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung; Kenneth E. Boulding; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86; Sage Publications, Ltd; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423312
35		-
36		-Because of his passion for equality, his hatred of hierarchy, dominance, top dogs, and anything which looks like oppression (much of which is praiseworthy), Galtung identifies entropy as a symbol of goodness and regards negentropy, that is, structure, improbability, and potential, as evil. Galt- ung is all for the increase of social entropy so far as that means destruction of organi- zation and hierarchy, the dissipation of wealth, 'and the reduction of everything to a dead level. It would almost seem as if Galtung would regard the last ultimate whimper of the universe, according to the second law of thermodynamics, in which all things are at an equal temperature and equally distributed throughout space so that nothing more can 'conceivably happen, as the ultimate heaven, or perhaps one should say Nirvana, towards which all this uncom- fortable and unequal structure of stars and planets, life and society, will eventually move. Here we see the profound difference be- tween the structural and the evolutionary points of view. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of struc- ture itself, and sees structure as the enemy of equality - which it is. The evolutionary point of view sees the whole evolutionary process as the segregation of entropy, the building up of little castles of order in the crystal, in DNA, in life, in humans, and in their innumerable artifacts both personal, material and organizational, always at the cost, according to the second law, of increas- ing thermodynamic disorder elsewhere, in our case of course nicely segregated in the sun about which we don't have to worry. The structuralist sees pollution in the struc- ture whether it is smoke, slums or vice and says 'away with it. The evolutionist sees pollution as part of the price of evolution itself. Gal'tung's misunderstandings about entro- py derive, one suspects, from the cardinal principle of his normative system, the over- whelmingly strong value which he gives to equality as such. One almost suspect's that Galtung would prefer a society in which everybody were equally destitute rather than one in which some were destitute and 'some were rich. A passion for equality as such, however, can easily lead into the hatred of the rich without any love for the poor. One can put a very strong negative value on poverty and believe it should be abolished wi'thout believing in equality at all. This would lead to a society with a floor below which nobody were allowed to fall, but above which a high degree of inequality would be tolerable. Galtung nowhere spells out what his ideal society would be, and in- deed if any of us did this we would probably decide that we did not like it af'ter all! But the drive for equality as such is extremely strong in all his writings.
37		-
38		-Subpoint B: Attempts to resolve “structural violence” inevitably result in the perpetuation of physical violence that shuts off democratic channels for minority representation.
39		-
40		-The concept of structural violence shuts down democratic debate and justifies violent lash outs to combat inequality. Maley 88
41		-William Maley, Professor and Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at The Australian National University , Australian Journal of International Affairs 42, 1988
42		-The deployment of a notion of positive peace has been a far from innocuous development in peace research. A comprehensive theory of needs, where needs are not defined simply as necessary means to an agreed end, can be the basis for a suppression of both democratic and liberal aspirations. Democracy and Liberty are both concerned with personal desires, the former in the sphere of the polity, and the latter in the sphere of the individual. Needs theory subjugates both the individual and the polity to the abstract ideology of the needs theorist. When Maxim Litvinov remarked in Geneva in the 1930s that peace is indivisible, he was referring to the negative sense of the term. 'Negative peace' is one of the few social values in whose name crimes can be committed only at the cost of self-contradiction. However, if 'negative peace' must be associated with 'positive peace' to give rise to peace in totality, then peace is no longer indivisible —since direct violence may be defended as a means of eliminating `structural violence'. This defence is a familiar one, resembling the classic liberal justification for rebellion, and even in certain circumstances intervention. Christian Bay has argued that structural violence `may be so extreme that a limited war must be deemed a lesser evil, if there is no other way to end or mitigate the structural violence, and if the war is sure to remain limited and brief in duration.'" This blithe assumption — that there could ever be circumstances in which one could be absolutely sure that a war would remain limited and brief in duration — is a splendid illustration of Bay's detachment from the real world. Nonetheless, the greatest danger in his claim stems from the extraordinary elasticity of the notion of structural violence. This is best brought out by the Danish peace researcher Lars Dencik, although using slightly different terminology. He defines conflicts as `incompatible interests', and goes on to remark that 'incompatible