Summary

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  • Caselist.CitesClass[1]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[2]

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Caselist.CitesClass[1]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-06 20:34:02.49
	1	+2016-11-06 20:34:02.0

Caselist.CitesClass[2]

Cites

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	1	+1. Civil suits don’t help the perception of the law. Civil suits don’t encourage reform- prefer our evidence it’s a direct response to their AC. Cheh evidence
	2	+Harmon, Law @ Virginia, 09
	3	+(Rachel A., PROMOTING CIVIL RIGHTS THROUGH PROACTIVE POLICING REFORM, 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu. )
	4	+Federal law has played an important role in regulating police misconduct. In particular, federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits for damages under § 1983, and the exclusionary rule are all legal tools that attempt to reduce police misconduct by punishing specific incidents of it and by deterring it in the future. Unfortunately, each is inadequate to promote wholesale institutional change. Federal criminal civil rights prosecutions face significant legal and practical obstacles, including that federal law imposes an onerous intent requirement on civil rights crimes; that victims of police misconduct often make problematic witnesses; and that juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant officers.16 As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct. Even if criminal prosecutions were more common, however, it is not clear that charges against individual officers would encourage departmental change. Almost inevitably, when some officers in a department are prosecuted, others are not. Criminal prosecution may therefore enable cities to characterize egregious misconduct as resulting from individual pathology rather than systemic problems and to deny the need for departmental improvement.17 Successful § 1983 suits for damages encourage some departmental reform, but they too are limited. Suits against individual officers are difficult to win, both because they suffer some of the same trial challenges as criminal cases against officers, and because officers often have qualified immunity for their actions, even when the conduct is unconstitutional.18 Suing supervisors or chiefs often requires establishing deliberate indifference or reckless action rather than negligence, and suing a city requires a plaintiff to show that misconduct was not only unconstitutional, but reflected municipal “policy” or “custom.”19 Some civil actions succeed despite these obstacles, but many incidents of serious misconduct result in an unsuccessful § 1983 suit or an inexpensive settlement, and therefore provide little incentive for reform.20 Moreover, some scholars have argued that even when plaintiffs win civil suits, damages actions against government actors are an ineffectual—even perverse—means of encouraging local officials to reduce misconduct.21 Daryl Levinson, for example, contends that government officers, police chiefs, and mayors respond to political incentives, and may never be forced to internalize the economic costs of damages paid by municipalities.22 Although Levinson may overstate the case against civil suits,23 he persuasively argues that even when they are successful, civil suits are at best an inefficient and limited means of encouraging institutional reform.24
	5	+2. Fosters more resentment towards the law and resentment. Rosen 05
	6	+Michael M. Rosen, January 2005, " A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for its Improvement" Golden Gate University Law Review, http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1899andamp;context=ggulrev MG
	7	+
	8	+It is hard to deny that the more time police officers spend at trial defending their conduct, the less time they spend patrolling the streets, the more money their departments expend in their defense, and the more frequently the officers will second-guess certain behaviors in the heat of the moment. These drawbacks may well be justified for the sake of society's prevention of tortious and unreasonable conduct on the part of law enforcement agents. Nevertheless, police agencies, Supreme Court justices, and some scholars highlight the important role that qualified immunity can play in reducing unnecessary costs and in improving deterrence of crime. In its amicus brief in support of the Saucier petitioner, NAPO addressed several concerns related to costs and deterrence.47 It began by asserting that officers currently face too many lawsuits related to their conduct, litigation that generally is resolved in their favor and therefore wastes taxpayer time and money! It pointed to an "ever increasing number of lawsuits against law enforcement officers" and the threat that increase poses to the general public interest.49 The increased threat of lawsuits, according to this argument, deters effective police performance, thereby diminishing public safety: NAPO referred to Justice Scalia's assertion in Anderson v. Creighton5l that permitting frivolous lawsuits against law enforcement to go to trial "entails substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties."·2 Several scholars echo NAPO's concerns. Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer describe the fears of the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,53 explaining that such litigation works its evils by deterring officers through the threat of personal liability. Barbara Armacost notes that such liability begets poor law enforcement, which in turn harms the very people the officers are sworn to protect. 54 The chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy's Legal Instruction Unit echoes these sentiments. 55 Thus, at least in theory, the proliferation of lawsuits appears to involve serious risks to agents as well as the public. Of course, this entire edifice hangs on the assumption that law enforcement agents regularly face personal liability for their conduct when acting under color of law. Fallon and Meltzer challenge this premise. 57 They contend that in most situations, the police department and/or the officers' union make use of a legal defense fund while the officer need not expend a penny of his or her own.58 Thus, Fallon and Meltzer contend that the entire policy argument rests on a false assumption. Nonetheless, despite the unlikelihood of an officer facing personal liability, frivolous litigation imposes serious secondary costs on his or her conduct. First, contributions or premiums paid to a legal defense insurance plan will likely increase with the amount of litigation the officer faces. Second, the officer's career may endure a stain or stigma despite a victory on the merits of an excessive force case. Third, the department, as the officer's employer, may impose discipline, whether formal or informal, on any officer's involvement in litigation, whether successful or unsuccessful. Suspensions or unpaid leave may accompany lawsuits faced even by officers who are ultimately victorious in court. Thus, litigation indeed affects officers' conduct, in the heat of the moment, whether reasonably or not.59 This effect dovetails with a growing tendency toward "depolicing" that has become prevalent in several of America's urban cores.60 According to many officers, recent years have seen an increase in lawsuits and informal complaints brought against law enforcement, a correlate tendency in departments to steer officers away from necessarily risky conduct in do-or-die situations, and a concomitant decline in officer morale. 