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+1NC CP |
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+Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes- |
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+-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions |
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+-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies |
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+-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records |
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+-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages |
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+-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers |
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+-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies |
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+- Governments responsible for police officers should enact statutes requiring them to respond to claims of IPV, and establish that the officers are liable for failing to respond. |
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+We have a solvency advocate available on spot from Hill 15 – I can show in CX or prep |
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+This is what their AC Bishop author advocates as the best solution |
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+Gary M. Bishop, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C.L. Rev. 1357 (1989), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol30/iss5/3 |
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+In the absence of such statutes, battered survivors women must seek other means by which to impose liability upon passive police officers. Overzealous police officers may be held liable under section 1983 when they use more force than necessary to place a person in custody, but courts are somewhat more reluctant to impose liability upon police officers who fail to act. 17Drawing upon the general principle that a state actor may violate section 1983 by failing to lend aid to an individual who is in need, courts have begun to recognize that police must assist battered women and must be held accountable for their failure to do so if certain conditions are pres- ent.' 9Some courts have used equal protection analysis as a means to impose liability upon passive police officers. 2° That is, if a com- parison between police response to domestic violence calls and po- lice response to general assault calls reveals that police officers treat domestic violence calls less seriously, the evidence may be sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation. 21Police officers may also be held liable for failure to aid battered women if a special rela- tionship exists between the officer and the victim. 22In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to define clearly the conditions necessary to establish such a special relationship in recognizing a section 1983 claim against police offi- cers who failed to lend assistance to a victim of domestic violence in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department." The 1989 United States Supreme Court case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services seriously undercuts the Balistreri court's efforts, and those of other courts, to provide battered women with a remedy against passive police officers. 24 Prior to DeShaney, courts had imposed a duty to act upon police officers based on the officers' authority to enforce the law, 25 on statutorily prescribed duties, 26 and on the theory of a "special relationship"27 between the victim and the police officer. DeShaney substantially narrowed the circumstances under which a special relationship may arise, 28 thus forcing lower courts to rely upon alternate legal doctrines to aid battered women. This note examines the avenues that are still open to battered women who sue passive police officers, including the limited special relationship concept. Section 1 surveys the various theories that courts have applied to determine when police officers have a duty to act.29 Section II explores the way that courts have utilized the duty-to-act theories in evaluating section 1983 claims of battered women against police officers." Section III analyzes the law regarding battered women and offers some recommendations to these women who bring section 1983 claims against passive police officers. 31 Section IV concludes that the enactment of statutes imposing liability on police officers who fail to take the proper action to protect battered women is the most effective solution to the problem. I. FAILURE TO ACT UNDER SECTION 1983 The language of section 1983 seems to require that a state actor undertake some affirmative act before he or she falls within the statute's purview. 32 Therefore, the threshold question in this area is whether a police officer's failure to act comes within the reach of words such as "cause" or "subject," which both imply positive action. There are a variety of theories under which section 1983 liability has been held to apply to police officers' failure to act. Under the law enforcement theory, a police officer who ignores the duty imposed upon him by his office and fails to aid someone who is within the officer's reach may be held liable under section 1983." The courts have also relied upon statutes that impose upon police officers a duty to act under certain conditions. 34 Finally, the courts have developed the special realtionship concept, und er which police have a duty to act under narrow circumstances." The failure-to-act doctrine is one that the courts began to developed outside of the survivors battered women context. In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Azar v. Conley that section 1983 is applicable to acts of omission as well as com- mission." Thus, an officer's failure to take steps to aid an individual—an omission—may be actionable under section 1983, just as an officer's actions (i.e., police brutality)—commission—may be deemed actionable. " In Azar, Mr. Conley and his friends and relatives harassed and intimidated Mr. Azar and the other members of his family." The Akron police took no action to assist the Azars. Mr. Conley was a police officer, and the plaintiffs alleged that the members of the force did not want to say anything about possible wrongdoing by a fellow officer. |
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+CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change |
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+Meltzer, JD, 14 |
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+(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police) |
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+In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2) |
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+The CP Solves the Case |
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+1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap |
