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3 -A focus on a priori reason and conceptual abstraction forces oppressed people to divorce themselves from the material conditions caused by whiteness and imagine a world in which whiteness is good. This takes out Kinsella since we indict the very logic behind that argument Curry 13
4 -
5 -Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS
6 -
7 -The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is. Whiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist. But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white he experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of his wealth. The white she has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own.
8 -
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10 -And, we should be having a debate about what to do about oppression, not what constitutes oppression – debates are 45 minutes long so endless academic moralizing is circular and gets no where, forgoing the opportunity for real world solutions.
11 -Their philosophy preaches that everyone is equal – this colorblind ideology perpetuates anti blackness under the myth of American liberalism. Curry 13
12 -
13 -Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS
14 -
15 -Despite the rhetorical strategies adopted by both Black and white political theorists which urge Blacks and whites alike to demand Americans to continue their allegiance to the foundational de-racialized ethos of the post-Civil Rights era, the reality of the American racism—its sheer recurring violence against Black people—demands more than symbolic rhetorical allusion. To seriously grasp the reality of racist oppression and the sempiternal machinations of anti-Blackness throughout American society be it in its institutions like the prison industrial complex, its policies like Affirmative action, or its manipulation of Black social degradation and economic disadvantage to support pathological theses about disasters like Katrina or cultural deviance as in the death of Trayvon Martin, Darius Simmons, or Jordan Davis, the study of the matter itself—racism—must be a study of a conceptual disengagement with the myth of racial equality and the “automatic progressivism” of the American liberal project. This disengagement is not simply the refusal to accept the idealism of civil rights myth held beyond the realm of fact, but the disengagement with the illusions of democracy and equality that continue to ignore the role that violence has played and continues to play in the subjugation, incarceration, and vilification of Black life. As Dr. A.J. William Myers reveals in his work groundbreaking work entitled Destructive Impulses, ¶ Until at such time white America (and Black America) is openly willing to confront a historical legacy of its own violence (perpetrated against an American people of color), any venture into and/ or expository on race relations becomes an exercise in futility…As a result, therefore, white violence, confined to the subliminal recesses of the American psyche, continues to prevent the transition necessary for the country to move beyond the idea of race. ¶ In America, Blackness and the racism that continues to condemn those historical racialized peoples is violence—it is the forceful and coercion enclosing of human beings to an inferior social, political, and economic status of which their own humanity exceeds. This dehumanizing relegation of the raced citizen is not a gradual or incremental debasement, but rather the historically immediate condition of inferiority that presents progress to be attainable by the cyclical degrees of physical violence against the racialized population. For these racially oppressed peoples, violence is the permanent fixture of existence in America, since it is the vitiation of their humanity that rationalizes the varying techniques of their cultural erasure, birthing the emergent symbolic associations of degradation that replace their invisibility, and empowering the intentional enforcements of their societal exclusions. In fact, it is precisely this triumvirate that gauges what we take to be the negation of the necessity of revolutionary change~-~-since the raced is taken to be present, as a result of a critical redefining of humanity, integrated into society.
16 -
17 -The aff’s attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff’s epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That’s a voting issue. Leonardo
18 -Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC
19 -
20 -The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies of whiteness. As a perspective, whiteness is historicaly fractured in its apprehension of racial formations. In order to ‘see’ the formation in full view, whites have to mobilize a perspective that begins with racial privilege as a central unit of analysis. Since starting from this point would mean whites engage in a thorough historical understanding of ‘how they came to be’ in a position of power, most whites resist such an undertaking and instead focus on individual merit, exception- alism, or hard work. The act of interpreting the totality of racial formations is an apostasy that white students and educators must undertake but one which does not come easy or without costs. The costs are real because it means whites would have to acknowledge their unearned privileges and disinvest in them. This is a different tack from saying that whites benefit from renouncing their whiteness because it would increase their humanity. Whites would lose many of their perks and privileges. So, the realistic appraisal is that whites do have a lot to lose by committing race treason, not just something to gain by forsaking whiteness. This is the challenge. In his discussion of gender and race, Terry Eagleton (1996) provokes a distinction between identity politics and class relations. He calls class position relational in a way that gender and race are not, because possessing a certain skin color or body configuration does not prevent another person from owning such traits. By contrast, a landless laborer occupies a material position because the gentleman farmer owns the land or property. Eagleton goes on to say that being black does not mean one is of a different species from a white person. Pigmentation is not definitive of a general human experience in the same way that freckle-faced people do not constitute an essentialy different human category. In this, Eagleton exposes the racist and patriarchal imagination by highlighting its contradictions and ilogics. However, his analysis leaves out a more powerful explanation of how racism actualy works. Like most oppressive systems, racism functions through an illogical rationalization process. For instance, the one-drop rule, or the Rule of Hypodescent, demarcates blacks from whites by drawing an artiŽ cial and arbitrary line between them in order both to create more slaves and limit people’s power to achieve whiteness. Thus, the power of whiteness comes precisely from its ability to usurp reason and rational thought, and a purely rationalistic analysis limits our understanding of the way it functions. Despite its contradictions, the contours of racism can be mapped out and analyzed and this is what Cheryl Harris (1995) attempts when she compares whiteness to owning property. First, whiteness becomes property through the objectiŽ cation of African slaves, a process which set the precondition for ‘propertizing’ human life (Harris, 1995, p. 279). Whiteness takes the form of ownership, the deŽ ning attribute of free individ- uals which Africans did not own. Second, through the reification and subsequent hegemony of white people, whiteness is transformed into the common sense that becomes law. As a given right of the individual white person, whiteness can be enjoyed, like any property, by exercising and taking advantage of privileges co-extensive with whiteness. Third, like a house, whiteness can be demarcated and fenced off as a territory of white people which keeps Others out. Thus, caling a white person ‘black’ was enough reason, as late as 1957, to sue for character defamation; the same could not be said of a black person being mistaken for ‘white.’ This was a certain violation of property rights much like breaking into someone’s house. In al, whites became the subjects of property, with Others as its objects. As Charles Mils (1997) explains, the Racial Contract is an agreement to misinter- pret the world as it is. It is the implicit consensus that whites frequently enter into, which accounts for their fragmented understanding of the world as it is racialy structured. When confronted with the reality of racial oppression, according to Hurtado, whites respond with: I wil listen to you, sometimes for the Ž rst time, and wil seem engaged. At critical points in your analysis I wil claim I do not know what you are talking about and wil ask you to elaborate ad nauseam. I wil consistently subvert your efforts at dialogue by claiming ‘we do not speak the same language’. (cited in McLaren et al., 2001, pp. 211–212; italics in original) The frequent detours, evasions, and detractions from the circuits of whiteness cripple our understanding of the racio-economic essence of schools and society. It is a distortion of perfect communication in Habermas’s (1984) sense of it which creates what I cal an altogether ‘ideological speech situation.’ That is, communi- cation is ideological to the extent that the ‘ideal speech situation’ is systematicaly distorted, which is different from saying that it is always a bit distorted. As Hurtado plainly describes, radical communication about the Contract meets apathy and indifference, perhaps a bit predictably. Admitting the reality of white racism would force a river of centuries of pain, denial, and guilt that many people cannot assuage. In several instances, both in coleagues’ courses as wel as mine, white students have expressed their emotions and frustrations through tears when white privilege is confronted. In fact, Rains (1997) has described the same event occurring in her courses. Although it might seem cynical or unfeeling to analyze criticaly such an occurrence, it is important to deploy such a critique in the name of political and pedagogical clarity. It is imperative to address the local moment and ‘be there’ for al students but in slicing through the pathos, one also beneŽ ts from re ection on the moment in its larger, global signiŽ cance. The times when I have confronted this scenario can be described as the honest interrogation of racial power engaged by both white and non-white students. At certain moments, some anger has been expressed, sometimes frustration. In general, the milieu is emotional and politicaly charged. How can it not be? In one particular case, I witnessed a situation where a black student interrogated the issue of racial privilege and questioned a white coleague’s comments for failing to do the same. By the end of the exchange, the white student left the room crying and the discussion halted. In another case, an earnest discussion took place about racism and ways to address it in schools. A white student cried because she felt frustrated and a little helpless about how she comes into the fold of becoming an anti-racist educator. After a minute of pause, students of color returned to the discussion at hand, not breaking their stride. In a third instance, in the midst of discussing the importance of building solidarity between teachers against racism, a white student cries and asks her coleagues to remember that they must stay cohesive and support each other as comrades in struggle. A coleague reports a fourth instance where, during a dialogue about the experiences of women of color, a white woman repeatedly insisted that the real issue was class, not race, because her experiences as a woman were similar to the women of color. When a faculty of color informed her that she was monopolizing the discussion and in the process invalidated the voices of women of color, the white woman cried and was unable to continue. In al these cases, we observed the guilt of whiteness prompting the women to cry in shame. Made to recognize their unearned privileges and confronted in public, they react with tears of admission. Discussing (anti)racism is never easy and is frequently suppressed in mainstream classroom conditions. The establishment of the right conditions is precious but often precarious. In the Ž rst case, we must keep in mind that it was the black student who felt dehumanized and subsequently felt enough courage to express her anger about comments she perceived to be problematic. The act of crying by the white student immediately positioned the black student as the perpetrator of a hurt and erased/deraced the power of her charge. A reversal of sorts had just occurred. The white student earned the other students’ sympathy and the professor folowed her to the halway to comfort her white the black student nursed her anger by herself. Likewise, I could not help but feel for the white student. Upon re ection, an important difference needs to be discussed. In the act of crying, the student attenuated the centuries of hurt and oppression that the black student was trying to relay. In the act of crying, the student transformed racism into a local problem between two people. I couldn’t help feeling that other students in the class thought the black person was both wrong and racist, erasing/deracing the institutional basis of what she had to say. The room’s energy suddenly felt funneled to the white student. Clearly, there are more ‘harmonious’ ways of teaching the topic of race and racism. However, they also often forsake radical critique for feelings. Feelings have to be respected and educators can establish the conditions for radical empathy. That said, anger is also a valid and legitimate feeling; when complemented by clear thought, anger is frighteningly lucid. Thus, a pedagogy of politeness only goes so far before it degrades into the paradox of liberal feel-good solidarity absent of dissent, without which any worthwhile pedagogy becomes a democracy of empty forms. White comfort zones are notorious for tolerating only smal, incremental dozes of racial confrontation (Hunter and Nettles, 1999). This does not suggest that educators procure a hostile environment, but a pedagogical situation that fails to address white racism is arguably already the conduit of hostility. It fragments students’ holistic understanding of their identity development through the ability of whiteness to deform our complete picture of the racial formation. It practices violence on the racialized Other in the name of civility and as long as this is the case, racial progress wil proceed at the snail pace of white racial consciousness. White race traitors and progressive Others shal piece together a whole from the fragmentary pieces that whiteness has created out of this world. The Contract challenges educators of the new millennium to explain the untruth of white perspectives on race, even a century after Du Bois’s initial chalenge. Obviously, this does not mean that whites cannot grasp the Contract; many do, but they cannot accomplish this from the white point of view, a world-view which, according to Gibson, projects a ‘delusional world,’ ‘a racial fantasyland,’ and ‘a consensual halucination’ (cited in Mils, 1997, p. 18). With the rise of globalization, education—which prides itself for inculcating into students knowledge about the real world—struggles to represent the world in the most real way possible. White epistemology can be characterized as fragmentary and fleeting because white liveli- hood depends on this double helix. It is fragmentary because in order for whiteness to maintain its invisibility, or its unmarked status, it must by necessity mistake the world as non-relational or partitioned (Dwyer and Jones, III, 2000). This allows the white psyche to speak of slavery as ‘long ago,’ rather than as a legacy which lives today; it minimizes racism toward non-white immigrants today through a convenient and problematic comparison with white immigrants, like the Irish or Jews. It is also fleeting because it must deny the history of its own genesis and the creation of the Other. It can only be concerned with ‘how things are and not how they got to be that way.’ As a socio-spatial epistemology, whiteness sees the world upside-down. Mils (1997) and I agree when he says: Thus on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologicaly and socialy functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites wil in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made. (p. 18; italics in original) According to Mils, whiteness concerns itself with racial details and misses the totality of the Racial Contract. Like the way it partitions the world according to its own image, whiteness constructs history as separate racial details without coherence. As a result, it fails to provide our students the language to link together California’s Proposition 187 (anti-immigrant), 209 (anti-afŽ rmative action), and 227 (anti-bilin- gualism) as related to white hegemony. With the exception of particular Asian ethnic groups (to which I wil return later), al three legislations limit the rights of students of color. Fortunately, white and non-white activists have countered such measures with unrelenting protests and public organizing because, as Hopson et al. (1998) remind us, ‘Recognizing and valuing language varieties and multiple ways of speaking among students is a precondition to understanding how to teach them’ (p. 5). As a racial epistemology, whiteness is necessarily idealist in order to construct the Other as abstract, rather than concrete. Enslavement, discrimination, and marginalization of the Other work most efficiently when they are constructed as an idea rather than a people. They can be more easily controled, aggregated as the same, or marked as unchanging and constant when textbooks idealize them as inconse- quential to the history and evolution of humankind. In effect, whiteness eggs us on to yoke together different peoples around the globe under the sign of sameness.
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25 -1NC – K
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27 -Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic 92
28 -Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
29 -III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.
30 -
31 -Their notion of the first amendment is colorblind and obscures anti-black violence. Boler 04
32 -Boler, Megan Megan Boler is a Full Professor in the Department of Social Justice Education, at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto.. "All Speech Is Not Free: The Ethics of" Affirmative Action Pedagogy"." Counterpoints 240 (2004): 3-13.
33 -On what basis might one justify an affirmative action pedagogy? The first justifica-¶ tion is forwarded by legal scholars in the area of critical race theory. The authors of¶ Words That Wound (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw, 1993) address the¶ tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The tension arises because,¶ in fact, all people are not equally protected under the law because of the institu-¶ tionalized inequities within our society. This reality complicates the effectiveness¶ of the First Amendment. Scholarship in critical race theory and educational analy-¶ ses document that in recent years, we find incidents of hate speech primarily to be¶ directed at racial, religious, or sexual minorities. Not surprisingly, one finds in turn¶ that invocations of the right to free speech are most often invocations to protect¶ the right of the members of the dominant culture to express their hatred toward¶ members of minority culture. These authors make important legal and historical¶ cases to support their observation that, in practice, while the rhetoric of the First¶ Amendment is a buzz word that makes all of us want to rally for its principle, in¶ practice "the first amendment arms conscious and unconscious racists - Nazis and¶ liberals alike - with a constitutional right to be racist. Racism is just another idea¶ deserving of constitutional protection like all ideas" (Matsuda et al., 1993, p. 15). A¶ scholar from another discipline addresses classroom dynamics and similarly argues¶ that we must "read the appeal to the First Amendment as itself a kind of panic re-¶ sponse in the same order as hate speech itself" (Roof, 1999, p. 45).¶ A second justification for privileging marginalized voices is based on the meas-¶ urement of the psychological effect of hate speech on targeted groups and individ-¶ uals. As one legal scholar explains, hate speech affects its victim in the visceral ex-¶ perience of a "disorienting powerlessness" (Lawrence, 1993, p. 70), an effect¶ achieved because hate speech is comparable to an act of violence. In reaction to¶ hate speech, the target commonly experiences a "state of semishock," nausea, and dizziness, and an inability to articulate a response. This scholar gives an example of a student who is white and gay. The student reports that in an instance where he¶ was called "faggot" he experienced all of the above symptoms. However, when he¶ was called "honky," he did not experience the disorienting powerlessness. As the¶ scholar remarks, "the context of the power relationships in which the speech takes¶ place, and the connection to violence must be considered as we decide how best to¶ foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our communities" (Lawrence, 1993,¶ p. 70).¶ These considerations bring me to another key point: The analysis of utterance¶ in the classroom requires more than rational dialogue. In fact, the critical race¶ theorists argue that because racism is irrational, no amount of rational dialogue¶ will change racist attitudes. I disagree, in part because I am convinced that class-¶ room discussion must recognize the emotions that shape and construct the mean-¶ ings of our claims, our interchange with one another, and our investments in par-¶ ticular worldviews. Thus, a discussion of racism or homophobia cannot rely¶ simply on rational exchange but must delve into the deeply emotional investments¶ and associations that surround perceptions of difference and ideologies. One is po-¶ tentially faced with allowing ones worldviews to be shattered, in itself a pro-¶ foundly emotionally charged experience
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35 -Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic 09
36 -Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf
37 -II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the parties to defer to the other’s point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been implicitly urging that the other side do just that.58 One could also argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing, namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its credit, who urge the other side to “get over it” and toughen its collective hide.60 Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge. Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate speech is. A Types of Hate Speech Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number of forms—direct (sometimes called “specific”) or indirect; veiled or overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or not.61 One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristic— such as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or gender—of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single individual (“Jones, you goddamned X.”) or group (“The goddamned Xs are destroying this country.”). It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.63 It can be anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be plainly identified.64 The object of the speech may be free to leave, or trapped, as in a classroom or workplace.65 B. The Harms of Hate Speech The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and degrees of harm. The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic, especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one delivering it possesses the power to harm. 1. Direct or Face-to-Face Hate Speech Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of hate speech as mere offense,66 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to sleep.67 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and impairment of work or school performance.68 Some may take refuge in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their misery.69 2. Hate Speech and Children With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as assaultive.70 Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.71 If the child’s parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for their families than before.72 Recent scholarship points out how the pathologies associated with social subordination may be transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.73 3. General Hate Speech With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just as serious.74 Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the victims in belittling terms.75 For example, before launching their wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the Holocaust.77 When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who resisted the blessings of civilization.78 When, a little later, the nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve their good fortune.79 Before interning the Japanese during World War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and despotic.80 It is possible that the connection between general hate speech and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and contingent, but conceptual and necessary.81 Concerted action requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without first articulating a reason why one is doing it—otherwise, no one but a sadist would join in.82 Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide, such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.83 The prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.84 Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow could gain little purchase.85 C. The Harms of Speech Regulation If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in? Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares, drug addiction, and a blunted self image?86 Diminished pecuniary and personal prospects?87 Will hate-speech regulation set up the speaker’s group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or anything comparable?88 The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes, such as Europe’s and Canada’s, that criminalize hate speech exhibit none of these ills.89 Speech and inquiry there seem as free and uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as our own.90 What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be momentarily irritated. But “bottling it up” seems not to inflict serious psychological or emotional damage.91 Early in the debate about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a result.92 By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a member of the target group.93 But studies examining this possibility discount it.94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident “revs him up” for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), shows that many Americans harbor measurable animus toward racial minorities.96 Might it be that hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that result?97 III. OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs,98 large or small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them? Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the aggressor, giving as good as they got.99 The harm of hate speech is variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.100 By the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might shy away from them.101 The interplay of voices that society relies on to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech “exceptions” and attention to the role of incessancy. A. Current Free-Speech Exceptions Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are: words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words that create a risk of imminent violence.102 If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating, potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother.103 But our tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate walking home late at night from the campus library?104 As important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding the dignity of a minor state official?105 Neither free-speech advocates nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they should.106 B. Incessancy and Compounding Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy—the tendency to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim—and compounding.107 A victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult such as “You damn idiot driver” or “Watch where you’re going, you klutz” that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times before.108 Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw. The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent, we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the victim’s vulnerability.109 When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim’s very identity. Hate speakers “pile on,” injuring in a way in which the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable harm. A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than the other, so that Rawls’s difference principle suggests that, as a moral matter, we break the tie in the victim’s favor.110 Moreover, the magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of free expression.111
38 -
39 -Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15
40 -
41 -Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.
42 -
43 -While all communities of color suffer from racism in general¶ and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has¶ been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black¶ racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the¶ two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and¶ every day constructions of race in the United States.12¶ For this¶ reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of¶ African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison¶ industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in¶ which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African¶ Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness¶ in both law and practice.¶ While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is¶ indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and¶ elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”¶ norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing¶ “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13¶ The socio-political construction of race coincides with the¶ age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and¶ perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the¶ solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.¶ By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or¶ slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the¶ Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of¶ debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less¶ than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of¶ 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly¶ drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result¶ according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what¶ we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially¶ pro-slavery”.¶ 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future¶ bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation¶ through escape were all clear indications of the significance of¶ slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the¶ Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”¶ to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.¶ 17¶ The social and constitutional construction of white as free and¶ Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.¶ According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,¶ may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.¶ 18 These¶ property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those¶ who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and¶ to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders¶ of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:¶ The concept of whiteness was premised on white¶ supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was¶ defined and constructed in ways that increased its¶ value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,¶ whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the¶ very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept¶ of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial¶ subjugation. This fact was particularly evident¶ during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,¶ as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the¶ form of status property.20¶ Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of¶ humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the¶ margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as¶ Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in¶ America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and¶ no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an¶ experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”¶ 21 Directly¶ condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded¶ groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,¶ Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an¶ outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22
44 -
45 -The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements. Oparah 14
46 -Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
47 -
48 -¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets. Andrea Smith, in her discussion of native studies, has argued that politi- cally progressive educators often adopt normative, colonial practices in the classroom, using pedagogical strategies and grading practices that rein- scribe the racialized and gendered regulation, policing, and disciplining that PIC abolitionists seek to end.53 In this sense, there could be no “postcarceral” academy. Certainly, sanctions for undergraduate and graduate students and faculty who challenge the university’s regular practices—from failing grades and expulsions to tenure denials and deportation—are systemically distrib- uted, along with rewards for those who can be usefully incorporated. Yet uni- versities and colleges also hold the seeds of a very different possible future, evoked, for example, by the universal admissions movement or by student strikes in Britain and Canada that demand higher education as a right, not a privilege of the wealthy. Rather than seeking to eradicate or replace higher educational institutions altogether, I suggest that we demand the popular and antiracist democratization of higher education.¶ The first step toward this radical transformation is the liberation of aca- demia from the machinery of empire: prisons, militarism, and corporations. Speaking of abolishing the white race, Noel Ignatiev argues that it is neces- sary for white people to make whiteness impossible by refusing the invisible benefits of membership in the “white club.”54 Progressive academics are also members of a privileged “club,” one that confers benefits in the form of a pay- check, health care, and other fringe benefits; social status; and the freedom to pursue intellectual work that we are passionate about. But we can also put our privilege to work by unmasking and then unsettling the invisible, symbi- otic, and toxic relationships that constitute the academic-MPIC.¶ Decoupling academia from its velvet-gloved master would begin the pro- cess of fundamental transformation. Without unfettered streams of income from corporations, wealthy philanthropists, and the military, universities and colleges would be forced to develop alternative fund-raising strategies, relationships, and accountabilities. Can we imagine a college administration aligned with local Occupy organizers to protest the state’s massive spend- ing on prisons and policing and demand more tax money for housing, edu- cation, and health care? Can we imagine a massive investment of time and resources by university personnel to solve the problem of how to decarcerate the nation’s prisons or end the detention of undocumented immigrants in order to fund universal access to higher education? Can we imagine a uni- versity run by and for its constituents, including students, kitchen and gar- den staff, and tenure-track and adjunct faculty? These are the possibilities opened up by academic-MPIC abolition.
49 -
50 -The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory.
51 -
52 -Their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84
53 -
54 -Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.
55 -
56 -
57 -It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the¶ same result: an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who¶ comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each¶ other's ideas." It is something like an elaborate minuet.¶ The failure to acknowledge minority scholarship extends even to¶ nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact. W.E. DuBois, deceased¶ Black historian, receives an occasional citation.5 Aside from him, little¶ else rates a mention. Higginbotham's monumental In the Matter of¶ Color' might as well not exist. The same is true of the work of Kenneth¶ Clark,1 Black psychologist and past president of the American¶ Psychological Association, and Alvin Poussaint,8 Harvard Medical¶ School professor and authority on the psychological impact of race. One¶ searches in vain for references to the powerful book by physicians Grier¶ and Cobbs, Black Rage,' or to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the¶ Earth,10 or even to writings of or about Martin Luther King, Jr.,1¶ "¶ Cesar Chavez, 2 and Malcolm X."3 When the inner circle writers need authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they¶ generally cite reports of the United States Commission on Civil¶ Rights1 4 or else each other.1 5¶ A single anecdote may help to illustrate what I mean. Recently a¶ law professor who writes about civil rights showed me, for my edification,¶ a draft of an article of his. It is, on the whole, an excellent article.¶ It extols the value of a principle I will call "equal personhood." Equal¶ personhood is the notion, implicit in several constitutional provisions¶ and much case law, that each human being, regardless of race, creed, or¶ color, is entitled to be treated with equal respect. To treat someone as¶ an outsider, a nonmember of human society, violates this principle and¶ devalues the self-worth of the person so excluded.¶ I have no quarrel with this premise, but, on reading the one hundred-plus¶ footnotes of the article, I noticed that its author failed to cite¶ Black or minority scholars, an exclusion from the community of kindred¶ souls as glaring as any condemned in the paper. I pointed this out¶ to the author, citing as illustration a passage in which he asserted that¶ unequal treatment can cause a person to suffer a withered self-concept.¶ Having just written an article on a related subject, 8 I was more or less¶ steeped in withered self-concepts. I knew who the major authorities¶ were in that area.¶ The professor's authority for the proposition about withered selfconcepts¶ was Frank Michelman, writing in the Harvard Law Review. I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar¶ and teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge¶ about withered self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add references¶ to such works as Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto1¶ " and Grier and¶ Cobbs's Black Rage,"' and he agreed to do so. To justify his selection of¶ Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the¶ author explained that Michelman's statement was "so elegant."¶ Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority¶ scholarship from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles¶ about civil rights? Elegance is, without question, a virtue in writing, in¶ conversation, or in. anything else in life. If minority scholars write inelegantly¶ and Frank Michelman writes elegantly, then it would not be¶ surprising if the latter were read and cited more frequently, and the¶ former less so. But minority legal scholars seem to have less trouble¶ being recognized and taken seriously in areas of scholarship other than¶ civil rights theory.19 If elegance is a problem for minority scholars, it¶ seems mainly to be so in the core areas of civil rights: affirmative action,¶ the equality principle, and the theoretical foundations of race relations¶ law.¶ In 1971, Judge Skelly Wright wrote an article entitled, Professor¶ Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.20 In the article,¶ Judge Wright took a group of scholars to task for their bloodless¶ carping at the Warren Court's decisions in the areas of racial justice¶ and human rights. He accused the group of missing the central point in¶ these decisions-their moral clarity and passion for justice-and labelled¶ the group's excessive preoccupation with procedure and institutional¶ role and its insistence that the Court justify every element of a¶ decision under general principles of universal application, a "scholarly tradition."'2 1¶ I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of¶ white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority¶ scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream¶ writers tend to acknowledge only each other's work. It is even¶ possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars¶ into the field,2 2 perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to establish¶ their reputations in other areas of law. I believe that this "scholarly¶ tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite scholars in other fields¶ of law seem to confront no such tradition.23
58 -
59 -
60 -Case
61 -
62 -Prefer comparative worlds:
63 -First is Reciprocal Burdens. Truth testing requires one debater to prove a positive truth and the other to disprove it. This is unequal because disproving a statement by casting doubt is always easier than proving one. Debaters who only have to prove their opponent wrong have more options because they can argue any one point in a series of links that their opponent must prove in their entirety. Further, this opens room for pre-resolutional positions that require debaters to prove the existence of resolutional terms prior to debating the resolution. A debater with the burden of proof must be prepared to not only debate all of her case and her opponent’s case, but also beat back an infinitely regressive set of skeptical indictments. Reciprocal burdens are vital to fairness because the debater with an easier burden defenitionally has a better chance at winning. There is greater structural access to the ballot for the debater with more avenues to win.
64 -
65 -A priori only exists in truth testing. No new 1ar justifications for truth testing, necessary part of 1ac if this is an arg they want to go for.
66 -
67 -We only have to win 1 time that speech ought to be restricted. Saying anti state things is bad under their framework because it is willing the destruction of the state which his equivalent to willing onself back into the state of nature.
68 -
69 -Focus on intent diverts attention from marginalizing action and doesn’t let us stop oppression. Utt 13
70 -
71 -Jamie Utt Jamie is the Founder and Director of Education at CivilSchools, a comprehensive bullying prevention program, a diversity and inclusion consultant, and sexual violence prevention educator based in Minneapolis, MN. July 30, 2013 “Intent vs. Impact: Why Your Intentions Don’t Really Matter”
72 -
73 -Intent v. Impact From Paula Deen to Alec Baldwin to your annoying, bigoted uncle or friend, we hear it over and over again: “I never meant any harm…” “It was never my intent…” “I am not a racist…” “I am not a homophobe…” “I’m not a sexist…” I cannot tell you how often I’ve seen people attempt to deflect criticism about their oppressive language or actions by making the conversation about their intent. At what point does the “intent” conversation stop mattering so that we can step back and look at impact? After all, in the end, what does the intent of our action really matter if our actions have the impact of furthering the marginalization or oppression of those around us? In some ways, this is a simple lesson of relationships. If I say something that hurts my partner, it doesn’t much matter whether I intended the statement to mean something else – because my partner is hurting. I need to listen to how my language hurt my partner. I need to apologize. And then I need to reflect and empathize to the best of my ability so I don’t do it again. But when we’re dealing with the ways in which our identities intersect with those around us – and, in turn, the ways our privileges and our experiences of marginalization and oppression intersect – this lesson becomes something much larger and more profound. This becomes a lesson of justice. What we need to realize is that when it comes to people’s lives and identities, the impact of our actions can be profound and wide-reaching. And that’s far more important than the question of our intent. We need to ask ourselves what might be or might have been the impact of our actions or words. And we need to step back and listen when we are being told that the impact of our actions is out of step with our intents or our perceptions of self. Identity Privilege and Intent For people of identity privilege, this is where listening becomes vitally important, for our privilege can often shield us from understanding the impact of our actions. After all, as a person of privilege, I can never fully understand the ways in which oppressive acts or language impact those around me. What I surely can do is listen with every intent to understand, and I can work to change my behavior. Because what we need to understand is that making the conversation about intent is inherently a privileged action. The reason? It ensures that you and your identity (and intent) stay at the center of any conversation and action while the impact of your action or words on those around you is marginalized. So if someone ever tells you to “check your privilege,” what they may very well mean is: “Stop centering your experience and identity in the conversation by making this about the intent of your actions instead of their impact.” That is: Not everything is about you.
74 -Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil. Issac 2
75 -—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)
76 -
77 -As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime~-~-the Taliban~-~-that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics~-~-as opposed to religion~-~-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
78 -
79 -A desire to ignore the consequences of their advocacy causes failure ~-~-- you must evaluate consequences of their proposal
80 -Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African and African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318
81 -Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal but can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 281 For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.
82 -
83 -Ideal theory shuts off the ability to critique oppression, has empirically never worked in guiding a society, and allows the oppressor to rationalize oppression. Mills 15
84 -Charles W. Mills (2015) Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy, New Political Science, 37:1, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/07393148.2014.995491 PVE
85 -
86 -
87 -For all four philosophers, then, including three former Rawls students, the characterization is indeed meant descriptively. But setting aside the argument from the authority of secondary sources, there is also (and more importantly) the argument from the text itself. It is difficult to make sense of what Rawls goes on to say if “society” is to be read as “ideal society” because he then introduces the further category of a “well-ordered society.” But if we are already in the realm of the ideal, how could there be conceptual room left for further idealization? We would then, weirdly, have the following categories: societies in general, real and hypothetical (and thus presumably including oppressive societies); ideal societies, non-oppressive cooperative ventures, as a subset of societies in general, real and hypothetical; and then well-ordered societies, as a subset of ideal societies (somehow ideally ideal, as against merely ideal). This is odd enough, but it gets more peculiar. Rawls then informs us that: “Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute.”47 How are we to read this use of “society”? Is it society-as-ideal-society? But how could it be? There are no ideal societies on the face of the planet! It is currently a category with no real instantiations. So there are no well-ordered societies either, that ideal ideal subset of the merely ideal. So Rawls has to be using the term here in its everyday sense, society-as-actual-society, which would mean either that he meant it that way all along, or that he has switched without warning from the (putative) idealized, Rawlsian term-of-art sense to the conventional sense. But by standard Gricean “conversational implicature,” one does not make a claim weaker than the facts allow. If the city is suffering a heat wave and the temperature outside is over hundred degrees Fahrenheit, we do not say: “It must be at least sixty degrees outside!” So this suggests that Rawls really believes that existing societies are in general cooperative ventures, if few can be categorized as well-ordered, because otherwise the natural thing for him to have said would be that “Existing societies are of course not cooperative ventures for mutual advantage, and so, a fortiori, are not well-ordered.” Thus we face a dilemma: either Rawls is using “society” in a perverse idiosyncratic way or he was massively ignorant of basic societal realities. But in either case, prescriptions for social justice based on such a conception of society or on such a sociology are going to be problematic to apply in the actual world. I think that the most charitable reading (though even it ultimately fails) is to assume that Rawls really had the modern Western democracies in mind when he spoke of “societies.” These are the societies that come closest to fitting the contract model, which he is trying to update for his theory. Pre-modern feudal and slave societies, modern non-Western dictatorships, clearly do not meet the criterion of genuinely being cooperative ventures, and so are not “societies” in the sense he means. Such a reading does not require comprehensive global historical illiteracy on Rawls’s part, just the kind of Eurocentric and androcentric historical illiteracy typical of his time (admittedly global in its own way). Moreover, this interpretation would be consistent with the later explicit announcement, in the 1980s essays and in the 1993 Political Liberalism, that A Theory of Justice’s seeming generality of normative reference was mistaken, and that he was really articulating a theory for the Western nations, drawing on ideas implicit within the Western tradition. But the problem is, of course, that apart from the feminist critique of Western patriarchy, and the racial subordination of people of color (Amerindian expropriation and genocide, African slavery) in the Western (alleged) democracy of which he was a citizen—which motivated Pierre van den Berghe’s famous alternative characterization of “Herrenvolk democracy”—this conception of society and of social justice excludes the formerly colonized nations from the scope of his principles of justice. Uncontroversially historically characterized by structural oppression, they presumably do not meet the bar for being “cooperative ventures” and thus do not count as “societies” proper of the appropriate normative Western kind. Apart from the absurdity of a theory of social justice that prescinds from dealing with structural social injustice—just stop for a second and think about the bizarreness of that—this partitioned normative cartography severs the very historic connections between “the West and the Rest” that are responsible for the latter’s “non-cooperative” nature in the first place! In their introduction to their edited Colonialism and Its Legacies, Jacob Levy and Iris Marion Young point out how Rawls’s framing of these issues, which projects backwards into the past a national isolation completely untrue to the actual international history, is part of a larger pattern of mystification (starting to change only recently) in contemporary political theory: Modernity—the centuries since 1500—has been at once the era of the European state and the era of the European empires . . . From 1500 through 1950, very nearly all of the inhabited world came under the power of one or another European state, or a European-derived settler state . . . Even if the age of European empires is broken into many discrete events, there are many such events . . . that would rank among the largest-scale conquests in human history. And these events include a substantial share of the greatest political evils ever committed. Yet all of this seemed, for many years, tangential to the story of modernity familiar to political theorists and philosophers.48 Formal decolonization enabled an amnesia about the colonial past and an ignoring of the neo-colonial present, problematic enough in political theory, but even worse in political philosophy: By the time of the revitalization of Anglophone political philosophy with the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971, decolonization had reshaped the political map. The world was, juridically, almost completely a world of sovereign and formally equal states. And the great debates projected back through modern intellectual history were fundamentally debates about the internal governance of such states ... Colonial and imperial relations—relations between metropolitan states and their conquered colonies and territories—figured approximately not at all . . . Contractarianism in particular treats life outside the state—the kind of state we can recognize as the modern European Weberian state— as prepolitical and extrapolitical, outside the core concerns of political philosophy . . . Social contract theory came more and more to be understood as relevant to the politics of one, self-contained and well-defined, state. If the first great work of social contract theory was Grotius’ Rights of War and Peace and the last was Theory of Justice, the contrast could hardly be more stark. The earlier work is nearly all about interpolity relations including imperial relations; the latter takes as the point of departure for political philosophy a self-governing society closed off from the rest of the world, unaffected by it and not affecting it. And Rawlsian questions (or the questions of his libertarian or communitarian critics) were projected backward through time.49 Unsurprisingly, then, nowhere in any of Rawls’s five directly authored books (or the two lecture collections) is there any mention of Native Americans, the Atlantic Slave Trade, European colonialism and imperialism, the genocide of indigenous populations, or the reality of systemic Euro-domination on a global scale.50 These people, these histories, simply cannot be accommodated by the official contract narrative. The “colonial” character of Rawls’s work and the vast, polyglot secondary literature of Rawlsianism is manifest not in racist representations of people of color, but in the simple fact that this whole body of thought takes as a starting-point what, in the period of modernity for which the contract is supposed to be most appropriate, is only true (to the extent that it is true) for the Euro-population, and for the Euro-population conceptually abstracted out of their political relations of domination over populations of color. Denying the past and present relations of colonialism and neocolonialism, which have created both, Rawls offers us a vision of autarkical polities whose respective levels of development are the result not of a transnational and intra- national (for the United States) system of extraction and exploitation, not of empire, but of different national cultures and traditions. The societies of the West get to be “cooperative ventures,” covered by the norms of justice; the societies of the Rest fall into the outer darkness, normatively registering only as “burdened societies” and “outlaw states.” Thus by the very conceptual framing of his theory, he launders colonialism and imperialism, whitewashing them out of his dikailogical framework. It is the viewpoint of the metropole, the colonizer, the white settler— the viewpoint of colonial racial privilege in a nominally post-colonial epoch, its coloniality manifesting itself not in a crude endorsement of colonialism (that would obviously be inappropriate for the postwar world) but, far more effectively, in a total aprioristic conceptual exclusion
EntryDate
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1 -2017-02-13 05:00:15.0
Judge
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1 -Brian Yang
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1 -Oakwood AO
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1 -27
Round
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1 -6
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
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1 -Stanford R6 NC
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1 -Stanford
Caselist.CitesClass[28]
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1 -Off
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3 -1NC – K
4 -
5 -The 1AC perpetuates the exact abstraction that recreates anti-black violence by ignoring the underlying antagonism inherent to its structure – asking historically racist institutions to try and fix problems is blind optimism that dooms them to recreate anti-blackness. Curry 13
6 -Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas AandM, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013. CC
7 -
8 -Despite the rhetorical strategies adopted by both Black and white political theorists which urge Blacks and whites alike to demand Americans to continue their allegiance to the foundational de-racialized ethos of the post-Civil Rights era, the reality of the American racism—its sheer recurring violence against Black people—demands more than symbolic rhetorical allusion. To seriously grasp the reality of racist oppression and the sempiternal machinations of anti-Blackness throughout American society be it in its institutions like the prison industrial complex, its policies like Affirmative action, or its manipulation of Black social degradation and economic disadvantage to support pathological theses about disasters like Katrina or cultural deviance as in the death of Trayvon Martin, Darius Simmons, or Jordan Davis, the study of the matter itself—racism—must be a study of a conceptual disengagement with the myth of racial equality and the “automatic progressivism” of the American liberal project. This disengagement is not simply the refusal to accept the idealism of civil rights myth held beyond the realm of fact, but the disengagement with the illusions of democracy and equality that continue to ignore the role that violence has played and continues to play in the subjugation, incarceration, and vilification of Black life. As Dr. A.J. William Myers reveals in his work groundbreaking work entitled Destructive Impulses, Until at such time white America (and Black America) is openly willing to confront a historical legacy of its own violence (perpetrated against an American people of color), any venture into and/ or expository on race relations becomes an exercise in futility…As a result, therefore, white violence, confined to the subliminal recesses of the American psyche, continues to prevent the transition necessary for the country to move beyond the idea of race. In America, Blackness and the racism that continues to condemn those historical racialized peoples is violence—it is the forceful and coercion enclosing of human beings to an inferior social, political, and economic status of which their own humanity exceeds. This dehumanizing relegation of the raced citizen is not a gradual or incremental debasement, but rather the historically immediate condition of inferiority that presents progress to be attainable by the cyclical degrees of physical violence against the racialized population. For these racially oppressed peoples, violence is the permanent fixture of existence in America, since it is the vitiation of their humanity that rationalizes the varying techniques of their cultural erasure, birthing the emergent symbolic associations of degradation that replace their invisibility, and empowering the intentional enforcements of their societal exclusions. In fact, it is precisely this triumvirate that gauges what we take to be the negation of the necessity of revolutionary change~-~-since the raced is taken to be present, as a result of a critical redefining of humanity, integrated into society.
