Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[21]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[19]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[21]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-18 19:51:17.627
	1	+2016-10-18 19:51:17.0

Caselist.CitesClass[19]

Cites

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	1	+China is in decline and using nationalism to quell political dissent–US military presence is necessary to ensure a soft landing and avoid lashout
	2	+Kaplan 2016 - Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security
	3	+Robert, "Eurasia's Coming Anarchy," Foreign Affairs, March/April
	4	+As China asserts itself in its nearby seas and Russia wages war in Syria and Ukraine, it is easy to assume that Eurasia’s two great land powers are showing signs of newfound strength. But the opposite is true: increasingly, China and Russia flex their muscles not because they are powerful but because they are weak. Unlike Nazi Germany, whose power at home in the 1930s fueled its military aggression abroad, today’s revisionist powers are experiencing the reverse phenomenon. In China and Russia, it is domestic insecurity that is breeding belligerence. This marks a historical turning point: for the first time since the Berlin Wall fell, the United States finds itself in a competition among great powers.
	5	+Economic conditions in both China and Russia are steadily worsening. Ever since energy prices collapsed in 2014, Russia has been caught in a serious recession. China, meanwhile, has entered the early stages of what promises to be a tumultuous transition away from double-digit annual GDP growth; the stock market crashes it experienced in the summer of 2015 and January 2016 will likely prove a mere foretaste of the financial disruptions to come.
	6	+Given the likelihood of increasing economic turmoil in both countries, their internal political stability can no longer be taken for granted. In the age of social media and incessant polling, even autocrats such as Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin feel the need for public approval. Already, these leaders no doubt suffer from a profound sense of insecurity, as their homelands have long been virtually surrounded by enemies, with flatlands open to invaders. And already, they are finding it harder to exert control over their countries’ immense territories, with potential rebellions brewing in their far-flung regions.
	7	+The world has seen the kind of anarchy that ethnic, political, and sectarian conflict can cause in small and medium-size states. But the prospect of quasi anarchy in two economically struggling giants is far more worrisome. As conditions worsen at home, China and Russia are likely to increasingly export their troubles in the hope that nationalism will distract their disgruntled citizens and mobilize their populations. This type of belligerence presents an especially difficult problem for Western countries. Whereas aggression driven by domestic strength often follows a methodical, well-developed strategy—one that can be interpreted by other states, which can then react appropriately—that fueled by domestic crisis can result in daring, reactive, and impulsive behavior, which is much harder to forecast and counter.
	8	+As U.S. policymakers contemplate their response to the growing hostility of Beijing and Moscow, their first task should be to avoid needlessly provoking these extremely sensitive and domestically declining powers. That said, they cannot afford to stand idly by as China and Russia redraw international borders and maritime boundaries. The answer? Washington needs to set clear redlines, quietly communicated—and be ready to back them up with military power if necessary.
	9	+
	10	+Any sign of weakness by the US risks Chinese domination of the SCS– then there is no turning back
	11	+Auslin 2/18 - resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at AEI
	12	+Michael, "Asian escalation: Why China picked Woody Island for its first South China Sea missiles," www.aei.org/publication/asian-escalation-why-china-picked-woody-island-for-its-first-south-china-sea-missiles/
	13	+Woody Island, then, is a perfect stepping-stone for Beijing to methodically extend its network of militarized bases throughout its claimed territories in the South China Sea, and possibly beyond. If China places SAMs on its Spratly Islands possessions, joining the almost certain deployment of jet fighters on the larger islands, it will come close to covering the entire South China Sea, putting at risk freedom of overflight. Since no neighboring country can match its buildup or forcibly eject it from its new bases, China is betting that its moves will result in the neutralization of opposition over time. Beijing’s goal is to get all other capitals in the region to accept its predominant position in an area vital to the global economy, and which is transited by tens of thousands of ships per year and crossed by dozens of international air flights per day.
	14	+The result is a region whose balance of power is rapidly shifting. We are witnessing the creation of an environment where one nation may soon have the strength to assert its own claims over common waterways and airways, should it ever desire to do so. That would be serious blow to U.S. strategy, which since the end of World War II has sought to prevent the emergence of any one dominant power in Asia.
	15	+Should China achieve its goals, the result will not necessarily be war. Rather, it may well be the tacit recognition by all countries in one of the world’s most vital regions that might makes right, and that rules are determined simply by the strongest power. It is another mark of the growing global disorder that threatens the liberal international system.
	16	+
	17	+The US Navy is the last line of defense against Xi going to war in order to stoke nationalism – even if it is not the case, allies perceive it that way and will militarize because of the plan
	18	+Kaplan 2016 - Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security
	19	+Robert, "Eurasia's Coming Anarchy," Foreign Affairs, March/April