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+Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis) |
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+This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as *906 Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work. Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization. Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched. The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized? For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing *907 programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325 |
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+2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations |
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+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) |
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+First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem. |
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+4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action |
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+Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306) |
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+A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61 |
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+The net benefit is Tech Shift |
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+A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections |
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+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) |
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+Technology has provided police departments with powerful tools to collect extensive data on private citizens. Those tools have captured images of every license plate passing through an intersection; n1 used facial-recognition technology to determine whether Super Bowl attendees had criminal records; n2 and implemented multi-technology systems that "aggregate and analyze information from approximately 3,000 surveil-lance cameras around the city ... ." n3 New technologies allow police departments to collect a range of data on the public space, including private citizens not under investigation, raising concerns regarding how that data may be used in the future. n4 And as storage and database capabilities have become cheaper and more efficient, the potential for expansive databases has become not only a science-fiction trope n5 but a reality. n6 *1030 But despite potential, these new tools fit poorly within the current regulatory framework. Police departments have embraced the information age with little guidance or oversight, raising significant privacy concerns regarding the effect of mass-data collection on the privacy rights the general public has enjoyed for centuries. n7 At the same time, current regulatory mechanisms have not adequately addressed how police departments should use cutting-edge surveillance technologies. n8 Such regulatory mechanisms often are inhibited by conflicting motivations n9 or poorly adapted to technological change. n10 Scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to address the privacy and criminal law concerns raised by these "data-collection technologies," but these approaches often provide inadequate flexibility to local jurisdictions to address their unique problems n11 or focus too narrowly on correcting a particular, novel iteration of the problem. n12 *1031 To overcome this regulatory deficit, civilian oversight can provide effective regulatory oversight of police departments' use of new and emerging technologies. Specifically, I argue that a specialized form of civilian oversight, the "Loyal Opposition" Policy Review Board (LOPRB), would function as a regulatory mechanism that not only provides proactive regulatory guidance on technology usage by police departments but would also allow for that guidance to be specifically tailored to the local community. n13 LOPRBs, composed of members who are informed on and invested in technology and civil rights, would undertake policy review of police department procedures for the use of new technologies and recommend "best practices" approaches to ensuring that individual privacy rights and police department investigative needs are effectively balanced. n14 Such a civilian oversight mechanism would ensure that the privacy concerns of the average citizen remain protected as new technologies are incorporated into the daily operations of police departments. |
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+B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance |
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+Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis) |
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+I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug the messiness of civil liberties protections~-~-the policy issues that lie at the core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well worth trying by a principal~-~-whether that principal is the President or the Congress~-~-who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of ways. n360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more congressional attention. n361 And in several different ways, they may increase public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports~-~-both public and private~-~-which can be used by Congress and the public. n362 And they build relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all *193 for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a complicated ecology. |
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+TPP |
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+TPP is predicted to pass, but there’s no time to waste. Mitchell ‘11/2 |
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+Peter Mitchell - AAP US Correspondent, Australian Associated Press. “US: White House bullish on TPP passing.” News.com.au. November 2, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-white-house-bullish-on-tpp-passing/news-story/66aaccb30c94f3301f95fa652040190f JJN |
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+US President Barack Obama's top Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiator has bullishly predicted the trade deal will be approved by Congress after next week's presidential election if congressional leaders bring it up for a vote. Michael Froman also warned if Congress does not ratify the 12-nation free trade proposal Australia, China and other nations will swoop in and steal markets from the US in the Asia-Pacific. "It's up to the congressional leadership to decide to bring it forward," Mr Froman told CNBC on Tuesday. "If they bring it forward I think we can get the votes there." Presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both oppose the TPP and members of Congress, many who are also up for re-election next Tuesday, have been reluctant to show public support for the contentious trade pact. Mr Obama and Mr Froman are hoping the the anti-trade sentiment will recede after the election and members of Congress will be willing to ratify it before Mr Obama moves out of the White House in January. "I think the key thing is the rest of the world isn't standing by whether it is China negotiating its own trade agreements or the EU, Canada or Australia or others, they are going to move ahead and get access to these markets at our expense," Mr Froman said. "Our market share is actually in decline in some of these important, fast growing and large markets so it is awfully important we show leadership." The TPP signatories are: Australia, the US, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru. |