9 -
10 -
11 -Their framework arguments are another link – their ethics are colorblind and abstract from reality in a way in a way that is inaccessible to oppressed bodies – they serve as another hoop to jump through before we can engage in racism and are exactly what keeps that oppression prevalent. Curry 13
12 -Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas AandM, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013. CC
13 -
14 - In the post-structuralist era, post-colonial thinking about racism specifically, and difference/otherness generally, has given a peculiar ameliorative function to discourse and the performance of “other-ed” identities. In this era, the dominant illusion is that discourse itself , an act that requires as its basis the recognition of the “other” as “similar,” is socially transformative—not only with regard to how the white subject assimilates the similitude of the “other-ed,” but as an actual activity gauged by the recognition by one white person or by a group of white people in any given scenario, is uncritically accepted and encouraged as anti-racist politics.. In actuality such discourse appeals, which necessitate—become dependent on—(white) recognition, function very much like the racial stereotype, in that the concept of the Black body being the expression and source of experience and phenomena (existential-phenomenological-theorization) is incarcerated by the conceptualization created the discursive catalyst yearning to be perceived by the white thing seeing the Black. Such appeals lend potentiality-hope-faith to the already present/demonstrated ignorance-racism-interest of the white individual, who in large part expresses the historical tone/epistemology of their racial group’s interest. When morality is defined, not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch. Ought implies a projected (futural) act. The word commands a deliberate action to reasonably expect the world to be able to sustain or support. For the Black thinker, the Black citizen-subject-slave-(in)human, ought is not rational but repressive. For the oppressed racialized thinker, the ethical provocation is an immediate confrontation with the impossibility of actually acting towards values like freedom, liberty, humanity, and life, since none of these values can be achieved concretely for the Black in a world controlled by and framed by the white. The options for ethical actions are not ethical in and of themselves, but merely the options the immorality of the racist world will allow, thus the oppressed is forced to idealize their ethical positions, eliminating the truth of their reality, and the peeling away the tyranny of white bodies, so that as the oppressed, the can ideally imagine an “if condition,” whereby they are allowed to ethical engage racism from the perspective of: “if whites were moral and respected the humanity of Blacks, then we can ethically engage in these behaviors. Unfortunately, this ought constraint only forces Blacks to consciously recognize the futility of ethical engagement, since it is in this ought deliberation that they recognize that their cognition of all values are dependent not on their moral aspirations for the world, but the determined by the will of white supremacy to maintain virtue throughout all ethical calculations. In short, Black ethical deliberation is censored so that it can only engage moral questions by asserting that whites are virtuous and hence capable of being ethically persuaded towards right action, hence all ethical question about racism, white supremacy and anti-Blackness is not about how Blacks think about the world, but what possibility the world allows Blacks to contemplate under the idea of ethics. These ethics, the ethics that result from this vitiated morality, are not arbiters of oppression at all. They are not a rational calculus that is capable of revealing a categorical imperative, rather they function as the Kantian constraints upon human experience; the synthetic apriori upon which the phenomena of whiteness is the landscape of thinking about Blackness under the Western anthropos. There is an implicit appeal to a hierarchy of being that is both empirical and universal—all man is superior to non-man. Hence, ethics emerges as the product of the overrepresentation of Western man thinking itself—projecting itself—into the future. These ethics, theorized away from the anti-Blackness not within it, only uphold an overdetermined virtue of whiteness. They hold within them no actual delineation between good or bad, only a Puritanical call to reason to turn its attention towards the other-ed created. This attention however relies on the perceptions and caricatures of Black torment that appeal to the whites’ self-assuring imagining of themselves, so that even when confronted with racism and their role as whites thinking about Black people incarcerated within a racist society and dying, these whites can claim that their conceptualization of racism itself, or (inter-sectionally) next to other injustices like poverty, sexism, homophobia, etc. makes them (whites) virtuous. It is the process of, the appeal to, “getting whites to recognize” (racist) oppression that allows the destruction of reality, Black death, to continue unabated, since it is the exact moment that whites are forced to engage racist problems in America, be it the anti-Black violence of American society, which animates the aversion of the justice system, the police state, the white citizenry, or the practice of American democracy itself—where the death of Black people/criminals/deviants/thugs remain normal and justified by whites—that they, the white(s) thinking about racism, get to impose upon Black reality, a racist moral maxim, namely that racism is not death and beyond –the end of~-~-ethical calculus or moral evaluation, but ultimately contingent in America and of measurable consequence so much so that must be weighed next to the other democratic values that preserve this great white society: security, safety, individuality, property, profit, and freedom, the very values that when enacted by whites continue to perpetuate one ultimate end, the death of Blacks.
15 -
16 -The aff’s attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff’s epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That’s a voting issue. Leonardo 02
17 -Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC
18 -
19 -The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies of whiteness. As a perspective, whiteness is historicaly fractured in its apprehension of racial formations. In order to ‘see’ the formation in full view, whites have to mobilize a perspective that begins with racial privilege as a central unit of analysis. Since starting from this point would mean whites engage in a thorough historical understanding of ‘how they came to be’ in a position of power, most whites resist such an undertaking and instead focus on individual merit, exception- alism, or hard work. The act of interpreting the totality of racial formations is an apostasy that white students and educators must undertake but one which does not come easy or without costs. The costs are real because it means whites would have to acknowledge their unearned privileges and disinvest in them. This is a different tack from saying that whites benefit from renouncing their whiteness because it would increase their humanity. Whites would lose many of their perks and privileges. So, the realistic appraisal is that whites do have a lot to lose by committing race treason, not just something to gain by forsaking whiteness. This is the challenge. In his discussion of gender and race, Terry Eagleton (1996) provokes a distinction between identity politics and class relations. He calls class position relational in a way that gender and race are not, because possessing a certain skin color or body configuration does not prevent another person from owning such traits. By contrast, a landless laborer occupies a material position because the gentleman farmer owns the land or property. Eagleton goes on to say that being black does not mean one is of a different species from a white person. Pigmentation is not definitive of a general human experience in the same way that freckle-faced people do not constitute an essentialy different human category. In this, Eagleton exposes the racist and patriarchal imagination by highlighting its contradictions and ilogics. However, his analysis leaves out a more powerful explanation of how racism actualy works. Like most oppressive systems, racism functions through an illogical rationalization process. For instance, the one-drop rule, or the Rule of Hypodescent, demarcates blacks from whites by drawing an arti cial and arbitrary line between them in order both to create more slaves and limit people’s power to achieve whiteness. Thus, the power of whiteness comes precisely from its ability to usurp reason and rational thought, and a purely rationalistic analysis limits our understanding of the way it functions. Despite its contradictions, the contours of racism can be mapped out and analyzed and this is what Cheryl Harris (1995) attempts when she compares whiteness to owning property. First, whiteness becomes property through the objecti cation of African slaves, a process which set the precondition for ‘propertizing’ human life (Harris, 1995, p. 279). Whiteness takes the form of ownership, the de ning attribute of free individ- uals which Africans did not own. Second, through the reification and subsequent hegemony of white people, whiteness is transformed into the common sense that becomes law. As a given right of the individual white person, whiteness can be enjoyed, like any property, by exercising and taking advantage of privileges co-extensive with whiteness. Third, like a house, whiteness can be demarcated and fenced off as a territory of white people which keeps Others out. Thus, caling a white person ‘black’ was enough reason, as late as 1957, to sue for character defamation; the same could not be said of a black person being mistaken for ‘white.’ This was a certain violation of property rights much like breaking into someone’s house. In al, whites became the subjects of property, with Others as its objects. As Charles Mils (1997) explains, the Racial Contract is an agreement to misinter- pret the world as it is. It is the implicit consensus that whites frequently enter into, which accounts for their fragmented understanding of the world as it is racialy structured. When confronted with the reality of racial oppression, according to Hurtado, whites respond with: I wil listen to you, sometimes for the  rst time, and wil seem engaged. At critical points in your analysis I wil claim I do not know what you are talking about and wil ask you to elaborate ad nauseam. I wil consistently subvert your efforts at dialogue by claiming ‘we do not speak the same language’. (cited in McLaren et al., 2001, pp. 211–212; italics in original) The frequent detours, evasions, and detractions from the circuits of whiteness cripple our understanding of the racio-economic essence of schools and society. It is a distortion of perfect communication in Habermas’s (1984) sense of it which creates what I cal an altogether ‘ideological speech situation.’ That is, communi- cation is ideological to the extent that the ‘ideal speech situation’ is systematicaly distorted, which is different from saying that it is always a bit distorted. As Hurtado plainly describes, radical communication about the Contract meets apathy and indifference, perhaps a bit predictably. Admitting the reality of white racism would force a river of centuries of pain, denial, and guilt that many people cannot assuage. In several instances, both in coleagues’ courses as wel as mine, white students have expressed their emotions and frustrations through tears when white privilege is confronted. In fact, Rains (1997) has described the same event occurring in her courses. Although it might seem cynical or unfeeling to analyze criticaly such an occurrence, it is important to deploy such a critique in the name of political and pedagogical clarity. It is imperative to address the local moment and ‘be there’ for al students but in slicing through the pathos, one also bene ts from re ection on the moment in its larger, global signi cance. The times when I have confronted this scenario can be described as the honest interrogation of racial power engaged by both white and non-white students. At certain moments, some anger has been expressed, sometimes frustration. In general, the milieu is emotional and politicaly charged. How can it not be? In one particular case, I witnessed a situation where a black student interrogated the issue of racial privilege and questioned a white coleague’s comments for failing to do the same. By the end of the exchange, the white student left the room crying and the discussion halted. In another case, an earnest discussion took place about racism and ways to address it in schools. A white student cried because she felt frustrated and a little helpless about how she comes into the fold of becoming an anti-racist educator. After a minute of pause, students of color returned to the discussion at hand, not breaking their stride. In a third instance, in the midst of discussing the importance of building solidarity between teachers against racism, a white student cries and asks her coleagues to remember that they must stay cohesive and support each other as comrades in struggle. A coleague reports a fourth instance where, during a dialogue about the experiences of women of color, a white woman repeatedly insisted that the real issue was class, not race, because her experiences as a woman were similar to the women of color. When a faculty of color informed her that she was monopolizing the discussion and in the process invalidated the voices of women of color, the white woman cried and was unable to continue. In al these cases, we observed the guilt of whiteness prompting the women to cry in shame. Made to recognize their unearned privileges and confronted in public, they react with tears of admission. Discussing (anti)racism is never easy and is frequently suppressed in mainstream classroom conditions. The establishment of the right conditions is precious but often precarious. In the  rst case, we must keep in mind that it was the black student who felt dehumanized and subsequently felt enough courage to express her anger about comments she perceived to be problematic. The act of crying by the white student immediately positioned the black student as the perpetrator of a hurt and erased/deraced the power of her charge. A reversal of sorts had just occurred. The white student earned the other students’ sympathy and the professor folowed her to the halway to comfort her white the black student nursed her anger by herself. Likewise, I could not help but feel for the white student. Upon re ection, an important difference needs to be discussed. In the act of crying, the student attenuated the centuries of hurt and oppression that the black student was trying to relay. In the act of crying, the student transformed racism into a local problem between two people. I couldn’t help feeling that other students in the class thought the black person was both wrong and racist, erasing/deracing the institutional basis of what she had to say. The room’s energy suddenly felt funneled to the white student. Clearly, there are more ‘harmonious’ ways of teaching the topic of race and racism. However, they also often forsake radical critique for feelings. Feelings have to be respected and educators can establish the conditions for radical empathy. That said, anger is also a valid and legitimate feeling; when complemented by clear thought, anger is frighteningly lucid. Thus, a pedagogy of politeness only goes so far before it degrades into the paradox of liberal feel-good solidarity absent of dissent, without which any worthwhile pedagogy becomes a democracy of empty forms. White comfort zones are notorious for tolerating only smal, incremental dozes of racial confrontation (Hunter and Nettles, 1999). This does not suggest that educators procure a hostile environment, but a pedagogical situation that fails to address white racism is arguably already the conduit of hostility. It fragments students’ holistic understanding of their identity development through the ability of whiteness to deform our complete picture of the racial formation. It practices violence on the racialized Other in the name of civility and as long as this is the case, racial progress wil proceed at the snail pace of white racial consciousness. White race traitors and progressive Others shal piece together a whole from the fragmentary pieces that whiteness has created out of this world. The Contract challenges educators of the new millennium to explain the untruth of white perspectives on race, even a century after Du Bois’s initial chalenge. Obviously, this does not mean that whites cannot grasp the Contract; many do, but they cannot accomplish this from the white point of view, a world-view which, according to Gibson, projects a ‘delusional world,’ ‘a racial fantasyland,’ and ‘a consensual halucination’ (cited in Mils, 1997, p. 18). With the rise of globalization, education—which prides itself for inculcating into students knowledge about the real world—struggles to represent the world in the most real way possible. White epistemology can be characterized as fragmentary and fleeting because white liveli- hood depends on this double helix. It is fragmentary because in order for whiteness to maintain its invisibility, or its unmarked status, it must by necessity mistake the world as non-relational or partitioned (Dwyer and Jones, III, 2000). This allows the white psyche to speak of slavery as ‘long ago,’ rather than as a legacy which lives today; it minimizes racism toward non-white immigrants today through a convenient and problematic comparison with white immigrants, like the Irish or Jews. It is also fleeting because it must deny the history of its own genesis and the creation of the Other. It can only be concerned with ‘how things are and not how they got to be that way.’ As a socio-spatial epistemology, whiteness sees the world upside-down. Mils (1997) and I agree when he says: Thus on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologicaly and socialy functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites wil in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made. (p. 18; italics in original) According to Mils, whiteness concerns itself with racial details and misses the totality of the Racial Contract. Like the way it partitions the world according to its own image, whiteness constructs history as separate racial details without coherence. As a result, it fails to provide our students the language to link together California’s Proposition 187 (anti-immigrant), 209 (anti-af rmative action), and 227 (anti-bilin- gualism) as related to white hegemony. With the exception of particular Asian ethnic groups (to which I wil return later), al three legislations limit the rights of students of color. Fortunately, white and non-white activists have countered such measures with unrelenting protests and public organizing because, as Hopson et al. (1998) remind us, ‘Recognizing and valuing language varieties and multiple ways of speaking among students is a precondition to understanding how to teach them’ (p. 5). As a racial epistemology, whiteness is necessarily idealist in order to construct the Other as abstract, rather than concrete. Enslavement, discrimination, and marginalization of the Other work most efficiently when they are constructed as an idea rather than a people. They can be more easily controled, aggregated as the same, or marked as unchanging and constant when textbooks idealize them as inconse- quential to the history and evolution of humankind. In effect, whiteness eggs us on to yoke together different peoples around the globe under the sign of sameness.
20 -
21 -
22 -The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges anti-blackness. Fiat is illusory so they don’t get to weigh the case.
23 -
24 -Debate is a speech act – debaters should be held accountable for their discourse in round. Vincent 13
25 -Chris Vincent, Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate, Vbriefly, 2013. NS
26 -
27 -The question then becomes how does our discourse justify what we believe? For many debaters it is the gaming aspect of debate that allows us to assume that our speech can be disconnected from the speech act. The speech can be defined as the arguments that are placed on the flow, and is evaluated in the context of what is the most logical and rational argument to win the round. The critical distinction is the speech act, which is the performance of that discourse. It’s not what you say, but what you justify. Understanding the speech act requires critically assessing the ramifications of the debaters discourse. Debate is in and of itself a performance. To claim that it is not is to be divorced from the reality of what we do. We must evaluate what a debaters performance does and justifies. For white debaters it is easy to view the discourse as detached from the body. For those with privilege in debate, they are never forced to have their performance attached to them but instead their arguments are viewed as words on paper. They are taught to separate themselves from any ideologies and beliefs, and feel that there is no consequence to what they say. It becomes the way in which they justify what is deemed as “rational” and “logical” thought. The argument sounds like it will be competitive so it is read but it is deemed as just an argument. Judges evaluate this as just a speech. This becomes what I deem as a performance by the body, rather than a performance of the body. Performances by the body allow debaters to not be held accountable to the words they say. Words are seen as divorced from any meaning outside of the flow, versus the performance of the body where the words are attached to the body itself. Debaters often insert the performance by the body, when they make arguments that they claim that they do not believe, but think it is the best strategy for the round. This is a false assumption, since for black debaters meaning is always connected to their bodies. The best strategy should never be one that at the same time justifies acts of racism.
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29 -
30 -1NC – K
31 -
32 -Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic 92
33 -Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
34 -III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.
35 -
36 -Their notion of the first amendment is colorblind and obscures anti-black violence. Boler 04
37 -Boler, Megan Megan Boler is a Full Professor in the Department of Social Justice Education, at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto.. "All Speech Is Not Free: The Ethics of" Affirmative Action Pedagogy"." Counterpoints 240 (2004): 3-13.
38 -On what basis might one justify an affirmative action pedagogy? The first justifica-¶ tion is forwarded by legal scholars in the area of critical race theory. The authors of¶ Words That Wound (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw, 1993) address the¶ tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The tension arises because,¶ in fact, all people are not equally protected under the law because of the institu-¶ tionalized inequities within our society. This reality complicates the effectiveness¶ of the First Amendment. Scholarship in critical race theory and educational analy-¶ ses document that in recent years, we find incidents of hate speech primarily to be¶ directed at racial, religious, or sexual minorities. Not surprisingly, one finds in turn¶ that invocations of the right to free speech are most often invocations to protect¶ the right of the members of the dominant culture to express their hatred toward¶ members of minority culture. These authors make important legal and historical¶ cases to support their observation that, in practice, while the rhetoric of the First¶ Amendment is a buzz word that makes all of us want to rally for its principle, in¶ practice "the first amendment arms conscious and unconscious racists - Nazis and¶ liberals alike - with a constitutional right to be racist. Racism is just another idea¶ deserving of constitutional protection like all ideas" (Matsuda et al., 1993, p. 15). A¶ scholar from another discipline addresses classroom dynamics and similarly argues¶ that we must "read the appeal to the First Amendment as itself a kind of panic re-¶ sponse in the same order as hate speech itself" (Roof, 1999, p. 45).¶ A second justification for privileging marginalized voices is based on the meas-¶ urement of the psychological effect of hate speech on targeted groups and individ-¶ uals. As one legal scholar explains, hate speech affects its victim in the visceral ex-¶ perience of a "disorienting powerlessness" (Lawrence, 1993, p. 70), an effect¶ achieved because hate speech is comparable to an act of violence. In reaction to¶ hate speech, the target commonly experiences a "state of semishock," nausea, and dizziness, and an inability to articulate a response. This scholar gives an example of a student who is white and gay. The student reports that in an instance where he¶ was called "faggot" he experienced all of the above symptoms. However, when he¶ was called "honky," he did not experience the disorienting powerlessness. As the¶ scholar remarks, "the context of the power relationships in which the speech takes¶ place, and the connection to violence must be considered as we decide how best to¶ foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our communities" (Lawrence, 1993,¶ p. 70).¶ These considerations bring me to another key point: The analysis of utterance¶ in the classroom requires more than rational dialogue. In fact, the critical race¶ theorists argue that because racism is irrational, no amount of rational dialogue¶ will change racist attitudes. I disagree, in part because I am convinced that class-¶ room discussion must recognize the emotions that shape and construct the mean-¶ ings of our claims, our interchange with one another, and our investments in par-¶ ticular worldviews. Thus, a discussion of racism or homophobia cannot rely¶ simply on rational exchange but must delve into the deeply emotional investments¶ and associations that surround perceptions of difference and ideologies. One is po-¶ tentially faced with allowing ones worldviews to be shattered, in itself a pro-¶ foundly emotionally charged experience
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40 -Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic 09
41 -Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf
42 -II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the parties to defer to the other’s point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been implicitly urging that the other side do just that.58 One could also argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing, namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its credit, who urge the other side to “get over it” and toughen its collective hide.60 Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge. Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate speech is. A Types of Hate Speech Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number of forms—direct (sometimes called “specific”) or indirect; veiled or overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or not.61 One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristic— such as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or gender—of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single individual (“Jones, you goddamned X.”) or group (“The goddamned Xs are destroying this country.”). It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.63 It can be anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be plainly identified.64 The object of the speech may be free to leave, or trapped, as in a classroom or workplace.65 B. The Harms of Hate Speech The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and degrees of harm. The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic, especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one delivering it possesses the power to harm. 1. Direct or Face-to-Face Hate Speech Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of hate speech as mere offense,66 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to sleep.67 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and impairment of work or school performance.68 Some may take refuge in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their misery.69 2. Hate Speech and Children With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as assaultive.70 Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.71 If the child’s parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for their families than before.72 Recent scholarship points out how the pathologies associated with social subordination may be transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.73 3. General Hate Speech With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just as serious.74 Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the victims in belittling terms.75 For example, before launching their wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the Holocaust.77 When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who resisted the blessings of civilization.78 When, a little later, the nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve their good fortune.79 Before interning the Japanese during World War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and despotic.80 It is possible that the connection between general hate speech and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and contingent, but conceptual and necessary.81 Concerted action requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without first articulating a reason why one is doing it—otherwise, no one but a sadist would join in.82 Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide, such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.83 The prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.84 Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow could gain little purchase.85 C. The Harms of Speech Regulation If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in? Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares, drug addiction, and a blunted self image?86 Diminished pecuniary and personal prospects?87 Will hate-speech regulation set up the speaker’s group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or anything comparable?88 The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes, such as Europe’s and Canada’s, that criminalize hate speech exhibit none of these ills.89 Speech and inquiry there seem as free and uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as our own.90 What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be momentarily irritated. But “bottling it up” seems not to inflict serious psychological or emotional damage.91 Early in the debate about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a result.92 By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a member of the target group.93 But studies examining this possibility discount it.94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident “revs him up” for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), shows that many Americans harbor measurable animus toward racial minorities.96 Might it be that hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that result?97 III. OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs,98 large or small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them? Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the aggressor, giving as good as they got.99 The harm of hate speech is variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.100 By the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might shy away from them.101 The interplay of voices that society relies on to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech “exceptions” and attention to the role of incessancy. A. Current Free-Speech Exceptions Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are: words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words that create a risk of imminent violence.102 If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating, potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother.103 But our tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate walking home late at night from the campus library?104 As important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding the dignity of a minor state official?105 Neither free-speech advocates nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they should.106 B. Incessancy and Compounding Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy—the tendency to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim—and compounding.107 A victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult such as “You damn idiot driver” or “Watch where you’re going, you klutz” that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times before.108 Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw. The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent, we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the victim’s vulnerability.109 When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim’s very identity. Hate speakers “pile on,” injuring in a way in which the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable harm. A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than the other, so that Rawls’s difference principle suggests that, as a moral matter, we break the tie in the victim’s favor.110 Moreover, the magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of free expression.111
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44 -Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15
45 -
46 -Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.
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48 -While all communities of color suffer from racism in general¶ and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has¶ been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black¶ racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the¶ two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and¶ every day constructions of race in the United States.12¶ For this¶ reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of¶ African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison¶ industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in¶ which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African¶ Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness¶ in both law and practice.¶ While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is¶ indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and¶ elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”¶ norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing¶ “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13¶ The socio-political construction of race coincides with the¶ age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and¶ perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the¶ solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.¶ By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or¶ slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the¶ Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of¶ debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less¶ than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of¶ 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly¶ drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result¶ according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what¶ we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially¶ pro-slavery”.¶ 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future¶ bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation¶ through escape were all clear indications of the significance of¶ slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the¶ Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”¶ to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.¶ 17¶ The social and constitutional construction of white as free and¶ Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.¶ According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,¶ may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.¶ 18 These¶ property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those¶ who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and¶ to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders¶ of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:¶ The concept of whiteness was premised on white¶ supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was¶ defined and constructed in ways that increased its¶ value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,¶ whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the¶ very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept¶ of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial¶ subjugation. This fact was particularly evident¶ during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,¶ as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the¶ form of status property.20¶ Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of¶ humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the¶ margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as¶ Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in¶ America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and¶ no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an¶ experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”¶ 21 Directly¶ condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded¶ groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,¶ Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an¶ outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22
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50 -The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements. Oparah 14
51 -Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
52 -
53 -¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets. Andrea Smith, in her discussion of native studies, has argued that politi- cally progressive educators often adopt normative, colonial practices in the classroom, using pedagogical strategies and grading practices that rein- scribe the racialized and gendered regulation, policing, and disciplining that PIC abolitionists seek to end.53 In this sense, there could be no “postcarceral” academy. Certainly, sanctions for undergraduate and graduate students and faculty who challenge the university’s regular practices—from failing grades and expulsions to tenure denials and deportation—are systemically distrib- uted, along with rewards for those who can be usefully incorporated. Yet uni- versities and colleges also hold the seeds of a very different possible future, evoked, for example, by the universal admissions movement or by student strikes in Britain and Canada that demand higher education as a right, not a privilege of the wealthy. Rather than seeking to eradicate or replace higher educational institutions altogether, I suggest that we demand the popular and antiracist democratization of higher education.¶ The first step toward this radical transformation is the liberation of aca- demia from the machinery of empire: prisons, militarism, and corporations. Speaking of abolishing the white race, Noel Ignatiev argues that it is neces- sary for white people to make whiteness impossible by refusing the invisible benefits of membership in the “white club.”54 Progressive academics are also members of a privileged “club,” one that confers benefits in the form of a pay- check, health care, and other fringe benefits; social status; and the freedom to pursue intellectual work that we are passionate about. But we can also put our privilege to work by unmasking and then unsettling the invisible, symbi- otic, and toxic relationships that constitute the academic-MPIC.¶ Decoupling academia from its velvet-gloved master would begin the pro- cess of fundamental transformation. Without unfettered streams of income from corporations, wealthy philanthropists, and the military, universities and colleges would be forced to develop alternative fund-raising strategies, relationships, and accountabilities. Can we imagine a college administration aligned with local Occupy organizers to protest the state’s massive spend- ing on prisons and policing and demand more tax money for housing, edu- cation, and health care? Can we imagine a massive investment of time and resources by university personnel to solve the problem of how to decarcerate the nation’s prisons or end the detention of undocumented immigrants in order to fund universal access to higher education? Can we imagine a uni- versity run by and for its constituents, including students, kitchen and gar- den staff, and tenure-track and adjunct faculty? These are the possibilities opened up by academic-MPIC abolition.
54 -
55 -
56 -Their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84
57 -
58 -Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.
59 -
60 -
61 -It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the¶ same result: an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who¶ comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each¶ other's ideas." It is something like an elaborate minuet.¶ The failure to acknowledge minority scholarship extends even to¶ nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact. W.E. DuBois, deceased¶ Black historian, receives an occasional citation.5 Aside from him, little¶ else rates a mention. Higginbotham's monumental In the Matter of¶ Color' might as well not exist. The same is true of the work of Kenneth¶ Clark,1 Black psychologist and past president of the American¶ Psychological Association, and Alvin Poussaint,8 Harvard Medical¶ School professor and authority on the psychological impact of race. One¶ searches in vain for references to the powerful book by physicians Grier¶ and Cobbs, Black Rage,' or to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the¶ Earth,10 or even to writings of or about Martin Luther King, Jr.,1¶ "¶ Cesar Chavez, 2 and Malcolm X."3 When the inner circle writers need authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they¶ generally cite reports of the United States Commission on Civil¶ Rights1 4 or else each other.1 5¶ A single anecdote may help to illustrate what I mean. Recently a¶ law professor who writes about civil rights showed me, for my edification,¶ a draft of an article of his. It is, on the whole, an excellent article.¶ It extols the value of a principle I will call "equal personhood." Equal¶ personhood is the notion, implicit in several constitutional provisions¶ and much case law, that each human being, regardless of race, creed, or¶ color, is entitled to be treated with equal respect. To treat someone as¶ an outsider, a nonmember of human society, violates this principle and¶ devalues the self-worth of the person so excluded.¶ I have no quarrel with this premise, but, on reading the one hundred-plus¶ footnotes of the article, I noticed that its author failed to cite¶ Black or minority scholars, an exclusion from the community of kindred¶ souls as glaring as any condemned in the paper. I pointed this out¶ to the author, citing as illustration a passage in which he asserted that¶ unequal treatment can cause a person to suffer a withered self-concept.¶ Having just written an article on a related subject, 8 I was more or less¶ steeped in withered self-concepts. I knew who the major authorities¶ were in that area.¶ The professor's authority for the proposition about withered selfconcepts¶ was Frank Michelman, writing in the Harvard Law Review. I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar¶ and teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge¶ about withered self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add references¶ to such works as Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto1¶ " and Grier and¶ Cobbs's Black Rage,"' and he agreed to do so. To justify his selection of¶ Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the¶ author explained that Michelman's statement was "so elegant."¶ Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority¶ scholarship from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles¶ about civil rights? Elegance is, without question, a virtue in writing, in¶ conversation, or in. anything else in life. If minority scholars write inelegantly¶ and Frank Michelman writes elegantly, then it would not be¶ surprising if the latter were read and cited more frequently, and the¶ former less so. But minority legal scholars seem to have less trouble¶ being recognized and taken seriously in areas of scholarship other than¶ civil rights theory.19 If elegance is a problem for minority scholars, it¶ seems mainly to be so in the core areas of civil rights: affirmative action,¶ the equality principle, and the theoretical foundations of race relations¶ law.¶ In 1971, Judge Skelly Wright wrote an article entitled, Professor¶ Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.20 In the article,¶ Judge Wright took a group of scholars to task for their bloodless¶ carping at the Warren Court's decisions in the areas of racial justice¶ and human rights. He accused the group of missing the central point in¶ these decisions-their moral clarity and passion for justice-and labelled¶ the group's excessive preoccupation with procedure and institutional¶ role and its insistence that the Court justify every element of a¶ decision under general principles of universal application, a "scholarly tradition."'2 1¶ I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of¶ white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority¶ scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream¶ writers tend to acknowledge only each other's work. It is even¶ possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars¶ into the field,2 2 perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to establish¶ their reputations in other areas of law. I believe that this "scholarly¶ tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite scholars in other fields¶ of law seem to confront no such tradition.23
62 -
63 -Case
64 -
65 -UV
66 -
67 -1. Anti blackness is worse harm under fairness – it stops people from engaging in the activity as a whole
68 -
69 -2. Fairness for who? This presumes a colorblind ideal notion of fairness which we impact turn – slight skews in round are necessary to compensate for the non ideal reality that queer debaters are always excluded
70 -
71 -3.The use of procedural requirements to bracket off criticism reinforces oppression – you should endorse a rejection of those procedures. Prosise 96
72 -Prosise, Theodore O., Greg R. Miller, and Jordan P. Mills. "Argument fields as arenas of discursive struggle." Argumentation and Advocacy 32.3 (1996): 111.