61 In 1981 in the State of California,"2 residents placed 8,686 complaints against peace officers, of which 1,552 or 18 were ultimately sustained.63 In 2000, Californians recorded 23,395 complaints, of which 2,395 or 10 were sustained. 64 This ballooning of claims - in particular unsuccessful ones65 - is as troubling as it is dramatic. The Oakland, California, Citizens Police Review Board ("CPRB") embodies this deterrent effect.66 This board provides an independent forum in which aggrieved citizens can register their complaints about police conduct. 67 At the same time, Detective Jesse H. Grant, who has had personal experience appearing before the CPRB, notes that complaints, more than 80 of which were not sustained in 2002, impose a serious deterrent effect on police conduct. 68 Officers now more than ever think twice and act conservatively - although not necessarily safely - when engaged in violent altercations with or apprehensions of dangerous suspects. 69 Ironically, the presence of entities like the CPRB undermines the justification for excessive force lawsuits to begin with: by providing an avenue for voicing grievances over police conduct, such boards obviate some of the need for civil actions. Moreover, they reflect the deterrent effect that wide-open public access to disciplinary bodies can breed. Thus, there exist significant reasons for the courts to grant some kind of immunity to law enforcement officials in order to ensure the contin-ued quality of their work. By increasing the threat of litigation, frivolous lawsuits can serve to deter officers' reasonable conduct, thus imperiling public safety and upending the delicate balance society seeks between forcefully fighting crime and respectfully treating all citizens.
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	11	+3. Controversial decision coming that will harm the Court’s image either way it’s decided. Compton Herald ‘10/31
	12	+Compton Herald serves as an important objective voice providing general coverage of important issues that impact the public to up-close-and-personal investigative stories of public officials. “Supreme Court to hear transgender bathroom case.” The Compton Herald. October 31, 2016. http://comptonherald.com/supreme-court-hear-transgender-bathroom-case/ JJN
	13	+WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear a case involving transgender restroom use, the Compton Herald has learned. The decision was announced Oct. 31 and is the first case of this kind to reach the high court. Once heard, the high court’s decision on this widely debated and controversial nationwide issue may well set a major historical precedent. The case involves a Virginia high school student who was born female but views herself as a male. Originally, a lower level court ruled the student would be allowed to use the boys’ restroom, but the Supreme Court placed a temporary stay while an appeal was reviewed, which was filed by the Gloucester County School Board. The student brought the case after the school upheld ordinary restroom use restrictions on the student when community members came forward with concern over the privacy of other students. “Students with gender identity dysphoria, to no fault of their own, should be treated with love and respect. However, such treatment must also be respectful of children of the opposite sex who don’t want their dignity and privacy violated daily in a locker room,” said Brad Dacus, president and founder of Pacific Justice Institute. The case is also important because the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education have issued a letter asserting that Title IX, which requires equal treatment between the sexes in the provision of educational services, applies to transgendered pupils. When Title IX was passed in 1972 Congress understood sex to be based purely on biological status. “What is important is whether the executive branch can unilaterally change the terms of a statute,” Dacus noted. “So in addition to the issue of privacy and transgenderism, the case has profound implications for the rule of law.” The Supreme Court is set to hear the case as early as next year. “It is PJI’s hope the Supreme Court will rule to protect the privacy and decency of all children in their decision,” Dacus added.
	14	+Turns
	15	+1. Qualified immunity establishes a good relationship between law and citizens. Kirby 2k
	16	+John D. Kirby, May, 2000, "Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard " Cornell Law Review, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3450andamp;context=clr MG
	17	+Some sacrifice of individual rights for the sake of effective government is the inevitable price of living in a society organized and run by fallible human beings. 70 The early common law recognized that the threat of personal liability might prevent officials from executing their duties with the necessary decisiveness. 71 The framers embodied this recognition in the Constitution. 72 Indecisiveness caused by fear of personal liability can lead to grave public harm. For example, a mayor may decide not to demolish a row of houses to provide a fire-break if he thinks he will subsequently be held liable for destroying the homes.7 3 This trade-off rationale implies that the protection that the qualified immunity doctrine supplies should be closely tailored to the needs of different levels of public officials. It should give no more protection than is necessary for the official to effectively fulfill his duties because each additional measure of protection divests victims of a greater range of remedies for violations of their constitutional rights. Providing more protection than is necessary to prevent officials from being unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties results in an unjustifiable sacrifice of individual constitutional rights.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-11-06 20:34:02.350

Judge

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	1	+Angus, Thomas

Opponent

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	1	+Harker QC

ParentRound

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	1	+6

Round

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	1	+4

Team

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	1	+Harvard Westlake Mork Neg

Title

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	1	+Court Legitimacy Case Turns

Tournament

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	1	+Damus