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+TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27 |
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+Adam Creighton – economics correspondent Washington. “Hope for TPP as Obama administration works the phones.” The Australian Business Review. October 27, 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hope-for-tpp-as-obama-administration-works-the-phones/news-story/8ce5e112900eb06ca2bb0711d3aa16ce JJN |
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+The world’s biggest free trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Australian officials have written off as a casualty of a fierce anti-trade backlash in the US, has an almost even chance of success in Congress, according to people familiar with the matter in Washington DC. The Obama administration has been hitting the phones and sending cabinet ministers to remote US towns in an unprecedented bid to persuade Congress to pass the controversial Asia-Pacific trade deal among 12 countries. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have repudiated the deal. The former top economics adviser to Vice-President Joe Biden, Jared Bernstein, said the chance the TPP would be passed after November 8 but before the new president took office was almost 50 per cent, offering hope for the deal signed by the Turnbull government and 11 other nations in February, which frees up trade and investment across 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. “I think the probability is a lot higher than conventional wisdom on the street; I’d give it a 45 per cent chance,” said Mr Bernstein. He said President Obama would certainly send the deal to Congress whoever won the election. “What’s interesting is just how (hard) the administration is working it … full-court press behind the scenes,” he said. “More than on healthcare, more than on stimulus, more than on financial reform: it’s remarkable,” added Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens Global Trade Watch. She said cabinet ministers had been traipsing the country trying to convince wavering Congressmen. “They are working the phones to a degree that actually is really interesting; cabinet secretary folks are once or twice a week since April calling House members who they might have any kind of chance with,” she added. “The odds of stopping it are slightly better, but it’s close.” Ambassador Joe Hockey and visiting Turnbull government ministers have been strenuously promoting the TPP in Washington, but confidence that the deal — which is also being sold as a way to entrench US and Australian commercial norms in a region increasingly dominated by China — will pass has dwindled significantly. Consonant with the mix of confected and genuine dissatisfaction with the TPP that permeates Republican and Democrat ranks in Congress, Republican congressman Kevin Brady earlier told The Australian the deal wouldn’t pass without additional protections for intellectual property, which Australia has publicly ruled out. Ms Wallach and Mr Bernstein, now at the Centre for Budget Priorities, by contrast argued the TPP deal had been captured by US corporate interests, and should be renegotiated to pare back the extra patent and intellectual property protections demanded by the US on behalf of its pharmaceutical industry. They also want to see clauses outlawing currency manipulation and removing investor-state dispute clauses that potentially limit governments’ freedom to make policies that damage foreign commercial interests. The TPP would be the first trade agreement to be rejected by Congress. If it doesn’t pass in the “lame duck” session — before the new house, senate and president are in place — it will be very unlikely the US would begin new trade negotiations given the febrile environment. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has made rewriting or rescinding US trade agreements the centrepiece of his economic strategy. “One of the reasons it’s 45 per cent (chance of success) and not 25 per cent is because … the undecideds are getting much more pressure from the administration than from (labour groups),” said Mr Bernstein. “Democrat and Republican elites have literally for decades ignored the costs of trade.” |
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+The plan sparks congressional debate. Orenstein ‘16 |
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+WALKER ORENSTEIN. “Reform advocates upset over pushback over changing malice law.” The News Tribune. July 29, 2016. http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article92684372.html JJN |
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+When an effort by state lawmakers to make prosecuting police for improper use of deadly force easier stalled last year, legislators compromised. They agreed to let a task force study the issue and recommend policy to next year’s Legislature on how to reduce violent interactions involving law enforcement. But some on the state-appointed committee, which had its second meeting Tuesday, say lawmakers overseeing the panel are filibustering even a dialogue about changing controversial state law regulating police use of deadly force. Amending state statute on the subject was a key component of reform-advocates’ demands that spurred the task force. It’s also the subject of a proposed initiative to the Legislature that would amend the law if enacted. Washington’s law is regarded as unique in the country. Convicting an officer for using deadly force requires proof the officer acted with “malice.” It’s a standard many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, have said is more or less impossible to meet, effectively giving police immunity when they use deadly force. Some committee members say changing the law would reduce police use of deadly force, a stated end-goal of the task force. Others on the panel have pushed back, saying changing the statute won’t help that cause. The split could derail what Karen Johnson, chairwoman of the Black Alliance of Thurston County, described as a “golden opportunity” to be a “national model” for discourse between law enforcement and police reform advocates. ‘SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY’ De’Sean Quinn, a member of the state’s African American Commission on the task force, said he wants