73 -
74 -A central aspect of argument field theory left unexamined has been the role of power in the establishment of argumentative author- ity in fields. The importance of the discursive struggles over the standards that distinguish legitimate and illegitimate forms of expression has also eluded thorough analysis. Critical theorists must recognize the practical discursive struggles of social agents.26 The actual symbolic practices of agents must be understood if we are to analyze how logical types become invested with authority. The establishment of authority may preclude participation in the field and marginalize those who could or should have a say. Field theory is better conceptualized by considering argument fields as social arenas of struggle, accounting for the key elements and factors that make fields dynamic. Toulmin, while recognizing the role of argumentative conflict in the establishment of authority, originally employed an evolutionary model in his explanation of the development of disciplinary fields. In Human Understanding, he argues that forums of competition allow the best warrants of a field to become accepted. The dominant warrants, he believes, did not develop from an "arbitrary authority or contest for power."27 His evolutionary perspective embraces the metaphor of change as progress. Condensing this, Robert Rowland explains, "The theories which best meet a discipline's needs will survive."28 The work of Thomas Kuhn, however, amply demonstrates the limits of such an evolutionary perspective of epistemic development.29 And although Toulmin now would not embrace the container model of knowledge accumulation, the original discussion of fields lacked an emphasis on the dynamics of social struggles for symbolic legitimacy, which may explain the current limitations in understanding how authority is produced and articulated in social space.The shared purposes of social agents also has been offered as a useful descriptor of argument fields. Rowland argues a conception of fields based on the shared purpose of the agents operating within the field.30 Zarefsky summarizes this notion, indicating that "two arguers are in the same field if they share a common purpose, and . . . the arguments they produce will differ in important ways from arguments which derive from a different purpose."31 In short, participants argue over what constitute the "best way" to engage in activities within the area of inquiry.:;2 This conception of fields begins to define a social arena based on an agent's participation in a struggle over the instrumental means and terminal states of a social field. It should be recognized that participants also share in the struggle for scarce resources-be they economic, cultural, political or symbolic.These agents argue over the legitimate perspective on what should constitute a claim to know, so they share in a struggle for epistemic legitimacy. The resolution of this struggle determines what types of argumentative proof are legitimated in the field. Extending from Toulmin's work, many scholars recognize that the symbolic negotiation of authority within social fields is ongoing. Such negotiation requires a discursive struggle in which arguments are presented and then accepted or rejected by the community of participants. 33 Charles Kneupper notes that "social fields are strongly influenced by rhetorical practice in both their continuation and change."34 Furthermore, James Klumpp suggests that "when a community encounters an experience there are normally multiple understandings of it. Through communication the community works out its choice of ways to respond (that is, its definition of the situation) and then sanctions ... appropriate action."35 Social actors categorize events in order to respond to those events in appropriate ways. This categorization is based, primarily, on the language practices of the social field. 36 For example, welfare policies frame cultural myths of an "underclass" and may exacerbate the problems of social members of lower economic status. The connotations associated with the term "underclass," such as chronic laziness, stigmatize members of the group. The policies that are formulated, therefore, are based on the perceived "character" of the members of the underclass, rather than the larger social, historical, and economic causes of their economic status. The implication is that action is often based on the successful symbolic struggles which categorize events, rather than on "good reasons."37 Since new ideas are filtered through taken-for-granted social assumptions, there is a general conservative social orientation toward argument. This helps explain how argument fields are maintained. Craig Dudczak, while recognizing that struggles take place within disciplines, claims that overall participants "maintain general disciplinary assumptions."38 Wenzel writes that "argument fields exhibit a persistence over time"39 and for Charles Willard "fields exist … through the ongoing defining activities" and the "recurring themes in a group's practices." In other words, certain symbolic forms of authority are reproduced and others are limited socially. Certain forms of argumentative support are celebrated and other forms are dismissed, based on the social forms of authority previously established by the agents participating in the field. But fields are not always stable. Postmodern scholars remind us that diversity and differences are the norm. Hence, attention must be paid to the diversity of discursive struggles that challenge traditional forms of social authority. Communities of memory, necessary for social negotiation, are partially established through discursive practices. But within the community, conflict is ever-present. So, what is the relationship between the community and the conflict within the field? Furthermore, what are the implications of the struggle? Hanson argues that the forums of field disputes can serve to "exclude" an individual "from further discussions. " 42 He is certainly correct; however, it is more than just a forum that excludes discourse. The successful symbolic struggle to define social authority excludes individuals and perspectives from participation and consideration in social fields. Despite these contributions, there has been insufficient discussion of the pragmatic struggles in which agents are engaged. The community of argument scholars will be served by a general theory of social fields in order to evaluate particular examples. Over a decade ago, Zarefsky contended that "we need an account of the growth and demise of fields against which we can check individual claims."4:1 What the current discussion lacks, specifically, is a consideration of the role that symbolic struggles of categorization of "appropriate" and "inappropriate" forms of authority plays in the stability and change of a social field's assumptions, which serve as the basis for the subsequent social structuring of practices. Current field theory fails to account adequately for social power and the conflict over scarce symbolic resources at the base of that social power. The study of such struggle is important because it relates to the stability and legitimacy of the dominant forms of discourse. Subsequently, there has been little attention to the real world implications of marginalizing alternative arguments within fields. For example, Nancy Fraser argues that the conceptual framing of social welfare policies excludes meaningful interpretation of social needs from a feminist perspective.44 The social forms of authority surrounding the welfare debate are defined by political "professionals." Consequently, the interpretation of a welfare recipient's "needs" and "interests" are considered primarily from the dominant political perspective. Excluded from the political debate are alternative voices and arguments. Lack of attention to the symbolic means of exclusion, such as this, is troubling. Rhetorical scholars need a theory which can help explain how and why certain arbitrary expressions are celebrated, while others are excluded altogether due to discursive struggles within dynamic social fields. Furthermore, scholars should be encouraged to explore the symbolic means agents employ to challenge traditionally dominant forms of argumentative authority.
75 -
76 -
77 -Independently, bad Strat skew – they pigeonhole the NEG to turns to the AFF contention – that’s uniquely bad since the AFF has infinite prep to choose advantages and can choose a hyper specific advocacy that don’t link to – NCs and Ks are key to neg flex.
78 -FW
79 -
80 -
81 -You must evaluate the consequences of their advocacy –
82 -
83 -Attempting to abstract away from social realities is repugnant and eliminates the possibility of a concrete solution to oppression. Curry 14
84 -
85 -Curry, Tommy J. Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A and M University “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” Victory Briefs, January/February 2015. CC
86 -
87 -Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, it is set against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—
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1 -Miriam Leany
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1 -Nueva AK
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1 -28
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
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1 -Berkeley R1 NC
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1 -Berkeley
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1 -Shell General
2 -Neoliberalism is a mafia protection racket – it defunds schools of private funding and makes them come to corporations for funding. This logic structures what speech and knowledge are free in the first place. The aff misdiagnoses the problem and lets neoliberalism slip through the cracks. Bagakis 11/15/16
3 -
4 -Gus Bagakis retired philosophy instructor at San Francisco State University and author of "Seeing Through The System: The Invisible Class Struggle in America," October 15, 2016 “Neoliberalism's Decades-Long Attack on Public Universities”
5 -
6 -One aspect of the project of neoliberalism was to reshape the population's understanding of the purpose of public institutions, such as schools and universities, to fit the corporate model. This transformation was part of a larger cultural shift that began in the '70s and '80s, when policy-makers started to see higher education more as a private (rather than public) good.¶ The plan to transform the higher education system to meet the needs of neoliberalism can be most clearly seen in a memo sent by Lewis Powell, a future member of the Supreme Court, to the US Chamber of Commerce in 1971. The memo was a response to some setbacks that befell the business community, ranging from government regulations on the environment to occupational safety and consumer protection laws. The memo presented a framework for the conservative reaction.¶ Powell stated:¶ One of the bewildering paradoxes of our time is the extent to which the enterprise system tolerates, if not participates in, its own destruction.¶ The campuses from which much of the criticism emanates are supported by (i) tax funds generated largely from American business, and (ii) contributions from capital funds controlled or generated by American business. The boards of trustees of our universities overwhelmingly are composed of men and women who are leaders in the system.¶ Further, he argued that¶ ... it is essential that spokesmen for the enterprise system ~-~- at all levels and at every opportunity ~-~- be far more aggressive than in the past ... There should be no hesitation to attack the Naders, the Marcuses and others who openly seek destruction of the system. There should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all political arenas for support of the enterprise system. Nor should there be reluctance to penalize politically those who oppose it.¶ The Powell memo's plan was to: a) defund public higher education; b) then "save" the universities with ideologically focused corporate funding friendly to "free enterprise;" c) turn universities into corporations; and d) turn the students into consumers who became educated labor products.¶ Neoliberal Plan for Defunding Universities ¶ States provide much of the funds for higher education but need to balance their budgets. So when tax revenues fall, higher education suffers, since it is a lower priority than Medicare, prisons and K-12 education. In addition, large corporations often pay little or no state income tax in states where they have large operations. In a 2011 report, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities concluded that at least 46 states have imposed cuts in the funding of higher education.¶ The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) ~-~- a nationwide association of state legislators and corporations ~-~- best expressed the neoliberal perspective. It successfully lobbied both the states and the federal government to reduce corporate taxes and, in effect, deprive public universities of the state and federal funds they needed.¶ In an Americans for Tax Fairness fact sheet on corporate tax rates, we can see that:¶ The corporate share of federal tax revenue has dropped by two-thirds in 60 years.¶ General Electric, Boeing, Verizon and 23 other profitable Fortune 500 firms paid no federal income taxes.¶ US corporations dodge $90 billion a year in income taxes.¶ US corporations officially hold $2.1 trillion in profits offshore.¶ Tax avoidance, plus lobbying that reduced corporate taxes, diminished the revenue for social programs, especially education. This reduced funding was coordinated with a public relations campaign claiming that public schools were failing, and that they should be privatized and would be improved if they were turned into profit-making ventures. The project is already running for K-12 education with the charter school movement, and now it's being used in higher education, as federal and state governments have gradually reduced funding.¶ The least discussed reason for reduced state revenue for social programs is our ever-growing defense budget. The Pentagon spends more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare and safety. Even prior to the arrival of neoliberalism, military adventures drained money from the social budget. In 1935, Gen. Smedley Butler wrote a book titled, War Is a Racket, in which he exposed greedy profit-making corporations as instigators of imperialism and war. In 1961, President Eisenhower warned of the military industrial complex as a hidden force in US politics. But the military budget is higher today than at any point since the Eisenhower administration.¶ We now have a new neoliberal-inspired military industrial complex consisting of companies, agencies, militarized policing, hidden budgets, a "deep state," private mercenaries and lobbyists that make Eisenhower's warning mild by comparison. Our budget priorities keep the country on a war footing, and our economy allows for military and homeland departments to be virtually untouchable. The current excuse for funds is "terrorism," but under neoliberalism, the actual purpose is to control the world's resources for American capitalism and to stop other countries from competing with us. As Colonel Wilkerson, echoing general Butler, stated recently: "We've privatized the ultimate public function: war ... In many respects it is now private interests that benefit most from our use of military force." A few universities are beneficiaries of war spending through their research for the war machine, but most are losers due to the financial and educational effects of the loss of funding, while the war machine grows.¶ "Saving" Defunded Universities With Corporate Funding¶ A partial replacement for the loss of public funds comes from corporate and philanthropic "gifts" and industry contracts for universities. Groups of conservative millionaires like the Koch brothers have created institutions to push the corporate agenda. They have infiltrated universities and introduced the neoliberal worldview through think tanks and programs designed to give "assistance" to those institutions that would accept their money and programs. These groups, with the combined help of the corporate controlled press and a sophisticated public relations campaign, eased the transition to the corporatization of universities.¶ Turning Universities Into Corporations¶ A 2014 Institute for Policy Studies report finds that the outcome of treating education as a commodity has led to universities mimicking business models. Presidents, chief executives and a layer of bureaucrats earning excessive salaries were established, while the earnings of the faculty declined, largely because tenured and tenure-track faculty were replaced by adjuncts (part-time faculty) and temporary faculty. Instead of giving primary focus to education, scholarship and research, colleges and universities began marketing themselves as products worth purchasing by the consumer. Science and humanities faculty were encouraged to become entrepreneurs and seek ways to profit directly from their intellectual and technical pursuits.¶ Mark Yudof, former president of the University of California, conceded that the university needed to stop viewing itself as a public institution and consider itself a "hybrid" university, bridging the divide between private and public institutions. In a time of scarce resources, privatization has emerged as a potential replacement for the historic model of community support of public universities. The danger is that when corporations fund universities, they get influence over studies and analysis produced by universities, as well as influence over the perspectives and career paths of large numbers of students. They also get use of vast resources for private gain and tax breaks associated with making donations.¶ Students as Consumers and Educated Labor Products¶ Fifty years ago, students often pursued their favorite high school subjects in college, assuming that the degree itself would guarantee a job. Not so today, as living expenses and tuition have risen. Students and their families paying the bill see themselves more as consumers of a commodity rather than engaging in a learning process. Because there is no guarantee of a good job after graduation, universities increasingly connect learning with the skills needed for the hard-to-enter job force. Education more and more becomes job training, and students become educated labor products.¶ By ensuring the need for outside sources of funding, neoliberalism set the context that led to the growth of tuition. When the federal government opened its student loan service to profit-making corporations, profit dominated. The privatized loan industry, through predatory lending schemes, offered loans to all students ~-~- even to those who sometimes could not afford them. Their profit motive, combined with the laws passed by a highly lobbied Congress, eventually made the $1.3 trillion student debt the worst kind of debt for students, but the best for banks and debt collectors. Currently, all involved in the student loan industry make money from student debt: banks, private investors and even the federal government. This action has led to the rise of for-profit colleges whose goal was often to exploit the poor who couldn't afford to enter higher education in the first place. And finally, as Kenneth Saltman pointed out, "Shifting the costs of higher education onto students represents a kind of debt spending by youth to fund the military and corporations."¶ Resisting Neoliberalism¶ Even though neoliberalism is in decline due to the 2008 depression and weak recovery, its values and accomplishments have staying power. By using rhetoric like "individual freedom," "liberty," "personal responsibility," "privatization" and the "free market," it was able to undo much of the New Deal and restore corporate power, and in the case of higher education, be responsible for the rise in tuitions and decline in educational quality.¶ The neoliberal plan for public universities is to defund, then refund with strings attached, corporatize them into profit-makers, and turn the students into educated labor products that would fit into the economy. Its effects are most clearly expressed by Grover Norquist's quote about government: "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub." Neoliberalism doesn't want to abolish universities; it simply wants to turn them into profitable corporations that will maintain and promote the neoliberal version of capitalism.
7 -
8 -Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
9 - ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
10 -Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system ~-~- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return.
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12 -The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
13 -Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
14 -¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets.
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16 -The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan.
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18 -First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
19 -(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
20 -RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.
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22 -DA Shell
23 -Title IX investigations are increasing. Kingiade 16.
24 -Tyler Kingkade. “There Are Far More Title IX Investigations Of Colleges Than Most People Know”. Huffington Post. June 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d AGM
25 -The growing backlog of federal Title IX investigations into colleges and universities has now topped 300, but many people, including students at the schools under scrutiny, aren’t aware of those reviews. As of Wednesday, there were 246 ongoing investigations by the U.S. Department of Education into how 195 colleges and universities handle sexual assault reports under the gender equity law. A Freedom of Information Act request by The Huffington Post revealed another 68 Title IX investigations into how 61 colleges handle sexual harassment cases. This puts the total number of Title IX investigations officially dealing with sexual harassment at 315. (Under civil rights statutes, sexual assault is defined as an extreme form of sexual harassment.) But dozens of those Title IX reviews receive no publicity because they don’t specifically deal with sexual assault. If a school is being investigated for allegedly mishandling harassment cases, but not reports of assault, it doesn’t appear on the list regularly given to reporters by the Education Department. Major educational institutions — including New York University, the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Georgia State University, Florida AandM University, Rutgers University, Howard University, the University of Oklahoma, Kent State University and the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse — have escaped public scrutiny because Title IX investigations into their actions haven’t been highlighted by the government or the schools themselves.SUNY Broome Community College is under three investigations that haven’t been previously disclosed. The Education Department has no plans to regularly issue a list of cases involving sexual harassment only, an official told HuffPost.
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27 -AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04
28 -Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809.
29 -In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may¶ make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amend-¶ ment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not¶ arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple liti-¶ gants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same¶ opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be¶ in active coordination with each other - as with the multiple chal-¶ lenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First¶ Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer¶ source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amend-¶ ment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity¶ of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect160 such¶ that the claims no longer appear tenuous. The combination of, say,¶ four scarcely plausible but simultaneous court challenges and twenty¶ scarcely plausible public claims of a First Amendment problem could make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible¶ than they actually are.161 From the standpoint of an interest group¶ seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the sup-¶ port of other interest groups,162 winning is better than losing publicly,¶ but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.¶ Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility,¶ the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the¶ multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is re-¶ ferred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in¶ newsroom jargon as "legs." Interestingly, this phenomenon sometimes¶ survives even authoritative rejection of the claim. With respect to the¶ argument that hostile-environment sexual harassment enforcement has¶ serious First Amendment implications, for example, neither the Su-¶ preme Court's rejection of this argument in dicta in R.A. V v. City of¶ St. Paul163 nor the Court's silent dismissal of the same claim in Harris¶ v. Forklift Systems, Inc.164 has slowed the momentum of those who¶ would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostile-¶ environment sexual harassment law.'65 Similarly, decades of judicial¶ rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially re-¶ stricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely dis-¶ couraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme¶ Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroftl66 can be considered not a¶ defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into¶ the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant cer-¶ tiorari, in part to determine "whether ... the extension of existing and¶ future copyrights violates the First Amendment;"'67 and the seven-¶ Justice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,'68 acknowledged¶ that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.
30 -Title IX is currently effective against harassment – this dramatically increases access to higher education. Musil 07
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32 -Caryn Musil, Scaling the Ivory Towers, MS Magazine Fall 2007: The Triumphs of Title IX, http://www.feminist.org/education/TriumphsOfTitleIX.pdf. NS
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34 -The contrast between her academic landscape and mine could not be more dramatic. And Title IX is the primary cause for the seismic shifts. The law’s impact has been elemental. Not only has it helped eliminate blatant discriminatory practices across educational institutions, but it has helped root out subtler methods of holding women back by closing the gap between men’s and women’s financial aid packages, improving housing opportunities for women students (a lack of women’s dorms was once used to restrict women’s admissions) and combating sexual harassment. Just before Title IX was signed into law, women were underrepresented as undergraduates, at just over 40 percent of all students. And it wasn’t that easy for them to get into those ivied halls. Young women typically had to make higher grades and SAT scores than young men to gain college admission, and often faced quotas limiting the number of women admitted. Once they got on campus, there were few women role models—less than one in five faculty members were women, and a mere 3 percent of college presidents. In some fields, even the women students were barely visible: About 1 percent of master’s degrees in engineering, 1 percent of doctoral dental degrees, and under 2 percent of master’s degrees in mathematics were awarded to women in 1970. The barriers were formidable, and sex discrimination unashamedly open and normative. In the years since Title IX, however, all of those numbers have risen tremendously. Take college enrollment, for starters: By 2005, women students comprised almost three out of five undergraduates, with some of this growth due to increased access for women of color (who have more than doubled their share of degrees since 1977, when they earned just over 10 per- cent). Women have not simply in- creased their numbers in academia, though: They have also moved into fields formerly dominated by men, particularly business and the sciences (see chart on page 45). These are the sorts of fields that lead women into higher-paying jobs after graduation. Bucking the rising trend, however, are computer and information sci- ence, where numbers peaked in 1984 before declining, and engineering and engineering technologies, in which the numbers of women grew and then leveled off. Certain fields have continued to be women-dominant from 1980 until 2005—health professions other than physicians and related inical sciences (currently more than 86 percent women) and education (about 79 percent women), but this isn’t the best news for economic equity, since wages tend to stay low in fields with few men. In graduate and professional schools, too, young women have enjoyed far greater access thanks to Title IX. In 1970, women earned only 14 percent of doctoral degrees, but today earn nearly half. Yet women’s doctorates are still not distributed evenly across disciplines: They range from a low of about 19 percent in engineering and engineering technologies to a high of about 71 per- cent in psychology. The most dramatic gains are in the professional schools. In 1971, just about 1 of 100 dental school graduates were women, while in 2005 that number grew nearly fortyfold. In medical schools the numbers jumped from less than 10 percent to nearly 50 percent, and law school numbers from about 7 percent to nearly 49 percent. There’s been quite a psychological benefit, too. As my older daughter, Rebecca, says of her experience at New York University Law School, “Women were more than half of the students, so sex discrimination was not something we ever worried about. ... It’s not that we don’t think about equality, but that we don’t have to think about it as much because of what’s already been done.” Armed with their professional degrees in medicine and law, women have entered those professions at steadily increasing rates. Yet their numbers—and in law firms, their advancement—still lag behind. In 2006, women made up 33 percent of lawyers but just 16 percent of partners in law firms. Similarly, in medicine only 27 percent of doctors are women, and they’re unevenly spread across specialties, the top three choices being internal medicine, pediatrics and general family medicine. The news is also mixed about women in academic leadership. By 1986 the number of women college presidents had tripled from 1970 to almost 10 percent, and by 2006 reached 23 percent, with a large proportion serving as presi- dents of community colleges. But most of the progress occurred between 1986 and 2001 and now has slowed considerably. Furthermore, today’s presidents re- main much less diverse by race, gender and ethnicity than the students, faculty or administrators who report to them: Only 4 percent of the respondents in a recent survey of college presidents identified as “minority women.” Women also tend to be more qualified and make more sacrifices than men in order to gain leadership; they’re far less likely than men presidents to be married and have children, and significantly more likely to hold an advanced degree. On faculties, women have increased across every rank but continue to move up more slowly than men. In 2006 they accounted for nearly 40 percent of full- time faculty and nearly 50 percent of part-timers. Young women benefit extraordinarily from all these women role models. As my daughter Emily says, “Women professors looked out for me the whole time ... and that is where I got my career counseling.” But women professors are not employed equally across institutional types—they’re just over half the faculty at institutions offering associate degrees, but only 34 percent at doctoral institutions. While women are increasing their numbers in tenure-track positions (nearly 45 percent), they still face the accumulated disad-vantages of sex discrimination over time and represent only about 31 per- cent of currently tenured faculty. “People change faster and more easily than institutions,” explains Yolanda T. Moses, associate vice chancellor for diversity at the University of California, Riverside. While the most blatant violations have been eliminated, Moses argues that the next level of work is even more complicated: “Systems can undermine progress ... and we need to unearth those behaviors that sabotage even our best intentions.” A search committee in physics or engineering, for example, may profess to be seeking more women, but make no efforts to break out of all-men, frequently all- white, networks to identify strong women candidates. These are the sorts of challenges that still remain, yet Title IX has gone a long way toward making campuses more hospitable. By offering legal protection from hostile work and learning environments, it helped draw attention to sexism in the classroom and opened the door for change. The fields of science, tech- nology, engineering and math were among the most chilly toward women, so Title IX helped usher in a period of serious self-study that has led to the adoption of more women-friendly teaching practices and programs, and thus a rise in women taking courses formerly dominated by men.
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36 -Gender equality in higher education and the workforce is key to climate science and innovation. Gender Summit 13
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38 -Gender Summit 3 — North America, Diversity Fueling Excellence in Research and Innovation:
39 -Conference Report, 11/13/13, https://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/activities/gendersummit/GS3-ConfReport.pdf. NS
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41 -Ms. Jarrett noted that gender equality in STEM is not just a women's issue, but one that affects all scientists and researchers. The incorporation of the gender dimension into research and innovation benefits everyone. Diversity in STEM brings innovation; it drives science forward and benefits society as a whole. She pointed out that GS3 is more than just about women: it is about our societies and tapping into the power of women to unlock the full potential of global communities. If we truly want to champion innovation and expand the capacity for discovery, everyone has to be involved. President Obama’s administration is committed to ensuring that our women and girls are in a position to lead in the future. The President has been quoted as saying, "When women succeed, nations are safer, more secure and more prosperous.”  Ralph Cicerone, PhD President, US National Academy of Sciences and Chair, National Research Council, USA emphasized (a) the importance of utilizing the full capacity of creative, talented and dedicated people; (b) the collective responsibility for ensuring that women scientists and engineers flourish and that they are supported and encouraged; and (c) the need to confront existing obstacles along their career paths. He stated that the Academy remains committed to enhancing gender inclusion by supporting the creation of networks around the world, including Africa, Latin America and Europe. Establishing these networks and collaborations promotes the creation of goals and strategies for implementation and an awareness of the efforts of others that can bring value to our own. To underscore the importance of gender incorporation within global research and development, former NSF Director Subra Suresh, PhD President, Carnegie Mellon University, USA stated that diversity in education and the workplace accelerates innovation because people have different life experiences that allow them to address the same issue from different vantage points. Diversity fostering global research is becoming more popular. In May 2012 the Global Research Council was established at NSF as a virtual organization to collectively engage in the development of principles governing scientific merit review, research integrity, pathways for open access to publications and data and mobility of researchers. Nearly 100 countries participated in the most recent meeting where the topics included the mobility of researchers, as well as a discussion of strategic planning for collective action in the near future. Wanda E. Ward, PhD Head, Office of International and Integrative Activities, National Science Foundation, USA posited that North America stood ready to further integrate and leverage the gender dimension in forging new and transformative discoveries and in fostering a diverse and inclusive scientific community. Importantly, the greater inclusion of biological sex and gender considerations in disciplinary and interdisciplinary frameworks is significant as all nations increase their investments in science and technology. Working collaboratively to ensure that scientific research is beneficial to women and men is a transformative moment for the shifting landscape of the scientific enterprise. This time of collective commitment for gender considerations in science and engineering will be beneficial to society at large as North America embraces the new opportunities of the shifting landscape of science innovation marked by emerging fields of science and the demographic changes of the scientific workforce. Attention was given to the fact that the more than 650 registrants comprised a diverse group of women and men interested in women’s issues, as well as diversity within the group of women who represent every stage of STEM workforce development, advancement and success. Dr. Ward’s presentation highlighted the NSF’s gender considerations in research design and analysis, as well as the Foundation’s emphasis on gender equity in the STEM workforce. This Summit was considered exemplary for engaging women of all backgrounds in imagining future work at the frontiers of science and in realizing their full potential in the scientific enterprise. Additionally, pending the availability of funding, NSF is pursuing four major areas for multinational collaboration: o discovery/frontier research for knowledge generation and translation, o human capacity/talent development and advancement, o institutional transformation in higher education systems and practices and o equity in stewardship activities, such as the merit review process, evaluation and assessment. Across the participating partners, there are compelling examples of individual contributions of women in basic research, as well as in the advancement of applied research within a gender- focused context. There are also success stories of policy changes and transformative practices emanating from the leadership, mentoring and advocacy roles of well-known women scientists and engineers. The shared commitment for framing a multi-national strategy was continued with input from the European Commission, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the National Council on Science and Technology of Mexico, and the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. Europe is working aggressively to change the workforce environment by encouraging more females to study science and engineering and to go on to research careers.  MarieGeoghegan-Quinn Commissioner of Research, Innovation and Science, European Commission stressed that because gender issues are not unique to Europe, it is important to tackle issues jointly. She stated that we need all of our talented scientists working toward research and innovative efforts and that there is no tradeoff between promoting gender equity and excellence in science. She expressed much interest in collaborating with North America. She stressed that it is logical, for both scientific and economic reasons, to work collaboratively to tackle common challenges. She also highlighted Horizon 2020, Europe’s new research funding program, which will champion gender equality in three ways: integrating the gender dimension into funded programs, encouraging balanced participation of men and women on funded research teams and ensuring gender balance in advisory groups and in teams that evaluate applications for funding.  Oldřich Vlasák Vice-President of the European Parliament stressed the importance of (a) research and development in future economic growth and (b) investing effectively, given the frequent scarcity of financial and human resources to support research. He stated that both the US and Europe need to invest more and do a better job with regard to human capital: “we can’t afford to waste research talent, which means we should not discourage any part of the population from participating in research and innovation.” Quoting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, he said that “no team can ever win if half of its players are on the bench.” Measures to ensure gender equality should be considered an investment in future economic growth, rather than a cost. He stated that “what we pay today will generate returns for the economy as a whole in the medium- and long-term by reducing the ineffectiveness associated with inequality.” The gender imbalances are not a self-correcting phenomenon, and Vlasák encouraged discussions during the third Gender Summit to view these issues as a matter of research potential and social justice. Remarks by Dominique Ristori Director General, European Commission Directorate General Joint Research Council focused on the importance of science and society, the latest developments in Europe’s gender equality policy and the European interest in a gender focused multi-national collaboration. He described the motivation and challenges for global research and innovation in the context of climate change, clean energy and the improved health and well-being of all citizens. Ensuring gender balance is a necessary condition for the achievement of the objective of Europe’s 2020 strategy for 75 employment, an objective that cannot be reached without strong commitment to gender equality, he stated.
42 -
43 -Climate innovations are the primary key to solve warming. Moniz 15
44 -
45 -Ernest Moniz (U.S. Secretary of Energy), Interviewed by David Biello, Accelerated Innovation Is the Ultimate Solution to Climate Change, Scientific American, 12/11/15, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/accelerated-innovation-is-the-ultimate-solution-to-climate-change/. NS
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47 -PARIS—From "clean coal" evangelists to solar power enthusiasts, most experts at the U.N. climate talks here agree that solving climate change means transforming how the world produces and uses energy—and as quickly as possible. Such a transformation would be unprecedented. It would require enormous investments. To help make it happen, the U.S. Department of Energy, which for decades has spent billions of dollars to develop and deploy advanced energy technologies (not always clean), will play a major role in the new "Mission Innovation." The initiative is an effort announced by 20 major countries at the COP 21 negotiations here to significantly accelerate clean-energy improvements. On December 9, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz sat down with Scientific American to explain how innovation and transformation might be sped up to meet the climate challenge, which requires a world without carbon dioxide pollution, soon. An edited transcript of the interview follows. How do we get to 80 percent cuts in CO2 emissions in 35 years, the Obama administration's long-term goal? And beyond that, to meet a Paris deal that might even require "zero carbon" by then. Obviously, innovation is going to be central. We're very pleased that our French hosts put innovation on the front burner: having Innovation Day, following Energy Day. And of course, the announcement on the very first day by 20 countries, including Pres. Obama, French Pres. Hollande, India Prime Minister Modi and others, of Mission Innovation. Then the Bill Gates announcement on the parallel Breakthrough Energy Coalition initiative. There is no question that the world now understands that innovation is the core to meet the INDCs national climate action plans, known as "intended nationally determined contributions". We've had a lot of cost reduction and innovation and deployment increases. That virtuous cycle has put us in a pretty good spot to meet a 10-year horizon, maybe a 15-year horizon. For sure, as we go to the longer time periods and extraordinarily low levels of greenhouse gas emissions being discussed, we're going to have to keep that going. I just came from a meeting of the Mission Innovation countries. There is a tremendous amount of enthusiasm. The resonance of the Mission Innovation agenda was so great because it largely fits with the directions that so many countries were going in. It's crystallized that—given that a very explicit framework. We are the dog that caught the car. And now we're laughs figuring out what to do with the car. Some people argue that we can meet the goal with the technology we already have, whether it be CO2 capture and storage for fossil fuels and nuclear power or more renewables or all of the above, to use a phrase. Others say we really need a breakthrough. You're on the breakthrough side? In some sense, the answer is yes. What we're talking about is this cycle of innovation, deployment, cost reduction. They all go hand in hand. We have seen that explicitly in the last six years. Continued cost reduction in clean technologies is going to be important. And new enabling technologies are going to be important. So, for example, with wind and solar, we still are not at the point where we can have a large scale-up of energy storage. We are still not at the stage where we really have incorporated information technology, like computers and the Internet extensively into the energy infrastructure in the way we're going to need. We also have qualitatively new directions to go in. One is the Makani flying wind turbines. Or now the Google X flying wind turbine; it’s so novel that we don't understand exactly how it could have a big, major transformative impact. But it sure looks like it would if it became a widespread technology.
48 -
49 -Warming leads to extinction – multiple scenarios prove. Roberts ‘13
50 -David Roberts - staff writer for Grist. “If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention.” Grist. January 10, 2013. http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/ JJN
51 -There was recently another one of those (numbingly familiar) internet tizzies wherein someone trolls environmentalists for being “alarmist” and environmentalists get mad and the troll says “why are you being so defensive?” and everybody clicks, clicks, clicks. I have no desire to dance that dismal do-si-do again. But it is worth noting that I find the notion of “alarmism” in regard to climate change almost surreal. I barely know what to make of it. So in the name of getting our bearings, let’s review a few things we know. We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent World Bank review of the science reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems. my emphasis Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6 degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade. Take all that in, sit with it for a while, and then tell me what it could mean to be an “alarmist” in this context. What level of alarm is adequate?
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54 -
55 -Controls the I/L to econ in adv 1 is diversity, title IX independently solves.
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57 -
58 -Case
59 -
60 -US Econ high now. Means no collapse. Irwin 2/15
61 -Neil Irwin, 2-15-2017, "While We’re Distracted by the Drama, the Economy Seems to Be Taking Off," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/upshot/us-economy-shows-more-signs-of-heating-up.html MG
62 -You could be forgiven for not noticing it, but the United States economy is gaining momentum. It may not be as dramatic as the torrent of political news out of Washington; an improving economy, after all, announces itself through a series of data releases that are just a little bit better than people were expecting. But that’s exactly what has happened. In consumer spending, the job market and manufacturing, the economy seems to be enjoying consistent, broad-based growth to start the year. There could always be a setback, of course, but the momentum is almost uniformly positive as the Trump era gets underway. Some of the factors at work may turn out to be temporary. Energy prices were near recent lows a year ago, and their recovery since has meant oil exploration and related fields are recovering. Similarly, the effects of a steep run-up in the value of the dollar from 2014 to early 2015 have now worked their way through the economy and aren’t holding back manufacturing the way they once were. An unusually warm winter is probably a factor in some of the good numbers, as people who in a normal year would have hunkered down amid snowstorms instead went shopping. But the positive tenor of the latest data has been building for months, and includes some data sets that shouldn’t be too affected by the weather. Think of the numbers released Wednesday and Thursday as the latest strong signals, not in isolation. Retail sales rose 0.4 percent in January, the Commerce Department said, and a booming 0.8 percent when volatile auto sales are excluded. American consumers are powering ahead in the eighth year of the expansion. Continue reading the main story The Consumer Price Index rose 0.6 percent, the Labor Department said; even excluding volatile food and energy, it was up 0.3 percent. The index is now up 2.3 percent over the last year excluding food and energy, suggesting that inflation is now in the ballpark of the 2 percent mark that the Federal Reserve aims for (the Fed focuses on a different inflation number that still shows readings below 2 percent). And the number of permits issued for new housing units rose 4.6 percent in January, the Census Bureau said Thursday, and is up 8.2 percent from a year ago, as the housing recovery kicks into a higher gear. The number of housing units started fell slightly in January, but November and December numbers were revised higher. While overall industrial production fell 0.3 percent in January, according to new Fed data, that was only because the warm winter depressed energy demand and thus output by utilities. Manufacturing output rose 0.5 percent. To cap off a day of good data pointing to an economic surge, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York said its survey of business activity soared to its highest level in two years. This all continues a recent theme. The economy added 227,000 jobs in January despite an unemployment rate that is already low. The number of people filing new claims for jobless benefits each week keeps hitting lows not seen since the 1970s. Photo Shoppers have continued to buy, which has kept the American economy moving. Credit Steve Griffin/The Salt Lake Tribune, via Associated Press The improving data — and particularly the uptick in inflation — does create a puzzle for the Federal Reserve. In testimony this week, the Fed’s chairwoman, Janet Yellen, made clear that an interest rate increase was on the way, though she left ambiguity on whether it would happen at the Fed’s March meeting or later in the spring or summer. If the Fed indeed raises interest rates this spring in an effort to keep the economy from overheating and inflation from taking off, it will be the third rise since December 2015 — but would signal that a faster pace of rate increases was on tap. On one hand, the Fed’s policies work with a lag, so it must act with an eye toward where the economy is going, not where it has been. On the other, after years of trying to slog out of a deep recession, Ms. Yellen and her colleagues don’t want to act prematurely and stop the expansion in its tracks.“Waiting too long” to raise rates, Ms. Yellen told Congress this week, would be unwise because it might require the Fed “to eventually raise rates rapidly, which could risk disrupting financial markets and pushing the economy into recession.” The stock market has reached new highs in recent days based on a mix of positive economic data and optimism that the Trump administration will bring business tax cuts and profit-friendly deregulation. Granted, a trade war or other disruptions could be damaging, and markets could turn quickly if some of the anticipated goodies don’t materialize from Washington. But the steady flow of improving economic data is a reminder that things are looking pretty good for 2017 if President Trump and Ms. Yellen can avoid messing it up.
