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+Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes- |
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+-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions |
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+-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies |
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+-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records |
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+-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages |
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+-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers |
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+-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies |
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+ |
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+CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change |
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+Meltzer, JD, 14 |
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+(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police) |
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+ |
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+The CP Solves the Case |
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+1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap |
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+Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis) |
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+ |
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+2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations |
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+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) |
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+3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect |
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+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) |
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+4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action |
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+Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306) |
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+The net benefit is Tech Shift |
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+A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections |
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+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) |
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+B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance |
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+Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis) |