Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[22]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[20]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[22]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-18 19:52:33.404
	1	+2016-10-18 19:52:33.0

Caselist.CitesClass[20]

Cites

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	1	+Nuclear subs are key to the US Japan security alliance
	2	+Takahashi, 15—Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies and currently Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Planning of Ministry of Defense in Tokyo (Sugio, “Rebuilding Deterrence: Post-2015 Defense Guidelines Challenges Facing the U.S. Japan Alliance”, http://project2049.net/documents/Takahashi_2015_Defense_Guidelines_Challenges_US_Japan_Alliance.pdf, dml)
	3	+
	4	+The third implication relates to China’s modernization of its nuclear forces. Currently, the main pillar of China’s strategic nuclear force is its road-mobile ICBM. In addition, China is developing submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) to develop a maritime leg of its strategic nuclear force. China’s efforts to acquire a maritime strategic nuclear force are assumed to be intended for developing an invulnerable nuclear second-strike capability. However, China has already achieved this capability through land-based, road-mobile ICBMs. The development of SLBM/SSBN would add an invulnerable second strike capability, but would not be a game changer. A more serious potential game changer for regional security is how the U.S. responds to China’s nuclear modernization. If the U.S. officially accepts the existence of mutual vulnerability between the two countries it may cause deterioration of the regional security environment through the “stability-instabilityparadox.”
	5	+The “stability-instability-paradox” is a paradoxical situation in which mutual deterrence at the strategic level causes one party’s aggressive behavior at the regional level because that party feel assured that the counterpart would refrain from responding to their aggressive behavior to avoid escalation to a level of mutual destruction. If the U.S. explicitly accepts mutual vulnerability with China, this, when combined with China’s A2/AD capability, could cause China to feel that it has built a robust deterrent against the U.S. at the strategic level. China may be encouraged to increase its aggressive creeping expansion in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
	6	+Enhancing Allied Deterrence
	7	+The U.S.-Japan alliance should reconstruct its deterrent at three levels to prepare countermeasures against these potential strategic effects of PLA modernization. First, the alliance should enhance the credibility of nuclear deterrence, and the U.S. should not explicitly accept the notion of mutual vulnerability with China. While China already has a certain degree of nuclear second strike capability against the U.S. with its roadmobile ICBMs, its nuclear strike capabilities are limited. China lacks the counter-force capability held by the U.S. and Russia. If the U.S. were to “admit” the U.S. and China are mutually vulnerable, it would be overlooking the qualitative asymmetrical advantage gained from its counter-force capability. Moreover, it may cause a “stability-instabilityparadox.” The current U.S. position on this issue, manifested in the latest Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, is ambiguous and along the lines of “neither confirm nor deny,” Chinese capabilities, while it explicitly implies mutual vulnerability with Russia. The continuation of this position is very important for regional deterrence.
	8	+Second, the alliance should work to find a solution to the competing demands of responding simultaneously both to creeping expansion and the A2/AD threat. To counter creeping expansion, significant forward presence is essential because the lack of forward presence would invite fait accompli based creeping expansion. Indeed, this kind of posture could be perceived as creating a “power vacuum.” From the perspective of countering the A2/AD threat, however, putting more forces on the frontline would not be wise because these frontline forces could be neutralized or destroyed by Chinese A2/AD capabilities. A light presence on the frontline and a heavier stand-off strike force outside of A2/AD ranges would be better-suited for this environment.
	9	+This dilemma has no easy solution. One of the answers to this conundrum is to enhance the resiliency of frontline forces through tactical dispersal. Another possible answer is to strengthen the coast guard to cope with creeping expansion without having a significant military force presence. Maybe the right answer is to combine these options. Alliance managers need to work hard to find the right capability portfolio and institutional division of labor to develop a solution to competing demands.
	10	+
	11	+The existence of the US-Japan alliance is an impact filter – it contains every existential threat
	12	+Roos 2011
	13	+, Former ambassador to China and Technological Lawyer (John, “U.S. Japan Relations”, U.S. Embassy in Japan, 8/23/2011, http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=2andsid=cfba6815-1430-41c7-bdfc-9cb5e3a9550b40sessionmgr4001andhid=4209andbdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=69987377anddb=poh)GHS-SG
	14	+The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity. Despite the changes in the post-Cold War strategic landscape, the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to be based on shared vital interests and values. These include stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community as a whole. Japan provides bases and financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the region. Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan hosts a carrier battle group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the 5th Air Force, and elements of the Army's I Corps. The United States currently maintains approximately 50,000 troops in Japan, about half of whom are stationed in Okinawa. Over the past decade the alliance has been strengthened through revised defense guidelines, which expand Japan's noncombatant role in a regional contingency, the renewal of the agreement on host nation support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and an ongoing process called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The DPRI redefines roles, missions, and capabilities of alliance forces and outlines key realignment and transformation initiatives, including reducing the number of troops stationed in Okinawa, enhancing interoperability and communication between the two countries' respective commands, and broadening cooperation in the area of ballistic missile defense. In February 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then-Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone signed the Guam International Agreement (GIA) in Tokyo. The GIA commits both nations to completing the transfer of approximately 8,000 U.S. Marines from bases in Okinawa to new facilities in Guam built with the assistance of Japan. In May 2010, the U.S. and Japanese Governments issued a joint statement that reaffirmed bilateral commitments to DPRI, including plans to transfer the capabilities of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab in the prefecture's northern area. The United States continues to work constructively with Japan on the implementation of these plans. On June 21, 2011, in Washington, the United States and Japanese Governments held a Security Consultative Committee meeting ("2+2") chaired by Secretary Clinton and then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, along with Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. The meeting, which marked the first 2+2 since the establishment of the DPJ-led government, issued a joint statement reaffirming the continuing importance of the alliance. More specifically, the statement outlined regional and global common strategic objectives and highlighted ways to strengthen security and defense cooperation. In the context of reconfirming both sides' commitment to U.S. force posture realignment, including initiatives in Okinawa, the 2+2 principals noted their decision in favor of a V-shaped runway configuration for the Futenma Replacement Facility. The 2+2 principals also issued accompanying statements on host nation support as well as cooperation in response to Japan's March 2011 earthquake. Because of the two countries' combined economic and technological impact on the world, the U.S.-Japan relationship has become global in scope. The United States and Japan cooperate on a broad range of global issues, including development assistance, combating communicable disease such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and avian influenza, and protecting the environment and natural resources. The countries also collaborate in science and technology in such areas as mapping the human genome, research on aging, and international space exploration. As one of Asia's most successful democracies and largest economies, Japan contributes irreplaceable political, financial, and moral support to U.S.-Japan diplomatic efforts. The United States consults closely with Japan and the Republic of Korea on policy regarding North Korea. The United States works closely with Japan and Australia under the auspices of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum to exchange views and increase coordination on global and regional initiatives. In Southeast Asia, U.S.-Japan cooperation is vital for stability and for political and economic reform. Outside Asia, Japanese political and financial support has substantially strengthened the U.S. position on a variety of global geopolitical problems, including the Gulf, Middle East peace efforts, and the Balkans. Japan, which was a member of the United Nations Security Council for the 2009-2010 term, is an indispensable partner in the UN and the second-largest contributor to the UN budget. Japan broadly supports the United States on nonproliferation and nuclear issues.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-18 19:52:35.865

Judge

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	1	+Panel

Opponent

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	1	+Westwood RM

ParentRound

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	1	+22

Round

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	1	+Octas

Team

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	1	+Harvard Westlake Engel Neg

Title

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	1	+SEPT-OCT - DA - US-Japan Alliance

Tournament

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	1	+St Marks