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64 -
65 -The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84
66 -Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE
67 -The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms
EntryDate
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1 -2017-02-19 16:43:24.0
Judge
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1 -Jack Coyle
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1 -Kent Denver AA
ParentRound
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1 -29
Round
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1 -4
Team
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
Title
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1 -Berkeley R4 NC
Tournament
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1 -Berkeley
Caselist.CitesClass[30]
Cites
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1 -Shell General
2 -Neoliberalism is a mafia protection racket – it defunds schools of private funding and makes them come to corporations for funding. This logic structures what speech and knowledge are free in the first place. The aff misdiagnoses the problem and lets neoliberalism slip through the cracks. Bagakis 11/15/16
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4 -Gus Bagakis retired philosophy instructor at San Francisco State University and author of "Seeing Through The System: The Invisible Class Struggle in America," October 15, 2016 “Neoliberalism's Decades-Long Attack on Public Universities”
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6 -One aspect of the project of neoliberalism was to reshape the population's understanding of the purpose of public institutions, such as schools and universities, to fit the corporate model. This transformation was part of a larger cultural shift that began in the '70s and '80s, when policy-makers started to see higher education more as a private (rather than public) good.¶ The plan to transform the higher education system to meet the needs of neoliberalism can be most clearly seen in a memo sent by Lewis Powell, a future member of the Supreme Court, to the US Chamber of Commerce in 1971. The memo was a response to some setbacks that befell the business community, ranging from government regulations on the environment to occupational safety and consumer protection laws. The memo presented a framework for the conservative reaction.¶ Powell stated:¶ One of the bewildering paradoxes of our time is the extent to which the enterprise system tolerates, if not participates in, its own destruction.¶ The campuses from which much of the criticism emanates are supported by (i) tax funds generated largely from American business, and (ii) contributions from capital funds controlled or generated by American business. The boards of trustees of our universities overwhelmingly are composed of men and women who are leaders in the system.¶ Further, he argued that¶ ... it is essential that spokesmen for the enterprise system ~-~- at all levels and at every opportunity ~-~- be far more aggressive than in the past ... There should be no hesitation to attack the Naders, the Marcuses and others who openly seek destruction of the system. There should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all political arenas for support of the enterprise system. Nor should there be reluctance to penalize politically those who oppose it.¶ The Powell memo's plan was to: a) defund public higher education; b) then "save" the universities with ideologically focused corporate funding friendly to "free enterprise;" c) turn universities into corporations; and d) turn the students into consumers who became educated labor products.¶ Neoliberal Plan for Defunding Universities ¶ States provide much of the funds for higher education but need to balance their budgets. So when tax revenues fall, higher education suffers, since it is a lower priority than Medicare, prisons and K-12 education. In addition, large corporations often pay little or no state income tax in states where they have large operations. In a 2011 report, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities concluded that at least 46 states have imposed cuts in the funding of higher education.¶ The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) ~-~- a nationwide association of state legislators and corporations ~-~- best expressed the neoliberal perspective. It successfully lobbied both the states and the federal government to reduce corporate taxes and, in effect, deprive public universities of the state and federal funds they needed.¶ In an Americans for Tax Fairness fact sheet on corporate tax rates, we can see that:¶ The corporate share of federal tax revenue has dropped by two-thirds in 60 years.¶ General Electric, Boeing, Verizon and 23 other profitable Fortune 500 firms paid no federal income taxes.¶ US corporations dodge $90 billion a year in income taxes.¶ US corporations officially hold $2.1 trillion in profits offshore.¶ Tax avoidance, plus lobbying that reduced corporate taxes, diminished the revenue for social programs, especially education. This reduced funding was coordinated with a public relations campaign claiming that public schools were failing, and that they should be privatized and would be improved if they were turned into profit-making ventures. The project is already running for K-12 education with the charter school movement, and now it's being used in higher education, as federal and state governments have gradually reduced funding.¶ The least discussed reason for reduced state revenue for social programs is our ever-growing defense budget. The Pentagon spends more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare and safety. Even prior to the arrival of neoliberalism, military adventures drained money from the social budget. In 1935, Gen. Smedley Butler wrote a book titled, War Is a Racket, in which he exposed greedy profit-making corporations as instigators of imperialism and war. In 1961, President Eisenhower warned of the military industrial complex as a hidden force in US politics. But the military budget is higher today than at any point since the Eisenhower administration.¶ We now have a new neoliberal-inspired military industrial complex consisting of companies, agencies, militarized policing, hidden budgets, a "deep state," private mercenaries and lobbyists that make Eisenhower's warning mild by comparison. Our budget priorities keep the country on a war footing, and our economy allows for military and homeland departments to be virtually untouchable. The current excuse for funds is "terrorism," but under neoliberalism, the actual purpose is to control the world's resources for American capitalism and to stop other countries from competing with us. As Colonel Wilkerson, echoing general Butler, stated recently: "We've privatized the ultimate public function: war ... In many respects it is now private interests that benefit most from our use of military force." A few universities are beneficiaries of war spending through their research for the war machine, but most are losers due to the financial and educational effects of the loss of funding, while the war machine grows.¶ "Saving" Defunded Universities With Corporate Funding¶ A partial replacement for the loss of public funds comes from corporate and philanthropic "gifts" and industry contracts for universities. Groups of conservative millionaires like the Koch brothers have created institutions to push the corporate agenda. They have infiltrated universities and introduced the neoliberal worldview through think tanks and programs designed to give "assistance" to those institutions that would accept their money and programs. These groups, with the combined help of the corporate controlled press and a sophisticated public relations campaign, eased the transition to the corporatization of universities.¶ Turning Universities Into Corporations¶ A 2014 Institute for Policy Studies report finds that the outcome of treating education as a commodity has led to universities mimicking business models. Presidents, chief executives and a layer of bureaucrats earning excessive salaries were established, while the earnings of the faculty declined, largely because tenured and tenure-track faculty were replaced by adjuncts (part-time faculty) and temporary faculty. Instead of giving primary focus to education, scholarship and research, colleges and universities began marketing themselves as products worth purchasing by the consumer. Science and humanities faculty were encouraged to become entrepreneurs and seek ways to profit directly from their intellectual and technical pursuits.¶ Mark Yudof, former president of the University of California, conceded that the university needed to stop viewing itself as a public institution and consider itself a "hybrid" university, bridging the divide between private and public institutions. In a time of scarce resources, privatization has emerged as a potential replacement for the historic model of community support of public universities. The danger is that when corporations fund universities, they get influence over studies and analysis produced by universities, as well as influence over the perspectives and career paths of large numbers of students. They also get use of vast resources for private gain and tax breaks associated with making donations.¶ Students as Consumers and Educated Labor Products¶ Fifty years ago, students often pursued their favorite high school subjects in college, assuming that the degree itself would guarantee a job. Not so today, as living expenses and tuition have risen. Students and their families paying the bill see themselves more as consumers of a commodity rather than engaging in a learning process. Because there is no guarantee of a good job after graduation, universities increasingly connect learning with the skills needed for the hard-to-enter job force. Education more and more becomes job training, and students become educated labor products.¶ By ensuring the need for outside sources of funding, neoliberalism set the context that led to the growth of tuition. When the federal government opened its student loan service to profit-making corporations, profit dominated. The privatized loan industry, through predatory lending schemes, offered loans to all students ~-~- even to those who sometimes could not afford them. Their profit motive, combined with the laws passed by a highly lobbied Congress, eventually made the $1.3 trillion student debt the worst kind of debt for students, but the best for banks and debt collectors. Currently, all involved in the student loan industry make money from student debt: banks, private investors and even the federal government. This action has led to the rise of for-profit colleges whose goal was often to exploit the poor who couldn't afford to enter higher education in the first place. And finally, as Kenneth Saltman pointed out, "Shifting the costs of higher education onto students represents a kind of debt spending by youth to fund the military and corporations."¶ Resisting Neoliberalism¶ Even though neoliberalism is in decline due to the 2008 depression and weak recovery, its values and accomplishments have staying power. By using rhetoric like "individual freedom," "liberty," "personal responsibility," "privatization" and the "free market," it was able to undo much of the New Deal and restore corporate power, and in the case of higher education, be responsible for the rise in tuitions and decline in educational quality.¶ The neoliberal plan for public universities is to defund, then refund with strings attached, corporatize them into profit-makers, and turn the students into educated labor products that would fit into the economy. Its effects are most clearly expressed by Grover Norquist's quote about government: "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub." Neoliberalism doesn't want to abolish universities; it simply wants to turn them into profitable corporations that will maintain and promote the neoliberal version of capitalism.
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8 -Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
9 - ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
10 -Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system ~-~- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return.
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12 -The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
13 -Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
14 -¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets.
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16 -The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan.
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18 -First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
19 -(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
20 -RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.
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22 -DA Shell
23 -Title IX investigations are increasing. Kingiade 16.
24 -Tyler Kingkade. “There Are Far More Title IX Investigations Of Colleges Than Most People Know”. Huffington Post. June 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d AGM
25 -The growing backlog of federal Title IX investigations into colleges and universities has now topped 300, but many people, including students at the schools under scrutiny, aren’t aware of those reviews. As of Wednesday, there were 246 ongoing investigations by the U.S. Department of Education into how 195 colleges and universities handle sexual assault reports under the gender equity law. A Freedom of Information Act request by The Huffington Post revealed another 68 Title IX investigations into how 61 colleges handle sexual harassment cases. This puts the total number of Title IX investigations officially dealing with sexual harassment at 315. (Under civil rights statutes, sexual assault is defined as an extreme form of sexual harassment.) But dozens of those Title IX reviews receive no publicity because they don’t specifically deal with sexual assault. If a school is being investigated for allegedly mishandling harassment cases, but not reports of assault, it doesn’t appear on the list regularly given to reporters by the Education Department. Major educational institutions — including New York University, the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Georgia State University, Florida AandM University, Rutgers University, Howard University, the University of Oklahoma, Kent State University and the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse — have escaped public scrutiny because Title IX investigations into their actions haven’t been highlighted by the government or the schools themselves.SUNY Broome Community College is under three investigations that haven’t been previously disclosed. The Education Department has no plans to regularly issue a list of cases involving sexual harassment only, an official told HuffPost.
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27 -AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04
28 -Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809.
29 -In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may¶ make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amend-¶ ment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not¶ arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple liti-¶ gants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same¶ opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be¶ in active coordination with each other - as with the multiple chal-¶ lenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First¶ Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer¶ source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amend-¶ ment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity¶ of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect160 such¶ that the claims no longer appear tenuous. The combination of, say,¶ four scarcely plausible but simultaneous court challenges and twenty¶ scarcely plausible public claims of a First Amendment problem could make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible¶ than they actually are.161 From the standpoint of an interest group¶ seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the sup-¶ port of other interest groups,162 winning is better than losing publicly,¶ but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.¶ Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility,¶ the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the¶ multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is re-¶ ferred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in¶ newsroom jargon as "legs." Interestingly, this phenomenon sometimes¶ survives even authoritative rejection of the claim. With respect to the¶ argument that hostile-environment sexual harassment enforcement has¶ serious First Amendment implications, for example, neither the Su-¶ preme Court's rejection of this argument in dicta in R.A. V v. City of¶ St. Paul163 nor the Court's silent dismissal of the same claim in Harris¶ v. Forklift Systems, Inc.164 has slowed the momentum of those who¶ would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostile-¶ environment sexual harassment law.'65 Similarly, decades of judicial¶ rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially re-¶ stricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely dis-¶ couraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme¶ Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroftl66 can be considered not a¶ defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into¶ the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant cer-¶ tiorari, in part to determine "whether ... the extension of existing and¶ future copyrights violates the First Amendment;"'67 and the seven-¶ Justice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,'68 acknowledged¶ that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.
30 -Title IX is currently effective against harassment – this dramatically increases access to higher education. Musil 07
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32 -Caryn Musil, Scaling the Ivory Towers, MS Magazine Fall 2007: The Triumphs of Title IX, http://www.feminist.org/education/TriumphsOfTitleIX.pdf. NS
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34 -The contrast between her academic landscape and mine could not be more dramatic. And Title IX is the primary cause for the seismic shifts. The law’s impact has been elemental. Not only has it helped eliminate blatant discriminatory practices across educational institutions, but it has helped root out subtler methods of holding women back by closing the gap between men’s and women’s financial aid packages, improving housing opportunities for women students (a lack of women’s dorms was once used to restrict women’s admissions) and combating sexual harassment. Just before Title IX was signed into law, women were underrepresented as undergraduates, at just over 40 percent of all students. And it wasn’t that easy for them to get into those ivied halls. Young women typically had to make higher grades and SAT scores than young men to gain college admission, and often faced quotas limiting the number of women admitted. Once they got on campus, there were few women role models—less than one in five faculty members were women, and a mere 3 percent of college presidents. In some fields, even the women students were barely visible: About 1 percent of master’s degrees in engineering, 1 percent of doctoral dental degrees, and under 2 percent of master’s degrees in mathematics were awarded to women in 1970. The barriers were formidable, and sex discrimination unashamedly open and normative. In the years since Title IX, however, all of those numbers have risen tremendously. Take college enrollment, for starters: By 2005, women students comprised almost three out of five undergraduates, with some of this growth due to increased access for women of color (who have more than doubled their share of degrees since 1977, when they earned just over 10 per- cent). Women have not simply in- creased their numbers in academia, though: They have also moved into fields formerly dominated by men, particularly business and the sciences (see chart on page 45). These are the sorts of fields that lead women into higher-paying jobs after graduation. Bucking the rising trend, however, are computer and information sci- ence, where numbers peaked in 1984 before declining, and engineering and engineering technologies, in which the numbers of women grew and then leveled off. Certain fields have continued to be women-dominant from 1980 until 2005—health professions other than physicians and related inical sciences (currently more than 86 percent women) and education (about 79 percent women), but this isn’t the best news for economic equity, since wages tend to stay low in fields with few men. In graduate and professional schools, too, young women have enjoyed far greater access thanks to Title IX. In 1970, women earned only 14 percent of doctoral degrees, but today earn nearly half. Yet women’s doctorates are still not distributed evenly across disciplines: They range from a low of about 19 percent in engineering and engineering technologies to a high of about 71 per- cent in psychology. The most dramatic gains are in the professional schools. In 1971, just about 1 of 100 dental school graduates were women, while in 2005 that number grew nearly fortyfold. In medical schools the numbers jumped from less than 10 percent to nearly 50 percent, and law school numbers from about 7 percent to nearly 49 percent. There’s been quite a psychological benefit, too. As my older daughter, Rebecca, says of her experience at New York University Law School, “Women were more than half of the students, so sex discrimination was not something we ever worried about. ... It’s not that we don’t think about equality, but that we don’t have to think about it as much because of what’s already been done.” Armed with their professional degrees in medicine and law, women have entered those professions at steadily increasing rates. Yet their numbers—and in law firms, their advancement—still lag behind. In 2006, women made up 33 percent of lawyers but just 16 percent of partners in law firms. Similarly, in medicine only 27 percent of doctors are women, and they’re unevenly spread across specialties, the top three choices being internal medicine, pediatrics and general family medicine. The news is also mixed about women in academic leadership. By 1986 the number of women college presidents had tripled from 1970 to almost 10 percent, and by 2006 reached 23 percent, with a large proportion serving as presi- dents of community colleges. But most of the progress occurred between 1986 and 2001 and now has slowed considerably. Furthermore, today’s presidents re- main much less diverse by race, gender and ethnicity than the students, faculty or administrators who report to them: Only 4 percent of the respondents in a recent survey of college presidents identified as “minority women.” Women also tend to be more qualified and make more sacrifices than men in order to gain leadership; they’re far less likely than men presidents to be married and have children, and significantly more likely to hold an advanced degree. On faculties, women have increased across every rank but continue to move up more slowly than men. In 2006 they accounted for nearly 40 percent of full- time faculty and nearly 50 percent of part-timers. Young women benefit extraordinarily from all these women role models. As my daughter Emily says, “Women professors looked out for me the whole time ... and that is where I got my career counseling.” But women professors are not employed equally across institutional types—they’re just over half the faculty at institutions offering associate degrees, but only 34 percent at doctoral institutions. While women are increasing their numbers in tenure-track positions (nearly 45 percent), they still face the accumulated disad-vantages of sex discrimination over time and represent only about 31 per- cent of currently tenured faculty. “People change faster and more easily than institutions,” explains Yolanda T. Moses, associate vice chancellor for diversity at the University of California, Riverside. While the most blatant violations have been eliminated, Moses argues that the next level of work is even more complicated: “Systems can undermine progress ... and we need to unearth those behaviors that sabotage even our best intentions.” A search committee in physics or engineering, for example, may profess to be seeking more women, but make no efforts to break out of all-men, frequently all- white, networks to identify strong women candidates. These are the sorts of challenges that still remain, yet Title IX has gone a long way toward making campuses more hospitable. By offering legal protection from hostile work and learning environments, it helped draw attention to sexism in the classroom and opened the door for change. The fields of science, tech- nology, engineering and math were among the most chilly toward women, so Title IX helped usher in a period of serious self-study that has led to the adoption of more women-friendly teaching practices and programs, and thus a rise in women taking courses formerly dominated by men.
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36 -Gender equality in higher education and the workforce is key to climate science and innovation. Gender Summit 13
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38 -Gender Summit 3 — North America, Diversity Fueling Excellence in Research and Innovation:
39 -Conference Report, 11/13/13, https://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/activities/gendersummit/GS3-ConfReport.pdf. NS
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41 -Ms. Jarrett noted that gender equality in STEM is not just a women's issue, but one that affects all scientists and researchers. The incorporation of the gender dimension into research and innovation benefits everyone. Diversity in STEM brings innovation; it drives science forward and benefits society as a whole. She pointed out that GS3 is more than just about women: it is about our societies and tapping into the power of women to unlock the full potential of global communities. If we truly want to champion innovation and expand the capacity for discovery, everyone has to be involved. President Obama’s administration is committed to ensuring that our women and girls are in a position to lead in the future. The President has been quoted as saying, "When women succeed, nations are safer, more secure and more prosperous.”  Ralph Cicerone, PhD President, US National Academy of Sciences and Chair, National Research Council, USA emphasized (a) the importance of utilizing the full capacity of creative, talented and dedicated people; (b) the collective responsibility for ensuring that women scientists and engineers flourish and that they are supported and encouraged; and (c) the need to confront existing obstacles along their career paths. He stated that the Academy remains committed to enhancing gender inclusion by supporting the creation of networks around the world, including Africa, Latin America and Europe. Establishing these networks and collaborations promotes the creation of goals and strategies for implementation and an awareness of the efforts of others that can bring value to our own. To underscore the importance of gender incorporation within global research and development, former NSF Director Subra Suresh, PhD President, Carnegie Mellon University, USA stated that diversity in education and the workplace accelerates innovation because people have different life experiences that allow them to address the same issue from different vantage points. Diversity fostering global research is becoming more popular. In May 2012 the Global Research Council was established at NSF as a virtual organization to collectively engage in the development of principles governing scientific merit review, research integrity, pathways for open access to publications and data and mobility of researchers. Nearly 100 countries participated in the most recent meeting where the topics included the mobility of researchers, as well as a discussion of strategic planning for collective action in the near future. Wanda E. Ward, PhD Head, Office of International and Integrative Activities, National Science Foundation, USA posited that North America stood ready to further integrate and leverage the gender dimension in forging new and transformative discoveries and in fostering a diverse and inclusive scientific community. Importantly, the greater inclusion of biological sex and gender considerations in disciplinary and interdisciplinary frameworks is significant as all nations increase their investments in science and technology. Working collaboratively to ensure that scientific research is beneficial to women and men is a transformative moment for the shifting landscape of the scientific enterprise. This time of collective commitment for gender considerations in science and engineering will be beneficial to society at large as North America embraces the new opportunities of the shifting landscape of science innovation marked by emerging fields of science and the demographic changes of the scientific workforce. Attention was given to the fact that the more than 650 registrants comprised a diverse group of women and men interested in women’s issues, as well as diversity within the group of women who represent every stage of STEM workforce development, advancement and success. Dr. Ward’s presentation highlighted the NSF’s gender considerations in research design and analysis, as well as the Foundation’s emphasis on gender equity in the STEM workforce. This Summit was considered exemplary for engaging women of all backgrounds in imagining future work at the frontiers of science and in realizing their full potential in the scientific enterprise. Additionally, pending the availability of funding, NSF is pursuing four major areas for multinational collaboration: o discovery/frontier research for knowledge generation and translation, o human capacity/talent development and advancement, o institutional transformation in higher education systems and practices and o equity in stewardship activities, such as the merit review process, evaluation and assessment. Across the participating partners, there are compelling examples of individual contributions of women in basic research, as well as in the advancement of applied research within a gender- focused context. There are also success stories of policy changes and transformative practices emanating from the leadership, mentoring and advocacy roles of well-known women scientists and engineers. The shared commitment for framing a multi-national strategy was continued with input from the European Commission, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the National Council on Science and Technology of Mexico, and the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. Europe is working aggressively to change the workforce environment by encouraging more females to study science and engineering and to go on to research careers.  MarieGeoghegan-Quinn Commissioner of Research, Innovation and Science, European Commission stressed that because gender issues are not unique to Europe, it is important to tackle issues jointly. She stated that we need all of our talented scientists working toward research and innovative efforts and that there is no tradeoff between promoting gender equity and excellence in science. She expressed much interest in collaborating with North America. She stressed that it is logical, for both scientific and economic reasons, to work collaboratively to tackle common challenges. She also highlighted Horizon 2020, Europe’s new research funding program, which will champion gender equality in three ways: integrating the gender dimension into funded programs, encouraging balanced participation of men and women on funded research teams and ensuring gender balance in advisory groups and in teams that evaluate applications for funding.  Oldřich Vlasák Vice-President of the European Parliament stressed the importance of (a) research and development in future economic growth and (b) investing effectively, given the frequent scarcity of financial and human resources to support research. He stated that both the US and Europe need to invest more and do a better job with regard to human capital: “we can’t afford to waste research talent, which means we should not discourage any part of the population from participating in research and innovation.” Quoting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, he said that “no team can ever win if half of its players are on the bench.” Measures to ensure gender equality should be considered an investment in future economic growth, rather than a cost. He stated that “what we pay today will generate returns for the economy as a whole in the medium- and long-term by reducing the ineffectiveness associated with inequality.” The gender imbalances are not a self-correcting phenomenon, and Vlasák encouraged discussions during the third Gender Summit to view these issues as a matter of research potential and social justice. Remarks by Dominique Ristori Director General, European Commission Directorate General Joint Research Council focused on the importance of science and society, the latest developments in Europe’s gender equality policy and the European interest in a gender focused multi-national collaboration. He described the motivation and challenges for global research and innovation in the context of climate change, clean energy and the improved health and well-being of all citizens. Ensuring gender balance is a necessary condition for the achievement of the objective of Europe’s 2020 strategy for 75 employment, an objective that cannot be reached without strong commitment to gender equality, he stated.
42 -
43 -Climate innovations are the primary key to solve warming. Moniz 15
44 -
45 -Ernest Moniz (U.S. Secretary of Energy), Interviewed by David Biello, Accelerated Innovation Is the Ultimate Solution to Climate Change, Scientific American, 12/11/15, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/accelerated-innovation-is-the-ultimate-solution-to-climate-change/. NS
46 -
47 -PARIS—From "clean coal" evangelists to solar power enthusiasts, most experts at the U.N. climate talks here agree that solving climate change means transforming how the world produces and uses energy—and as quickly as possible. Such a transformation would be unprecedented. It would require enormous investments. To help make it happen, the U.S. Department of Energy, which for decades has spent billions of dollars to develop and deploy advanced energy technologies (not always clean), will play a major role in the new "Mission Innovation." The initiative is an effort announced by 20 major countries at the COP 21 negotiations here to significantly accelerate clean-energy improvements. On December 9, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz sat down with Scientific American to explain how innovation and transformation might be sped up to meet the climate challenge, which requires a world without carbon dioxide pollution, soon. An edited transcript of the interview follows. How do we get to 80 percent cuts in CO2 emissions in 35 years, the Obama administration's long-term goal? And beyond that, to meet a Paris deal that might even require "zero carbon" by then. Obviously, innovation is going to be central. We're very pleased that our French hosts put innovation on the front burner: having Innovation Day, following Energy Day. And of course, the announcement on the very first day by 20 countries, including Pres. Obama, French Pres. Hollande, India Prime Minister Modi and others, of Mission Innovation. Then the Bill Gates announcement on the parallel Breakthrough Energy Coalition initiative. There is no question that the world now understands that innovation is the core to meet the INDCs national climate action plans, known as "intended nationally determined contributions". We've had a lot of cost reduction and innovation and deployment increases. That virtuous cycle has put us in a pretty good spot to meet a 10-year horizon, maybe a 15-year horizon. For sure, as we go to the longer time periods and extraordinarily low levels of greenhouse gas emissions being discussed, we're going to have to keep that going. I just came from a meeting of the Mission Innovation countries. There is a tremendous amount of enthusiasm. The resonance of the Mission Innovation agenda was so great because it largely fits with the directions that so many countries were going in. It's crystallized that—given that a very explicit framework. We are the dog that caught the car. And now we're laughs figuring out what to do with the car. Some people argue that we can meet the goal with the technology we already have, whether it be CO2 capture and storage for fossil fuels and nuclear power or more renewables or all of the above, to use a phrase. Others say we really need a breakthrough. You're on the breakthrough side? In some sense, the answer is yes. What we're talking about is this cycle of innovation, deployment, cost reduction. They all go hand in hand. We have seen that explicitly in the last six years. Continued cost reduction in clean technologies is going to be important. And new enabling technologies are going to be important. So, for example, with wind and solar, we still are not at the point where we can have a large scale-up of energy storage. We are still not at the stage where we really have incorporated information technology, like computers and the Internet extensively into the energy infrastructure in the way we're going to need. We also have qualitatively new directions to go in. One is the Makani flying wind turbines. Or now the Google X flying wind turbine; it’s so novel that we don't understand exactly how it could have a big, major transformative impact. But it sure looks like it would if it became a widespread technology.
48 -
49 -Warming leads to extinction – multiple scenarios prove. Roberts ‘13
50 -David Roberts - staff writer for Grist. “If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention.” Grist. January 10, 2013. http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/ JJN
51 -There was recently another one of those (numbingly familiar) internet tizzies wherein someone trolls environmentalists for being “alarmist” and environmentalists get mad and the troll says “why are you being so defensive?” and everybody clicks, clicks, clicks. I have no desire to dance that dismal do-si-do again. But it is worth noting that I find the notion of “alarmism” in regard to climate change almost surreal. I barely know what to make of it. So in the name of getting our bearings, let’s review a few things we know. We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent World Bank review of the science reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems. my emphasis Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6 degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade. Take all that in, sit with it for a while, and then tell me what it could mean to be an “alarmist” in this context. What level of alarm is adequate?
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53 -
54 -
55 -Case
56 -The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84
57 -Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE
58 -The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms
59 -
60 -Arguing minorities should engage in a dialogue with aggressors is rooted in paternalism, ineffective, and puts the oppressed further at risk. Delgado 94.
61 -Richard Delgado. David H. Yun. “Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: AN Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation”. California Law Review. July 1994. AGM
62 -Defenders of the First Amendment sometimes argue that minorities should talk back to the aggressor. .FNSS Nat Hentoff, for example, writes that antiracism rules teach black people to depend on whites for protection, while talking back clears the air, emphasizes selfireliance, and strengthens one’s self-image as an active agent in charge of one’s own destiny. FN86 The "talking back" solution to campus racism draws force from the First Amendment principle of "more speech,” according to which additional dialogue is always a preferred response to speech that some find troubling. FN 87 '884 Proponents of this approach oppose hate speech rules, then, not so much because they limit speech, but because they believe that it is good for minorities to learn to speak out. A few go on to offer another reason: that a minority who speaks out will be able to educate the speaker who has uttered a racially hurtful remark. FN88 Racism, they hold, is the product of ignorance and fear. If a victim of racist hate speech takes the time to explain matters, he or she may succeed in altering the speaker’s perception so that the speaker will no longer utter racist remarks. FN89 How valid is this argument? Like many paternalistic arguments, it is offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith. In the nature of paternalism, those who make the argument are in a position of power, and therefore believe themselves able to make things so merely by asserting them as true. FN90 They rarely offer empirical proof of their claims, because none is needed. The social world is as they say because it is their world: they created it that way. FN91 In reality, those who hurl racial epithets do so because they feel empowered to do so. FN92 Indeed, their principal objective is to reassert and reinscribe that power. One who talks back is perceived as issuing a direct challenge to that power. The action is seen as outrageous, as calling for a forceful response. Often racist remarks are delivered in several-on-one situations, in which responding in kind is foolhardy. FN93 Many highly publicized cases of racial homicide began in just this fashion. A group began badgering a black person. The black person talked back, and paid with his life. FN94 Other racist remarks are delivered in a cowardly fashion, by means of graffiti scrawled on a campus wall late at night or on a poster placed outside of a black student’s dormitory door. FNQS in these situations, more speech is, of course, impossible. 885 Racist speech is rarely a mistake, rarely something that could be corrected or countered by discussion. What would be the answer to ”Nigger, go back to Africa. You don’t belong at the University“? "Sir, you misconceive the situation. Prevailing ethics and constitutional interpretation hold that I, an African American, am an individual of equal dignity and entitled to attend this university in the same manner as others. Now that I have informed you of this, I am sure you will modify your remarks in the future”? FN96 The idea that talking back is safe for the victim or potentially educative for the racist simply does not correspond with reality. it ignores the power dimension to racist remarks, forces minorities to run very real risks, and treats a hateful attempt to force the victim outside the human community as an invitation for discussion.
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1 -2017-02-19 23:10:07.0
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1 -Zohair Madhani
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1 -Mission San Jose JP
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1 -30
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
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1 -Berkeley R5 NC
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1 -Berkeley
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3 -A focus on a priori reason and conceptual abstraction forces oppressed people to divorce themselves from the material conditions caused by whiteness and imagine a world in which whiteness is good. Curry 13
4 -
5 -Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS
6 -
7 -The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is. Whiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist. But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white he experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of his wealth. The white she has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own.
8 -
9 -
10 -And, we should be having a debate about what to do about oppression, not what constitutes oppression – debates are 45 minutes long so endless academic moralizing is circular and gets no where, forgoing the opportunity for real world solutions.
11 -Their philosophy preaches that everyone is equal – this colorblind ideology perpetuates anti blackness under the myth of American liberalism. Curry 13
12 -
13 -Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS
14 -
15 -Despite the rhetorical strategies adopted by both Black and white political theorists which urge Blacks and whites alike to demand Americans to continue their allegiance to the foundational de-racialized ethos of the post-Civil Rights era, the reality of the American racism—its sheer recurring violence against Black people—demands more than symbolic rhetorical allusion. To seriously grasp the reality of racist oppression and the sempiternal machinations of anti-Blackness throughout American society be it in its institutions like the prison industrial complex, its policies like Affirmative action, or its manipulation of Black social degradation and economic disadvantage to support pathological theses about disasters like Katrina or cultural deviance as in the death of Trayvon Martin, Darius Simmons, or Jordan Davis, the study of the matter itself—racism—must be a study of a conceptual disengagement with the myth of racial equality and the “automatic progressivism” of the American liberal project. This disengagement is not simply the refusal to accept the idealism of civil rights myth held beyond the realm of fact, but the disengagement with the illusions of democracy and equality that continue to ignore the role that violence has played and continues to play in the subjugation, incarceration, and vilification of Black life. As Dr. A.J. William Myers reveals in his work groundbreaking work entitled Destructive Impulses, ¶ Until at such time white America (and Black America) is openly willing to confront a historical legacy of its own violence (perpetrated against an American people of color), any venture into and/ or expository on race relations becomes an exercise in futility…As a result, therefore, white violence, confined to the subliminal recesses of the American psyche, continues to prevent the transition necessary for the country to move beyond the idea of race. ¶ In America, Blackness and the racism that continues to condemn those historical racialized peoples is violence—it is the forceful and coercion enclosing of human beings to an inferior social, political, and economic status of which their own humanity exceeds. This dehumanizing relegation of the raced citizen is not a gradual or incremental debasement, but rather the historically immediate condition of inferiority that presents progress to be attainable by the cyclical degrees of physical violence against the racialized population. For these racially oppressed peoples, violence is the permanent fixture of existence in America, since it is the vitiation of their humanity that rationalizes the varying techniques of their cultural erasure, birthing the emergent symbolic associations of degradation that replace their invisibility, and empowering the intentional enforcements of their societal exclusions. In fact, it is precisely this triumvirate that gauges what we take to be the negation of the necessity of revolutionary change~-~-since the raced is taken to be present, as a result of a critical redefining of humanity, integrated into society.
16 -
17 -The aff’s attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff’s epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That’s a voting issue. Leonardo
18 -Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC
19 -
20 -The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies of whiteness. As a perspective, whiteness is historicaly fractured in its apprehension of racial formations. In order to ‘see’ the formation in full view, whites have to mobilize a perspective that begins with racial privilege as a central unit of analysis. Since starting from this point would mean whites engage in a thorough historical understanding of ‘how they came to be’ in a position of power, most whites resist such an undertaking and instead focus on individual merit, exception- alism, or hard work. The act of interpreting the totality of racial formations is an apostasy that white students and educators must undertake but one which does not come easy or without costs. The costs are real because it means whites would have to acknowledge their unearned privileges and disinvest in them. This is a different tack from saying that whites benefit from renouncing their whiteness because it would increase their humanity. Whites would lose many of their perks and privileges. So, the realistic appraisal is that whites do have a lot to lose by committing race treason, not just something to gain by forsaking whiteness. This is the challenge. In his discussion of gender and race, Terry Eagleton (1996) provokes a distinction between identity politics and class relations. He calls class position relational in a way that gender and race are not, because possessing a certain skin color or body configuration does not prevent another person from owning such traits. By contrast, a landless laborer occupies a material position because the gentleman farmer owns the land or property. Eagleton goes on to say that being black does not mean one is of a different species from a white person. Pigmentation is not definitive of a general human experience in the same way that freckle-faced people do not constitute an essentialy different human category. In this, Eagleton exposes the racist and patriarchal imagination by highlighting its contradictions and ilogics. However, his analysis leaves out a more powerful explanation of how racism actualy works. Like most oppressive systems, racism functions through an illogical rationalization process. For instance, the one-drop rule, or the Rule of Hypodescent, demarcates blacks from whites by drawing an artiŽ cial and arbitrary line between them in order both to create more slaves and limit people’s power to achieve whiteness. Thus, the power of whiteness comes precisely from its ability to usurp reason and rational thought, and a purely rationalistic analysis limits our understanding of the way it functions. Despite its contradictions, the contours of racism can be mapped out and analyzed and this is what Cheryl Harris (1995) attempts when she compares whiteness to owning property. First, whiteness becomes property through the objectiŽ cation of African slaves, a process which set the precondition for ‘propertizing’ human life (Harris, 1995, p. 279). Whiteness takes the form of ownership, the deŽ ning attribute of free individ- uals which Africans did not own. Second, through the reification and subsequent hegemony of white people, whiteness is transformed into the common sense that becomes law. As a given right of the individual white person, whiteness can be enjoyed, like any property, by exercising and taking advantage of privileges co-extensive with whiteness. Third, like a house, whiteness can be demarcated and fenced off as a territory of white people which keeps Others out. Thus, caling a white person ‘black’ was enough reason, as late as 1957, to sue for character defamation; the same could not be said of a black person being mistaken for ‘white.’ This was a certain violation of property rights much like breaking into someone’s house. In al, whites became the subjects of property, with Others as its objects. As Charles Mils (1997) explains, the Racial Contract is an agreement to misinter- pret the world as it is. It is the implicit consensus that whites frequently enter into, which accounts for their fragmented understanding of the world as it is racialy structured. When confronted with the reality of racial oppression, according to Hurtado, whites respond with: I wil listen to you, sometimes for the Ž rst time, and wil seem engaged. At critical points in your analysis I wil claim I do not know what you are talking about and wil ask you to elaborate ad nauseam. I wil consistently subvert your efforts at dialogue by claiming ‘we do not speak the same language’. (cited in McLaren et al., 2001, pp. 211–212; italics in original) The frequent detours, evasions, and detractions from the circuits of whiteness cripple our understanding of the racio-economic essence of schools and society. It is a distortion of perfect communication in Habermas’s (1984) sense of it which creates what I cal an altogether ‘ideological speech situation.’ That is, communi- cation is ideological to the extent that the ‘ideal speech situation’ is systematicaly distorted, which is different from saying that it is always a bit distorted. As Hurtado plainly describes, radical communication about the Contract meets apathy and indifference, perhaps a bit predictably. Admitting the reality of white racism would force a river of centuries of pain, denial, and guilt that many people cannot assuage. In several instances, both in coleagues’ courses as wel as mine, white students have expressed their emotions and frustrations through tears when white privilege is confronted. In fact, Rains (1997) has described the same event occurring in her courses. Although it might seem cynical or unfeeling to analyze criticaly such an occurrence, it is important to deploy such a critique in the name of political and pedagogical clarity. It is imperative to address the local moment and ‘be there’ for al students but in slicing through the pathos, one also beneŽ ts from re ection on the moment in its larger, global signiŽ cance. The times when I have confronted this scenario can be described as the honest interrogation of racial power engaged by both white and non-white students. At certain moments, some anger has been expressed, sometimes frustration. In general, the milieu is emotional and politicaly charged. How can it not be? In one particular case, I witnessed a situation where a black student interrogated the issue of racial privilege and questioned a white coleague’s comments for failing to do the same. By the end of the exchange, the white student left the room crying and the discussion halted. In another case, an earnest discussion took place about racism and ways to address it in schools. A white student cried because she felt frustrated and a little helpless about how she comes into the fold of becoming an anti-racist educator. After a minute of pause, students of color returned to the discussion at hand, not breaking their stride. In a third instance, in the midst of discussing the importance of building solidarity between teachers against racism, a white student cries and asks her coleagues to remember that they must stay cohesive and support each other as comrades in struggle. A coleague reports a fourth instance where, during a dialogue about the experiences of women of color, a white woman repeatedly insisted that the real issue was class, not race, because her experiences as a woman were similar to the women of color. When a faculty of color informed her that she was monopolizing the discussion and in the process invalidated the voices of women of color, the white woman cried and was unable to continue. In al these cases, we observed the guilt of whiteness prompting the women to cry in shame. Made to recognize their unearned privileges and confronted in public, they react with tears of admission. Discussing (anti)racism is never easy and is frequently suppressed in mainstream classroom conditions. The establishment of the right conditions is precious but often precarious. In the Ž rst case, we must keep in mind that it was the black student who felt dehumanized and subsequently felt enough courage to express her anger about comments she perceived to be problematic. The act of crying by the white student immediately positioned the black student as the perpetrator of a hurt and erased/deraced the power of her charge. A reversal of sorts had just occurred. The white student earned the other students’ sympathy and the professor folowed her to the halway to comfort her white the black student nursed her anger by herself. Likewise, I could not help but feel for the white student. Upon re ection, an important difference needs to be discussed. In the act of crying, the student attenuated the centuries of hurt and oppression that the black student was trying to relay. In the act of crying, the student transformed racism into a local problem between two people. I couldn’t help feeling that other students in the class thought the black person was both wrong and racist, erasing/deracing the institutional basis of what she had to say. The room’s energy suddenly felt funneled to the white student. Clearly, there are more ‘harmonious’ ways of teaching the topic of race and racism. However, they also often forsake radical critique for feelings. Feelings have to be respected and educators can establish the conditions for radical empathy. That said, anger is also a valid and legitimate feeling; when complemented by clear thought, anger is frighteningly lucid. Thus, a pedagogy of politeness only goes so far before it degrades into the paradox of liberal feel-good solidarity absent of dissent, without which any worthwhile pedagogy becomes a democracy of empty forms. White comfort zones are notorious for tolerating only smal, incremental dozes of racial confrontation (Hunter and Nettles, 1999). This does not suggest that educators procure a hostile environment, but a pedagogical situation that fails to address white racism is arguably already the conduit of hostility. It fragments students’ holistic understanding of their identity development through the ability of whiteness to deform our complete picture of the racial formation. It practices violence on the racialized Other in the name of civility and as long as this is the case, racial progress wil proceed at the snail pace of white racial consciousness. White race traitors and progressive Others shal piece together a whole from the fragmentary pieces that whiteness has created out of this world. The Contract challenges educators of the new millennium to explain the untruth of white perspectives on race, even a century after Du Bois’s initial chalenge. Obviously, this does not mean that whites cannot grasp the Contract; many do, but they cannot accomplish this from the white point of view, a world-view which, according to Gibson, projects a ‘delusional world,’ ‘a racial fantasyland,’ and ‘a consensual halucination’ (cited in Mils, 1997, p. 18). With the rise of globalization, education—which prides itself for inculcating into students knowledge about the real world—struggles to represent the world in the most real way possible. White epistemology can be characterized as fragmentary and fleeting because white liveli- hood depends on this double helix. It is fragmentary because in order for whiteness to maintain its invisibility, or its unmarked status, it must by necessity mistake the world as non-relational or partitioned (Dwyer and Jones, III, 2000). This allows the white psyche to speak of slavery as ‘long ago,’ rather than as a legacy which lives today; it minimizes racism toward non-white immigrants today through a convenient and problematic comparison with white immigrants, like the Irish or Jews. It is also fleeting because it must deny the history of its own genesis and the creation of the Other. It can only be concerned with ‘how things are and not how they got to be that way.’ As a socio-spatial epistemology, whiteness sees the world upside-down. Mils (1997) and I agree when he says: Thus on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologicaly and socialy functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites wil in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made. (p. 18; italics in original) According to Mils, whiteness concerns itself with racial details and misses the totality of the Racial Contract. Like the way it partitions the world according to its own image, whiteness constructs history as separate racial details without coherence. As a result, it fails to provide our students the language to link together California’s Proposition 187 (anti-immigrant), 209 (anti-afŽ rmative action), and 227 (anti-bilin- gualism) as related to white hegemony. With the exception of particular Asian ethnic groups (to which I wil return later), al three legislations limit the rights of students of color. Fortunately, white and non-white activists have countered such measures with unrelenting protests and public organizing because, as Hopson et al. (1998) remind us, ‘Recognizing and valuing language varieties and multiple ways of speaking among students is a precondition to understanding how to teach them’ (p. 5). As a racial epistemology, whiteness is necessarily idealist in order to construct the Other as abstract, rather than concrete. Enslavement, discrimination, and marginalization of the Other work most efficiently when they are constructed as an idea rather than a people. They can be more easily controled, aggregated as the same, or marked as unchanging and constant when textbooks idealize them as inconse- quential to the history and evolution of humankind. In effect, whiteness eggs us on to yoke together different peoples around the globe under the sign of sameness.