interests are here defined objectively, i.e. by the observing scientist according to his theory and is sic independent of the actual subjective consciousness of the actors involved. This means that incompatible interests are conceived of as structural (actor indepen-dent), the structure defined according to the theory of the scientist.'" He draws the predictable conclusion that 'in certain situations "revolutionary violence" may be the necessary means to obtain conflict resolution proper'." This is irresistibly reminiscent of the conclusion of Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence, that it is `to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world'20, and it is instructive, though for peace educators perhaps not very comforting, to recall that Sorel's ideas eventually were used in justification of Italian Fascism." (p. 30)
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44		-2. Democratic deliberation is key to avoid massive violence. Halperin 11
45		-(Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=0,11)
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47		-As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collapse. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It must come from the people of a nation working to get on the path of democracy and then adopting the policies necessary to remain on that path. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, the outside world can make an enormous difference in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much in America's interest to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed.
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49		-3. Combatting “structural violence” justifies reactionary violence against a system that is poorly defined. This makes conflict inevitable and trades-off with peaceful reform. Quester
50		-George H. Quester is chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, ANNALS, AAPSS, 504, July 1989
51		-A third major problem to be raised about some forms of peace research and peace studies, again related to what we have al- ready discussed, arises in the tendency to define peace as much more than an absence of the organized violence of warfare, to define it indeed as the elimination also of poverty and injustice and of prejudice and tyranny, and so on-namely, to define peace simply as a synonym for what is good, for what an economist would call utility. Sometimes we are thus told that an op- position to violence must include an oppo- sition to "structural violence,"7 with the latter phrase presumably meaning any or- ganizational or power relationships that vi- olate the moral standards of the beholder, or we are also told that we must be in favor of "positive peace," which will include all of these good things, accomplished some- how simultaneously, rather than being con- tent with a "negative peace," limited merely to an absence of warfare. Surely there is a great deal that is lost from all of these definitional innovations, but what is there to be gained? If someone assumed, as noted previously, that con- sciousnesses somehow have to be raised, then it may well seem important. as an educational and motivational vehicle, to insist that peace includes an end to poverty or racism. If one assumes that there can never be an avoidance of war unless one simultaneously has an avoidance of pov-erty or racism or other social evils, then this causal link will also suggest a definitional link. But, if there is indeed no such one-to- one link in causal relationships and if mo- tivation is not the entirety of the problem of war and peace, then we surely will have thrown away a great deal of clarity if we insist on calling everything bad "war" or "violence" and if we insist on referring to everything we favor as "peace." This would be a little like telling the American Cancer Society that every disease now has to be referred to as "cancer," including heart disease and cholera and meningitis. Can medicine make any progress at all if it is not allowed to use different words for different ailments? Is it really true that to use different words for war and dictator- ship and poverty is to weaken our motiva- tion or to accept the inevitability of some evils or actually to favor the existence of such evils? If one goes far enough in accepting the definitional innovations produced by some peace studies curricula, it becomes possi- ble then to define violent attacks as peace- ful, as long as they are intended to eliminate racism or injustice, because these attacks are to oppose "structural violence." At the worst, this kind of redefinition is deliberately misleading, as war and vio- lence are defined as being inappropriate for any cause except one's own. At a less du- plicitous level, we simply have some need- less confusion brought into the process, by some relatively honest and well-meaning people.
52		-
53		-Subpoint C: The term “structural violence” is insufficient for diagnosing the reality of oppression. It is not a method for liberation, just an ivory tower theory.
54		-
55		-The term “structural violence” is incredibly vague. It can refer to any form of exploitation. Leech 12
56		-Galtung’s ‘Structural Violence’ and the Sierra Leone Civil War c.1985-1992; Dr. Philip JM Leech lecturer in International Relations at Plymouth University where he teaches International Relations of the Middle East; October 12, 2012;