the group to be “action oriented.” Real action for him might include recommending the state collect data on police use of force to easier analyze how to reduce it, he said. But the key aim, he said, is to reach consensus on how to change Washington’s malice law, particularly in light of the recent police killings of Philando Castile in Minnesota and Alton Sterling in Louisiana. “I feel a sense of responsibility for my kids that we really try and address this issue,” Quinn, who has two sons, said in an interview. Gerald Hankerson, a member of the committee and president of the NAACP of Alaska, Oregon and Washington, said lawmakers and some law enforcement officials on the panel have been hesitant to broach the topic in seriousness. Others on the task force agree. Tuesday’s meeting centered mostly on law enforcement training. Toshiko Hasegawa, appointed to the task force as a member of the state’s Asian American Commission, called out lawmakers during committee session, saying they were avoiding a deeper discussion on changing the law by “hiding behind procedure.” She added in a later phone interview that committee co-chairman Sen. Kirk Pearson, R-Monroe, was deliberately avoiding the topic. “Why is the police task force on deadly force not discussing deadly force?” Hasegawa asked. The task force is required to meet only four times. Johnson, Quinn, Hasegawa and others signed a letter sent to Pearson and co-chairman Rep. Roger Goodman, D-Kirkland, before Tuesday’s meeting, asking for clearer guidelines on discussing the malice statute and more input on meeting agendas. Quinn said he felt work on the statute was being ducked, and said the Legislature is not responding fast enough to outcries for police reform in the country. “It’s not OK to not deal with the difficult issues,” he said. Although the Legislature is not obligated to act on task force recommendations, “consensus with law enforcement” on legal changes “would be significant for the Legislature going forward,” said Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle. Rather than building consensus, the meetings so far have “almost been like it’s a dog and pony show,” Hankerson said. ‘NOT THE FIRST THING ON MY MIND’ Rep. Dave Hayes, R-Camano Island, is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office and one of four legislators on the panel. He said the task force should look at all sorts of avenues to reduce violent interactions involving police, and said changing Washington’s malice standard is “definitely not the first thing on my mind.” Added Hayes: “I don’t believe that changing the statute is going to fix anything.” He said he expects the result of the task force to be “a couple bills regarding data collection and how we use that data to make our local law enforcement officers better.” He cautioned the Legislature would have to weigh the cost of those bills to not place a burden on local law enforcement departments. Pearson, who left before the conclusion of Tuesday’s meeting, did not return calls or messages from The News Tribune asking for comment. On Tuesday, he said reviewing past applications of the malice statute is “beyond” what the committee was designed to do. Goodman said at the meeting the task force needs to learn more about perspectives of law enforcement officers, their training, and about data collection, and not just work on the malice statute. “We can’t be sort of rushing to focus on one aspect — one very important aspect and that is perception of flaws in the law — but we need to sit back and continue to listen,” he said during the committee meeting. Sue Rahr, the executive director of the Criminal Justice Training Commission, said at the meeting that prosecuting officers for improper use of deadly force “isn’t enough” to reduce violent encounters with law enforcement. Police officers in Washington train at Rahr’s organization with the exception of the Washington State Patrol. Rahr is on the task force. “If the task force does change the law, that’s only going to solve one piece of the problem,” she said. “The problem is much bigger and much more complex than that.” GOING FORWARD Johnson and others have tried to soothe brewing discontent in the group. She reminded task force members there would be more meetings, and that they can schedule more than four if needed. Goodman promised a more collaborative approach to setting new meeting agendas. A minority report can be filed if task force members don’t agree with the final group report to the Legislature. Frockt said Monday that he was looking at the malice law “very seriously,” and feels “ a deep sense of obligation and gravity surrounding this given what’s happening around the country.” “There are people who are going to be clearly disappointed if we don’t make some changes in some Washington law,” he added. “I hope that this is not the situation where the task force goes through, does a lot of work and nothing really happens with it.” Quinn said he’s still optimistic that thorough work on the malice statute will come. But, he said, “there needs to be a demonstration that we need to address these issues.” |
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+Plan kills Obama’s agenda |
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+KRINER 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston University Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, page 276-77 |
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+One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily. By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. First. high-profile congressional challenges to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect. |
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+Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15 |
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+Andy Morimoto is a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The Strategic Costs of TPP Failure.” The Diplomat. August 22, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-strategic-costs-of-tpp-failure/ JJN |