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25 -1NC – K
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27 -Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic 92
28 -Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
29 -III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.
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31 -Their notion of the first amendment is colorblind and obscures anti-black violence. Boler 04
32 -Boler, Megan Megan Boler is a Full Professor in the Department of Social Justice Education, at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto.. "All Speech Is Not Free: The Ethics of" Affirmative Action Pedagogy"." Counterpoints 240 (2004): 3-13.
33 -On what basis might one justify an affirmative action pedagogy? The first justifica-¶ tion is forwarded by legal scholars in the area of critical race theory. The authors of¶ Words That Wound (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw, 1993) address the¶ tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The tension arises because,¶ in fact, all people are not equally protected under the law because of the institu-¶ tionalized inequities within our society. This reality complicates the effectiveness¶ of the First Amendment. Scholarship in critical race theory and educational analy-¶ ses document that in recent years, we find incidents of hate speech primarily to be¶ directed at racial, religious, or sexual minorities. Not surprisingly, one finds in turn¶ that invocations of the right to free speech are most often invocations to protect¶ the right of the members of the dominant culture to express their hatred toward¶ members of minority culture. These authors make important legal and historical¶ cases to support their observation that, in practice, while the rhetoric of the First¶ Amendment is a buzz word that makes all of us want to rally for its principle, in¶ practice "the first amendment arms conscious and unconscious racists - Nazis and¶ liberals alike - with a constitutional right to be racist. Racism is just another idea¶ deserving of constitutional protection like all ideas" (Matsuda et al., 1993, p. 15). A¶ scholar from another discipline addresses classroom dynamics and similarly argues¶ that we must "read the appeal to the First Amendment as itself a kind of panic re-¶ sponse in the same order as hate speech itself" (Roof, 1999, p. 45).¶ A second justification for privileging marginalized voices is based on the meas-¶ urement of the psychological effect of hate speech on targeted groups and individ-¶ uals. As one legal scholar explains, hate speech affects its victim in the visceral ex-¶ perience of a "disorienting powerlessness" (Lawrence, 1993, p. 70), an effect¶ achieved because hate speech is comparable to an act of violence. In reaction to¶ hate speech, the target commonly experiences a "state of semishock," nausea, and dizziness, and an inability to articulate a response. This scholar gives an example of a student who is white and gay. The student reports that in an instance where he¶ was called "faggot" he experienced all of the above symptoms. However, when he¶ was called "honky," he did not experience the disorienting powerlessness. As the¶ scholar remarks, "the context of the power relationships in which the speech takes¶ place, and the connection to violence must be considered as we decide how best to¶ foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our communities" (Lawrence, 1993,¶ p. 70).¶ These considerations bring me to another key point: The analysis of utterance¶ in the classroom requires more than rational dialogue. In fact, the critical race¶ theorists argue that because racism is irrational, no amount of rational dialogue¶ will change racist attitudes. I disagree, in part because I am convinced that class-¶ room discussion must recognize the emotions that shape and construct the mean-¶ ings of our claims, our interchange with one another, and our investments in par-¶ ticular worldviews. Thus, a discussion of racism or homophobia cannot rely¶ simply on rational exchange but must delve into the deeply emotional investments¶ and associations that surround perceptions of difference and ideologies. One is po-¶ tentially faced with allowing ones worldviews to be shattered, in itself a pro-¶ foundly emotionally charged experience
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35 -Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic 09
36 -Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf
37 -II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the parties to defer to the other’s point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been implicitly urging that the other side do just that.58 One could also argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing, namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its credit, who urge the other side to “get over it” and toughen its collective hide.60 Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge. Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate speech is. A Types of Hate Speech Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number of forms—direct (sometimes called “specific”) or indirect; veiled or overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or not.61 One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristic— such as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or gender—of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single individual (“Jones, you goddamned X.”) or group (“The goddamned Xs are destroying this country.”). It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.63 It can be anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be plainly identified.64 The object of the speech may be free to leave, or trapped, as in a classroom or workplace.65 B. The Harms of Hate Speech The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and degrees of harm. The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic, especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one delivering it possesses the power to harm. 1. Direct or Face-to-Face Hate Speech Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of hate speech as mere offense,66 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to sleep.67 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and impairment of work or school performance.68 Some may take refuge in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their misery.69 2. Hate Speech and Children With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as assaultive.70 Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.71 If the child’s parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for their families than before.72 Recent scholarship points out how the pathologies associated with social subordination may be transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.73 3. General Hate Speech With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just as serious.74 Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the victims in belittling terms.75 For example, before launching their wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the Holocaust.77 When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who resisted the blessings of civilization.78 When, a little later, the nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve their good fortune.79 Before interning the Japanese during World War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and despotic.80 It is possible that the connection between general hate speech and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and contingent, but conceptual and necessary.81 Concerted action requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without first articulating a reason why one is doing it—otherwise, no one but a sadist would join in.82 Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide, such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.83 The prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.84 Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow could gain little purchase.85 C. The Harms of Speech Regulation If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in? Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares, drug addiction, and a blunted self image?86 Diminished pecuniary and personal prospects?87 Will hate-speech regulation set up the speaker’s group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or anything comparable?88 The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes, such as Europe’s and Canada’s, that criminalize hate speech exhibit none of these ills.89 Speech and inquiry there seem as free and uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as our own.90 What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be momentarily irritated. But “bottling it up” seems not to inflict serious psychological or emotional damage.91 Early in the debate about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a result.92 By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a member of the target group.93 But studies examining this possibility discount it.94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident “revs him up” for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), shows that many Americans harbor measurable animus toward racial minorities.96 Might it be that hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that result?97 III. OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs,98 large or small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them? Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the aggressor, giving as good as they got.99 The harm of hate speech is variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.100 By the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might shy away from them.101 The interplay of voices that society relies on to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech “exceptions” and attention to the role of incessancy. A. Current Free-Speech Exceptions Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are: words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words that create a risk of imminent violence.102 If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating, potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother.103 But our tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate walking home late at night from the campus library?104 As important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding the dignity of a minor state official?105 Neither free-speech advocates nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they should.106 B. Incessancy and Compounding Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy—the tendency to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim—and compounding.107 A victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult such as “You damn idiot driver” or “Watch where you’re going, you klutz” that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times before.108 Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw. The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent, we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the victim’s vulnerability.109 When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim’s very identity. Hate speakers “pile on,” injuring in a way in which the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable harm. A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than the other, so that Rawls’s difference principle suggests that, as a moral matter, we break the tie in the victim’s favor.110 Moreover, the magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of free expression.111
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39 -Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15
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41 -Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.
42 -
43 -While all communities of color suffer from racism in general¶ and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has¶ been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black¶ racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the¶ two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and¶ every day constructions of race in the United States.12¶ For this¶ reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of¶ African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison¶ industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in¶ which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African¶ Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness¶ in both law and practice.¶ While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is¶ indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and¶ elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”¶ norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing¶ “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13¶ The socio-political construction of race coincides with the¶ age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and¶ perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the¶ solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.¶ By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or¶ slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the¶ Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of¶ debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less¶ than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of¶ 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly¶ drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result¶ according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what¶ we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially¶ pro-slavery”.¶ 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future¶ bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation¶ through escape were all clear indications of the significance of¶ slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the¶ Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”¶ to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.¶ 17¶ The social and constitutional construction of white as free and¶ Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.¶ According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,¶ may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.¶ 18 These¶ property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those¶ who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and¶ to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders¶ of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:¶ The concept of whiteness was premised on white¶ supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was¶ defined and constructed in ways that increased its¶ value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,¶ whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the¶ very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept¶ of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial¶ subjugation. This fact was particularly evident¶ during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,¶ as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the¶ form of status property.20¶ Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of¶ humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the¶ margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as¶ Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in¶ America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and¶ no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an¶ experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”¶ 21 Directly¶ condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded¶ groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,¶ Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an¶ outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22
44 -
45 -The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements. Oparah 14
46 -Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
47 -
48 -¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets. Andrea Smith, in her discussion of native studies, has argued that politi- cally progressive educators often adopt normative, colonial practices in the classroom, using pedagogical strategies and grading practices that rein- scribe the racialized and gendered regulation, policing, and disciplining that PIC abolitionists seek to end.53 In this sense, there could be no “postcarceral” academy. Certainly, sanctions for undergraduate and graduate students and faculty who challenge the university’s regular practices—from failing grades and expulsions to tenure denials and deportation—are systemically distrib- uted, along with rewards for those who can be usefully incorporated. Yet uni- versities and colleges also hold the seeds of a very different possible future, evoked, for example, by the universal admissions movement or by student strikes in Britain and Canada that demand higher education as a right, not a privilege of the wealthy. Rather than seeking to eradicate or replace higher educational institutions altogether, I suggest that we demand the popular and antiracist democratization of higher education.¶ The first step toward this radical transformation is the liberation of aca- demia from the machinery of empire: prisons, militarism, and corporations. Speaking of abolishing the white race, Noel Ignatiev argues that it is neces- sary for white people to make whiteness impossible by refusing the invisible benefits of membership in the “white club.”54 Progressive academics are also members of a privileged “club,” one that confers benefits in the form of a pay- check, health care, and other fringe benefits; social status; and the freedom to pursue intellectual work that we are passionate about. But we can also put our privilege to work by unmasking and then unsettling the invisible, symbi- otic, and toxic relationships that constitute the academic-MPIC.¶ Decoupling academia from its velvet-gloved master would begin the pro- cess of fundamental transformation. Without unfettered streams of income from corporations, wealthy philanthropists, and the military, universities and colleges would be forced to develop alternative fund-raising strategies, relationships, and accountabilities. Can we imagine a college administration aligned with local Occupy organizers to protest the state’s massive spend- ing on prisons and policing and demand more tax money for housing, edu- cation, and health care? Can we imagine a massive investment of time and resources by university personnel to solve the problem of how to decarcerate the nation’s prisons or end the detention of undocumented immigrants in order to fund universal access to higher education? Can we imagine a uni- versity run by and for its constituents, including students, kitchen and gar- den staff, and tenure-track and adjunct faculty? These are the possibilities opened up by academic-MPIC abolition.
49 -
50 -The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory.
51 -
52 -Their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84
53 -
54 -Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.
55 -
56 -
57 -It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the¶ same result: an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who¶ comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each¶ other's ideas." It is something like an elaborate minuet.¶ The failure to acknowledge minority scholarship extends even to¶ nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact. W.E. DuBois, deceased¶ Black historian, receives an occasional citation.5 Aside from him, little¶ else rates a mention. Higginbotham's monumental In the Matter of¶ Color' might as well not exist. The same is true of the work of Kenneth¶ Clark,1 Black psychologist and past president of the American¶ Psychological Association, and Alvin Poussaint,8 Harvard Medical¶ School professor and authority on the psychological impact of race. One¶ searches in vain for references to the powerful book by physicians Grier¶ and Cobbs, Black Rage,' or to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the¶ Earth,10 or even to writings of or about Martin Luther King, Jr.,1¶ "¶ Cesar Chavez, 2 and Malcolm X."3 When the inner circle writers need authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they¶ generally cite reports of the United States Commission on Civil¶ Rights1 4 or else each other.1 5¶ A single anecdote may help to illustrate what I mean. Recently a¶ law professor who writes about civil rights showed me, for my edification,¶ a draft of an article of his. It is, on the whole, an excellent article.¶ It extols the value of a principle I will call "equal personhood." Equal¶ personhood is the notion, implicit in several constitutional provisions¶ and much case law, that each human being, regardless of race, creed, or¶ color, is entitled to be treated with equal respect. To treat someone as¶ an outsider, a nonmember of human society, violates this principle and¶ devalues the self-worth of the person so excluded.¶ I have no quarrel with this premise, but, on reading the one hundred-plus¶ footnotes of the article, I noticed that its author failed to cite¶ Black or minority scholars, an exclusion from the community of kindred¶ souls as glaring as any condemned in the paper. I pointed this out¶ to the author, citing as illustration a passage in which he asserted that¶ unequal treatment can cause a person to suffer a withered self-concept.¶ Having just written an article on a related subject, 8 I was more or less¶ steeped in withered self-concepts. I knew who the major authorities¶ were in that area.¶ The professor's authority for the proposition about withered selfconcepts¶ was Frank Michelman, writing in the Harvard Law Review. I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar¶ and teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge¶ about withered self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add references¶ to such works as Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto1¶ " and Grier and¶ Cobbs's Black Rage,"' and he agreed to do so. To justify his selection of¶ Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the¶ author explained that Michelman's statement was "so elegant."¶ Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority¶ scholarship from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles¶ about civil rights? Elegance is, without question, a virtue in writing, in¶ conversation, or in. anything else in life. If minority scholars write inelegantly¶ and Frank Michelman writes elegantly, then it would not be¶ surprising if the latter were read and cited more frequently, and the¶ former less so. But minority legal scholars seem to have less trouble¶ being recognized and taken seriously in areas of scholarship other than¶ civil rights theory.19 If elegance is a problem for minority scholars, it¶ seems mainly to be so in the core areas of civil rights: affirmative action,¶ the equality principle, and the theoretical foundations of race relations¶ law.¶ In 1971, Judge Skelly Wright wrote an article entitled, Professor¶ Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.20 In the article,¶ Judge Wright took a group of scholars to task for their bloodless¶ carping at the Warren Court's decisions in the areas of racial justice¶ and human rights. He accused the group of missing the central point in¶ these decisions-their moral clarity and passion for justice-and labelled¶ the group's excessive preoccupation with procedure and institutional¶ role and its insistence that the Court justify every element of a¶ decision under general principles of universal application, a "scholarly tradition."'2 1¶ I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of¶ white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority¶ scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream¶ writers tend to acknowledge only each other's work. It is even¶ possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars¶ into the field,2 2 perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to establish¶ their reputations in other areas of law. I believe that this "scholarly¶ tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite scholars in other fields¶ of law seem to confront no such tradition.23
58 -
59 -
60 -Case
61 -
62 -1. If the squo is already unequal, the government can’t make a decision for the general will that’s not represented. The modality of the AC is dependent on an already prior just government.
63 -2. Causes policy paralysis which makes the fw impossible – rousseau is talking about small communities deliberating but we physically can’t account for everyone’s perspective
64 -3. The values you hold are part of a decision process the government has created –no representation can legitimate it since the existence of government changes the content of your representation.
65 -4. The government has already been given coercive power – people enter the state knowing that they can’t deliberate on every issue since they grant the government legitimate authority
66 -
67 -The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84
68 -Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE
69 -The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms
70 -
71 -The marketplace of ideas causes perspectives to be ignored and entrenches already dominant power structures. Bietzke 97.
72 -Paul H. Brietzke. “How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fail”. Valparaiso Scholar. 1997. http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1846andcontext=vulr AGM
73 -Advocates of a broad and absolutist political speech are right: dissenters are protected against the tyranny of the majority, without having to prove the "hard-to-measure worth" of free speech.37 This is an obviously-important protection, during crisis times or when the speech-harm can indeed be cured by more speech, but it should not forestall the search for protections which are more "cost-effective" in terms of having fewer speech-harm side effects. The nature of such protections is suggested by persistent critiques of the political speech/marketplace of ideas nexus. Critics plausibly argue that this nexus operates "to exaggerate the evils of government and as in Areopagitica the goodness of people," to "understate the risks and harms of speech and to overstate its benefits,"" and to understate the physical and psychological dangers, and often the futility, of attempts to counter bad speech with good. Stanley Ingber concludes that the ideas marketplace changes little and has little to do with an informed choice. Rather, this nexus serves to socialize the citizenry into a conformity to some perspectives rather than others. The "marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the economic market ..., and ideas that support an entrenched power structure or ideology are most likely to gain acceptance. " Society is not a debating club like the Oxford Union, not a "town meeting or... a group of scientists interested in figuring out some truth."' Producers often speak to make a profit, and they are usually very different people from the ostensible consumers, who often misunderstand or ignore the message, often lack a viable channel for communicating their response, and are often afraid to make fools of themselves by speaking up. Feeling cut off from an active participation, many people are left with the passivity of an evening in front of the TV that is controlled (even after the advent of cable TV) by oligopolistic networks practicing a very definite viewpoint censorship. Many subjects or perspectives are ignored or relegated to fragmented "market surrogates," like a "counterculture" newspaper or a "public access" TV channel, because they are thought to be "distressing" or "unentertaining" and, thus, unprofitable. Most of effective political speech is really a commercial speech, and it would receive less ("low value") protection if the Supreme Court pushed some of its analyses to their logical conclusions.4 The deep (economic)42 rationality assumption characteristic of the ideas marketplace, and of other markets as well, cannot hold in the real world: it ignores a host of factors that make us human, including altruism, habit, bigotry, panic, genius, luck or its absence, and factors such as peer pressures, institutions, and cultures that turn us into social animals. A dehumanized, desocialized, and often sexist "economic man" or "speech man" supposedly goes through life as if it were one long series of analogies to isolated transactions on the New York Stock Exchange.4
74 -
75 -Their theory of rights doesn’t make sense – there’s no such thing as an unqualified good and the state can never be neutral. Meckl 14
76 -Meckl, Markus. "The Cost of Free Speech: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Their Challenge to Liberalism." (2014): 662-663.
77 -Langton’s remark derives its appeal from its gesturing towards power¶ relations. She is saying that given the nature of the interests and the¶ relative power of the groups, justice requires that we favor the interest¶ in refusal of the subordinated group over the interest in subordinating¶ by the dominant group. This suggestion provides an excellent segue¶ to turn to Foucault’s work on the issue of power, in an attempt to show¶ how it, in conjunction with speech act theory, may illuminate the¶ issues that feminists and critical race theorists seem to be implicitly¶ employing.¶ The discussion in the past chapter has demonstrated how power and¶ speech are intimately related, even if they are not related in exactly the¶ way that Langton and Hornsby want to maintain. However, there is¶ still a lot which remains to be said about the nature of power, which¶ I will turn to in Chapter 5. To conclude, though, what the preceding¶ discussion has revealed is that the relationship between speech and¶ power – gestured to in the silencing and subordination arguments¶ – nevertheless leads away from their conclusion that this relationship¶ culminates in the power of the speakers of pornography and hate speech.¶ Rather, as we have begun to see, the relationship of speech to power leads¶ to the more plausible, but more radical, conclusion that this relationship¶ in fact culminates in the state, whose speech acts in enacting laws and¶ deciding the scope of those laws in its judicial decisions is unequivocally¶ powerful.¶ This conclusion, which I will spend the rest of the book elaborating¶ and defending, has far-reaching implications, particularly regarding¶ the end of the egalitarian ideal of state neutrality in the marketplace of¶ ideas. The discussion of speech act theory in this chapter has suggested¶ that the undercurrent in the silencing and subordination arguments¶ – that the liberal’s lauding of state neutrality in freedom of expression¶ cases operates to conceal and to further power imbalances – in fact holds¶ great truth. Given this, the state is not and cannot ever be neutral. It is¶ always exercising its power in the speech acts taking place in its judicial¶ decisions. If this is the case, egalitarian liberals can, without violating their other key commitment to equal concern and respect, abandon¶ their claims to neutrality. Indeed, they ought to, because the claim¶ to neutrality is in fact pernicious and allows for rights violations to go¶ unnoticed by the state.¶ Taking speech act theory on board in this argument shows how the¶ state is always already implicated in power relations, and is thus never¶ neutral. While this is in some ways a radical reconceptualization of the¶ state from that of traditional liberalism’s idea of state neutrality, I want¶ to argue that it is not incompatible with the fundamental tenets of liberalism,¶ and indeed can provide for a more robust, and ultimately¶ more just, conception of the state. However, there is still much elaboration¶ needed on the nature of state power, and I will turn now to a¶ discussion of the leading theories of state power, which will come from¶ outside of the liberal tradition and from contemporary continental political¶ theorists. It is my contention that these theorists, while not usually¶ invoked in liberal debates, can offer a much more nuanced view of the¶ role of state power, and one which liberals would be well served to accept¶ if the liberal state is to be successful in undoing the harms of cultural¶ oppression. Given that, I will turn in Chapters 5 and 6 to a discussion of¶ Foucault’s and Butler’s conception of state power.
78 -
79 -And, the state will inevitably intervene, so it’s better to restrict the right of racists than citizens. Meckl 14
80 -
81 -Meckl, Markus. "The Cost of Free Speech: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Their Challenge to Liberalism." (2014): 662-663.
82 -
83 -Before turning to those arguments, though, let us conclude by noting¶ that the silencing and subordination arguments effect their criticism¶ by granting Dworkin’s conception of the link between freedom of¶ expression, moral agency, and democracy itself, and then showing that¶ lack of regulation too denies moral agency and is thus deleterious to¶ democracy. The force of the silencing argument is to grant that freedom¶ of expression is indeed tied to moral agency and then to democracy¶ itself, but to show that given that, the fact that some speech¶ leads to the denial of other speech must itself also entail that moral¶ agency and hence democracy
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1 -Joseph Flores
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
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1 -USC R2 NC
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1 -USC
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1 -Shell
2 -CP Text: Public Universities and colleges should establish restrictions on hate speech consistent with Byrne’s proposal. This includes restrictions on otherwise protected free speech. They will remove all other restrictions on protected free speech. Byrne 91
3 -
4 -Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399.
5 -
6 -This article examines the constitutionality of university prohibitions of¶ public expression that insults members of the academic community by directing¶ hatred or contempt toward them on account of their race. I Several¶ thoughtful scholars have examined generally whether the government can¶ penalize citizens for racist slurs under the first amendment, but to the limited¶ extent that they have discussed university disciplinary codes they have assumed¶ that the state university is merely a government instrumentality subject¶ to the same constitutional limitations as, for example, the legislature or¶ the police. 2 In contrast, I argue that the university has a fundamentally dif ferent relationship to the speech of its members than does the state to the speech of its citizens. On campus, general rights of free speech should be qualified by the intellectual values of academic discourse. I conclude that the protection of these academic values, which themselves enjoy constitutional protection, permits state universities lawfully to bar racially abusive speech, even if the state legislature could not constitutionally prohibit such speech throughout society at large. At the same time, however, I assert that the first amendment renders state universities powerless to punish speakers for advocating any idea in a reasoned manner. It is necessary at the outset to choose a working definition of a racial insult. This definition, however, is necessarily provisional; any such definition implies the writer's views on the boundaries of constitutionally protected offensive speech, and the reader cannot be expected to swallow the definition until she has had the opportunity to inspect the writer's constitutional premises. Having offered such a caution, I define a racial insult as a verbal or symbolic expression by a member of one ethnic group that describes another ethnic group or an individual member of another group in terms conventionally derogatory, that offends members of the target group, and that a reasonable and unbiased observer, who understands the meaning of the words and the context of their use, would conclude was purposefully or recklessly abusive. Excluded from this definition are expressions that convey rational but offensive propositions that can be disputed by argument and evidence. An insult, so conceived, refers to a manner of speech that seeks to demean rather than to criticize, and to appeal to irrational fears and prejudices rather than to respect for others and informed judgment. 3
7 -
8 -The counterplan establishes checks on reverse enforcement, chilling effect, and slippery slope.
9 -
10 -Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399.
11 -
12 -Disciplinary rules are the least effective way that a university can enhance¶ the quality of speech or foster racial tolerance among its members. The educational¶ program must celebrate and instruct its students in the beauty and¶ usefulness of graceful and accurate speech and writing; a liberal education¶ should leave students intolerant of propaganda and commercial manipulation,¶ and competent to directly and forcefully express coherent views as citizens.¶ Such teaching is not amoral; the graduate ought freely to prefer the¶ exercise of skill, reflective perception, and an abiding curiosity to desires for acquisition, consumption, and domination. Without the university's consistent¶ action on a commitment to reasoned discourse as central to its mission,¶ the university's attempt to prohibit insulting or lewd speech may seem a hypocritical¶ denial of its own failings.¶ Similarly, prohibiting racial insults will advance racial harmony on a campus¶ only when the university has effectively committed itself to educate lovingly¶ the members of every ethnic group. Although nearly every university¶ admits minority students using criteria that aspire in good faith to be fair,¶ many have failed to transform themselves into truly multi-ethnic institutions.¶ Not to have succeeded at this daunting task does not merit reproach; the¶ university's origins and traditions are explicitly European, growth and accommodation¶ to the extent required to create a multi-ethnic community¶ must take time and witness false steps. However, not to have made plain¶ that blacks, hispanics, Asians, Indians, and others who have been excluded in¶ the past are not only now welcome, but are requested to collaborate in shaping¶ new university structures and mores so that the benefits of advanced education¶ will be available without regard to birth and so that the university can¶ continue to spawn for a changing society a cosmopolitan culture based on¶ reason and reflection standing above tribal fears and blind desires, not to¶ have begun this work in earnest merits regret and will provoke anger. Universities¶ that pass rules against racial insults which are not part of a comprehensive¶ commitment to ethnic integration will serve only to exacerbate racial¶ tensions.¶ Schools that adopt prohibitions on racially offensive speech ought to enforce¶ them with restraint. Certainly, when students have sought to intimidate¶ or frighten other students with racial insults, the school should treat this¶ behavior as a fundamental breach of university standards meriting the¶ strongest punitive measures. But often insulting expressions will result from¶ insensitivity or ignorance; complaints about such behavior should be seen as¶ opportunities for teaching, and creative informal measures that make the offenders¶ aware of the harmful consequences and injustice of their behavior¶ should be pursued. The school should also provide succor to the victim¶ whose hurt and anger must be acknowledged and meliorated. But severely¶ punishing ignorant young people for expressions inherited from their parents¶ or neighborhoods may serve to harden. and focus their sense of grievance,¶ create martyrs, and prolong racial animosity. Deans who administer such¶ rules must overcome their personal repugnance at racist speech and enforce¶ the rules for the benefit of the entire community. Controversial interpretative¶ application of the rules should be placed in the hands of faculty and¶ students representative of the entire institution, and the accused, the victim,¶ and the dean should have an opportunity to express their perspectives.¶ A recurrent concern regarding rules against racial insults is their vague-ness and overbreadth. These, of course, were the bases upon which the University¶ of Michigan's policy was declared unconstitutional, although the¶ demonstrated propensity of the school to apply the policy to presumptively¶ protected speech appears to have steered the Court's conclusions on these¶ issues.17 6 In general, university disciplinary rules rarely are struck down for¶ vagueness; courts usually permit universities to regulate student conduct on¶ the basis of generally stated norms, so long as they give fair notice of the¶ behavior proscribed. 177 Courts generally are more strict regarding vagueness¶ in rules that affect speech, in no small part because of the distrust of the¶ competence and motives of the government censor.178¶ A central argument of this article has been that the university can be¶ trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it has the proper¶ moral basis and adequate expertise to do so. It is not surprising, therefore,¶ that I believe that vagueness concerns about such university rules are largely¶ misplaced. This is not to deny that a university should adopt safeguards to¶ protect accused students from the concerns that the courts have highlighted.¶ First, the rules should state explicitly that no one may be disciplined for the¶ good faith statement of any proposition susceptible to reasoned response, no¶ matter how offensive. The possibility that punishment is precluded by this¶ limitation should be addressed at every stage of the disciplinary process. Second,¶ some response between punishment and acquittal should be available¶ when the university concludes that the speaker was subjectively unaware of¶ the offensive character of his speech; these cases seem to present mainly educational¶ concerns. Third, all controversial issues of interpretation of the¶ rules should be entrusted to a panel of faculty and students who are representative¶ of the institution. Rules furthering primarily academic concerns about¶ the quality of speech and the development of students should be given meaning¶ by those most directly concerned with the academic enterprise rather¶ than by administrators who may register more precisely external political¶ pressures on the university. Given these safeguards and a comprehensible¶ definition of an unacceptable insult, such as the one ventured in the introduction¶ to this article,179 a court which accepts the underlying proposition that a¶ university has the constitutional authority to regulate racial insults should¶ not be troubled independently by vagueness.¶ A difficult prudential consideration is whether a university should decline¶ to regulate insults because of public criticism that censorship demeans the very intellectual virtues towards which the university strives, such as the superiority¶ of persuasion over compulsion. Obviously, the adoption of such¶ regulation has brought forth sincere and bitter criticism from many friends of¶ higher education-the Economist, for example, went so far as to call such¶ regulations "disgraceful."'' 80 To some extent these criticisms stem from misunderstanding¶ about the character of academic speech and the goals of¶ prohibitions on racial insult, but universities should admit that turning to¶ regulation marks a sad failure in civility. A failure already has occurred,¶ however, when students scurrilously demean other students because of their¶ race. The university at this point can only choose among evils. It would not¶ be true to its traditions if it did not come down on the side of protecting the¶ educational environment for blameless students against wanton and hurtful¶ ranting.
13 -Hate speech codes are effective they create legal recognition which is key to challenge a culture of racism.
