Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[19]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[17]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[19]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-16 14:07:43.659
	1	+2016-10-16 14:07:43.0

Caselist.CitesClass[17]

Cites

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	1	+A. links-
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	3	+1. Pragmatic eco philosophy crucial to avoiding paralysis and eco collapse-aff’s absolutist stance causes massive environmental damage.
	4	+Andrew LIGHT Environmental Philosophy @ NYU ‘5 “What is Pragmatic Philosophy”
	5	+http://faculty.washington.edu/alight/papers/Light.What20Pragmatic.pdf. P. 349-351
	6	+
	7	+I have no easy answer to this question of how practical or “do-able” reform proposals made by philosophers should be. As
	8	+suggested above, it is a question that has obvious important implications for the application of philosophical principles to environmental policy. My intuition though is that the pragmatist ought to have a long-term end in view while at the same time she must have at the ready viable alternatives which assume current political or economic systems and structures whenever possible. This is not to say that the pragmatic philosopher gives up on the tasks of defending alternatives to current structures, and the pursuit of those alternatives in democratic debates on the reallocation of resources. It only means that our position may require, for consistency sake to our pragmatic intentions at least, that we not rely exclusively on such changes in articulating our preferred ends for better public policies. In this context, there are at least two senses in which one could understand the meaning of “pragmatic” philosophy as discussed so far. (1) Philosophy that has practical intent, anchored to practical problems, and (2) Philosophy which aids in the development of policy solutions that can actually achieve support and consensus. While Young’s approach certainly encompasses (1) the question is whether she also does (2). My own pragmatist approach assumes that there is a connection between (1) and (2) (indeed, that (1) implies (2)). Assuming a successful argument that (1) and (2) are related in this way (for some this may take some argument, for others it will be obvious) then a question remains concerning how to go about achieving (2). Let me make just one suggestion for how the pragmatist could go about reconciling her desire to change systems with the need to make achievable policy recommendations. As is suggested by my approach, my view is that if a pragmatic philosophy in the end is in the service of an argument to create better polices, then in our democratic society it must be prepared to argue its case before the public, and perhaps sometimes only before policy makers. As Said puts it, the public intellectual not only wants to express her beliefs but also wants to persuade others—meaning the public at large—of her views (1994, p. 12). This raises the critical issue of how such appeals to the public are to be made. It raises the issue of how important persuasion is to the creation of pragmatic arguments. All philosophy is in some sense about persuasion, though to differentiate ourselves from rhetoricians (if we are interested in making such distinctions, which I still am) we must restrict ourselves to persuasion through some form of argument given more or less agreed upon (and revisable) standards for what counts as a good argument. But the pragmatic philosopher is not simply concerned with per- suading other philosophers. She is also interested in persuading the public either directly (in hopes that they will in turn influence policy makers) or indirectly, by appealling to policy makers who in turn help to shape public opinion. The work of a public philosophy is not solely for intramural philosophical discussion; it is aimed at larger forums. But as I suggested before, such a task requires some attention to the question of what motivates either the public, policy makers, or both to act. Our bar is set higher than traditional philosophical standards of validity and abstractly conceived soundness. For if we are to direct our philosophy at policies in a context other than a hypothetical philosophical framework, we must also make arguments which will motivate our audiences to act. Since we are dealing in ethi- cal and political matters, the question for pragmatic philosophers like Young and myself is how much we must attend to the issue of moral motivation in forming our pragmatic arguments. If we agree that the issue of moral motivation is always crucial for a pragmatic philosophy then at least two issues arise. First, as I suggested before, we must be prepared to embrace a theoretical or conceptual pluralism which allows us to pick and choose from a range of conceptual frameworks in making our arguments without committing to the theoretical monism which may be assumed in some versions of these frameworks. The reason is that we need to be able to make arguments that will appeal to the conceptual frameworks of our audiences while recognizing that these frameworks can change from audience to audience. So, if we think a utilitarian argument will be useful for talking to economists in decision making positions, then we should be allowed to engage such a framework without completely committing ourselves to utilitarianism.
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	11	+2. Critiques of technological thought will be appropriated by groups looking to destroy the environment
	12	+Ted BENTON Sociology @ Essex 5 in After Postmodernism eds. Jose Lopez and Garry Potter p. 137-138
	13	+
	14	+Second, the post Kuhnian relativist aproaches to the sociology of science, in challenging the proclaimed finality and cultural authority of big science, saw themselves as on the side of 'the underdog', pressing for democratic account¬ability on the part of the scientific establishment even for a thoroughgoing democratisation of knowledge itself. Sociologists of science have tended to see 'technoscience' as indissolubly tied to political and industrial power and domin¬ation. To call into question its epistemological authority has been to undermine a key source of legitimation for established power. However, the politics of the critique of science become more complex and ambivalent in the face of the new ecological issues. While many Greens see the interests associated with technoscience as largely to blame for many ecological hazards, they also rely on scientific detection, measurement and theoretical explanations in making out the Green case. The construction of incinerators for waste disposal adjacent to working class estates, the noise and fumes emitted by heavy road traffic, the loss of treasured landscapes and so on, are forms of ecological degradation which are readily perceptible, and may enter directly into the discourses of popular movements. However, many other, often more sinister and catastrophic, forms of ecological transformation may only be detected by scientific instrumentation. Nuclear and other forms of radiation, low concentrations of toxins in food and drinking water, antibiotic resistant pathogens, shifts in the chemical composi-tion of the upper atmosphere and so on fall into this category. In other cases, the scale of transformation is what is ecologically significant and, here again, scientific modelling and measurement displace the evidence provided by the senses of necessarily localised human agents. Global climate change, biodiversity loss, ozone depletion are among the transformations which fall into this category. Finally, rational discourse about policy options depends on (but is certainly not restricted to) best