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+The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in trouble. Trade ministers failed last month to conclude the massive 12-nation trade deal by their hoped-for summer deadline, putting negotiations in danger of collapse. This is a problem. Trade advocates argue that letting the TPP die would be a significant lost opportunity for the global economy. But there’s a potentially bigger problem here – one that may have serious consequences for both U.S. national security and regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. Just consider the strategic backdrop against which last month’s negotiations occurred. Maritime disputes flaring across the South China Sea. Tensions rising between Beijing and Tokyo. Perennial friction between China and Taiwan and a growing nuclear stockpile in North Korea. If the TPP falls through, it could greatly hurt the America’s ability to stabilize the fraught geopolitics of Asia. Some have argued that a TPP failure would be a net positive for regional stability. The deal, they claim, would isolate and provoke China, and should therefore be abandoned. But this view is blinkered. Given the high trade volumes and trade arrangements across the Asia-pacific, China stands very little chance of being isolated. Moreover, Chinese officials have other ventures on their minds. According to He Weiwen, a former Chinese Commerce Ministry official, “the Chinese are more or less neutral because we have our own agenda, pushing forward ASEAN plus six and the Silk Road.” In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that the opposite is true: that a TPP failure will cause a number of strategic problems for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. First, failure would mean stunting the growth of America’s Pacific partners. This is problematic for two reasons. Most importantly, fewer states would be devoting fewer resources to meet shared challenges like counterterrorism and climate change. In addition, as countries get richer and more interdependent, they become more invested in the well-being of their neighbors. And while free trade, interdependence, and prosperity do not guarantee stability and peace (see: World War I), they do create conditions that make conflict less appealing. Second, failure would create more potential for instability and crises. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which China and one of its neighbors along the South China Sea (say, Vietnam) get into a serious spat over territorial claims. With the TPP, this spat would be less likely to escalate into a full-blown crisis, as China understands that the U.S. is more inclined to intervene in situations that threaten its growing trade interests. Without the TPP, there is less clarity about U.S. resolve, so the potential for miscalculation and escalation increases. Third, failure would send a strong signal that the U.S. no longer has the political will to lead in the region. This would come at a time when allies are already uncertain of U.S. commitments. Earlier this week, for example, Japan’s trade minister expressed disappointment in last month’s trade meetings, saying “every TPP country wondered why the U.S. was quick to give up the conclusion without its usual relentless persistence.” If the U.S. allows negotiations to collapse, it would demonstrate the Obama administration’s declaration – that the U.S. is “all in, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific” – to be hollow. This has important geopolitical implications. If Asia’s great powers perceive the U.S. to be unserious about its role in the region, this will increase the incentive for the powerful regional states (i.e. China and Japan) to jockey with one another for regional hegemony. Finally, failure would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. economy – and America’s ability to project strength abroad rests on its economic foundation at home. According to an analysis from the Peterson Institute, U.S. income gains under the TPP would be significant, potentially adding $59 billion per year by 2020. Failing to conclude the TPP would forego these potential gains, and would make it more difficult for the U.S. to stem the defense cuts put in place by the sequester and invest in our military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling noted that “trade is what most of international relations are about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy.” Today, U.S. trade policy – and indeed, its national security policy – are in danger of falling apart. Getting something as big and complicated as the TPP across the line won’t be easy. But given the smoldering flashpoints across Asia, the U.S. can hardly afford to squander any tools in its foreign policy toolkit. The stakes are too high. |
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+Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war. Rudd 11 |
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+Rudd 11 – Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “The Case for American Engagement in Asia: The Australian Perspective”, 9-15, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110915.aspx?ministerid=2 |
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+THE GEO-STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS But as nations change, so too do relations between nations. The emergence of new powers inevitably brings new strategic complexity, as the power relativities of the 20th century give way to the new ones. Asia will be vulnerable to a host of strategic uncertainties, arising from the need for new powers to integrate into the global economic and political order, and for the established powers to accommodate them. The potential for misunderstanding — and the consequences of miscalculation — is also vast. Tensions like those we see in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf may become even more difficult to manage. Make no mistake: these aren’t just regional problems. Questions about the future of the South China Sea touch on every regional country’s future, given their global strategic and economic significance. This theme isn't new, but what I can tell you about this strategic shift is that we — Australia and the United States — will face it as allies. Sure, there is the possibility of instability in our region. But we've faced the possibility of conflict — and actual conflict — together in the past. Many different tests, circumstances and challenges have put the acid to our alliance since the ANZUS treaty was signed, 60 years ago. We've been reminded again that the only time the ANZUS treaty has been formally invoked was ten years ago this week — in response to the attacks on September 11. But military and intelligence cooperation with the US continues across a wide range of theatres within the framework of the Alliance. Here in San Francisco — where the ANZUS treaty was signed, all those years ago — I'm reminded that Australian and American servicemen and women have fought, flown, sailed and — I'm reliably informed — surfed together since the Pacific War. Today, that Alliance continues to grow in meaning and intensity. We are fighting together in Afghanistan; working together against global threats like piracy; and responding together to natural disasters across the region. For us, for our relationship, the end of the Cold War hasn’t meant a downgrading of the importance of our Alliance — if anything, it’s become more intense and more important. So as we face the challenges of the 21st Century — the challenges of the shift of power to Asia — we will do so together. We’re working together to ensure our forces are aligned in the right way to provide for the national security of our two countries, and to help us shape the emerging regional environment. Our forces have to be able to respond to the range of contingencies that can arise in our region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Increasingly, we