57		-https://whereshouldthebirdsfly.wordpress.com/2012/10/12/galtungs-structural-violence-and-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-c-1985-1992/
58		-The critical element or link in the chain of this ‘causal flow’ (200 Galtung, 1996) is structural violence. It is the process that links cultural distinction to Direct Violence. Structural violence is an ostensive label that may be applied to a broad range of phenomena. What Galtung notes as definitive is that Structural violence is the process of deprivation of needs. Each part of the violence equation depends on the existence of the other two before the violent conflict become truly serious and sustained (197-200 Galtung, 1996). It need not be consistent or radical . Simply put, it is violence embodied by a structure, or violence that ‘operates regardless of intent’ (93 Galtung, 1996). It is characterized politically as repression, and economically by exploitation. However, Galtung notes that ‘blunt repression/exploitation is necessary but not sufficient’ (93 Galtung, 1996). In fact the nature of structural violence is somewhat vague in that it allows the quantity and the qualitative nature of aggression and dominance to be variable (201 Galtung, 1996).
59		-
60		-2. John Galtung, the creator of the concept of “structural violence”, admitted that his theory couldn’t be applied objectively. We cannot even assess what “structural violence” is. Lawler 89
61		-Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711
62		-
63		-For Galtung sociology was undoubtedly a science. In contrast to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, sociology was a 'factual' science, which in terms of scientific rigour occupied a middle position between physics and the 'humanistic sciences' (Galtung 1958d, p.88). His account of the virtues of applying science to the study of the social world was, nonetheless, ambiguous. Galtung (1958d) recognised that the object-domain of the social sciences made the application of scientific method difficult and perhaps impossible if overly high standards were applied. Consequently he argued that the primary purpose of social science was to generate descriptive empirical statements which would have to be sub-jected to some form of testing procedure (1958b). Theory-building could follow but was not essential to the claim for scientific status (Galtung1959b, p. 10). Galtung also admitted that significant problems existed regarding the scientific assessment of theoretical statements about the social world, but in a manner characteristic of his subsequent work appealed to the future development of suitable analytical tools. Though his discussion of the question of value-freedom was often ambiguous in his early sociological papers, Galtung informed his stu-dents that value-statements were not testable and therefore unscientific(1958d, p.92). Though Galtung recognised that values impinged upon the conduct of social science in a variety of ways — inter alia, the deter-mination of investigative focus, the exclusion of undesired results and the procurement of financial support — the problem was consistently presented as one of degree and not destructive of a genuinely scientific sociology (1958b).
64		-
65		-3. “Structural violence” rejects holding any specific group or class responsible for exploitation in favor of a vacuous criticism of a “system” that it never fully identifies. Lawler 89
66		-Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711
67		-
68		-Galtung also rejected the implication of the radical critique that specific groups or social classes were responsible for exploitation. The term 'exploitation' was refused by him on the grounds that it was politically and emotionally overloaded. The continuing influence of his sociological orientation was evident in the preference for offering a definition of violence as an abstract systemic property that can be comprehended without reference to specific historical conjunctures or agents. But Gal- tung's approach also reflected the influence of Gandhi, from whom was taken the view that a distinction should be made between status actions and status holders (1959c, 1980). It is the structure of social interaction within which agents of violence act that is to be attacked, rather than the agents themselves. To attack the agents is to meet one form of violence with another. True dedication to the doctrine of ahimsa required 'the return of good for evil' and a distinction between the doer and the deed (Galtung 1959c; Borman 1986). However Gandhian ethics arose out of a complex matrix of occidental and oriental philosophical principles never fully explicated by even Gandhi himself (Sharma 1965; Borman 1986). Galtung restricted his treatment of Gandhi's thought to the draw- ing out of some practical implications. Though he was to later complain of the failure of his critics to see the imprint of Gandhi on his work, this is hardly surprising since few clues were provided. The fundamental problem with the concept of structural violence was that it was vacuous without a substantiation of the value-system on which it depended. The denial of potentiality by structural violence, presupposed some notion of human potential. As one critic noted, without a clear analysis of the values underpinning it, the concept was reduced to a label to be applied to anything its author did not like (Eide 1971)
69		-
70		-4. “Structural violence” cannot explain social changes or the exact origins of violence beyond the fact that it simply exists. Lawler 89