14 -Michel Rosenfeld* Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School¶ of Law. 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 2002-2003
15 -
16 --Article surveyed hate speech laws across US, UK, Canada, Germany
17 -
18 -The principal disadvantages to the approach to hate speech¶ under consideration, on the other hand, are: that it inevitably has¶ to confront difficult line drawing problems, such as that between¶ fact and opinion in the context of the German scheme of¶ regulation; that when prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech¶ fails, such as in the British Southern News case discussed above,'30¶ regulation may unwittingly do more to legitimate and to¶ disseminate the hate propaganda at issue than a complete absence¶ of regulation would have;' that prosecutions may be too selective¶ or too indiscriminate owing to (often unconscious) biases¶ prevalent among law enforcement officials, as appears to have¶ been the case in the prosecutions of certain black activists under¶ the British Race Relations Act;'32 and, that since not all that may¶ appear to be hate speech actually is hate speech-such as the¶ documentary report involved in Jersild33 or a play in which a racist¶ character engages in hate speech, but the dramatist intends to¶ convey an anti-hate message-regulation of that speech may¶ unwisely bestow powers of censorship over legitimate political,¶ literary and artistic expression to government officials and judges.¶ In the last analysis, none of the existing approaches to hate¶ speech are ideal, but on balance the American seems less¶ satisfactory than its alternatives. Above all, the American¶ approach seems significantly flawed in some of its assumptions, in¶ its impact and in the message it conveys concerning the evils¶ surrounding hate speech. In terms of assumptions, the American¶ approach either underestimates the potential for harm of hate¶ speech that is short of incitement to violence, or it overestimates¶ the potential of rational deliberation as a means to neutralize calls¶ to hate. In terms of impact, given its long history of racial¶ tensions, it is surprising that the United States does not exhibit¶ greater concern for the injuries to security, dignity, autonomy and¶ well being which officially tolerated hate speech causes to its black¶ minority. Likewise, America's hate speech approach seems to¶ unduly discount the pernicious impact that racist hate speech may have on lingering or dormant racist sentiments still harbored by a¶ non-negligible segment of the white population.'34 Furthermore,¶ even if we discount the domestic impact of hate speech, given the¶ worldwide spread of locally produced hate speech, such as in the¶ case of American manufactured Neo-Nazi propaganda¶ disseminated through the worldwide web, a strong argument can¶ be made that American courts should factor in the obvious and¶ serious foreign impact of certain domestic hate speech in¶ determining whether such speech should be entitled to¶ constitutional protection. Finally, in terms of the message¶ conveyed by refusing to curb most hate speech, the American¶ approach looms as a double-edged sword. On the one hand,¶ tolerance of hate speech in a country in which democracy has been¶ solidly entrenched since independence over two hundred years ago¶ conveys a message of confidence against both the message and the¶ prospects of those who endeavor to spread hate.'35 On the other¶ hand, tolerance of hate speech in a country with serious and¶ enduring race relations problems may reinforce racism and¶ hamper full integration of the victims of racism within the broader¶ community.'36¶ The argument in favor of opting for greater regulation of hate¶ speech than that provided in the United States rests on several¶ important considerations, some related to the place and function¶ of free speech in contemporary constitutional democracies, and¶ others to the dangers and problems surrounding hate speech.¶ Typically, contemporary constitutional democracies are¶ increasingly diverse, multiracial, multicultural, multireligious and¶ multilingual. Because of this and because of increased migration,¶ a commitment to pluralism and to respect of diversity seem¶ inextricably linked to vindication of the most fundamental¶ individual and collective rights. Increased diversity is prone to¶ making social cohesion more precarious, thus, if anything,¶ exacerbating the potential evils of hate speech. Contemporary¶ democratic states, on the other hand, are less prone to curtailing free speech rights than their predecessors either because of deeper¶ implantation of the democratic ethos or because respect of¶ supranational norms has become inextricably linked to continued¶ membership in supranational alliances that further vital national¶ interests.¶ In these circumstances, contemporary democracies are more¶ likely to find themselves in a situation like stage four in the context¶ of the American experience with free speech rather than in one¶ that more closely approximates a stage one experience.'37 In other¶ words, to drown out minority discourse seems a much greater¶ threat than government prompted censorship in contemporary¶ constitutional democracies that are pluralistic. Actually, viewed¶ more closely, contemporary pluralistic democracies tend to be in a¶ situation that combines the main features of stage two and stage¶ four. Thus, the main threats to full fledged freedom of expression¶ would seem to come primarily from the "tyranny of the majority"¶ as reflected both within the government and without, and from the¶ dominance of majority discourses at the expense of minority ones.¶ If it is true that majority conformity and the dominance of its¶ discourse pose the greatest threat to uninhibited self-expression¶ and unconstrained political debate in a contemporary pluralist¶ polity, then significant regulation of hate speech seems justified.¶ This is not only because hate speech obviously inhibits the selfexpression¶ and oopportunity of inclusion of its victims, but also,¶ less obviously, because hate speech tends to bear closer links to¶ majority views than might initially appear. Indeed, in a¶ multicultural society, while crude insults uttered by a member of¶ the majority directed against a minority may be unequivocally¶ rejected by almost all other members of the majority culture, the¶ concerns that led to the hate message may be widely shared by the¶ majority culture who regard of other cultures as threats to their¶ way of life. In those circumstances, hate speech might best be¶ characterized as a pathological extension of majority feelings or¶ beliefs.¶ So long as the pluralist contemporary state is committed to¶ maintaining diversity, it cannot simply embrace a value neutral¶ mindset, and consequently it cannot legitimately avoid engaging in¶ some minimum of viewpoint discrimination. This is made clear by¶ the German example, and although the German experience has¶ been unique, it is hard to imagine that any pluralist constitutional¶ democracy would not be committed to a similar position, albeit to¶ a lesser degree.'38 Accordingly, without adopting German free speech jurisprudence, at a minimum contemporary pluralist¶ democracy ought to institutionalize viewpoint discrimination¶ against the crudest and most offensive expressions of racism,¶ religious bigotry and virulent bias on the basis of ethnic or national¶ origin
19 -
20 -Hate speech kills the market place of ideas, fosters self-hatred and primes society for real violence. Johnsons 2000
21 -Catherine B. Johnson JD Candidate Fordham Law School “STOPPING HATE WITHOUT STIFLING SPEECH: RE-EXAMINING THE MERITS OF HATE SPEECH CODES ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES” August, 2000 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1821
22 -
23 -The ubiquity and incessancy of harmful racial depiction are thus the source of its virulence. Like water dripping on sandstone, it is a pervasive harm which only the most hardy can resist. Yet the prevailing first amendment paradigm predisposes us to treat racist speech as an individual harm, as though we only had to evaluate the effect of a single drop of water. This approach ... systematically misperceives the experience of racism for both victim and perpetrator. 157¶ ¶ Mari Matsuda, a professor at the School of Law and at the Center for Asian American Studies at UCLA, was one of the first to look at the hate speech issue from the point of view that it actually harms its victims. She is often accredited for bringing an "outsider jurisprudence" to the forefront of this debate. 158 Matsuda explains that victims of hate speech suffer irreparable harm, both psychologically and physically. 159 Victims of racist speech internalize the feelings of inferior self-worth and self-hatred. This in turn affects their relationships with others, their job performance, educational endeavors, and ultimately their ability to effectively communicate. 160 *1845 The harm of hate speech, as proponents of codes contend, is real.¶ a. Assaultive Speech Lands a BlisteringBlow¶ ¶ Those in favor of hate speech regulations argue that the harm of such speech is the equivalent of a punch - an actual assault on one's sense of person, essentially having the same effect as physical violence. 161 Like violence, words may land a sharp and insidious blow to those at whom they are hurled: "The experience of being called a 'nigger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike' is like receiving a slap in the face." 162 Regulating such speech is a "pragmatic response to the urgent needs of students of color and other victims of hate speech who are daily silenced, intimidated, and subjected to severe psychological and physical trauma by racist assailants who employ words and symbols as part of an arsenal of weapons of oppression and subordination." 163¶ As if repeated blows to one's psychological well-being by language of this sort is not enough, the victim is then further injured by the "government response of tolerance." 164 The blows of the racists, the homophobes or the sexists is then compounded by a final shot from the government or the university that stands idly by and accepts the intolerant messages. 165¶ Those involved in the outsider jurisprudence movement contend that a message of hate "inflicts wounds" 166 that do not just injure the intended victim but rather "hit the gut of all those in the target group." 167 This message - you are different, you are inferior, you do not belong, you will never amount to anything - is then *1846 "conveyed on the street, in school yards, in popular culture, and in the propaganda of hate widely distributed in this country." 168¶ b. Tolerance of Hate Speech Perpetuates a Social Reality ofSubordination¶ ¶ Those who call for regulation of hate speech further contend that in allowing such messages to be conveyed and spread, the government is arguably constructing and even perpetuating a damaging social reality about the affected groups "so that members of that group are always one down." 169 All members are harmed, because "at some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea that may hold some truth." 170¶ This dominant social reality harms victims of hate speech in two ways: (1) externally, in society's perception of such groups; and (2) internally, in the victim's own perception of himself. The former is known as the "those people" effect - when one repeatedly hears that "those people are lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dishonest, inscrutable ... we reject the idea, but the next time we sit next to one of 'those people' the dirt message, the sex message, is triggered." 171¶ By "permitting one social group to speak disrespectfully of another habituates and encourages speakers to continue speaking that way in the future," 172 thereby making laws regulating such speech imperative to ensure that such groups may no longer find themselves "one down." 173 As this way of speaking becomes "normalized" by society, it then becomes "inscribed in hundreds of plots, narratives, and scripts; it becomes part of culture, what everyone knows." 174¶ Not only do such messages cause external or reputational harm to the group as perceived by society, such ideas often become an internal reality for victims. Repeated messages of this sort eventually *1847 cause victims to believe that perhaps they do not deserve to be treated as everyone else. 175 "Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of this sort ... inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. Minorities internalize the stories they read, see and hear every day." 176¶ The effect of such internalization silences victims, ingraining them with the notion that their voice is not valuable or credible in society's discourse. 177 "Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her adequate share?" 178 The result of such silencing is that victims of hate speech have no effective voice in the marketplace of ideas, 179 leaving them little opportunity to counter-attack the assaultive speech. 180¶ c. Hate Speech Denies Equal EducationalOpportunity¶ ¶ ¶ Our educational institutions are idealized as a refuge for the calm, impartial, and unimpeded pursuit of knowledge and truth. Here we hope to escape the bigotry, cruelty and injustice outside. But universities and colleges are no longer, if they ever were, tranquil havens in a prejudiced world. Instead, for people of color, women, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, and members of other arbitrarily disadvantaged groups, institutions of higher education have become, increasingly, places of physical and psychological danger. 181
24 -And hate speech primes society for genocide – multiple empirical examples prove. Tsesis 09
25 -Tsesis, Alexander Loyola University Chicago School of Law. "Dignity and speech: The regulation of hate speech in a democracy." (2009).
26 -Permitting persons or organizations to spread ideology touting a¶ system of discriminatory laws or enlisting vigilante group violence¶ erodes democracy. So it was in the Weimar Republic, where the¶ repeated anti-Semitic propaganda of vulgar ideologues like Julius¶ Streicher, who published perverse attacks against Jews in Der¶ Stiirmer, chipped away at the post-World War I German democratic¶ experiment.6¶ ' Avowedly influenced by nineteenth century antiSemitism,¶ his weekly stories of Jewish ritual murder and sexual¶ exploitation were a crude way of antagonizing the victims and¶ gaining support for widespread prejudice against Jews." It is truly¶ eerie, now, looking at photographs relating the effectiveness of Nazi¶ propaganda: respectable looking adults in suits and dresses¶ listening to long lectures on Jewish inferiority; children, barely able¶ to stand on their two feet, raising their right arm in a Nazi salute.¶ Nazi propaganda incorporated numerous well-known¶ nineteenth century slogans. To take one example, Streicher, who¶ was later sentenced to death by the Nuremberg War Crimes¶ Tribunal, 64 used an inflammatory slogan, "The Jews are our misfortune!" on his newspaper masthead.and At one point over¶ 130,000 copies of his publication were sold and displayed on public¶ message boards throughout the country.66 The phrase also became¶ prominently featured on posters throughout the Third Reich.67¶ This slogan was taken verbatim from an 1879 article by¶ Professor Heinrich von Treitschke, arguably the greatest German¶ historian of the nineteenth century.68 Its visibility in pre-World War¶ II German society helped legitimize anti-Semitism there in¶ intellectual circles.69¶ A gradual process of incitement also occurred elsewhere. In¶ many American colonies, authors and legal institutions had been¶ degrading blacks since the seventeenth century.70 By national¶ independence, in 1776, the colonies of South Carolina and Georgia¶ had long-standing commitments to retaining slavery despite the oftrepeated¶ mantra of universal natural rights. In 1787, those two states refused to endorse the proposed Constitution without¶ provisions protecting that undemocratic institution."72¶ Senator John Calhoun, Congressman Henry Wise, and other¶ powerful racist orators misled the public about the supposedly¶ benevolent slave owner, feeding his slaves and treating them like¶ his own children. 3 The repeated inculcation of supremacism proved¶ effective in misrepresenting blacks as moveable property.¶ Abolitionists like Theodore Weld, Angelina and Sarah Grimk6,¶ Frederick Douglass, and William Lloyd Garrison were unable to win¶ over the country to their abolitionist views.74 To the contrary,¶ proslavery thought monopolized the Southern marketplace of¶ ideas.' Slavery came to an end after a bloody Civil War, not¶ through articulate or even heated debate.6¶ Because intimidating hate speech has so often inflamed¶ dangerous attitudes, the value of such expression should be¶ balanced against the likelihood that it will cause harm. The risks¶ are greater when hate propaganda incorporates symbolism, like¶ swastikas, that demagogues have historically displayed to rally¶ supporters to action. Robert Post is undoubtedly correct that speech¶ is valuable because it provides a breeding ground for "collective selfdetermination."7¶ 7 The more difficult question is how self-expression¶ should be treated when it conflicts with the safety of its target.¶ As much as self-expression is fundamental to democratic¶ institutions, it can, nevertheless, be balanced against the social¶ interest in safeguarding a pluralistic culture by preventing the¶ instigation of demagogic threats. Placing no limits on speech-not¶ even on expressions blatantly intended to make life miserable for¶ minorities-preserves the rights of speakers at the expense of¶ targeted groups. Defamation statutes, zoning regulations, and¶ obscenity laws indicate that the freedom of speech is not shielded¶ where it undermines other individuals' legitimate interests. 7 Hate speech regulation undoubtedly inhibits some opportunities for selfexpression;¶ more importantly, it prevents instigative communication¶ from undermining its targets' ability to live unaccosted by¶ harassment.¶ In the many historic examples when destructive messages¶ proved to be effective in instigating violence, they caused enormous¶ social turmoil. Just like shouting "fire" in a crowded movie theater,¶ which can be prohibited without violating the First Amendment,79¶ hate speech can cause a stampede. Take Spain, for instance, which¶ expelled its Jewish population in 1492.80 The expulsion came after¶ years of Inquisition propaganda and hurt both the exiled Jews and¶ the remaining Spanish population. 1 Teachings by zealous¶ preachers like Vincent Ferrer, a later-canonized Dominican monk,¶ in the late fifteenth century brought on a nationwide anti-Jewish¶ hysteria that opposed the free practice of Judaism while decrying¶ overt violence.82 Pursuant to his instigation, a Castilian decree¶ discriminated against Jews in employment, dress, and criminal¶ punishments.83 Historian Heinrich Graetz explained the connection¶ between anti-Jewish preaching and draconian edicts: the populace¶ was "inflamed by the passionate eloquence of the preacher and¶ emphasized his teaching by violent assaults on the Jews." 4 Another¶ historian explained that:¶ For centuries, Christians had been encouraged to hate the¶ Jews. With preachers telling them, Sunday after Sunday, that¶ Jews were perverted and guilty of complicity in the death of¶ Christ, the faithful ended up by detesting them with a hatred 815 that was bound one day to express itself in violence .¶ Once unleashed, the expulsion of Jews from Spain followed¶ naturally from the verbal spread of hatred during the Inquisition.8 6¶ The economic consequences were grave. Many commercial enterprises in Seville and Barcelona, for instance, were ruined .¶ "Spain lost an incalculable treasure by the exodus of Jewish...¶ merchants, craftsmen, scholars, physicians, and scientists," wrote¶ the encyclopedic Will Durant, "and the nations that received them¶ benefitted economically and intellectually."88 Anti-Jewish preaching¶ in parts of Spain influenced a wide social segment of the population,¶ and the result was devastating both for the Jews who fled and for¶ the country that renounced them on dogmatic grounds. Elsewhere¶ in the ancient world, as historian Ben Kiernan has compellingly¶ documented, periodic mass massacres perpetrated against segments¶ of the native populations in Ireland, North and South America, and¶ Australia were likewise influenced by widely disseminated¶ dehumanizing statements. 9¶ The spread of ethnic and racial hatred continues to elicit¶ violence throughout the modern world. The dissemination of¶ ethnically incitable messages has precipitated tribal clashes in¶ Kenya.90 In Rwanda, ethnic stereotyping and repeated media calls¶ for the extermination of Tutsi led to a massive genocide perpetrated¶ against that group.9¶ '¶ Arab racial hate propaganda in the Sudan has catalyzed a¶ government-sponsored attempt to "cleanse" black Africans in¶ Darfur, Sudan." Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo¶ the government has relied on the incitement of ethnic hatred,¶ creating a culture where ethnic murder is a routine militia¶ practice. In the Arab world, terror organizations like Hamas and¶ Hizballah spread hatred against Jews without any interference from several governments, including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi¶ Arabia. 94 School texts that are "written and produced by Saudi¶ government" teach children to kill Jews and to hate Christians and¶ Jews.95¶ Hate propaganda in these countries is far more virulent than it¶ is in the United States; nevertheless, a democracy committed to the¶ protection of individual rights does not run afoul of free speech¶ principles by criminalizing group incitement that has so globally¶ proven to influence harmful social movements.¶ A First Amendment theory, as the Supreme Court made clear in¶ Virginia v. Black, must examine whether there are historical¶ reasons to believe that offensive expression against an identifiable¶ group is likely to intimidate reasonable audiences. Robert Post's¶ argument about the undemocratic nature of hate speech regulation¶ regards "the function of public discourse" to be the reconciliation of¶ "the will of individuals with the general will. Public discourse is¶ thus ultimately grounded upon a respect for individuals seen as 'free¶ and equal persons."'97 He emphasizes democracy's central obligation¶ to protect private "autonomous wills."9" His insightful¶ characterization, however, captures only part of the raison d'etre of¶ democracy; on a more community-oriented level, that system of¶ governance serves to protect the overall well-being of the polity¶ against the wanton call for discriminatory conduct or violence. And¶ Black explicitly sanctions states' use of historical records to identify¶ symbolism that is likely to terrorize the populace and, therefore,¶ detract from the common good.99 This development in First¶ Amendment jurisprudence indicates that there is more to democracy¶ than self-determination.¶ Post's most recent statement on hate speech does not address¶ Black, even though the chapter was written after the Court¶ rendered its decision. 100 He connects the expression of hate to¶ "'extreme' intolerance and 'extreme' dislike."' °¶ ' This description,¶ while correct, does not account for the connection between hate¶ speech and extreme conduct. While the Constitution does not¶ authorize laws against negative emotions, speech that is¶ substantially likely to cause discriminatory harm, especially violence, can be regulated without infringing on the fundamental¶ principles of democracy.
27 -
28 -DA Shell
29 -Title IX investigations are increasing. Kingkade 16.
30 -Tyler Kingkade. “There Are Far More Title IX Investigations Of Colleges Than Most People Know”. Huffington Post. June 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d AGM
31 -The growing backlog of federal Title IX investigations into colleges and universities has now topped 300, but many people, including students at the schools under scrutiny, aren’t aware of those reviews. As of Wednesday, there were 246 ongoing investigations by the U.S. Department of Education into how 195 colleges and universities handle sexual assault reports under the gender equity law. A Freedom of Information Act request by The Huffington Post revealed another 68 Title IX investigations into how 61 colleges handle sexual harassment cases. This puts the total number of Title IX investigations officially dealing with sexual harassment at 315. (Under civil rights statutes, sexual assault is defined as an extreme form of sexual harassment.) But dozens of those Title IX reviews receive no publicity because they don’t specifically deal with sexual assault. If a school is being investigated for allegedly mishandling harassment cases, but not reports of assault, it doesn’t appear on the list regularly given to reporters by the Education Department. Major educational institutions — including New York University, the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Georgia State University, Florida AandM University, Rutgers University, Howard University, the University of Oklahoma, Kent State University and the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse — have escaped public scrutiny because Title IX investigations into their actions haven’t been highlighted by the government or the schools themselves.SUNY Broome Community College is under three investigations that haven’t been previously disclosed. The Education Department has no plans to regularly issue a list of cases involving sexual harassment only, an official told HuffPost.
32 -
33 -AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04
34 -Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809.
35 -In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may¶ make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amend-¶ ment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not¶ arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple liti-¶ gants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same¶ opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be¶ in active coordination with each other - as with the multiple chal-¶ lenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First¶ Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer¶ source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amend-¶ ment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity¶ of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect160 such¶ that the claims no longer appear tenuous. The combination of, say,¶ four scarcely plausible but simultaneous court challenges and twenty¶ scarcely plausible public claims of a First Amendment problem could make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible¶ than they actually are.161 From the standpoint of an interest group¶ seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the sup-¶ port of other interest groups,162 winning is better than losing publicly,¶ but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.¶ Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility,¶ the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the¶ multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is re-¶ ferred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in¶ newsroom jargon as "legs." Interestingly, this phenomenon sometimes¶ survives even authoritative rejection of the claim. With respect to the¶ argument that hostile-environment sexual harassment enforcement has¶ serious First Amendment implications, for example, neither the Su-¶ preme Court's rejection of this argument in dicta in R.A. V v. City of¶ St. Paul163 nor the Court's silent dismissal of the same claim in Harris¶ v. Forklift Systems, Inc.164 has slowed the momentum of those who¶ would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostile-¶ environment sexual harassment law.'65 Similarly, decades of judicial¶ rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially re-¶ stricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely dis-¶ couraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme¶ Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroftl66 can be considered not a¶ defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into¶ the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant cer-¶ tiorari, in part to determine "whether ... the extension of existing and¶ future copyrights violates the First Amendment;"'67 and the seven-¶ Justice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,'68 acknowledged¶ that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.
36 -Title IX is currently effective against harassment – this dramatically increases access to higher education. Musil 07
37 -
38 -Caryn Musil, Scaling the Ivory Towers, MS Magazine Fall 2007: The Triumphs of Title IX, http://www.feminist.org/education/TriumphsOfTitleIX.pdf. NS
39 -
40 -The contrast between her academic landscape and mine could not be more dramatic. And Title IX is the primary cause for the seismic shifts. The law’s impact has been elemental. Not only has it helped eliminate blatant discriminatory practices across educational institutions, but it has helped root out subtler methods of holding women back by closing the gap between men’s and women’s financial aid packages, improving housing opportunities for women students (a lack of women’s dorms was once used to restrict women’s admissions) and combating sexual harassment. Just before Title IX was signed into law, women were underrepresented as undergraduates, at just over 40 percent of all students. And it wasn’t that easy for them to get into those ivied halls. Young women typically had to make higher grades and SAT scores than young men to gain college admission, and often faced quotas limiting the number of women admitted. Once they got on campus, there were few women role models—less than one in five faculty members were women, and a mere 3 percent of college presidents. In some fields, even the women students were barely visible: About 1 percent of master’s degrees in engineering, 1 percent of doctoral dental degrees, and under 2 percent of master’s degrees in mathematics were awarded to women in 1970. The barriers were formidable, and sex discrimination unashamedly open and normative. In the years since Title IX, however, all of those numbers have risen tremendously. Take college enrollment, for starters: By 2005, women students comprised almost three out of five undergraduates, with some of this growth due to increased access for women of color (who have more than doubled their share of degrees since 1977, when they earned just over 10 per- cent). Women have not simply in- creased their numbers in academia, though: They have also moved into fields formerly dominated by men, particularly business and the sciences (see chart on page 45). These are the sorts of fields that lead women into higher-paying jobs after graduation. Bucking the rising trend, however, are computer and information sci- ence, where numbers peaked in 1984 before declining, and engineering and engineering technologies, in which the numbers of women grew and then leveled off. Certain fields have continued to be women-dominant from 1980 until 2005—health professions other than physicians and related inical sciences (currently more than 86 percent women) and education (about 79 percent women), but this isn’t the best news for economic equity, since wages tend to stay low in fields with few men. In graduate and professional schools, too, young women have enjoyed far greater access thanks to Title IX. In 1970, women earned only 14 percent of doctoral degrees, but today earn nearly half. Yet women’s doctorates are still not distributed evenly across disciplines: They range from a low of about 19 percent in engineering and engineering technologies to a high of about 71 per- cent in psychology. The most dramatic gains are in the professional schools. In 1971, just about 1 of 100 dental school graduates were women, while in 2005 that number grew nearly fortyfold. In medical schools the numbers jumped from less than 10 percent to nearly 50 percent, and law school numbers from about 7 percent to nearly 49 percent. There’s been quite a psychological benefit, too. As my older daughter, Rebecca, says of her experience at New York University Law School, “Women were more than half of the students, so sex discrimination was not something we ever worried about. ... It’s not that we don’t think about equality, but that we don’t have to think about it as much because of what’s already been done.” Armed with their professional degrees in medicine and law, women have entered those professions at steadily increasing rates. Yet their numbers—and in law firms, their advancement—still lag behind. In 2006, women made up 33 percent of lawyers but just 16 percent of partners in law firms. Similarly, in medicine only 27 percent of doctors are women, and they’re unevenly spread across specialties, the top three choices being internal medicine, pediatrics and general family medicine. The news is also mixed about women in academic leadership. By 1986 the number of women college presidents had tripled from 1970 to almost 10 percent, and by 2006 reached 23 percent, with a large proportion serving as presi- dents of community colleges. But most of the progress occurred between 1986 and 2001 and now has slowed considerably. Furthermore, today’s presidents re- main much less diverse by race, gender and ethnicity than the students, faculty or administrators who report to them: Only 4 percent of the respondents in a recent survey of college presidents identified as “minority women.” Women also tend to be more qualified and make more sacrifices than men in order to gain leadership; they’re far less likely than men presidents to be married and have children, and significantly more likely to hold an advanced degree. On faculties, women have increased across every rank but continue to move up more slowly than men. In 2006 they accounted for nearly 40 percent of full- time faculty and nearly 50 percent of part-timers. Young women benefit extraordinarily from all these women role models. As my daughter Emily says, “Women professors looked out for me the whole time ... and that is where I got my career counseling.” But women professors are not employed equally across institutional types—they’re just over half the faculty at institutions offering associate degrees, but only 34 percent at doctoral institutions. While women are increasing their numbers in tenure-track positions (nearly 45 percent), they still face the accumulated disad-vantages of sex discrimination over time and represent only about 31 per- cent of currently tenured faculty. “People change faster and more easily than institutions,” explains Yolanda T. Moses, associate vice chancellor for diversity at the University of California, Riverside. While the most blatant violations have been eliminated, Moses argues that the next level of work is even more complicated: “Systems can undermine progress ... and we need to unearth those behaviors that sabotage even our best intentions.” A search committee in physics or engineering, for example, may profess to be seeking more women, but make no efforts to break out of all-men, frequently all- white, networks to identify strong women candidates. These are the sorts of challenges that still remain, yet Title IX has gone a long way toward making campuses more hospitable. By offering legal protection from hostile work and learning environments, it helped draw attention to sexism in the classroom and opened the door for change. The fields of science, tech- nology, engineering and math were among the most chilly toward women, so Title IX helped usher in a period of serious self-study that has led to the adoption of more women-friendly teaching practices and programs, and thus a rise in women taking courses formerly dominated by men.
41 -
42 -Sexual harassment in the classroom is a result of patriarchal violence that invades academia. Sexual harassment represents an oppressive use of power by professors and kills the participation and success of the harassed. Benson and Thomson 82
43 -
44 -Benson, Donna J., and Gregg E. Thomson. "Sexual harassment on a university campus: The confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender stratification." Social problems 29.3 (1982): 236-251.
45 -
46 -It is precisely this widespread confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender¶ stratification which defines the problem of sexual harassment. There is, in other words, a nexus¶ of power and sexualprerogative often enjoyed by men with formal authority over women. Men¶ in such positions can engage in (or "get away with") overt sexual behaviors that would be rebuffed¶ or avoided were the relationship not one of superior and subordinate. They can also discharge selectively the power and rewards of their positions as a means to obligate women sexualy (Blau,¶ 1964).¶ As well as reward and punish women directly, men can manipulate and obscure their sexual in-¶ tentions toward female subordinates. Women learn that the "official" attention of a male¶ superior is often but a vehicle through which he can "press his pursuits" (Goffman, 1977). In¶ turn, what is often mistakenly perceived by men as an unfounded distrust or suspicion of motives¶ has its basis in previous experience with male "helpfulness." Therefore, as Thorne5 suggests, there¶ is an intrinsic ambiguity between the formal definition of the male superior/female subordinate¶ relationship and a sexual one, in which the gender of the woman can be made salient at the in-¶ itiative of the man.¶ Male Authority and Sexual Interest on the University Campus¶ At major universities, student access to individual instructors can be a scarce resource. Faculty¶ members serve as gatekeepers to the professions, yet an institutional priority on research severely¶ constrains the time and energy that they devote to instruction and interaction with under-¶ graduates (Blau, 1973). Moreover, though students are supposedly evaluated according to merit,¶ the teacher's role permits a wide latitude in the degree of interaction and helpfulness granted to¶ individual students. An instructor enjoys considerable discretionary power to provide or¶ withhold academic rewards (grades, recommendations) and related resources (help, psychological¶ support).6¶ As in the workplace, it is usually men who exercise this discretionary power over female univer-¶ sity students. While women now comprise more than half of all college students,¶ faculty-especially within higher ranks and at major universities-are overwhelmingly male.¶ About 95 percent of university full professors are men (Patterson and Engelberg, 1978). Nor-¶ mative requirements for career advancement at competitive universities are based on traditional,¶ male life-cycle patterns and work schedules that are not convenient to many women (Hochschild,¶ 1975).¶ In the past, it has been difficult for women to successfully enter any prestigious and male-¶ dominated - hence, "non-traditional" - field (Epstein, 1970). Social psychological analyses (Med-¶ nick et. al., 1975) have identified some of the barriers still faced by college women seeking such¶ careers. Yet a recent compendium of student responses to a University of California ad-¶ ministrative query about sex discrimination on campus is replete with testimony from male¶ students that female students' sexuality now gives them an unfair advantage in this competition¶ (University of California, Berkeley, 1977). While women allude to numerous sexist remarks and¶ behaviors by faculty which derogate the abilities of women as a group, the male respondents¶ claim that individual women profit from their sexual attributes because male instructors go out of¶ their way to be "extra friendly" and helpful to them. According to the male perception, then, the¶ latitude permitted in the faculty-student relationship works - at the initiative of either instructor¶ or student - to the advantage of attractive women.¶ Some sociologists of higher education view faculty-student sexual exchanges only as women at-¶ tempting to use their sexuality to compensate for a lack of academic accomplishment:¶ Innumerable girls have found that a pretty face and a tight sweater were an adequate substitute for diligence and cleverness when dealing with a male teacher. Some, having been frustrated in efforts to get¶ by on this basis, have pushed matters further and ended up in bed-though not necessarily with an A¶ (Jencks and Riesman, 1968:427n).¶ Similarly, Singer's (1964:148) empirical study of the relationship between personal attrac-¶ tiveness and university grades relies on unsupported conjecture about female manipulativeness to¶ conclude that ". . . the poor college professor is . . . enticed by the female students ... as he goes¶ about his academic and personal responsibilities." In both studies we find the unquestioned¶ assumption that women (unfairly) capitalize on their sexuality in an otherwise meritocratic and¶ asexual relationship.7¶ Our analysis of sexual harassment as the nexus of power and sexual prerogative implies that,¶ from the woman's perspective, the situation is more complex and decidedly less sanguine. Rather¶ than having a unilateral "sex advantage," female students face the possibility that male instruc-¶ tors may manipulate sexual interest and authority in ways which ultimately undermine the posi-¶ tion of women in academia. Because women can no longer be openly denied access to educational¶ and professional training legally, sexual harassment may remain an especially critical factor of¶ more covert discrimination.
47 -AC
48 -
49 -Removing restrictions on free speech allows hate speech – hate speech IS free speech
50 -Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh,No, There’s No “hate Speech” Exception to the First Amendment, The Washington Post, 5/7/15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.05cfdd01dea4 //LADI
51 -I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.)
52 -
53 -A2 Chilling Effect
54 -Any chilling effect is outweighed by costs hate speech does to minority students. Hate speech codes is less onerous than other options. Ma 95
55 -
56 -Alice K. Ma Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges; J.D. candidate 1995 “Campus Hate Speech Codes: Affirmative Action in the Allocation of Speech Rights” 83 Calif. L. Rev. 693 March 1995
57 -
58 -At its worst, this chilling effect would silence speakers who did not use racial insults. Requiring innocent parties to bear part of the cost of a traditional affirmative action program is not by itself fatal to the program. As Chief Justice Burger noted about the set-aside scheme in Fullilove, "It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the expec *723 tations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." 179 However, restricting the speech of innocent parties is more significant than denying them a contracting opportunity. The chilling effect of hate speech regulations raises serious First Amendment questions.¶ Nevertheless, vagueness and overbreadth concerns are not unique to hate speech codes and can be addressed through careful drafting. Professors Richard Delgado and David Yun argue that it is technically feasible to draft constitutional campus antiracism rules. 180 Delgado and Yun suggest that such rules could prohibit expressions of racial hatred and contempt directly, or they could regulate behavior currently actionable in tort. 181 Either approach would satisfy current constitutional requirements. According to Delgado and Yun, all we lack is the will. 182¶ If they are instituted, the benefit flowing from campus hate speech codes would reach not only the victims of hate speech, who would see justice done, but also the entire community, which would benefit from the deterrent effect. However, this added benefit would not increase the costs of a hate speech code. In situations involving conventional affirmative action programs, extending benefits to those who have not themselves suffered from discrimination causes concern because of the corresponding additional burden on innocent parties. In contrast, campus hate speech regulations would not exact an additional price for the added benefit accrued by nonvictims. Those who engage in hate speech would not be penalized more harshly in order to benefit the community since this benefit, the deterrent effect, is built into the sanction that would be imposed in any case.¶ Other issues related to who carries the burden of preference programs are inapplicable to the hate speech context. The Court's emphasis on flexibility, exemplified by a waiver of the preference where the burden on the *724 majority group would be unfair, 183 is meaningless since no disciplinary action would be taken unless one student racially insulted another. It is difficult to imagine what would excuse racist speech, but any extenuating circumstances could be taken into account by campus authorities.¶ The second and final question, whether the harm caused to minorities justifies the burden imposed on student perpetrators, is more intractable. Ostensibly, censoring a student who has called another a "nigger" - and deterring others from so indulging themselves in the future - is less onerous than being denied admission in the first place, which, realistically, is the result of all school affirmative action programs for some applicants. 184 Although the Davis plan was struck down in Bakke, racial minorities routinely receive special consideration at many colleges and universities. By comparison, preferential layoff schemes like the one in Wygant do not survive strict scrutiny because they impose too heavy a burden on the innocent. However, being prevented from using racial insults seems less drastic to an individual than losing one's job. It is likely that most people consider their job more important than their freedom to insult people of color. This choice seems particularly clear when one considers that the burden imposed on perpetrators would be minimal. A narrowly drafted speech code would not proscribe, for example, non-intimidating speech on the subject of race and ethnicity in a neutral forum. On an individual level, therefore, hate speech codes do not impose a disproportionate burden.
59 -
60 -
61 -The idea that speech coeds spill over or chill speech is all hype – most students have never seen someone punished for expressing opinions . Posner 16
62 -Posner, Eric. (Eric Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair at the University of Chicago. His current research interests are international law and constitutional law) "Campus Free Speech Problems Are Less Than Meets the Eye." Cato Unbound . January 18, 2016. https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/01/08/eric-posner/campus-free-speech-problems-are-less-meets-eye.SP
63 -I don’t like political correctness any more than Greg Lukianoff does, but he exaggerates the problem and unfairly blames universities when the problem really lies with students. There are 5,300 colleges and universities in the United States. They educate approximately 20 million students every year. It is hardly surprising that campus administrators who enforce the rules blunder from time to time. In most of Lukianoff’s examples, the student (or professor, in one case) engaged in speech that was on the margin of other activities that are appropriately regulated, such as distributing leaflets and threatening students or faculty. The universities overreacted, but errors are unavoidable. He does not cite an example of a university punishing a student for merely expressing a view that people regard as offensive—Holocaust denial, or white supremacy, or criticism of Muslims, or opposition to affirmative action, or whatever. Moreover, nearly all of Lukianoff’s examples of quasi-censorship take place outside of the university’s core education and research mission. We’re talking about students complaining about how they are treated outside of class, not in it, often at the hands of other students or student organizations. As a law professor, I teach students who are graduates of colleges all around the country. I’ve taken to quizzing them about political correctness and censorship in their colleges. None of them have recounted classmates being punished by administrators for expressing their views. None of them have said that they refrained from expressing a view because of fears that the university would punish them. The few anecdotes I have heard from my students are, like Lukianoff’s, borderline cases where a student expresses views in a way that may threaten campus order, safety, and security. (One such example involved a student who made a bonfire of his books—apparently to express his sentiments about his education, but in a way that understandably caused concern to administrators.) The major threat to free discussion on campus is the ideological conformity of students—who are afraid of losing friends and being hassled by peers if they express ideologically idiosyncratic views—and not university administrators, who are mostly passive and remote. While it is true that most universities have speech codes, these codes are designed not to stifle but to enhance discussion by discouraging students from being rude to each other. One of the oddities of the American university is that students are expected to live together and not just attend classes together. Universities’ understandable but obsessive genuflection to the god of diversity means that students of radically different backgrounds and attitudes are thrown together. The idea is that they are supposed to learn from each other; the reality is that everyone must constantly be on his guard because it is so easy to inadvertently offend someone from a different background by innocently expressing one’s opinion. While Lukianoff and I can retreat from the public square to the privacy of our homes if we find public debate offensive, students who live in dorms have no such option. This is why students so frequently self-segregate by joining fraternities and clubs, and by moving off campus when allowed to. In this way, they act no differently from most Americans who self-segregate by moving to homogenous neighborhoods. But self-segregation within the university can go only so far, and this is why universities insist on the authority to punish students who “harass” each other—meaning who fail to be reasonably polite to each other. This is regulation of manners, not of speech or opinion—in the spirit of time, place, and manner regulations that governments are permitted to impose even under the strict doctrines of First Amendment law. University speech codes (at least, in private universities) go farther because campus life is different from public life. If a white student insists on telling his black roommate that affirmative action is wrong, I doubt any administrator would consider this a violation of speech codes. If instead he calls his roommate racial epithets, I suspect the university would intervene. I don’t know whether Lukianoff would regard this as a violation of the white student’s freedom of speech, but it would be ridiculous to require the black student to tolerate this boorish behavior.
64 -
65 -A2 Counterspeech
66 -Market place fails – cp necessary for successful counter speech. Multiple warrants - Bhikhu 12
67 -
68 -Parekh, Bhikhu. "Is there a case for banning hate speech?." The content and context of hate speech: Rethinking regulation and responses (2012): 37-56.
69 -
70 -Secondly, it is argued that evil ideas are best defeated not by banning them but by subjecting hem to a critical scrutiny and confronting them with opposite ideas. The answer to hate speech is not less but more speech. This argument makes a valid point but exaggerates it. It is true that respect for fellow human beings requires us to engage with their misguided but sincerely held beliefs, and that we should tackle the basis of these beliefs rather than suppress their public expressions. There are however limits to this approach. The market place of ideas, on whose competitive scrutiny and fairness this approach relies, is not neutral and does not provide level playing fields. It has its biases, and operates against the background of prevailing prejudices. When racist and xenophobic ideas are an integral part of a society’s culture, they appear self-evident, commonsensical, obvious, and enjoy a built-in advantage over their opposites. Furthermore, a fair competition between ideas requires that they should all enjoy equal access to the market place, including the popular media and other agencies through which they are communicated and critically engage with each other. This is rarely the case. Even assuming that the market is neutral and equally accessible to all bodies of ideas, it is naïve to imagine that evil ideas would always be worsted in their battle with good ones. Ideas do not operate in a social vacuum. They are bound up with interests, the prevailing structure of power and so on: the victory often goes to those enjoying the patronage of powerful groups or willing and able to manipulate people’s fears. Even so far as material products are concerned, competition does not ensure that quality triumphs over cheap and uniform products. There is no reason to expect a different outcome at the level of ideas. This is not to deny the importance of the market place of ideas, but rather to argue that, like the market in general, it needs to be subjected to certain regulative principles. This is what the ban on hate speech does. By allowing ideas to be freely expressed provided that they do not violate certain norms of mutual respect and civility, it ensures their fair competition, counters the weight of prevailing prejudices, and encourages the participation of those likely to be intimidated or alienated by hate speech.