aren’t just working with each other, but with other regional players. I'm not just talking about the Pacific, or the Asia-Pacific. The critical region for our future now extends to include the Indian Ocean as well. The growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean starts with India's rise. India is the largest democracy in the world. Forecast to be the third largest economy in the world in coming decades, it is in the interest of both the United States and Australia for India to play the role of a major international power. For now, India’s focus remains South Asia. But its strategic weight is increasing with its increasing economic size and strength. India is increasingly looking east with interest, both for strategic and economic reasons, and because of long-standing cultural connections. But the importance of the Indian Ocean also lies in its unique role in maritime security and sea lines of communication for a much larger group of economies, both in Europe and Asia. Lying between the Middle East energy sources and the dynamic global engine room of Asia, its importance grows with each passing year. The pressures on the Gulf and West Indian Ocean choke points will intensify, as India grows and East Asian centres of growth remain reliant on Gulf energy and African resources. In the 21st Century, questions of resource, energy and food security are becoming more vital than ever. As Robert Kaplan says, the Indian Ocean is once again at the heart of the world, as it was in ancient and medieval times. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES The United States has been a guarantor of security and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific for decades. But the 21st Century will demand more. As the world changes, it's even more critical that the US builds its engagement with our region. As the United States transitions back from tough and unforgiving wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it might seem tempting to resist the case for further international engagement. President Obama has already rightly intensified US involvement with East Asia. It remains the case, in one way or another, that the United States is vital in solving common problems collectively. No other power is able or willing to support essential global public goods — like the free movement of trade, capital and people around the world. Sea-lane security, regional security in critical regions like the Gulf, open markets, the reserve currency, deep and liquid capital markets — who else provides these global public goods? America has faced these questions before. On the eve of entry into World War II, Henry Luce's seminal editorial in Life magazine on the American Century was much more than a statement about relative power, as America assumed its position in the new order. It was a call for American leadership in international affairs. It is in America’s interest and the world’s interest to provide that leadership — because in its absence, the risks grow that we will see destabilisation that threatens us all. The interdependence of our economies has been shown clearly by the financial crisis, and a collapse in the conditions for open trade would be an economic disaster for all trading nations. I share President Obama's view that America can neither retreat from "responsibility as an anchor of global security" nor "confront... every evil that can be found abroad". But President Obama talked of the need for a "more centered course" — and that lies in a deep US engagement in Asia. I believe the vast majority of the countries of Asia welcome that continued and expanded American strategic role in our hemisphere. As Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono said in November 2008, as the financial crisis was wreaking havoc upon us, “none of these global challenges can be addressed by the world community without having America onboard. And conversely, none of these issues can be resolved by the United States alone.” And as Lee Kuan Yew said a year later, “the consensus in ASEAN is that the US remains irreplaceable in East Asia.” In the 21st Century, the US needs substantial, sophisticated, nimble engagement in the region. |
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+Case |
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+We’ll go through their evidence and demonstrate the problems |
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+Gray says lack of GOVERNMENT accountability is the problem- even when mandatory response laws are passed police command don’t enforce them. It also says the lack of an affirmative right to police action is a problem- the aff doesn’t fix either of these problems |
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+Lela Gray, J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School, 2011; B.A., University of South Florida, 2007. “Municipal Accountability in Domestic Violence: A Promising New Case,” http://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/Articles/Vol04_1/4.1.362-Gray.pdf |
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+In this paper, I argue that one reason for the continued existence of this IPV domestic violence plague is the lack of local government and law enforcement accountability. In Part I of this paper, I discuss the general rule that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers no affirmative right to governmental protection, and the two exceptions to the general rule. I posit that even though these two exceptions were supposed to enhance governmental accountability, the courts’ interpretation of these exceptions has meant that municipalities and the police are seldom held responsible in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983 claims), even when they fail to adhere to the laws. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1978 that on the issue of intimate violence, “the most serious law enforcement problem . . . is the failure of the police to respond to a call for help.”14 Six years later, the U.S. Attorney General’s Office announced a nationwide failure of law enforcement to respond adequately in IPV domestic violence cases.15 Reports like these spurred the passage of mandatory arrest policies in many states;16 however, in the 1990’s the studies and reports on IPV domestic violence continued to show an overall inadequate police response to the problem.17 One reason for the inadequate response is a lack of local government and law enforcement accountability. Expanding the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process exceptions would help cure this problem. |
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+Their stein Evidence is not a solvency advocate- it is not about qualified immunity or 1983 suits –its about Alabama state law that the plan wouldn’t effect –they selectively underlined it to not show that |