71		-Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711
72		-
73		-In his sociological writings Galtung provided no analysis or defence of any specific values, other than to claim that they were empirically held, or to assert that values should be revised in reflection of systemic changes. What was missing was a sense of the politics of social change. Even if consensus could be established as to the direction in which a social system is moving, it is a different matter to evaluate such change. Furth-ermore, how are we to choose between competing and non-commensurable understandings of systemic 'health'? The only answer implicit in Galtung's discussion was that empirical evidence must be produced to show which set of values accorded best with the social system under scrutiny. That brings us back full-circle to the value-contamination of observation and the impact of the political perspective that conditions our analysis of social systems. Functionalism can be wedded to any political ideology, but being a descriptive rather than analytical discourse it cannot provide that ideology. Though aware of the problem of defending values outside of a dis-tinctly normative discourse, Galtung was not apparently perturbed by it. In his discussion of functionalism (1959a) he claimed that there were' fairly inter-subjectively communicable and consensual standards' such as 'sane', 'healthy' or 'normal', against which social systems could be judged. For Galtung, to describe a system as 'healthy' was not a value-judgement, in contrast to the claim that 'healthy is good'. Leaving aside the question as to whether the distinction holds or if 'fairly consensual 'constitutes a scientific category, it became clear that when Galtung turned to peace research the evaluative standard of 'peace' was to be sim-ilarly derived and understood. In its Galtungian mould, peace research was differentiated from earlier forms of normative enquiry into global social relations by the absence of any distinctly normative discourse.
74		-
75		-5. Galtung’s theory of structural violence is entirely theoretical. It makes massive leaps in logic and cannot even quantify the violence people suffer. Rummel
76		-UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR: VOL. 5: THE JUST PEACE, Chapter 3, Alternative Concepts Of Peace*; R.J. Rummel; https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TJP.CHAP3.HTM
77		-
78		-Structural violence appears, for Galtung, when resources, or especially the power to allocate them, are unevenly distributed: when people are starving and this could be avoided; when life expectancy is much greater in the upper class; when a small elite control the entry into high status. Here, without any prior ethical analysis or normative preparation,110 Galtung makes his first intellectual broad jump from the analytical-empirical plane to the ethical, but in a most cavalier manner: "In order not to overwork the word violence we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as social injustice."111¶ Then Galtung presents his final two distinctions (dimensions) regarding violence: it may be intended or unintended, or manifest or latent. With these and the other distinctions mentioned, Galtung defines a "typology of violence" in which the personal-structural distinctions are basic. In focusing on the means of personal and structural violence Galtung makes his second broad jump, but now back from the ethical to the analytical-empirical plane~-~-again without analysis and as offhanded: "If we accept that the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power, then this can be measured."112¶ D. His Concept of "Positive Peace." The above serves as an introduction to six factors maintaining inequalitarian distributions~-~-that is, "mechanisms of structural violence"113~-~-which are of no concern here. Nor need we tarry over Galtung's discussion of the relationship between personal and structural violence, and the trade-offs in emphasizing a system that is higher on one than another. But what I should mention is his conclusion on the definition of peace: ¶ E. His Political Theory. Thus, structural violence = unactualized human potentials = social injustice = inequality. Therefore, positive peace = equality = social justice = realized human potentials = absence of structural violence. This equation is stipulated; analysis to support the critical relationships are lacking; and the definitional and substantive problems in the formulation are glaring. One should understand, however, that the critical relationships and definitions are entirely theoretical. Even violence, usually an easily measured empirical concept of physical harm and destruction, is converted into a construct meaning unactualized human potential, then equated in theory with injustice and, thence, equality~-~-each of them constructs.

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-20 04:49:44.0

Judge

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1		-Aaron Timmons

Opponent

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1		-Newark OA

ParentRound

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1		-13

Round

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1		-4

Team

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1		-Harvard Westlake Paul Neg

Title

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1		-1 - PIC - Structural Violence

Tournament

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1		-Glenbrooks