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-A. Interpretation- the word limit means to “restrict” not to ban or eliminate |
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-1. Limit has a variety of definitions, but they all mean “bound” not eliminate |
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-COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 02 |
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-(SY-LENE OF WASHINGTON, INC. v. STARWOOD URBAN RETAIL II, LLC No. 132, September Term, 2002 COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 376 Md. 157; 829 A.2d 540; 2003 Md. LEXIS 455 July 29, 2003, Filed) |
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-Definitions of the word "limit" include the following: (1) to assign within limits, to appoint, fix definitely, to specify; (2) to confine within limits, to set bounds to, to prohibit a person from something; (3) to border upon a country; (4) to beg within specified limits. Each of these definitions incorporates the concept of a boundary or restraint. To limit something is to define its extent, and in so doing, to quantify it. The suggestion that the concept of elimination is contained within the term limit conflicts with the idea that a limit defines an area or range. |
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-2. Legal consensus- limit does not mean eliminate |
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-COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND 14 |
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-(SIERRA CLUB, ET AL. v. DOMINION COVE POINT LNG, L.P. No. 2429, September Term, 2012 COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND 216 Md. App. 322; 86 A.3d 82; 2014 Md. App. LEXIS 18; 44 ELR 20037 February 28, 2014, Filed) |
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-Before the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff argued that the lease was ambiguous and that parol evidence should be admitted to determine the parties' intent at the time the lease was signed. Id. at 165. The defendant countered, arguing that the plain language of the lease did not provide any upper or lower limit to the number of spaces that must be provided, and therefore, it could eliminate all the spaces. It also argued that because the language was clear, no parol evidence should be admitted. Id. at 166. The Court noted that HN11Go to this Headnote in the case.under the objective test of contract interpretation, if the written contract is clear the court will give effect to its plain meaning. It explained, however, that a contract is ambiguous if it could be "subject to more than one interpretation when read by a reasonably prudent person." Id. at 167. The Court then looked to the language of the contract, to answer the question ***18 of whether the term "limit" meant that the defendant could eliminate. Id. at 168. First, it reviewed the dictionary definition of the word "limit," and then addressed the parties' arguments regarding the various meanings of the term. After examining caselaw from other states, the Court concluded that the "limit" did not mean "eliminate" and ruled that the defendant could not deny plaintiff any parking spaces entirely. Id. at 169. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court in order for it to consider parol evidence and determine the intended amount of spaces at the time of contracting. Id. |
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-3. This case law represents broad precedent |
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-COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA 08 |
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-(COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT E 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1013 May 1, 2008, Amended by Order Filed ) |
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-P34 We find support for our conclusion in Sy-Lene and Schuster. In Sy-Lene, the lease provided that the tenant would pay for each employee parking space as needed for its employees and provided that the "landlord reserves the right to limit the number of employee parking spaces to be provided Tenant". 829 A.2d at 543. After a dispute arose between the parties, the landlord told the retail tenant that it would provide no reduced-fee employee parking spaces. Id. The trial court dismissed the action and the special court of appeals affirmed, holding that the right to limit the number of spaces implicitly included the right to limit the number to zero. Id. at 543-45. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari and reversed. Id. at 544. The court of appeals held that the definition of the word "limit" did not incorporate the concept of elimination. *23 Id. at 547. It then remanded the case to the trial court to determine the parties' intentions at the time of executing the lease as to what limit of spaces would be acceptable. Id. at 547-48. |
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-B. Violation- the affirmative does not mandate a quantitative or qualitative restriction on qualified immunity, they eliminate it entirely |
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-C. Reasons to prefer |
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-1. Ground- the topic is designed to force the affirmative to defend the process of legal reform. Predictable negative ground includes counterplans to regulate police conduct outside of immunity reform, court precedent disads, and critiques of the legal system like CLS. Allowing the aff to abolish immunity access a different literature base over whether or not policing is a legitimate government function which makes the topic bidirectional and turbocharges aff solvency |
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-2. The affirmative interpretation is unreasonable- no definition of limit includes eliminate, its only justified by semantic gymnastics. The topic could have been written to prohibit immunity but was not. This places the affirmative outside your jurisdiction- they haven’t presented a topical advocacy, you can vote negative on presumption |
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-3. Legal precision – we cite an evolving case law from multiple courts proving a consensus that limit does not include eliminate. This makes our interpretation the most predictable- it’s a legal topic, we should focus on legal definitions over random dictionary cards or field contextual evidence with no intent to define |
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-D. Topicality is a voting issue- it sets the balance of ground for debate and tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. It should be evaluated via competing interpretations- its not what they do it’s what they justify. |