available scientific thinking about the causal mechanisms involved(the 'greenhouse' effect, CO2 exchanges at the surface of the oceans, pholovvnthesis, mechanisms of cloud formation and many others in the case of dinsate 'hanged. To expose the normatively and culturally 'constructed' character of those scientific research programmes which have so far indcnt ifled, measured and explained the hazardous dynamics of ecological change is to run a serious political risk. The big industrial complexes, such as the biotech, pharmaceutical, agribusiness, petrochemical, construction and road transport sectors, together with their state sponsors, have a lifeline thrown to them. That the knowledge base which exposes the ecological 'externalities' of their activities is culturally biased and epistemologically questionable is music to their ears. Why put the brakes on wealth creation and progress on the basis of such flimsy and questionable evidence (see R. Rowell, 1996, esp. chap. 5)? These misuses of the work of constructionist sociology of environmental science are often seen as problematic from the standpoint of its practitioners (see, for example, r} a special issue of Social Studies of Science, 1996). Of course, it would be quite posble to accept these implications of he approach, in the face of unwanied political consequences: perhaps the weakening or even abandoning of environmental regulation and technteal safety standards could be accepted as an appropriate response to the sociologied dchunking of en ironmental science. lot esnnglv, however, few constructionists would be happy with such an out¬conic. the question is, can they coherently or consistently unhappy about it? Winne i9 and Burninghaio md. Coopei (1999) oiler sophisticated defences of their own variants of construe onism from this sort of 'realist' criticism. They claim, variously, that the 'taking of sides' in environmental conflicts is not necessarily the most productive role for social scientists to take, and that, not¬withstanding rite realist critique. it often possible to combine constructionism with cotmitiimmred cn' ironmen iahsns. These contributions deserve much fuller responses than I have space for here hot, as I shall argue below. dicnt are other reasons for scepticism about the more radical versions of constructionism.
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	16	+3. No aff offense- concern for the environment isn’t “management” –it’s a coping mechanism
	17	+Silvio FUNTOWICZ Inst. for Systems Engineering and Informatics @ Joint Research Centre, Comission of the European Communities AND Jerome RAVETZ Research Methods Consultancy ‘91 in Ecological Economics eds. Robert Costanza and Lisa Wainger p. 144
	18	+The inherent limitations of traditional problem-solving strategies are revealed by a structural feature of the new global environmental issues. For in these, decisions depend on evaluations of future states of the natural environment, resources, and human society, all of which are unknown and unknowable. The powers of science have not only produced irremediable uncertainties in knowledge, now we also find moral uncertainties, resulting from the invasion of the domains of the sacred and private. The most notable cases here we reproductive technology and also scientific research requires inflicting of pain on aware beings. Under these circumstances of radical uncertainty, a new type of problem-solving strategy is emerging. In post-normal science, the traditional description, "the art of the soluble" is no longer appropriate. For in this work, it is issues rather than problems that are examined, despite the amount of special scientific research and professional consulting conducted. Instead of the traditional images of conquering or managing, now it is better to think of coping and ameliorating. This is a far cry from the old excitement of scientific discovery or engineering creativity; but now we must cope with the consequences of those traditional activities that were conducted for so long in innocence of their effects.
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	21	+B. The impact outweighs the case- Physical existence of the environment is more important than ontology
	22	+Paul WAPNER Prf. And Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program @ American ‘3 “Leftist Criticism of ‘Nature’” Dissent Winter p. 74-75
	23	+The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn’t mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn’t postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of “nature” does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn’t speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature’s behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions—except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can’t ascribe meaning to that which doesn’t appear. What doesn’t exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature’s expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature’s behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world—in all its diverse embodiments—must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean- François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its “incredulity toward meta-narratives.” Nonetheless, I can’t see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme “other”; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the “other.” At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the “other” actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth’s diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don’t, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment. Now, what does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to eco-criticism requires that we go further and include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations. That is, we need to be moved by our concern to make room for the “other” and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions. I don’t mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the “other” should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, consider what to do about climate change, debate restrictions on ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth—and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. We must do so not because we wish to maintain what is “natural” but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner. I have been using postmodern cultural criticism against itself. Yes, the postmodernists are right: we can do what we want with the nonhuman world. There is nothing essential about the realm of rocks, trees, fish, and climate that calls for a certain type of action. But postmodernists are also right that the only ethical way to act in a world that is socially constructed is to respect the voices of the others— of those with whom we share the planet but with whom we may not share a common language or outlook. There is, in other words, a limit or guiding principle to our actions. As political theorist Leslie Thiele puts it, “One can’t argue for the diversity of views of ‘nature’ without taking a stand for the diversity of nature.”

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-16 14:07:45.460

Judge

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	1	+Rodrigo Paramo

Opponent

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	1	+Apple Valley JB

ParentRound

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	1	+19

Round

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	1	+3

Team

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	1	+Harvard Westlake Engel Neg

Title

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	1	+1- K - Eco Pragmatism

Tournament

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	1	+St Marks