	20	+Slow growth is also leading China to externalize its internal weaknesses. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has been building a high-tech military, featuring advanced submarines, fighter jets, ballistic missiles, and cyberwarfare units. Just as the United States worked to exclude European powers from the Caribbean Sea beginning in the nineteenth century, China is now seeking to exclude the U.S. Navy from the East China and South China Seas. Its neighbors have grown worried: Japan, which views Chinese naval expansion as an existential threat, is shedding its pacifism and upgrading its forces, and Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam have modernized their militaries, too. What were once relatively placid, U.S.-dominated waters throughout the Cold War have become rougher. A stable, unipolar naval environment has given way to a more unstable, multipolar one.
	21	+But as with Russia, China’s aggression increasingly reflects its cresting power, as its economy slows after decades of acceleration. Annual GDP growth has dropped from the double-digit rates that prevailed for most of the first decade of this century to an official 6.9 percent in the third quarter of 2015, with the true figure no doubt lower. Bubbles in the housing and stock markets have burst, and other imbalances in China’s overleveraged economy, especially in its shadow banking sector, are legion.
	22	+Then there are the growing ethnic tensions in this vast country. To some degree, the Han-dominated state of China is a prison of various nations, including the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Uighurs, all of whom have in varying degrees resisted central control. Today, Uighur militants represent the most immediate separatist threat. Some have received training in Iraq and Syria, and as they link up with the global jihadist movement, the danger will grow. In recent years, there has been a dramatic upsurge of bombings linked to Uighur separatism in the region of Guangxi, a transit point on the smuggling route Uighurs take to Vietnam—proof that terrorism will not be confined to minority areas in China’s west. Beijing has tried to pacify these movements with economic development—for example, proposing the Silk Road Economic Belt in Central Asia in order to undermine Uighur nationalism there. But if such immense projects falter because of China’s own slowing economy, separatism could explode into greater violence.
	23	+Even more so than Putin, Xi, with years of experience serving the Communist Party in interior China, must harbor few illusions about the depth of China’s economic problems. But that does not mean he knows how to fix them. Xi has responded to China’s economic disarray by embarking on an anticorruption drive, yet this campaign has primarily functioned as a great political purge, enabling him to consolidate China’s national security state around his own person. Since decisions are no longer made as collectively as before, Xi now has greater autonomy to channel domestic anxiety into foreign aggression. In the last three decades, China’s leadership was relatively predictable, risk averse, and collegial. But China’s internal political situation has become far less benign.
	24	+China’s ambitions reach further than Russia’s, but they have generated less concern in the West because they have been more elegantly applied. Whereas Putin has sent thugs with ski masks and assault rifles into eastern Ukraine, Xi’s aggression has involved much smaller, incremental steps, making it maddeningly difficulty for the United States to respond without appearing to overreact. He has sent his coast guard and merchant ships (rather than exclusively his navy) to harass Philippine warships, dispatched an oil rig into waters claimed by both China and Vietnam (but for only a few weeks), and engaged in land-reclamation projects on contested islands and reefs (but ones that are devoid of people). And since these acts of brinkmanship have taken place at sea, they have caused no hardship for civilians and practically no military casualties.
	25	+Other Chinese moves are less subtle. Besides expanding its maritime claims, China is building roads, railways, and pipelines deep into Central Asia and is promising to invest tens of billions of dollars in a transportation corridor that will stretch from western China across Pakistan to the Indian Ocean, where China has been involved in port projects from Tanzania to Myanmar (also called Burma). As China’s economic troubles worsen, the elegance of its aggression may wear off and be replaced by cruder, more impulsive actions. Xi will find it harder to resist the urge to use Asian maritime disputes to stoke nationalism, a force that brings a measure of cohesion to societies threatening to fragment.
	26	+
	27	+US Naval presence is key to deter China from rapid expansion and ensures coop
	28	+Kaplan 2016 - Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security
	29	+Robert, "Eurasia's Coming Anarchy," Foreign Affairs, March/April
	30	+Planning for such contingencies does not mean planning a war of liberation, à la Iraq. (If China and Russia are ever to develop more liberal governments, their people will have to bring about change themselves.) But it does mean minimizing the possibility of disorder. To avoid the nightmarish security crises that could result, Washington will need to issue clear redlines. Whenever possible, however, it should communicate these redlines privately, without grandstanding. Although congressional firebrands seem not to realize it, the United States gains nothing from baiting nervous regimes worried about losing face at home.
	31	+In the case of Russia, the United States should demand that it stop initiating frozen conflicts. As Putin attempts to distract Russians from economic hardship, he will find it more tempting to stir up trouble in his neighborhood. Lithuania and Moldova probably top his list of potential targets, given their corrupt and easily undermined democratic governments. (Moldova is already nearing the point of political anarchy.) Both countries are also strategically valuable: Moldova could provide Russia with the beginning of a gateway to the Balkans, and Lithuania offers a partial land bridge to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. For Putin, frozen conflicts carry the advantage of being undeclared, reducing the odds of a meaningful Western response. That’s why the response must be in kind: if Putin makes behind-the-scenes moves in Lithuania or Moldova, the West should intensify sanctions against Russia and increase the tempo of military exercises in central and eastern Europe.