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+Kelsey Stein, journalist for AL.com, “Wrongful death lawsuit dismissed after Hoover police did not immediately enter home after woman’s fatal stabbing,” September 18, 2104, http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/09/judge_dismisses_lawsuit_claimi.html |
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+The death of my sister, Kimberly Jamison Ozburn, is a chilling example of what can happen when police wait to assist a victim. The facts of the Jamison family's subsequent lawsuit must not be ignored. On March 19, 2013, Kimberly called 911 at 9:25 p.m., telling dispatch that her assailant had a gun, pleading for police to "come fast," and, a short time later, screaming that her assailant was stabbing her. She desperately needed help, and she needed it fast. Our mother, Virginia, escaped from the home and called dispatch at 9:28, telling them the assailant's full name, that he was armed with a knife and gun, and that, as she fled the scene, he was trying to stab her daughter. Police arrived during this call, which records Virginia telling police this essential information and also how to enter the house, and where Kimberly and her assailant were located. The first two responders were on the scene by 9:30, fully aware of the information in the 911 calls. By 9:37, four more officers had arrived. My family, then, doesn't understand how it could have taken almost two hours for these officers to "assess the situation" and "develop a plan" before entering the home at 11:16 p.m. The city of Hoover explains the action of its officers by claiming that a fast entry would not have been in time to prevent Kimberly's death. But we do know this: an ambulance was on the scene by 9:32. The Jamison home is less than a half mile from the interstate; less than 10 minutes from UAB hospital. And phone records show that Kimberly was alive ~-~- she attempted to make an outgoing call from the house phone ~-~- at 9:34 p.m. Virginia sued the city, but that wrongful death action was dismissed, not because of lack of merit, but because of the Alabama law that renders police immune from lawsuits. And that, we believe, is the larger issue stemming from this incident: In times of crisis, citizens should be able to count on police who know how to respond promptly! The Jamison family fears that survivors victims of domestic violence in Alabama are in a truly terrible situation, unable to rely on 911 for meaningful assistance. We understand that the purpose of qualified immunity is to encourage police to take actions in the line of duty without concern about being second-guessed after the fact. However, under the Alabama statute and the Cranman state Supreme Court restatement of immunity law, police are protected by this "qualified' immunity under almost all circumstances, unless their decision making is willful, malicious, or in bad faith. We believe Hoover PD was negligent in its failure to act. We acknowledge that Alabama law confers immunity to protect police negligence, but we believe that law needs to be changed. Serious negligence should not be protected. And police should not enjoy immunity when they fail to take reasonable action. |
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+Their second Gray card is a reason to vote neg on presumption- it says UNLESS local governments are held accountable there will be no effect on IPV. Gray 2 |
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+However, both the “special relationship” exception and the “state-created danger” exceptions have been applied only in the most flagrant cases, which effectively stripped the exceptions of any usefulness in the area of domestic abuse. While this narrow application is sound in most areas of the law, there is a sore need and good reason for expansion and broad application of these exceptions in the area of domestic violence. Unlike other criminals, batterers often continue to abuse the same survivors victim(s) day-after-day. Also unlike other crimes or torts, IPV domestic violence is not a random crime and the survivors victims of domestic violence are not sporadically chosen. Because domestic violence is so widespread and the victims are often re-victimized again and again, empowerment of batterers is particularly troublesome. When officers like those in the Okin case empower batterers, they send a message that the continued torment of the victim is permissible. The Battered Women’s Movement and other activist groups have done their jobs and pushed for over twenty years to get the attention and backing of the New York Legislature. Likewise, Congress and other State Legislatures have made great strides nationally in the area of domestic violence, enacting domestic violence statutes over the past twenty years both federally and in every state in the nation.163 Without local government accountability in federal court, IPV domestic violence laws remain nearly meaningless. Extending Okin and allowing §1983 claims against state and local governments in the area of domestic violence will help ensure that batterers are not empowered by deliberate indifference and a custom of inaction. This expansion and a broader application of substantive due process in domestic violence cases will add teeth to the current domestic violence laws as local governments and police face accountability under § 1983. Without accountability, the huge strides made in IPV domestic violence legislation over the past twenty years will remain but words on a page. |
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+Turns |
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+Civil suits don’t encourage reform- prefer our evidence it’s a direct response to their 1AC evidence Harmon 09 |
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+Rachel A., PROMOTING CIVIL RIGHTS THROUGH PROACTIVE POLICING REFORM, 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu. |
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+Federal law has played an important role in regulating police misconduct. In particular, federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits for damages under § 1983, and the exclusionary rule are all legal tools that attempt to reduce police misconduct by punishing specific incidents of it and by deterring it in the future. Unfortunately, each is inadequate to promote wholesale institutional change. Federal criminal civil rights prosecutions face significant legal and practical obstacles, including that federal law imposes an onerous intent requirement on civil rights crimes; that victims of police misconduct often make problematic witnesses; and that juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant officers.16 As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct. Even if criminal prosecutions were more common, however, it is not clear that charges against individual officers would encourage departmental change. Almost inevitably, when some officers in a department are prosecuted, others are not. Criminal prosecution may therefore enable cities to characterize egregious misconduct as resulting from individual pathology rather than systemic problems