71 -Counterspeech isn’t the best avenue – it places minorities in a dangerous situation and forces the burden of changing society onto them. Delgado and Yun ‘94
72 -Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley. David H. Yun – Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D. 1993, University of Colorado. “Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation.” California Law Review. 1994. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1712andcontext=californialawreview JJN
73 -D. "More Speech"-Talking Back to the Aggressor as a Preferable Solution to the Problem of Hate Speech Defenders of the First Amendment sometimes argue that minorities should talk back to the aggressor.85 Nat Hentoff, for example, writes that antiracism rules teach black people to depend on whites for protection, while talking back clears the air, emphasizes self-reliance, and strengthens one's self-image as an active agent in charge of one's own destiny.8 6 The "talking back" solution to campus racism draws force from the First Amendment principle of "more speech," according to which additional dialogue is always a preferred response to speech that some find troubling.87 Proponents of this approach oppose hate speech rules, then, not so much because they limit speech, but because they believe that it is good for minorities to learn to speak out. A few go on to offer another reason: that a minority who speaks out will be able to educate the speaker who has uttered a racially hurtful remark."8 Racism, they hold, is the product of ignorance and fear. If a victim of racist hate speech takes the time to explain matters, he or she may succeed in altering the speaker's perception so that the speaker will no longer utter racist remarks.8 9 How valid is this argument? Like many paternalistic arguments, it is offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith. In the nature of paternalism, those who make the argument are in a position of power, and therefore believe themselves able to make things so merely by asserting them as true.90 They rarely offer empirical proof of their claims, because none is needed. The social world is as they say because it is their world: they created it that way.91 In reality, those who hurl racial epithets do so because they feel empowered to do so. 92 Indeed, their principal objective is to reassert and reinscribe that power. One who talks back is perceived as issuing a direct challenge to that power. The action is seen as outrageous, as calling for a forceful response. Often racist remarks are delivered in several-on-one situations, in which responding in kind is foolhardy. 93 Many highly publicized cases of racial homicide began in just this fashion. A group began badgering a black person. The black person talked back, and paid with his life.94 Other racist remarks are delivered in a cowardly fashion, by means of graffiti scrawled on a campus wall late at night or on a poster placed outside of a black student's dormitory door.95 In these situations, more speech is, of course, impossible. Racist speech is rarely a mistake, rarely something that could be corrected or countered by discussion. What would be the answer to "Nigger, go back to Africa. You don't belong at the University"? "Sir, you misconceive the situation. Prevailing ethics and constitutional interpretation hold that I, an African American, am an individual of equal dignity and entitled to attend this university in the same manner as others. Now that I have informed you of this, I am sure you will modify your remarks in the future"? 96 The idea that talking back is safe for the victim or potentially educative for the racist simply does not correspond with reality. It ignores the power dimension to racist remarks, forces minorities to run very real risks, and treats a hateful attempt to force the victim outside the human community as an invitation for discussion. Even when successful, talking back is a burden. Why should minority undergraduates, already charged with their own education, be responsible constantly for educating others?
74 -
75 -
76 -A2 Underground
77 -Hate speech bans are good – underground movements are less effective and destructive, and there are still plenty of people who would be deterred and they allow for coalitions of targeted groups to fight back. Parekh 12
78 -Parekh, Bhikhu (2012) ‘Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?’, in Herz, M. and Molnar, P. (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–56. EE
79 -It is sometimes argued that banning hate speech drives extremist groups under- ground and leaves us no means of knowing who they are and how much support they enjoy. It also alienates them from the wider society, even makes them more detennined. and helps them recruit those attracted by the allure of forbidden fruit. This is an important argument and its force should not be underestimated. How- eyer, it has its limits. A ban on hate speech might drive extremist groups underground, but it also persuades their moderate and law-abiding members to dissociate them- selves from these groups. When extremist groups go underground, they are denied the oxygen of publicity and the aura of public respectability. This makes their oper- ations more difficult and denies them the opportunity to link up with other similar groups and recruit their members. While the ban might alienate extremist groups, it has the compensating advan- tage of securing the enthusiastic commitment and support of their target groups. Besides, beyond a certain point, alienation need not be a source of worry. Some religious groups are alienated from the secular orientation of the liberal state, inst as the communists and polyamoronsly inclined persons bitterly resent its commitment (respectively) to market economy and rnonogamy. We accept such forms of alien- ation as inherent in collective life and do not seek to redress them by abandoning the liberal state. The ban might harden the determination of some, but it is also likely to weaken that of those who seek respectability and do not want to be associated with ideas and groups considered so disreputable as to be banned, or who are deterred by the cost involved in supporting them. There is the lure of the prohibited, but there is also the attraction of the respectable.
EntryDate
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1 -2017-03-04 22:55:16.0
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1 -Deven Cooper
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1 -Elite of Irvine CL
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1 -32
Round
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1 -4
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
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1 -USC R4 NC
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1 -USC
Caselist.CitesClass[33]
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1 -1NC – Must Defend Topic (Long)
2 -
3 -Interpretation - The AFF may only garner offense from hypothetical enactment of the resolution
4 -
5 -This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter. Solves their method good offense – they can read __ as a framework argument to justify a topical plan, there’s no reason voting off it is key.
6 -
7 -Parcher 01 defines resolved
8 -
9 -Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)
10 -
11 -(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in original) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.
12 -
13 -Violation:
14 -
15 -They defend their advocacy text which isn’t the topic. Independently, they gain offense off their speech act. The standards will contextualize the violation
16 -
17 -Standards:
18 -
19 -1. Engagement – there are infinite non topical AFFs - a precise and predictable point of difference is key to effective dialogue. Steinberg and Freeley 13
20 -
21 -Steinberg and Freeley 13, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4. NS from file
22 -
23 -Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state¬ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec¬tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci¬sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam¬ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise¬ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi¬ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis¬course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta¬tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro¬vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden¬tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca¬demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri¬ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some¬thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca¬demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu¬nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless¬ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen¬tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec¬tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web¬site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo¬cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided
24 -
25 -Outweighs:
26 -A. Even if their method is good, it isn’t valuable if it’s not procedurally debatable – they don’t get access to any of their offense
27 -B. The best solutions are formed with critical contestation from multiple sides – it’s more likely we make a good liberation strategy if both debaters can engage and test it
28 -C. Debate is about process not content – we inevitably switch sides, even if it’s arguing against one method with another. The individual ideas we learn, like __, aren’t as valuable as learning how to effectively apply those ideas outside of round by engaging in precise discussions instead of just asserting opinions.
29 -D. They force the NEG to extremist generics – this is why cap and anthro are such common responses to their position - which causes more evasion than if we had a substantive debate about __ in the topic.
30 -E. It’s key to long term activism which turns case and outweighs because of existential threats. Lundberg 10
31 -
32 -Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311
33 -
34 -The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so~-~-~-~-These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world.
35 -
36 -
37 -2. Procedural Fairness - Non topical advocacies mean they can defend anything outside the resolution which is unpredictable, and also defend uncontestable offense like ___. This kills NEG ground and thus equal access to the ballot.
38 -
39 -This is an independent voting issue which outweighs:
40 -
41 -A. Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB.
42 -B. Fairness is key to effective dialogue. Galloway 07
43 -
44 -Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007)
45 -
46 -Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
47 -
48 -C. Links best to the role of the judge to determine the winner as per the ballot – that’s impossible if the round’s unfair. Even if their method is good for education there’s no reason you vote on it, just as even if exercise is good for soccer playerss you don’t vote for the team that ran most.
49 -
50 -D. T version of the AFF__
51 -
52 -Voter: Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse
53 -
54 -Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.
55 -No RVIs
56 -A. Topicality is a prima facie burden for the AFF. You wouldn’t vote for them just because they didn’t speak over their time limits and you shouldn’t vote for them for following the most basic rule of debate.
57 -B. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices,killing substantive clash on other flows.
58 -
59 -
60 -CAP K
61 -
62 -Unified action is crucial - individual politics in flux are easily crushed by capitalism. Ahmad 97
63 -
64 -Ahmad, Professorial Fellow at the Centre of Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi and is visiting Professor of Political Science at York University, 1997 (Aijaz, Culture, Nationalism, And the Role of Intellectuals in In defense of history). NS from file
65 -
66 -But then you have asked me also about future prospects for radical intellectuals in the United States, and you have said some provocative things about interest and identity groups, giving the example of blacks and gays and in a way feminism. Let me remark on the examples first. That everyone should have equal rights of course goes without saying. But there are also a number of ambiguities in relation to the political field. The gay rights movement, for example, cuts across the distinction between civil society and the state, the so-called private and the public. There are certain rectifi¬cations that only the state can undertake, and there is nothing structural about the U.S. state that prevents those rectifications. I don’t at all wish to minimize the extent of prejudice against homosexuality when I say that in the political field, properly so called, there is really nothing that prevents the U.S. state from absorbing the pressures of the gay rights movements within its authorized ideologies of pragmatism and pluralism. In that sense, the situation of women and blacks is quite different. Of course there are enormous prejudices against women and blacks, and of course these social prejudices are fully reflected in the behavior of the state. But I have something else in mind. The majority of blacks constitute a distinct underclass in the U.S. economy that has been reproduced over and over again since the time of slaveiy. The majority of women do the lowest paid work, in the United States and elsewhere; feminization of manual work in the core capitalist countries is part of the strategic offensive of capital against labor as such; and women’s unpaid housework is a fundamental component in minimizing the aggregate wage bill, hence for ensuring a certain rate of profit. Despite all the celebrated successes of feminism in certain areas of academic and cultural life in the United States, there have been no gains in the incomes of poor women, not to speak of black youth. The issue of justice to that vast majority of women and blacks goes to the very heart of the totality of U.S. life and cannot be fully resolved without revolutionaiy transformations. Some white, upper-class feminisms may cultivate the detachment you mentioned, but most women can’t afford that. That every group has the right to fight for members of that group also goes without saying. But I want to raise a much more difficult question about democracy. A great problem for socialist theory and practice today is that of the relationship between difference and universality, group rights and indivisible universal rights, the right as woman and the right as citizen, and the right as worker, whether citizen or immigrant. The postmodernist answer is simple: universality is a chimera; identities are local, contingent, freely chosen; rights of identity are absolute, and self-representation is the only authentic form of representation. This absolutization of identity, this quick abrogation of universality, strikes me as politically very dangerous. For a start: if in the constitution of your identity, I have no rights of cognition, participation, criticism, then on what basis may you ask for my solidarity with you except on the basis of some piety, some voluntaristic good will that I may withdraw at any moment? I can’t explicate this problem here, so let me reduce the scope of what I’m saying. You see, at this historical juncture, when the issue of people’s equal access to material goods has been posed by what I still call socialism, the capitalist state probably prefers to deal with a people that confronts it not in its unity but in its dispersal among communities and interest groups. Communities and interest groups typically raise the issue of social prejudice and distribution of the social surplus; the issue of the ownership of property as such can only be raised within the discourse of universal rights. Once we get distributed into distinct groups, our public rhetorics can then go on stressing how much we believe in everyone’s equal rights, but in the actual dealings with the state each community and each interest group can become a distinct supplicant competing with all others for its own share of the social surplus. One way of putting this may be that the capitalist state can perhaps live more easily with multiple and competing claimants on the social surplus that it governs, making sure that they cancel out each other, than with a radicalized politics of universal rights where each is to be the equal of all others, not just juridically but in every conceivable dimension, most cru¬cially the dimension of economic goods. What I am trying to say, I suppose, is that group egoism of discrete communities is perhaps not much of an improvement on the historical egoism of the bourgeois male individual, and that we need forms of politics that constitute human subjects both in their heterogeneity and their universality. (62-3)
67 -
68 -The assumption that signifiers and signs are the primary mode of exchange, and that playing with symbols is effective resistance, only glorifies consumption at the expense of understanding how labor exploitation orders society. This is a viewpoint that can only be taken by upper middle class intellectuals who are already divorced from need.
69 -Zavarzadeh PhD 95
70 -(Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, post-ality: Marxism and postmodernism, post-ality the (dis)simulations of cybercapitalism)
71 -This noninstrumental "consumption" is a semiotic act; "a system of com¬munication" (Selected Writings 46), a mode of forming and disseminating "mean¬ings" above and beyond the functionality of consumption. "A washing machine serves as equipment and plays as an element of comfort, or of prestige, etc. It is the field of play that is specifically the field of consumption" (Selected Writings 44; emphasis added). When one buys a pair of "designer" jeans, one does not simply respond to a "need" (to keep warm, for instance) but acts on the pulsation of "desire": to express oneself and in doing so become involved in a purposeless practice that is essentially an aesthetic act ("play"). For Baudrillard, post-ality is the articulation of this mode of consumption: early capitalism is marked by functional consumption which perpetuates production while post-al capitalism ("consumer society") is a break from this functionalism. Consumption, in post-al capitalism becomes an end in itself, an "excessive play: a sheer "waste"—a carnival, a re¬gime of festivities and prodigalities. Consumption in Baudrillard's theory, then, is not determined by such classical Marxist concepts as "use-value" and "exchange" value but by "sign value." The signs and meanings produced through prodigal expenditure are signs that cannot be easily absorbed back into the established system of codes that now controls all significations. Consumption is both anti-production and anti-regulatory: it is a process of excessive signification that cannot be contained by the dominant mode of signification. "Conspicuous consumption" for Baudrillard is then essentially a resistant semiotic act—an act of intervention in the order of established meanings and rep¬resentations legitimated by capitalism. Prodigal "consumption" is, according to him, a radical negation of capitalism. The act of consumption therefore is not ex¬hausted by its instrumentality and usefulness (it is, in terms of his later writings, a mode of "seduction" a form of opposition to production and procreation); it is the signifier of an irradicable negative (that cannot be assimilated in a Marxist dialecti¬cal synthesis) and constitutes the principle of post-al mutation. The form of capital¬ism that could be analyzed in Marxist terms of political economy, Baudrillard maintains, has ended and, an entirely new analytics that he calls, the "political economy of the sign" (Mirror 121) is needed to make sense of post-al capitalism. However, Baudrillard's understanding of the Marxist concept of "produc¬tion" as a "mirror" is not simply a misrecognition but is also ideological in the sense that the logic of its misrecognition is a class logic: it legitimates the (economic) interests of the ruling class. The Marxist theory of "production," contrary to Baudrillard, Habermas, Butler, Cornel West and other critics of the "production paradigm," does not reduce all human activities to "labor"; rather it is a theory of the emancipation of humans from necessity and the freedom from the capitalist form of labor. Baudrillard's notion of "symbolic exchange" is simply a post-al colo¬nial nostalgia for "primitive" society; a transhistorical utopia for the North Atlantic elite who has freed itself from necessity—at the cost of the labor of the other—and now regards the main question of humanity to be not "production" but destructive "consumption." For this class, life is lived ludically: the playfulness that erases the use-value of the objects of necessity in order to turn them into moments of the aesthetic sublime. Post-al theories, in general, proclaim to "deconstruct" the metaphysics of labor. Consumptionist theories after Baudrillard, however, have used the deconstruction of "production" as their foundation for proving the autonomy of capital from labor and consumption from class/production. One of the main signs of post-al society, according to Stuart Hall, is that "there is a leading role for con¬sumption, reflected in such things as greater emphasis on choice and product dif¬ferentiation, on marketing, packaging and design, on 'targeting' of consumers by life-style, taste and culture rather than by the Registrar General's categories of so¬cial class" ("The Meaning of New Times" 118). One of the un-saids of the displace¬ment of production by consumption is the notion that capitalism is a response not to profit but to the "free choice" (desire) of individuals: it is the consumption and desire for difference that drives capital, and, as such, capitalism is not only not antagonistic to human needs but is in fact a direct response to them. "The private control of the sovereign consumer" is portrayed in these reactionary theories as "real, visible and tangible" (Mulgan, "The Power of the Weak" 358). Consumption in post-al theory has become the trope of the indeterminacy of production. In its privileging of "consumption," post-al theory privileges individual "choice" over human "needs": it is, in short, a class theory. Thus, even though the displacement of production is a move made in the name of epistemological neces¬sity—to provide a more accurate knowledge of capitalism now—it is, in practice, an ideological alibi for what Hall's statement clearly marks: the removal of "class struggle" from the scene of the social in the interest of increasing the freedom of choice for the upper middle classes within the existing socio-economic structures. These critics announce the end of socialism and with it the outdatedness of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post¬al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, they envision an enlightened radical democracy to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Fukuyama, Mouffe, Cornell West, Aronowitz, Butler and others have advised) and make property holders of each citizen. This, needless to say, is the Thatcherist notion of property-owning democracy represented as a radical differential socialism. For theorists of radical democracy, it is only by means of conspicuous and prodigal "owning" (which en¬ables consumption to become transfunctional and symbolic) that one can be resituated outside the system of exchange and be set free from the repressive utili¬tarianism of capitalism. The "sign" (constructed through conspicuous consump¬tion) and not "labor" is the formative force in post-al capitalism, and, therefore, it is the "control of the code" (Mirror 122) and not seizing of the means of produc¬tion that is the urgent question for political struggle in the post-al moment. The post-al question, to be clear, is no longer the end of exploitation in the form of putting an end to the extraction of surplus labor (communism) but a more equi¬table distribution ("consumption") among people, regardless of their race, gender, sexualities, nationalities, of the surplus value produced by the exploitation of the proleteriat. The proliferation of post-al "social movements" (feminism, anti-racism, environmentalism, queer theory, postnationalism) are part of this abandoning the project of the emancipation of humanity from labor under capitalism (exploitation) and instead instituting in its place the libertarian goal of freedom of consump¬tion. The project of emancipation is seen in post-al theories as a universalizing and totalitarian undertaking (Butler, "Poststructuralism") that disregards the difference/ differance—what Drucilla Cornell calls, "each of us in her singularity" (113). Cornell is, of course, annotating here what Derrida (quoting Levinas) calls "the equitable honoring of faces" ("Forces of Law" 959) of each consumer. In restoring differ¬ence/differance, post-al theories, in Bell's word, "uncouple" production from con¬sumption. The emergence of theories of consumption, these theorists argue, is the proof that the "political" (the freedom of the subject) is what, in the post-al mo¬ment, determines the economic. However, the popularity of consumptionist theo¬ries has very little to do with the political or the freedom of the subject: it is a not so subtle device for reducing overproduction. Far from asserting the autonomy of the subject, it, in fact, demonstrates how the freedom of the subject under capitalism is always the freedom that enhances the economic interests of the owners of the means of production. 15-18
72 -
73 -Baudrillard’s consumer society and ideas concerning hyperreality and simulation render laborers invisible
74 -Ebert 96 Teresa Ebert, Professor in the Department of English at University at Albany State University of New York, Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism, University of Michigan Press, pages 137-139
75 -
76 -The other side of the ludic valorization of consumption is the erasure of needs. This is especially evident in Baudrillard’s hypereality of simulations, signs and simulacra. Needs, for Baudrillard, “are nothing; there is only the system of needs,” defined as “the product of the system of production” (“Consumer Society”, 43, 42). But the system of production, for Baudrillard, as we have already seen, “is itself hyperreal” (Simulations 44) and enmeshed in the semiotic codings of commodities and simulacra. Needs, in other words, are themselves local simulations of desire, which is insatiable because it is founded on a lack…a need is not a need for a particular object as much as it is a “need” for difference (the desire for social meaning), only then will we understand that satisfaction can never be fulfilled, and consequently that there can never be a definition of needs. (“Consumer Society” 45) Baudrillard’s consumer society not only deploys semiotics to supplant capitalism, but socialism as well. For socialism, as a society organized to fulfill real, material needs, becomes both unnecessary and impossible when needs are seen as merely the insatiable need for difference: part of the unending chain of significations covering over the lack that is desire. This ludic postmodern consumer society and commodified culture of simulated needs –described by Baudrillard and embraced by such other postmodern critics as Arthur Kroker –is primarily the affluent world of the privileged. As Baudrillard says, “We are everywhere surrounded by the remarkable conspicuousness of consumption and affluence, established by the multiplication of objects, services, and material goods. This now constitutes a fundamental mutation in the ecology of the human species" (“Consumer Society” 29). Is this a fundamental mutation, or is it a continuation and intensification of the class inequalities of capitalism globally? The new society of "consummativity" is a society of consumers whose basic needs are already met and whose practices of consumption are thus concerned with the circulation of desire through the codes of commodities and simulated needs. Feminism cannot limit its practices to a Baudrillardian consumer society. The severe limits of Baudrillard’s consumer society and much of the post-Marxist logic of New Times are effectively described by Neil Lazarus? Even though Lazarus does not use the concept of ludic postmodernism, many of his observations are applicable to it. For instance, the Indie concept of consumer society is, as Lazarus says of Baudrillard, based on an "unwarranted generalization entailed in his redefinition of a putatively dominant cultural practices—consumption—as constitutive of society itself. Once society is defined exclusively in terms of consumption, those who are not consumers become invisible" (97). In other words, by making a cultural practice constitutive of society, ludic critics not only engage in a highly reductive overgeneralization, but they erase labor itself. As Lazarus says, they "exclude all those who are not 'consumers,’ but whose labor makes ‘consummativity' possible” (97). They exelude both those who produce commodities as well as those who produce subsistence—neither of whom have access to the value, the profits of their surplus labor, the exploitation of which provides the surplus value, the capital, for those who do consume.
77 -Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
78 - ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
79 -Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system ~-~- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return.
80 -
81 -The alternative is to abandon the affirmative’s hope for more discourse in favor of militant class struggle – rather than looking for new ways to dissent, a radical leftist project must begin with reimagining political formations outside of capitalism. The real lesson of the 60’s is that activism centered on rights is a failed project that the affirmative tries to reinvent, which will lead to the same result. Hickel 12
82 -
83 -Hickel, Jason London School of Economics and Political Science, and Arsalan Khan University of Virginia. "The culture of capitalism and the crisis of critique." Anthropological Quarterly 85.1 (2012): 203-227.
84 -
85 -We began this essay with the observation that, at the very moment when¶ neoliberal ideologues are zealously advancing the “free market” by invoking¶ the grand moral principles of liberty and freedom, American progressives¶ are content to speak in a utilitarian and technocratic language that aims¶ for “balanced” solutions through rational consensus. This reflects how the¶ Left in America no longer sees its historical role as one of ensuring socioeconomic¶ justice in the face of exploitation by a clearly defined adversary¶ like “the Right” or “the elite.” Instead, progressives seem preoccupied¶ with another, more diffuse constellation of threats: political polarization,¶ the decline of civility in public discourse, and increasing ideological rigidity¶ and zeal. This is why some representatives of the American liberal-left, like¶ Jon Stewart, have been so adamant about blaming “extremists” on both¶ sides of the political aisle, and why the Obama campaign succeeded on a¶ relatively vague platform of cooperation, compromise, “hope,” and “unity.”¶ That this appears to so many as a better kind of politics makes sense within¶ a cultural framework that sees ideological conflict as illusory rather than¶ substantive, as a result of misunderstanding and misrepresentation rather¶ than a product of incommensurable interests or structural inequities. In¶ such a world, conflict can be redressed through a shared commitment to¶ civility, consensus building, openness, and diversity.¶ It bears pointing out briefly that this trend has been paralleled to some¶ extent by discourses about globalization in culture studies, post-colonial¶ studies, and, indeed, some strands of anthropology. Jonathan Friedman¶ (2002) has famously criticized Bhabha (1994), Appadurai (1993), and Malkki¶ (1992) for celebrating hybridity and cosmopolitanism as the antidote¶ to the chauvinism of nationalist and other essentialist identities, which¶ they see as inherently violent because they are preoccupied with defending¶ cultural boundaries against the threatening Other. Friedman rightly¶ argues that the celebration of hybridity and cosmopolitanism obscures¶ the violent exclusions that face the vast majority of people who cannot¶ partake of globalization’s “cut ‘n’ mix culture” (2002:33). Like the forms¶ of progressive politics that we have discussed above, this literature thoroughly¶ depoliticizes globalization and rationalizes neoliberal capitalism.¶ Fortunately, this has not been the last word on the matter: in the past¶ decade, a number of anthropologists have gone to great lengths to theorize¶ the violent contradictions of neoliberalism. Kalb, following Polanyi,¶ insists on seeing globalization as “a political project of globally imposed marketization…sponsored by transnational class segments within the¶ core northern states and its comprador allies in dependent economies”¶ (2005:177). Friedman (2003) stresses how class polarization has created¶ cosmopolitan elites who are self-consciously global and hybrid, while at¶ the same time generating intense forms of cultural closure and chauvinism¶ among those most adversely affected by neoliberal policy. Carrier¶ and Heyman take a similar approach to the study of consumption, arguing¶ for a radical departure from prevailing “psycho-cultural” analyses that¶ tend to “ignore or simplify inequalities and conflict” (1997:355).¶ To quote Žižek (2009a) once again, “The aim of progressive politics¶ should be to reconstruct society in such a way that poverty will be impossible.”¶ But the altruistic virtues of cultural capitalism and development¶ hobble this project by obscuring the exploitative relations of production¶ that generate poverty and inequality in the first place, and by appropriating¶ the critical capacities of the Left. These new trends appear to sanitize¶ capitalism, to obviate its contradictions. They make capitalism seem¶ palatable and benevolent. Instead of imagining real alternatives to global¶ capitalism, many progressives today content themselves with promoting¶ TOMS Shoes, Ethos water, and Alternative Spring Break with evangelical¶ zeal. This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized¶ our capacity to imagine alternatives, and has transformed our potential¶ for meaningful political critique and activism into a profoundly depoliticized,¶ consumerist passivity. As a result, progressives in America have¶ largely abandoned the task of confronting the antagonisms intrinsic to¶ market capitalism. This is not to say that progressives do not care about¶ growing inequality and mounting human suffering in America and abroad.¶ They do. However, in many cases, their energies have been channeled¶ into the spirit of rebellious and virtuous consumption and the moral project¶ of development, which may mitigate the effects of capitalist production¶ (although this too is questionable) but will never address the ultimate¶ causes of our contemporary economic crises.¶ This is partly the unfortunate, and unintended, legacy of some strands¶ of thinking located within the New Left of the 1960s, and even within the¶ much-lauded Frankfurt School. To be sure, the overriding concern with¶ individual autonomy and authentic self-expression that permeated the¶ intellectual and political milieu of the 1960s helped secure important¶ legal and political rights, and made possible the notion of a more inclusive¶ and multicultural nation. Broadly speaking, these legal and politi-cal rights have created opportunities for select members of racial and¶ ethnic minorities and women to enter into an elite world from which they¶ had previously been barred. Although their place within this elite remains¶ suspect and conditional, often predicated on their ability and willingness¶ to participate in cultural activities that are themselves marked¶ by race and gender bias, these new rights have not significantly altered¶ the actual distribution of powers either within America or within global¶ capitalist society more broadly. Indeed, as we have shown, capitalism¶ largely appropriated the idea of individual rights and liberties and the¶ anti-society ethos of the times to facilitate neoliberal forms of consumption¶ and production. Moreover, given that corporations also have the¶ legal status of individuals, they have taken advantage of the very same¶ laws that were designed to protect individual rights and freedoms, and¶ this has facilitated an unprecedented consolidation of corporate power.¶ What this period furnished in place of a substantial redistribution of¶ wealth and power is the appearance of freedom and choice. Consumers—at¶ least those with sufficient resources—now have the freedom¶ to fashion our identities as mainstream or alternative and to choose¶ between regular, rebellious, and virtuous commodities; but we cannot¶ opt out of the system, and we are not free to reconsider the fundamental¶ violence at the heart of our capitalist society.¶ Progressives in America today remain largely circumscribed within¶ the neoliberal paradigm. This fact becomes particularly clear in debates¶ about military policy. For instance, Democrats have fought hard to repeal¶ “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” so that homosexuals can have the freedom to¶ serve in the military, but they have left the military-industrial complex itself¶ mostly unscrutinized. Discussions about the War on Terror tend to fall¶ along similar lines. While certain progressive circles have advanced radical¶ critiques, the dominant concern remains that “national security” has¶ come at the expense of liberty and freedom for citizens at home. Generally¶ speaking, this approach fails to recognize that liberty in America has¶ always been a privilege primarily reserved for white, middle-class males,¶ and that its extension or denial to others is largely contingent on the historical¶ needs of capitalism. Furthermore, the notion of liberty that functions¶ domestically as a critique of state overreach is deployed at the same¶ time to rationalize the belligerent use of military force around the world,¶ and to underwrite the imperial project of violently restructuring foreign¶ governments and economies in accordance with neoliberal principles. In the Muslim world, this is the very process that—because of the humiliation,¶ poverty, and conspicuous inequalities that it generates—bloats the¶ ranks of militant movements. In light of this, any thorough critique of the¶ War on Terror will require that scholars and activists examine the links between¶ American imperial interests in the Muslim world and the systemic¶ needs of capitalist accumulation.
86 -
87 -
88 -The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan.
89 -
90 -First, neoliberalism is a conceptual framework that has to be challenged at the level of scholarship. Godrej 14
91 -Farah Godrej Department of Political Science¶ University of California-Riverside “neoliberalism, Militarization, and the Price of dissent¶ Policing Protest at the University of California¶ “Edited by Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. The Imperial University. University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
92 -I have offered here a particular window into the ways in which the interests, mechanisms, and operations of both the university system and the neoliberal state are aligned with those of private capital. Of course, that the academy is made to strategically ally with capital as a key piece of neoliberal consolida- tion should not surprise us. Rather, what is worth noting, I have argued here, is the necessity of the linkages between disinvestment in public education, militarization, and the criminalization of dissent. These necessary link- ages demonstrate this volume’s premise that the university is an institution embedded in the hierarchies and inequalities of U.S. racial, gender, and class politics and shed light on the confluence of military and industrial interests as they appear within the U.S. university. I have sought also to emphasize the systematicity and multilayered complexity of this phenomenon. That is, the various pieces of this picture necessarily go together, as rhetoric, law, bureaucracy, and the force of arms all combine effectively to produce the desired end.¶ The neoliberal logic entailed in the privatization of the University of Cal- ifornia is, I have argued, necessarily interlinked with the logic of militari- zation and the criminalization of dissent, because it employs a militarized enforcement strategy, coupled with a political rhetoric that criminalizes the specific behaviors involved in protest and dissent against these strate- gies. The militarization of the university campus is thus not simply a reflec- tion of the increasing militarization of American law enforcement based on the logic of ongoing threats to public safety encoded in years of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.25 Rather, such militarization is one prong of a necessary enforcement strategy designed to convey that dissent against privatization is meant to be costly in inflicting various forms of legitimized violence upon those who dissent. The second prong of the enforcement strategy also conveys that dissenters will pay a high price by being criminal- ized, either through rhetoric that paints them as violent and therefore mar- ginal, unworthy, and undesirable in the public imagination or through legal machinations that force them to expend tremendous financial resources on extricating themselves from prosecution.¶ The language of cost and price here, of course, reminds us of the ongo- ing hegemony—and perhaps victory—of the conceptual frameworks of neoliberalism and its theoretical accompaniments, such as rational choice theory, predominantly featured in neoclassical economics. These strategies of criminalization and militarization rest on sending signals to adversaries, encoded precisely in these languages, wherein value and worth are measured in terms of indicators such as price or cost, and rational actors are assumed to be guided by a universally comprehensible incentive structure. Thus the strategies of criminalization and militarization rest on de-incentivizing dis- sent, so to speak, assuming that dissenters will measure the costs inherent in their actions and choose rationally to cease from engaging in such dissent. The continued insistence on dissent is therefore resistance to the logic of neoliberal privatization on multiple levels: it not only calls out the complic- ity of the university with the neoliberal state and the forces of private capital but also continues to dissent despite the “incentives” offered in exchange for desisting from dissent. And in so doing, it should be signaling its rejection not simply of privatization but of the entire conceptual baggage of neolib- eralism, including its logics of rational choice, cost, price, and incentive, as well as its logic of structural violence. In other words, the ongoing struggle against the logic of neoliberal privatization requires that dissent continue, despite its high “price.”¶
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1 -Gabriela Gonzalez
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1 -Chaminade JT
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1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
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1 -USC R6 NC
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1 -USC
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1 -T - Protect
2 -A: interpretation the affirmative may only defend that public colleges and universities eliminate restrictions on constitutionally protected speech.
3 -
4 -B: Title IX doesn’t apply to protected speech. It only restricts unprotected speech. Office for Civil Rights 07
5 -
6 -Office for Civil Rights. 1/25/07 The Department has determined that this document is a “significant guidance document” under the Office of¶ Management and Budget’s Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007),¶ available at The Office for¶ Civil Rights (OCR) issues this and other policy guidance to provide recipients with information to assist them in meeting¶ their obligations, and to provide members of the public with information about their rights, under the civil rights laws¶ and implementing regulations that we enforce. OCR’s legal authority is based on those laws and regulations. This¶ guidance does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and examples to inform recipients¶ about how OCR evaluates whether covered entities are complying with their legal obligations. If you are interested in¶ commenting on this guidance, please send an e-mail with your comments to OCR@ed.gov, or write to the following UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION¶ OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf
7 -
8 -Answer: The DCL on sexual violence did not expressly address First Amendment issues¶ because it focuses on unlawful physical sexual violence, which is not speech or expression¶ protected by the First Amendment.¶ However, OCR’s previous guidance on the First Amendment, including the 2001 Guidance,¶ OCR’s July 28, 2003, Dear Colleague Letter on the First Amendment,35 and OCR’s October¶ 26, 2010, Dear Colleague Letter on harassment and bullying,36 remain fully in effect. OCR¶ has made it clear that the laws and regulations it enforces protect students from¶ prohibited discrimination and do not restrict the exercise of any expressive activities or¶ speech protected under the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, when a school works to prevent and redress discrimination, it must respect the free-speech rights of students, faculty, and¶ other speakers.¶ Title IX protects students from sex discrimination; it does not regulate the content of¶ speech. OCR recognizes that the offensiveness of a particular expression as perceived by¶ some students, standing alone, is not a legally sufficient basis to establish a hostile¶ environment under Title IX. Title IX also does not require, prohibit, or abridge the use of¶ particular textbooks or curricular materials.37
9 -
10 -
11 -The affirmative makes unprotected speech protected, which is distinct from restrictions on already protected speech.
12 -
13 -C: Limits – if the aff doesn’t defend protected speech then there’s an infinite amount of plans that they can defend because they can specify any kind of speech becoming permissible. Limits kill fairness – if there’s no basis to predict their aff then we can’t prep it and will only get generics that don’t really apply to their aff. Infinte pre round prep means they’ll roast us on generics every time. Also kills education and engagement - if we can’t predict their aff than discussion is bad and we don’t’ learn anything.
14 -
15 -Also jurisdiction is independent voter – a) Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it’s the only impact you can evaluate. B) The AFF isn’t topical regardless of fairness or education since it doesn’t affirm the text - we wouldn’t debate guns again just because it was a good topic.
16 -
17 -
18 -Voter is fairness – debate is a competitive activity and you have to decide who did the better debating, which is impossible if they structure their case where it’s impossible for me to win.
19 -
20 -Drop the debater on T:
21 -
22 -A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground.
23 -
24 -B. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy
25 -
26 -Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.
27 -
28 -No RVIs:
29 -
30 -A. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows. B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2ar to their shell.
31 -Extra-T
32 -A: interpretation: The affirmative may only garner offense on repealing restrictions on constitutionally protected free speech.
33 -
34 -B: The aff is extra-T. Title IX includes a lot more than just speech. The aff is also FX T, it doesn’t cause free speech, but passes a policy that would lead to an increase in free speech.
35 -
36 -Extra T and FX T are voting issues – it lets them get offense off of planks we can’t predict because there’s no grounding in the topic. If we can’t prep their AFF then they’ll always win because they can research the best frontlines and use the extra t advantage to outweigh our offense.
37 -
38 -Also, it kills the best neg offense because they can add extra planks that make our best offense not apply or less relevant.
39 -
40 -Empirically proven in this round - their first advantage is about gender violence and research.
41 -
42 -Cap
43 -The idea that we only need to talk about sexual harassment more to understand it is based on the neoliberal myth that all we are missing from revolution is more democracy. This diverts focus from class. Dean 14
44 -
45 -Dean, Jodi. "13 After Post-Politics: Occupation and the Return of Communism." The post-political and its discontents: Spaces of depoliticization, spectres of radical politics (2014): 261.