	32	+At the very least, NATO must dramatically ramp up intelligence sharing among eastern European countries and be ready to quickly deploy more aircraft, ground forces, and special operations forces to the region. The hundreds of U.S. soldiers, marines, and sailors stationed on a rotating basis in frontline NATO states of the former Warsaw Pact constitute such a small presence that they are unlikely to deter Russian aggression; several battalions or even a brigade is needed. More broadly, the United States will need to create a military tripwire—one that deters Russia from launching a limited strike across its borders but does so without provoking a crisis. Thus, the U.S. counter to Russia’s growing “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities in the highly populated Baltic region will have to be more fine-tuned than its response to China’s in the emptier South China Sea.
	33	+Washington also needs to set clear redlines with China. In the South China Sea, it cannot allow the country’s land-reclamation projects to graduate to the establishment of a so-called air defense identification zone—airspace where China reserves the right to exclude foreign aircraft—as the regime declared in the East China Sea in 2013. Such moves form part of a strategy of deliberate ambiguity: the more unclear and complex a military standoff becomes, the more threatened the United States’ maritime dominance will be. If China does announce such a zone in the South China Sea, Washington must respond by increasing U.S. naval activity in the vicinity and expanding military aid to regional allies. Already, the U.S. Navy has begun freedom-of-navigation operations, however halfhearted, within the 12-nautical-mile boundary of sovereign authority that China has claimed around its man-made islands. If these operations do not become regular and more explicit, China will not feel deterred.
	34	+
	35	+Specifically submarines are key
	36	+
	37	+Hussey 16
	38	+(http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/09/19/the_us_nuclear_gambit_110083.html)
	39	+In addition, each sub missile would carry more warheads than needed to cover a target footprint thus carrying redundant warheads. The weight of the missile would also be heavier than optimum and this would reduce the target coverage of the missile as well as its range, requiring our submarines to operate in less geographic ocean area than is optimum, leaving them more vulnerable to detection. The navy has emphasized over and over again that the critical key to its deterrent value is the number of submarines available to the Commander in Chief not so much the total number of warheads. Too few submarines—which the Ploughshares plan would give us—wouldn’t work.
	40	+An arms race around the region incentivizes first strikes war
	41	+Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
	42	+Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 41-44
	43	+Of the ten known, suspected, and impending nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and Iran), six have military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Should the Global Trends Hobbesian scenario occur due to a withdrawal of the U.S. forward security presence, the number of nuclear weapon states would almost certainly rise. That outcome would assuredly result in greater instability, as multisided security competitions would very likely break out. Military planners in the region would have to defend against multiple and possibly shifting adversary alliance combinations. The addition of more nuclear players would result in the need for greater preparation and stockpiling by all, because previously safe levels of nuclear munitions would no longer be safe enough. New players would mean further reductions in warning time during crises. Some leaders might conclude that striking first at the hint of crisis is the only way to survive. Under the Hobbesian pathway, the odds of nuclear disaster would rise substantially. Should the United States withdraw its forward military presence, Japan has the capacity to rapidly become a large nuclear weapons state. Japan has decades of experience with its nuclear enterprise, which operates fifty electrical generation reactors and has fully developed nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities and expertise.11 Japan already possesses roughly nine tons of weapons-usable plutonium, enough for about two thousand nuclear weapons- more than the number of strategic nuclear weapons allowed on active service by the United States and Russia under the New START TreatyY In April2013 the Japanese government decided to proceed with the opening of the Rokkasho reprocessing facility, which will have the capacity to produce an additional nine tons of plutonium annually from spent fuel at Japan's nuclear power plants.13 As a world leader in industrial machining and electronics, there is no doubt that Japan also has the ability to manufacture the other exotic components of nuclear weapons. Japanese officials remind observers concerned about its nuclear capacity that the country's nuclear enterprise is closely supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But it is also the case that Japan already has all of the ingredients required to quickly become a major nuclear weapons state should a change in the security environment in the region compel its leaders to make that decision. Japan also already possesses the means to deliver nuclear warheads to targets anywhere in the region. Japan's civilian space agency has operated since 1955 and has deep experience with liquid- and solid-fuel missiles. Japan put its first satellite into Earth orbit in 1970 and has recorded scores of successful space launches.14 Japan's experience with satellite construction and its participation in the International Space Station program demonstrate the country's expertise with payloads, sensors, telemetry, and space maneuveringY Japan's current boosters, with the capacity to lift over ten tons into low earth orbit, show missile capacity easily exceeding that required for military intercontinental ballistic missiles. 