and to deny the need for departmental improvement.17 Successful § 1983 suits for damages encourage some departmental reform, but they too are limited. Suits against individual officers are difficult to win, both because they suffer some of the same trial challenges as criminal cases against officers, and because officers often have qualified immunity for their actions, even when the conduct is unconstitutional.18 Suing supervisors or chiefs often requires establishing deliberate indifference or reckless action rather than negligence, and suing a city requires a plaintiff to show that misconduct was not only unconstitutional, but reflected municipal “policy” or “custom.”19 Some civil actions succeed despite these obstacles, but many incidents of serious misconduct result in an unsuccessful § 1983 suit or an inexpensive settlement, and therefore provide little incentive for reform.20 Moreover, some scholars have argued that even when plaintiffs win civil suits, damages actions against government actors are an ineffectual—even perverse—means of encouraging local officials to reduce misconduct.21 Daryl Levinson, for example, contends that government officers, police chiefs, and mayors respond to political incentives, and may never be forced to internalize the economic costs of damages paid by municipalities.22 Although Levinson may overstate the case against civil suits,23 he persuasively argues that even when they are successful, civil suits are at best an inefficient and limited means of encouraging institutional reform.24 Footnote- 16. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 465-67 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE 247, 253, 258-59, 266 (William A. Geller and Hans Toch eds., 1996); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 806-11; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488, 490-92 (1992 |
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+Testifying in court can cause psychological damage – moving away from courts as a whole is better. Nelson 06 |
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+Leah Nelson, 8-1-2006, "Testifying in Court Can Amplify Trauma For Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse," Association for Psychological Science, http://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/observer/2006/august-06/testifying-in-court-can-amplify-trauma-for-victims-of-childhood-sexual-abuse.html MG |
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+It goes without saying that childhood sexual abuse is often a traumatic experience. Add to that revisiting the abuse in courtroom testimony, and a complex picture emerges about the full impact the abuse can have on a victim. In her invited address at the APS 18th Annual Convention, “Childhood Trauma, and Court: The Psychology and the Law,” Gail Goodman, University of California, Davis, discussed research findings on the after-effects of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), highlighting the potentially damaging effects of a related event that is all too often overlooked: the trauma of testifying about CSA during trial. Between 1986 and 1988, Goodman and her team of researchers studied the behavioral patterns of over 200 children involved as victims in CSA prosecutions. They re-interviewed 174 of the victims as young adults (between 1997 and 2001), looking at their memories of the abuse and their current pathology and searching for correlations between their state as young children at the time of the CSA prosecutions and their later mental health. “The picture is really complex, and you have to understand the circumstances surrounding the child and the case to make a prediction,” said Goodman. Certain conditions, such as whether the child had to testify multiple times throughout a prosecution, was the strongest predictor of later traumatization. Other, less stable predictors include gender, age at the time of testimony, and the length of the perpetrator’s sentence. In children who testified multiple times, especially if the abuse was severe and intrafamilial, Goodman’s team found correlations with later sexual problems, defensive avoidance, and internalization problems, such as depression. Even “children who in the 1980s seemed more resilient, if they testified more than once, later as adults did nearly as badly as those who presented behavioral problems” at the time of testimony, Goodman said. Children who were already deeply disturbed at the time of the testimony fared worst of all: “If the child is already crying at that point, that’s a bad sign for later on.” Despite these troublesome findings, Goodman does not believe that keeping young children from testifying is always the right solution. “In terms of attitudes, it may be important for the child to testify,” she said. CSA victims who had the chance to speak at trial tend to have a more positive attitude towards the legal system and are more likely to think that the trial of their abuser was fair, she explained. Part of Goodman’s study focused on memory in conjunction with research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and Goodman’s team found many connections between the two. Delayed disclosure of CSA is common, so knowing how well people remember is important in considering whether they should testify about events that occurred. Goodman asked the adults what they remembered about the CSA and also what was the most traumatic event of their lives. Based on comparisons between what they reported as young children and what they said when later interviewed, adults with PTSD who were victimized had clear memories of the abuse whether or not the PTSD was caused by CSA. Those with few symptoms of PTSD who remembered something else, like a car accident, as their most traumatic life event had the least accurate memories. She proposed that poor memory is associated with defensive avoidance: that individuals who suppress their feelings about the trauma, don’t want to think about the past, and don’t show signs of PTSD are more likely to have faded memories than those who are more overtly traumatized. Overall, the best predictor for correct memory was the level of abuse. “The worse it is, the more traumatizing, the better the memory,” she said. However, for avoidant individuals, this was not necessarily so. Throughout her presentation, Goodman emphasized that although predictors exist, there are variations among individuals that must be considered in each case. Regardless of this caveat, audience members were intrigued. Chuck Mueller, a child clinical psychologist from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, said, “It’s very interesting, very provocative…. I was thinking about how much we want to incorporate this topic.” National Institute of Child Health and Human Development researchers Mel Pipe and Yael Orbach expressed their admiration for Goodman’s care in taking so many factors into account. “She, in many ways, started the field,” said Pipe. “It really is a great example of science being applied.” |