46 -
47 -The US Left has not been completely without vision. It uniformly asserts the primacy of democracy. In a rich discussion of the conver- gence of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, Wendy Brown high- lights de-democratisation as its central force and threat (2006). The details of Brown’s analysis are evocative, but her overall account is unpersuasive because it both presumes a prior democracy, a previous acceptance and practice of democracy that is now unravelling, and neglects the hegemony of democratic rhetoric today. Democracy was long a contested category in US politics, subordinated to individual and states’ rights, and valued less than elites’ property and privilege. Anxieties over the tyranny of the majority, the great unwashed, immigrants, Catholics, workers, women, blacks and the young infused the American system from its inception. The combination of civil rights, students and new social movements in the 1960s with rapid expansion in communications media enabling people to reg- ister their opinions, contact representatives and organise gatherings and protests has, contra Brown, realised democratic aspirations to a previously unimaginable degree. Far from de-democratised, the contemporary ideological formation of communicative capitalism fetishises speech, opinion and participation. Communicative capital- ism materialises and repurposes democratic ideals and aspirations in ways that strengthen and support globalised neoliberalism. In fact, the proliferation, distribution, acceleration and intensification of communicative access and opportunity produce a deadlocked democracy incapable of serving as a forum for progressive political and economic change.¶ The problem of the last decades is not de-democratisation. It has been the Left’s failure to defend a vision of economic equality and solidarity, in other words, its betrayal of communism. When democ- racy appears as both the condition of politics and the solution to the political condition, capitalism cannot appear as the violence it is. Rather than assuming the underlying class conflict, one assumes a field generally fair and equal enough for deliberation and voting to make sense, the basic assumption of post-politics.¶ In some settings, an emphasis on democracy is radical, like the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the initial fight for politi- cal freedom that led to the Russian February Revolution, as well as in struggles against colonialism and imperialism, and even in opposi- tion to the authoritarianism of the party-state bureaucracies of the former East. To stand for democracy in these instances was to stand against an order constituted through the exclusion of democracy. In contemporary parliamentary democracies, however, for leftists to refer to their goals as a struggle for democracy is strange. It is a defence of the status quo, a call for more of the same. Democracy is our ambient milieu, the hegemonic form of contemporary politics. That democracy is widely accepted did not stop the 2011 protest movements from presenting themselves in its name. In fact, democ- racy was the other side of the ‘politics of no politics’ urged in Greece, Spain and Occupy Wall Street. The 2011 Spanish protest camps and street occupations opted explicitly for a politics of no politics. Opposing high unemployment and steep spending cuts, thousands of people from throughout Spanish society took to the streets in a massive mobilisation. Multiple voices, participants as well as com- mentators, emphasised that no common line, platform or orienta- tion united the protesters; they were not political. For many, the intense, festive atmosphere and break from the constraints of the usual politics incited a new confidence in social change. Discussion groups in the multiple assemblies approved a wide variety of motions that included raising taxes on the rich, eliminating the privileges of the political elite, controlling banks and providing for inexpensive and ecologically friendly public transportation. At the same time, the refusal of representation and reluctance to implement decision mechanisms hampered actual debate, enabling charismatic indi- vidual speakers to move the crowd and acquire quasi-leadership positions (no matter what position they took), and constraining pos- sibilities of working through political divergences toward a collective plan (prominent voices insisted that the movement was not politi- cal). The mobilisation of thousands, the experience of occupation and resistance, was a vital political step, a clear indication of mass opposition to a state serving the interests of capital (Schneider 2011). For a while, it broke with ‘the network of inert habits’ previously inhibiting and displacing oppositional struggle (Badiou 2011: 35). Yet insofar as the assemblies were deliberative rather than executive bodies (in an unfortunate inverse of the Paris Commune), the action they set in motion was foreshortened, ineffective.¶ The occupation of Athens’ Syntagma Square that began on 25 May 2011 similarly rejected representation, introducing a number of organisational innovations that prioritised the inclusion of indi- vidual voices over the inclusion of tendencies, groups and previ- ously developed political positions. The innovations included the formation of a set of working groups, thematic assemblies and a general assembly with the Right to make decisions and before which speakers were chosen by lot.2 These arrangements expanded oppor- tunities for political expression. They installed a gap in the everyday, allowing a glimpse into the possibility of another world. According to some commentators, though, the large general assembly also re-induced passivity as people started to equate action with voting and to refrain from engaging in direction action.3 The participa- tion without representation approach hindered the development of a specific plan, strategy or vision of an alternative to the austerity programme the Greek government ultimately acquiesced to under IMF pressure. The movement of the squares risked becoming an end in itself rather than an element of a larger political strategy aiming towards ending capitalism and developing equitable and common relations of production.¶ These same patterns reappeared in Occupy Wall Street. On the one hand, the openness of the movement, its rejection of party identification, made it initially inviting to a wide array of those dis- contented with continued unemployment, increasing inequality and political stagnation in the US. On the other, when combined with the consensus-based process characteristic of the General Assemblies (adopted from the Spanish and Greek occupations), this inclusivity had detrimental effects, hindering the movement’s ability to take a strong stand against capitalism and for collective control over common resources.¶ The ‘politics of no-politics’ meme seeking to trump class and eco- nomic struggle in the Spanish, Greece and US protests was not new. It was a reappropriation of the idea of post-politics. From post-politics’ initial appearance as a description of a technocratic state intent on managing populations in the service of capital, to its subsequent deployment in critical analyses of governance under neoliberalism, it manifested itself again in activists’ misunderstanding of their own oppositional movement. Avoiding the division and antagonism that comes with taking a political position, they displaced their energies onto procedural concerns with inclusion and participation, as if the content of the politics were either given – a matter of identity – or sec- ondary to the fact of inclusion, which makes the outcome of political struggle less significant than the process of deliberation. As Manuel Castells described the Spanish acampadas: ‘what is transformative is the process rather than the product’ (2011). Many in Spain, Greece and Occupy named their goal democracy, envisioning their struggles specifically as a struggle for democracy (rather than for the abolition of private property, collective ownership of the means of production, and economic equality within an already democratic setting). Some Occupy Wall Street activists, for example, tried to make money in politics the primary issue, as if inequality were primarily an effect of a broken political system rather than a constitutive attribute of capitalism.¶ If occupation is understood as a tactic, it becomes clear that these movements are not primarily democratic, and framing them as such is a symptom of the continued ideological suasion of post-politics. Occupation is not a democratic process; it is a militant, divisive tactic that expresses the fundamental division on which capitalism depends. Occupiers actively reject democratic institutions, break the law, disrupt public space, squander public resources, and attempt to assert the will of a minority of vocal protesters outside of and in contradiction to democratic procedures. This assertion is what made Occupy and the other movements so strong, so invigorating – they were divisive in a setting that attempted to reduce division to matters of personal opinion, taste or faith. Unfortunately, emphases on democracy led activists and commentators to underplay this com- ponent of the movement.¶ One of the clearest early statements of the democratic underpin- nings of the 2011 movements came from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who viewed them not only as calls for a ‘real democracy’ but also as experiments in a democracy liberated from the constraints of representation. Further developing their argument in the short book Declaration (2012), they emphasise direct and horizontal participa- tion in political decision-making, again viewing the movements as nascent and local forms of what is needed on a larger scale.¶ The problem with Hardt and Negri’s democratic depiction of the movements is not that it clashes with the self-understanding of par- ticipants, for many share their view. Nor is the problem their empha- sis on participation and decision-making rather than execution, itself another instance of the way enthusiasm for horizontality results in a Left disregard for what Marx noted as a key achievement of the Paris Commune, namely, the fact that it acted as an executive rather than a parliamentary body. The problem is that the language of democracy is post-political. It avoids the fundamental antagonism of class conflict and proceeds as if the only thing really missing were participation. This avoidance of antagonism leads to a disavowal of division within the movements – and thus effectively to the post-political move that seeks to individualise, displace and manage political division.¶ Consider, for example, one of the early challenges facing Occupy Wall Street: with what was it concerned? To what wrong or crime was the movement responding? Early reluctance to name capital- ism the crime and the wealthiest 1 per cent the enemy made it seem as if Ron Paul supporters, anti-Fed (the US Federal Reserve Bank) conspiracy theorists and anti-tax libertarians were as much a part of the movement as those demanding jobs for all, a guaranteed minimum income, campaign finance reform, and the restoration of the Glass-Steagall legislation separating commercial and investment banking. Because the movement was committed to a consensus-based approach to democratic decision-making, capitalism’s supporters could install themselves as permanent obstacles to the articulation of any goals or demands deemed unacceptable by virtue of being too pro-union, socialist or communist.¶ Or consider the debate over demands (Deseriis and Dean 2012). In Occupy Wall Street, the debate over whether Occupy should issue demands obscured the fact that the people coming together in the name of the 99 per cent were an assemblage of politically and economically divergent subjectivities, not an actual social bloc. The refusal to be represented by demands was actually the refusal or ina- bility to make an honest assessment of the social composition of the movement so as to develop a politics in which different forces and perspectives do not simply neutralise each other in the search for a position with which everyone could agree. Such inability was further obfuscated by emphases on democratic processes and participation. In order to avoid conflicts and pursue the myth of consensus, the movement produced within itself autonomously operating groups, committees and caucuses. These groups were brought together through structures of mediation such as the General Assembly and the Spokes Council, which struggled to find a common ground amidst the groups’ members’ divergent political and economic posi- tions. Positions were so divergent and the likelihood of achieving even modified consensus so small that even before the eviction of Zuccotti Park, activists realised that getting anything done required working in smaller, separate or local groups rather than seeking the approval of the GA. In short, the democratic emphasis on consensus and refusal of demands that incited the movement became a serious blindspot with regard to real divergences, a blindspot that had high costs in terms of political efficacy as serious proposals got watered down in order to secure agreement from those who rejected their basic premises.¶
48 -The university classroom is the wrong place to fight harassment – the university is fundamentally neoliberal and class room discussions and curriculum operate on a for profit basis. The AFF is an illusory stab and creating change, which makes students buy into the myths the university is selling. Monzó 14
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50 -Monzó, Lilia D Chapman University, California, United States. "A critical pedagogy for democracy: Confronting higher education’s neoliberal agenda with a critical Latina feminist episteme." Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS) 12.1 (2014): 73-100.
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52 -In this contradictory version of Freirian thought, praxis becomes civic engagement that focuses¶ solely on reforms that increase opportunities within the existing capitalist system. Such efforts¶ alone obfuscate the role of class and unwittingly support the existing structure by treating¶ capitalism as a proverbial and impermeable reality or suggesting that minimizing inequalities is¶ both possible and sufficient to creating a just society. Within this liberal agenda, terms such as¶ liberation and freedom index narrow political conceptions such as freedom of speech and¶ freedom of the press – ideologies associated with “democratic” advanced capitalist societies that¶ while important do not address the most fundamental human right – the freedom from necessity¶ and from alienation. A socialist democracy that emphasizes freedom and participation among all¶ citizens, regardless of gender, race, or other social positioning is untenable within a capitalist¶ economy. The extreme and widening gap between the wealthy and the poor, the focus on labor¶ power as opposed to real power, the extortion of surplus value off the poor to maximize profits¶ for the wealthy, the relegation of poverty and a hyper exploitation of racialized communities and especially women of color in the U.S. and across the world, and the alienation experienced by all¶ human beings are incompatible with a democratic way of life.¶ Revolutionary critical pedagogy as developed by Paula Allman, Peter McLaren, and others¶ reinserts a fundamental Marxist emphasis on interrogating and transforming the totalizing nature¶ of capitalism that engulfs humanity through not only political economy but social and cultural¶ relations. These scholars reject and critique the liberal trend to reform, recognizing these as¶ unable to stop the destruction that is inherent in the labor capital social relation calling instead¶ for creating the conditions for revolutionary change that would transform the forces of¶ production outside of capital’s value form. Revolutionary critical pedagogues call for a¶ “collective struggle” across racial, ethnic, gender, and national lines (Darder, 2014). They¶ understand that while racism and patriarchy must be fought these struggles alone will not end¶ human suffering and exploitation. As Darder and Torres (2004) argue, as long as there exists a¶ need for a mass of exploited workers as is needed under capitalism, these will undoubtedly be¶ made of predominantly racialized minorities who have been made thus in order to preserve the¶ dominance of an elite white transnational capitalist class. Racism is not an accident but an¶ orchestrated material reality that hides the role of the capitalist class and sets up workers of “said¶ working class and middle class sectors” to compete with each other for presumed less¶ exploitative jobs, educational opportunities, and a myriad of other social and economic resources¶ all the while the capitalists who own the bulk of the worlds resources are rarely considered in the¶ equation, must less confronted. Likewise, struggles against patriarchy cannot be forged without¶ forging a struggle against capitalism since the exploitation of women in the U.S. and across the¶ world is an important source of capital accumulation of transnational corporations. Thus, while I¶ champion struggles that confront racial and gender oppression and also work to mitigate¶ conditions of exploitation, I also argue that these struggles must be simultaneously accompanied¶ by and conjoined with broader struggles against the capitalist class that aim to transform existing¶ social relations of production. I reject the domesticated version of critical pedagogy discussed¶ earlier in favor of a Marxist revolutionary critical pedagogy that is based on developing clarity¶ rather than charity in which human beings are liberated from wage slavery through a process that¶ necessitates – demands – revolution (Freire, 1970). According to Freire (1970), the oppressed are tasked with forging this revolution because they¶ have insights into the nature of oppression that are necessarily hidden from the dominant group.¶ Thus, the participation of non-dominant groups in the decision-making of our society is a critical¶ component of advancing democracy. If democracy embodies the notion that the diverse¶ perspectives of different individuals and groups add to our collective understanding of society¶ and to moving us forward as human beings, then we must recognize the need to bring the diverse¶ epistemes of women, people of color and other marginalized groups into the spaces that¶ legitimize knowledge – specifically, the university. The university plays a central role in the production of legitimate knowledge. While some have¶ celebrated its historical role in the “advancement” of society through teaching and scholarship,¶ others have called it an “ivory tower” espousing to a presumed superior Eurocentric episteme¶ and positioned outside the sphere of the commons (Basole, 2009). Miller (2009) points out that¶ the university, since inception, has been complicit with the state in promoting cultural¶ imperialism and supporting research that responded to the state’s economic and political ends.¶ Yet in so far as its rhetoric of “academic freedom” must be maintained in order to suppress its¶ relationship to capital interests, it provides the spaces for dissent among faculty and students.¶ Indeed one of the fundamental functions of the university is social critique. University students,¶ energized by their newfound critical acumen, have often been the first in society to vociferously¶ exclaim their outrage in protests and other rebellions (Zill, 2011).¶ The rise of neoliberalism, however, has led to the corporatization of the university and to what is¶ being called “knowledge capitalism,” which has strengthened existing ties between universities¶ and capital interests and dangerously undermining the role of the university as the context with¶ the greatest potential to address social problems and equality. Mike Peters (2011) points out that¶ universities are increasingly clamoring to join the game of marketization, selling themselves to¶ students and investors with consequences to program development, curriculum, and research.¶ Indeed many university presidents now sit on boards of corporations, which could mean conflicts¶ of interest with respect to what the university’s goals are in terms of either advancing the ideals¶ of democracy or corporate interests. It would seem that the latter is winning out. Rather than a social service to society, education is increasingly seen as a highly lucrative commodity¶ purchased by students at grotesquely huge tuitions that will leave students in debt for years to¶ come. Students are, thus, seen as a large source of revenue for banks and other financial¶ institutions.¶ The neoliberal emphasis on privatization, standardization, and accountability is increasingly¶ witnessed at both structural levels and in programmatic and curriculum planning. Similar to the¶ dehumanizing ethic of many transnational corporations that have moved their factories to the so¶ called “third world” to maximize their profits through cheap labor, a number of U.S. universities¶ are seeking new markets for exploitation in the “developing” world where local faculty are often¶ hired at very low wages and as part timers without job security (Ross, 2009). While some may¶ argue that providing university education to students in these countries is a moral imperative, an¶ important concern is how this “offshoring” may result in further distribution of western¶ knowledge systems in non-western countries. In a similar vein, we are also seeing fewer tenure¶ line positions and an increase of poorly paid adjunct positions in U.S. campuses.¶ Faculty research and other scholarly projects are increasingly being reshaped to become more¶ palatable to the business community or boards of trustees. Further impacting faculty are the¶ increasing demands for increased productivity in the form of publications in specialized¶ academic journals, closely tied to tenure and promotion decisions. This increased output and¶ competition are creating a proliferation of journals and articles for consumption that do not¶ necessarily strengthen quality and instead put tremendous pressure and increased workloads on¶ faculty. The standardization of productivity that facilitates accountability has led to a narrowing¶ of what counts as knowledge, with a return to notions of objective and measurable research being¶ considered more rigorous and scientific than qualitative and participatory approaches.¶ The corporate university necessarily functions to prepare students and society to participate in a¶ market economy. However, while the university does prepare citizens to fill jobs it must also¶ engage students in questioning and critiquing the existing structures of society, to recognize and¶ confront policies and practices that are undemocratic, and to learn to imagine and conceive of¶ alternatives that may bring greater equality and a new social order. When what is taught and learned becomes significantly determined through business interests it is difficult for the¶ university to retain autonomy toward these ends as they prove to be in direct conflict to capital¶ interests (Giroux, 2009).
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55 -Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
56 - ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
57 -Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system ~-~- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return.
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59 -The alternative is to abandon the affirmative’s hope for more discourse in favor of militant class struggle – rather than looking for new ways to dissent, a radical leftist project must begin with reimagining political formations outside of capitalism. The real lesson of the 60’s is that activism centered on rights is a failed project that the affirmative tries to reinvent, which will lead to the same result. Hickel 12
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61 -Hickel, Jason London School of Economics and Political Science, and Arsalan Khan University of Virginia. "The culture of capitalism and the crisis of critique." Anthropological Quarterly 85.1 (2012): 203-227.
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63 -We began this essay with the observation that, at the very moment when¶ neoliberal ideologues are zealously advancing the “free market” by invoking¶ the grand moral principles of liberty and freedom, American progressives¶ are content to speak in a utilitarian and technocratic language that aims¶ for “balanced” solutions through rational consensus. This reflects how the¶ Left in America no longer sees its historical role as one of ensuring socioeconomic¶ justice in the face of exploitation by a clearly defined adversary¶ like “the Right” or “the elite.” Instead, progressives seem preoccupied¶ with another, more diffuse constellation of threats: political polarization,¶ the decline of civility in public discourse, and increasing ideological rigidity¶ and zeal. This is why some representatives of the American liberal-left, like¶ Jon Stewart, have been so adamant about blaming “extremists” on both¶ sides of the political aisle, and why the Obama campaign succeeded on a¶ relatively vague platform of cooperation, compromise, “hope,” and “unity.”¶ That this appears to so many as a better kind of politics makes sense within¶ a cultural framework that sees ideological conflict as illusory rather than¶ substantive, as a result of misunderstanding and misrepresentation rather¶ than a product of incommensurable interests or structural inequities. In¶ such a world, conflict can be redressed through a shared commitment to¶ civility, consensus building, openness, and diversity.¶ It bears pointing out briefly that this trend has been paralleled to some¶ extent by discourses about globalization in culture studies, post-colonial¶ studies, and, indeed, some strands of anthropology. Jonathan Friedman¶ (2002) has famously criticized Bhabha (1994), Appadurai (1993), and Malkki¶ (1992) for celebrating hybridity and cosmopolitanism as the antidote¶ to the chauvinism of nationalist and other essentialist identities, which¶ they see as inherently violent because they are preoccupied with defending¶ cultural boundaries against the threatening Other. Friedman rightly¶ argues that the celebration of hybridity and cosmopolitanism obscures¶ the violent exclusions that face the vast majority of people who cannot¶ partake of globalization’s “cut ‘n’ mix culture” (2002:33). Like the forms¶ of progressive politics that we have discussed above, this literature thoroughly¶ depoliticizes globalization and rationalizes neoliberal capitalism.¶ Fortunately, this has not been the last word on the matter: in the past¶ decade, a number of anthropologists have gone to great lengths to theorize¶ the violent contradictions of neoliberalism. Kalb, following Polanyi,¶ insists on seeing globalization as “a political project of globally imposed marketization…sponsored by transnational class segments within the¶ core northern states and its comprador allies in dependent economies”¶ (2005:177). Friedman (2003) stresses how class polarization has created¶ cosmopolitan elites who are self-consciously global and hybrid, while at¶ the same time generating intense forms of cultural closure and chauvinism¶ among those most adversely affected by neoliberal policy. Carrier¶ and Heyman take a similar approach to the study of consumption, arguing¶ for a radical departure from prevailing “psycho-cultural” analyses that¶ tend to “ignore or simplify inequalities and conflict” (1997:355).¶ To quote Žižek (2009a) once again, “The aim of progressive politics¶ should be to reconstruct society in such a way that poverty will be impossible.”¶ But the altruistic virtues of cultural capitalism and development¶ hobble this project by obscuring the exploitative relations of production¶ that generate poverty and inequality in the first place, and by appropriating¶ the critical capacities of the Left. These new trends appear to sanitize¶ capitalism, to obviate its contradictions. They make capitalism seem¶ palatable and benevolent. Instead of imagining real alternatives to global¶ capitalism, many progressives today content themselves with promoting¶ TOMS Shoes, Ethos water, and Alternative Spring Break with evangelical¶ zeal. This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized¶ our capacity to imagine alternatives, and has transformed our potential¶ for meaningful political critique and activism into a profoundly depoliticized,¶ consumerist passivity. As a result, progressives in America have¶ largely abandoned the task of confronting the antagonisms intrinsic to¶ market capitalism. This is not to say that progressives do not care about¶ growing inequality and mounting human suffering in America and abroad.¶ They do. However, in many cases, their energies have been channeled¶ into the spirit of rebellious and virtuous consumption and the moral project¶ of development, which may mitigate the effects of capitalist production¶ (although this too is questionable) but will never address the ultimate¶ causes of our contemporary economic crises.¶ This is partly the unfortunate, and unintended, legacy of some strands¶ of thinking located within the New Left of the 1960s, and even within the¶ much-lauded Frankfurt School. To be sure, the overriding concern with¶ individual autonomy and authentic self-expression that permeated the¶ intellectual and political milieu of the 1960s helped secure important¶ legal and political rights, and made possible the notion of a more inclusive¶ and multicultural nation. Broadly speaking, these legal and politi-cal rights have created opportunities for select members of racial and¶ ethnic minorities and women to enter into an elite world from which they¶ had previously been barred. Although their place within this elite remains¶ suspect and conditional, often predicated on their ability and willingness¶ to participate in cultural activities that are themselves marked¶ by race and gender bias, these new rights have not significantly altered¶ the actual distribution of powers either within America or within global¶ capitalist society more broadly. Indeed, as we have shown, capitalism¶ largely appropriated the idea of individual rights and liberties and the¶ anti-society ethos of the times to facilitate neoliberal forms of consumption¶ and production. Moreover, given that corporations also have the¶ legal status of individuals, they have taken advantage of the very same¶ laws that were designed to protect individual rights and freedoms, and¶ this has facilitated an unprecedented consolidation of corporate power.¶ What this period furnished in place of a substantial redistribution of¶ wealth and power is the appearance of freedom and choice. Consumers—at¶ least those with sufficient resources—now have the freedom¶ to fashion our identities as mainstream or alternative and to choose¶ between regular, rebellious, and virtuous commodities; but we cannot¶ opt out of the system, and we are not free to reconsider the fundamental¶ violence at the heart of our capitalist society.¶ Progressives in America today remain largely circumscribed within¶ the neoliberal paradigm. This fact becomes particularly clear in debates¶ about military policy. For instance, Democrats have fought hard to repeal¶ “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” so that homosexuals can have the freedom to¶ serve in the military, but they have left the military-industrial complex itself¶ mostly unscrutinized. Discussions about the War on Terror tend to fall¶ along similar lines. While certain progressive circles have advanced radical¶ critiques, the dominant concern remains that “national security” has¶ come at the expense of liberty and freedom for citizens at home. Generally¶ speaking, this approach fails to recognize that liberty in America has¶ always been a privilege primarily reserved for white, middle-class males,¶ and that its extension or denial to others is largely contingent on the historical¶ needs of capitalism. Furthermore, the notion of liberty that functions¶ domestically as a critique of state overreach is deployed at the same¶ time to rationalize the belligerent use of military force around the world,¶ and to underwrite the imperial project of violently restructuring foreign¶ governments and economies in accordance with neoliberal principles. In the Muslim world, this is the very process that—because of the humiliation,¶ poverty, and conspicuous inequalities that it generates—bloats the¶ ranks of militant movements. In light of this, any thorough critique of the¶ War on Terror will require that scholars and activists examine the links between¶ American imperial interests in the Muslim world and the systemic¶ needs of capitalist accumulation
64 -And, reject policy making – legalistic solutions to harassment will never work. We need to reimagine class struggle as a starting point. John 13
65 -Maya John, 5-8-2013, "Class Societies and Sexual Violence: Towards a Marxist Understanding of Rape," https://radicalnotes.com/2013/05/08/class-societies-and-sexual-violence-towards-a-marxist-understanding-of-rape/ VC
66 -Nonetheless, intermediate demands to combat sexual violence on women have to be substantiated with a politics that is informed by the ultimate vision of liberating human (i.e. both men and women’s) sexuality, and hence, works towards overthrowing capitalism. Unfortunately, the way in which many intermediate demands are being pursued by women’s organizations, such demands are becoming the final demands rather than launch pads for a consistent, long-term transformative politics. Thus, what is often lost in feminist contestation with the law is the simple fact that even if modern society comes to reconcile the form of the law with the burgeoning content (women’s oppression), there will still be a lack of coherence which the law will be incapable of addressing, and hence, women’s oppression will persist unabated. This means that even with the strengthening of the notion of individual consent, bourgeois law will continue to elide the fact that consent is structured by relationalities, and that most women are not in the circumstances to exercise an active individual choice. As often highlighted by communist leaders like Clara Zetkin, Alexandria Kollantai, etc., most women are not in positions to exercise such choice as they are in conditions of overt dependence on male partners. As part of a socio-economic system that thrives on nurturing unemployment in order to acquire as much work possible from fewer people, women are either bound to be unemployed or poorly paid. In such conditions, women’s dependence on the family for economic sustenance is inevitable. What follows are compromises with bad marriages, bad sex, violence, etc. Clearly then, since the minds and bodies of two people are involved it is important to account for how consent is often structured by the dynamics playing themselves out between the two concerned persons. In this regard, nominal consent may always be present due to feelings of obligation, dependence, etc. The compromises and the forcing (often termed seduction) are clearly made possible by the mind games that play themselves out, as well as the conditions of (emotional, psychological and financial) dependence of women on their partners. Indeed, what we are constantly witnessing are situations where women, due to the fear of being abandoned by partners, and due to their economic dependence, consent to a form of sex in which sexual pleasure is detached from the person-in-the-body, and in which the woman’s body becomes a mere instrument for pleasing only oneself and not her. In fact, such a form of sex never allows for enhancement of gratitude, affection, or the deepening of the relationship between the two persons involved—something which organic sexual encounters should establish. In this regard, can the mere existence of a legal paradigm resolve this thorny problem of consent as long as the material conditions on which men-women relationships are based are not transformed? After all, can the mere existence of a legal paradigm firmly based on individual consent create the ground for good sex based on intimacy, mutual contentment and commitment? No, definitely not. Bad sex is not an individualized, sexological problem that stems from the lack of a male partner’s understanding of his female partner’s body. In contrast, it is a general social problem for good sex remains a distant dream for the majority in our society. In a socio-economic system where the majority are burdened by long work hours, there is precious little time to nurture human relationships and to understand each other’s bodies. In such a context, most are compromising with bad sex, or pretending to have good sex as is often the case with upward mobile middle-class women. Interestingly, while it is true that feminists recognize and work with notions of good vis-à-vis bad sex, the larger framework of their understanding is such that these notions are divested of their social complexities. Liberal feminists, for example, perceive the problem more in terms of having bad partners who do not seek the consent of their female partners. And so according to this liberal feminist position, to acquire good sex all one needs is the freedom to choose the (right) partner, the freedom to multiple partners, etc. Lost, of course, is the emphasis on how individual choice is itself compromised by the fact that you choose from what you are given by the modern society. Now radical feminists do accept the presence of a larger problem but do so only in terms of the prevalence of a (broader) male-female inequality in society. In this context, it is impossible to think that the given legal paradigm is capable of adjudicating on and preventing the harm caused to women in consensual forms of bad sex. In reality, adjudication on bad sex, especially of the consensual variety, is beyond the scope of bourgeois law since its paradigm of legality is based on the notion of ‘free’ individuals in contract. According to its logic, once consent is given, the problem of exploitation within ‘freely’ contracting individuals is effaced/becomes immaterial. This means that the resolution to the question of bad sex and its myriad forms can begin to take place only if society transcends the ideology of free market —a process which can unfold only if human relations are unshackled from all inequalities which breed selfish, dehumanizing sex and feelings of alienation from other human beings. In this light, radical feminist arguments on ‘empowering’ women in order to eradicate male-female inequality, and hence, sexual exploitation of women, are highly misplaced as it is assumed that women can be ‘empowered’ while the other half of humankind remains fettered to the exploitation and oppression created by the larger socio-economic system.
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70 -Case
71 -Their plan text is incoherent
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73 -A. Colleges can’t repeal Title IX- its federal law. They can repeal their own policies, but that’s not what the text says and that would put them in violation of federal law
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76 -B. Vote negative on presumption- this isn’t a solvency takeout- they have read a plan that legally cannot happen, and if it did happen it would not resolve their 1AC harms. Voting on a risk of solvency encourages the aff to cut silly cases and produces a model of debate where people run to the margins instead of engaging the substance
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78 -Their claims are popular in the media because they sound dramatic – college learning environments operate openly and smoothly, even the most touchy subjects are fine. Moreno 9/7
79 -Jonathan D. Moreno, Warning: My Class Is One Big Trigger, Sep 07, 2016, Huffington Post, EE
80 -We’ve been hearing a lot these days about trigger warnings as a phenomenon in American higher education, that teachers are being expected to warn their students if assigned material might upset them. Respected social scientists have argued that trigger warnings pose a serious problem with modern academic culture by impeding students’ growth and exaggerating their sensitivities. There have been several high-profile incidents involving the withdrawal of speaking invitations and some professors have complained that they feel constrained in what they can teach. I must have missed that memo. Anyway, it doesn’t describe the university I know. I’ve seen no evidence that education has been stifled. And if instructors are giving more such warnings, so what? If this practice had the dire consequences that critics
EntryDate
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1 -2017-04-08 17:50:02.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Dan Miyamoto
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Harker QC
ParentRound
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -34
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2
Team
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
Title
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -NDCA R2 NC
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -NDCA
Caselist.CitesClass[35]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,12 +1,0 @@
1 -A2 Reverse Enforcement
2 -That laws will be used against minorities is empirically denied and prevents reforms. Delgado and Yun ‘94
3 -Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley. David H. Yun – Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D. 1993, University of Colorado. “Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation.” California Law Review. 1994. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1712andcontext=californialawreview JJN
4 -B. The "Reverse Enforcement" Argument A second paternalistic argument is that enactment of hate speech rules is sure to hurt minorities because the new rules will be applied against minorities themselves.61 A vicious insult hurled by a white person to a black will go unpunished, but even a mild expression of exasperation by a black motorist to a police officer or by a black student to a professor, for example, will bring harsh sanctions. The argument is plausibile because certain authorities are racist and dislike blacks who speak out of turn, and because a few incidents of blacks charged with hate speech for innocuous behavior have occurred. Nadine Strossen, for example, asserts that in Canada, shortly after the Supreme Court upheld a federal hate speech code, prosecutors began charging blacks with hate offenses. 62 But the empirical evidence does not suggest that this is the pattern, much less the rule. Police and FBI reports show that hate crimes are committed much more frequently by whites against blacks than the reverse. 63 Statistics compiled by the National Institute Against Violence and Prejudice confirm what the police reports show, that a large number of blacks and other minorities are victimized by racist acts on campus each year.' Moreover, the distribution of enforcement seems to be consistent with commission of the offense. Although an occasional minority group member may be charged with a hate crime or with violating a campus hate speech code, these prosecutions seem rare.6 5 Racism, of course, is not a one-way street; some minorities have harassed and badgered whites. Still, the reverse-enforcement objection seems to have little validity in the United States. A recent study of the international aspects of hate speech regulation showed that in repressive societies, such as South Africa and the former Soviet Union, laws against hate speech have indeed been deployed to stifle dissenters and members of minority groups.6 6 Yet, this has not happened in more progressive countries.67 The likelihood that officials in the United States would turn hate speech laws into weapons against minorities seems remote.
5 -
6 -Other countries show it won’t happen – our strong commitment to free speech hasn’t paid off either. The AFF is another empty promise. Delgado and Yun 95
7 -Delgado, Richard Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., University of California-Berkeley, 1974, and David Yun Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D., University of Colorado, 1993.. "Speech We Hate: First Amendment Totalism, the ACLU, and the Principle of Dialogic Politics, The." Ariz. St. LJ 27 (1995): 1281.
8 -
9 -If protecting hate speech and pornography were essential to safeguarding freedom of inquiry and a flourishing democratic politics, we would expect to find that nations that have adopted hate speech rules and curbs against pornog-raphy would suffer quickly a sharp erosion of the spirit of free inquiry. But this has not happened. n46 A host of indus-trialized nations, including Sweden, Italy, Canada, and Great Britain, have instituted laws against hate speech and hate propaganda, n47 in many cases to comply with international treaties and conventions requiring such action. n48 Many of these countries traditionally respect free speech at least as much as the United States does. n49 No such na-tion has reported any erosion of the atmosphere of free speech or debate. n50¶ At the same time, the United States, which until recently has refused to put such rules into effect, has a less than perfect record of protecting even political speech. United States agencies have persecuted communists, n51 hounded Hollywood writers out of the country, n52 and harassed and badgered such civil rights leaders as Josephine Baker, n53 Paul Robeson, n54 and W. E. B. DuBois n55 in a campaign of personal and professional smears that ruined their reputations and destroyed their ability to earn a living. In recent times, conservatives inside and outside the Administra-tion have disparaged progressives to the point where many are now afraid to describe themselves *1291 as "liberals." n56 Controversial artists are denied federal funding. n57 Museum exhibits that depict the atomic bombing of Hiroshi-ma have been ordered modified. n58 If political speech lies at the center of the First Amendment, its protection seems to be largely independent of what is taking place at the periphery. There may, indeed, be an inverse correlation. Those institutions most concerned with social fairness have proved to be the ones most likely to promulgate anti-hate speech rules. n59 Part of the reason seems to be the recognition that hate speech can easily silence and demoralize its victims, discouraging them from participating in the life of the institution. n60 If so, enacting hate speech rules may be evi-dence of a commitment to democratic dialogue, rather than the opposite, as some of its opponents maintain.
10 -Even if codes were sometimes enforced against minorities it would be infinitely more harmful to allow whites to say whatever they want. Wilson 95
11 -Wilson, John K. The myth of political correctness: the conservative attack on higher education. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.SP
12 -This "fact" will come as a surprise to the black student punished at the University of Michigan for calling a white student 'white trash during an argument. Marcia Pally notes that "in the eighteen months that the University of Michigan applied its speech code, black students were accused of rotor speech in over twenty cases. Students were punished twice under the code's anti-racist provisions, both times for speech by or on behalf of blacks... Many opponents of speech codes, such as ACLU president Nadine Shoes., argue against them precisely because minorities, not whites, will be the ones punished: "These codes are enforced disproportionately against the very groups that think they're going to be protected by them'" While there is always a danger that college administrators may punish protected speech (as they have always done), abolishing all speech codes and leaving colleges with the intellectual equivalent of a Wild West shootout where any words—no matter how abusive and threatening—can be freely spoken is not the answer. Nor is the answer to go back to the old vague and arbitrary conduct codes, which are more dangerous than the worst of the much-maligned °speech coda." Instead, Colleges should adopt specific speech codes that regulate certain kinds of abusive speech and behavior—such as threats, harassment, and the mass theft of newspaper—without endangering the free oppression of offensive ideas.
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-04-09 01:26:33.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -nadia hussein
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Newark DA
ParentRound
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -35
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -4
Team
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Harvard Westlake Gross Neg
Title
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -NDCA R4 NC
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -NDCA
Caselist.RoundClass[27]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -27
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-02-13 05:00:13.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Brian Yang
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-Stanford-Round6.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Oakwood AO
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -6
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,5 +1,0 @@
1 -AC - Kant
2 -NC - Kant Colorblindness K CRT K Case
3 -1AR - K of Curry
4 -NR - CRT K 1AR K
5 -2AR - 1AR K
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Stanford
Caselist.RoundClass[28]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -28
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-02-18 17:29:56.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Miriam Leany
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-Berkeley-Round1.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Nueva AK
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -1
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,5 +1,0 @@
1 -AC - Nietzsche
2 -NC - Colorblindness K CRT K Case
3 -1ar - Nietzsche Ks
4 -NR - Colorblindness
5 -2ar - same as 1ar
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Berkeley
Caselist.RoundClass[29]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -29
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-02-19 16:43:22.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Jack Coyle
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-Berkeley-Round4.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Kent Denver AA
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -4
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,5 +1,0 @@
1 -AC - Econ FS Good
2 -NC - Cap Title IX DA Case
3 -1ar - AC Cap DA
4 -NR - DA Case
5 -2ar - AC DA Cap impact turns
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Berkeley
Caselist.RoundClass[30]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -30
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-02-19 23:09:56.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Zohair Madhani
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Mission San Jose JP
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -5
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,5 +1,0 @@
1 -AC - Speech Codes Bad
2 -NC - Cap K Title IX DA Case
3 -1AR - Mindset shift bad K
4 -NR - Mindset shift good DA
5 -2AR - Theory
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Berkeley
Caselist.RoundClass[31]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -31
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-04 05:11:18.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Joseph Flores
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-USC-Round2.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Interlake MW
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -USC
Caselist.RoundClass[32]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -32
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-04 22:55:14.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Deven Cooper
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-USC-Round4.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Elite of Irvine CL
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -4
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -USC
Caselist.RoundClass[33]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -33
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-05 17:18:03.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Gabriela Gonzalez
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-USC-Round6.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Chaminade JT
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -6
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -USC
Caselist.RoundClass[34]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -34
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-04-08 17:49:59.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Dan Miyamoto
OpenSource
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/download/Harvard+Westlake/Gross+Neg/Harvard%20Westlake-Gross-Neg-NDCA-Round2.docx
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Harker QC
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -NDCA
Caselist.RoundClass[35]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -35
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-04-09 01:26:31.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -nadia hussein
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Newark DA
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -4
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -NDCA

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