16 In sum, Japan possesses the technical expertise and capacity to become an intercontinental missile power in short order, should a security vacuum created by a U.S. withdrawal from the region make that necessary. Although South Korea would take more time than Japan, it too could become a nuclear weapons state. Indeed, some political leaders there have recently agitated for this course. If such action is taken, these leaders may be responding to popular wishes; after North Korea detonated its third nuclear device in February 2013, two public opinion surveys in South Korea showed that 64 to 66 percent of those surveyed believed that South Korea should have its own nuclear arsenalY At the same moment, South Korean leaders pressed the U.S. government to modify an agreement between the two countries so that South Korea could build the same nuclear fuel reprocessing capacity that Japan has been allowed since the early 1980s. Such a capacity would allow South Korea to reprocess the spent fuel from its twenty-two nuclear power plants into weapons-grade plutonium.18 As with Japan, South Korea possesses the industrial and electronics expertise to fashion the other components required for deliverable nuclear weapons. South Korean officials deny that the government is interested in nuclear weapons and remind observers that the country's nuclear enterprise remains under IAEA supervision. But the country is just a few steps away from having the capacity to produce substantial amounts of bomb-grade nuclear material, a capability that a large majority of the public seems to support. South Korea recently demonstrated a new class of cruise missile with a one-thousand-kilometer range. In a 2013 exercise, the South Korean navy scored hits on targets with the new cruise missile launched from a destroyer and a submarine.19 During the 1980s the United States fitted similar cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, and Israel is thought to have done the same with its submarine-launched cruise missiles.20 Launched from ground positions inside South Korea, the missiles have the range to reach not only all of North Korea, but also Tokyo, Beijing, and Shanghai. When deployed on South Korean submarines, an even greater number of targets come in range. Thus, although South Korea would take longer than Japan, it already has most of the nuclear enterprise and missile capacity it needs to become an effective nuclear weapons state. Perhaps equally important for political leaders responsible for such a decision, the South Korean public backs such a move. It seems rational to surmise that the intensity of such a view would only increase should either the United States reduce its security presence or Japan acquire its own nuclear arsenal. India is already a substantial nuclear and missile power and has the capacity to further expand its capabilities and inventories. India is thought to have eighty to one hundred nuclear weapons based around plutonium cores (India conducted three underground nuclear tests in 1998). The nation also possesses up to 11.5 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium in spent nuclear fuel which in theory could be reprocessed into enough bomb-grade plutonium for at least two thousand additional weaponsY India has an active missile program and is adding new missiles to its inventory that will allow India to deliver nuclear strikes across the Asian region. In April2012 India tested the Agni-5 missile, with additional testing in 2013_22 The missile has a range of five thousand kilometers-sufficient to reach targets throughout China and into the western Pacific. 23 India is also testing a submarine-launched ballistic missile, the deployment of which would increase the survivability of India's nuclear capacity. 24 India will thus soon have the capability to deliver military power into the western Pacific, should its interests require it to do so-a development policymakers and military planners in the region will have to take into account. Taiwan presents perhaps the least likely, but also the most provocative, case of nuclear weapons potential in the region. In the 1970s and again in the 1980s, Taiwan launched clandestine nuclear fuel reprocessing programs aimed at providing it with its own nuclear deterrent against mainland China. Both times, the United States forced Taiwan to abandon these programs.25 Taiwan has stored spent nuclear fuel at three two-unit nuclear power plants, which could be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium if Taiwan built a facility to do so, as it attempted to do clandestinely in the 1970s and 1980s. Taiwan also possesses the industrial and electronics expertise to assemble a deliverable nuclear weapon. Taiwan is developing an indigenously produced long-range land-attack cruise missile that in theory could be armed with a nuclear warhead. The missile, named Cloud Peak, has a range of 1,200 and possibly 2,000 kilometers and will be mounted on mobile transporters.26 The leadership in Beijing would view a decision by Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons as highly provocative and quite possibly a casus belli. Beijing would likely view such a development as tantamount to a declaration of independence, something that Beijing in the past has stated it would resist with force. Under current circumstances, Taiwan appears to have no interest in this course. But a withdrawal of the U.S. security presence would be a different matter, especially if it led to nuclear and missile races elsewhere in the region. In that event a Taiwanese nuclear program could go from being a highly remote case to perhaps the most likely path to war in the region.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-18 19:51:19.942

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	1	+Panel

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	1	+Westwood RM

ParentRound

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	1	+21

Round

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	1	+Octas

Team

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	1	+Harvard Westlake Engel Neg

Title

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	1	+SEPT-OCT - DA - China Deterrence

Tournament

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	1	+St Marks