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1		-Framework
2		-
3		-The resolution is a question of state obligations since the state alone has the power to prohibit nuclear power – prefer actor specific obligations since they differ – police have a duty to arrest criminals but civilians don’t.
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5		-This is different from individual morality – the state doesn’t have an intent since policymakers pass laws for different reasons, and doesn’t have the reflexive capacity of individuals so it can’t be valued intrinsically. Policymakers have to use util. Goodin
6		-Robert Goodin 90, professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences, “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142
7		-
8		-My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.
9		-
10		-So the standard is minimizing suffering
11		-Role-playing as the government is key to real world education—3 unique reasons. Joyner 99
12		-Joyner 99 (Christopher, Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, “TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW: VIEWS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLITICAL SCIENTIST,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring, lexis)
13		-Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. *386 By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.
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15		-Plan
16		-Plan Text: Countries ought to prohibit the production of Russian state owned nuclear power. Blomme 15
17		-Brian Blomme (Climate and energy communications manager for Greenpeace International), Count on the nuclear industry to have strange things happen, 7/7/15, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/nuclear-reaction/Rosatom-Finnish-nuclear-project/blog/53456/ VC
18		-There's more. Mikhail Zhukov heads up Inteco, which used to be owned by the richest woman in Russia, Yelena Baturina. She happens to be married to Yuri Lužkov, the former mayor of Moscow. Baturina sold Inteco to 50 state-owned Sberbank and to billionaire Mihail Shishkanov. Sberbank is an essential financier of Rosatom. Given these unsettling findings, Greenpeace warned the Finnish government to carefully examine the license application by Fennovoima to ensure it meets ownership criteria and is in best interests of the country. But the concerns are bigger than Finland. As our Finnish program manager, Sini Harkki, said: "This game that Fennovoima and Rosatom appear to be playing should be a concern to any country that is in discussions with Rosatom regarding building nuclear reactors. If the state corporation is ready to play a game with something as simple as ownership rules, what else will it play games with in building a dangerous reactor?" Rosatom is actively pursuing nuclear contracts around the world. And this warning is something many other countries should heed. In October 2014, Greenpeace released a report on the problems with Rosatom and the Russian nuclear industry. This ownership game appears to be consistent with the kinds of problems that plague Rosatom and should be required reading for politicians in any country thinking of cutting a deal with Rosatom. Fennovoima and Rosatom looked for years for investors. Yet it only took a few days to expose what appears to be a hoax, and a front for Russian capital. That's not the end of nuclear problems in Finland. The country is suffering through a protracted mess with Areva, the French nuclear company, over the building the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear plant. The project is years late and billions over budget with no end to the problems in sight. With lessons like those from Rosatom and Areva's Finnish nuclear projects, it is no wonder that in Finland the public majority is against nuclear. In spite of the people's will, Finland's current energy strategy relies on nuclear. But with ample renewable resources to be developed and the usual mess with nuclear projects, it is time to reconsider that strategy, listen to the will of the Finnish citizens, and move into the nuclear-free clean-energy future.
19		-
20		-Rosatom’s nuclear empire is on the rise now. Kraev 16
21		-Kamen Kraev. June 28, 2016. “Russia’s nuclear energy expansion – a geopolitical footprint?” http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/2040-russia-s-nuclear-energy-expansion-a-geopolitical-footprint LM
22		-The background Russia has currently 35 nuclear reactor units in commercial operation, generating roughly 25 gigawatts (GW) of power annually. This covered about 19 per cent of Russia’s total electricity production in 2015, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The bulk of Russia’s reactor fleet in operation has been commissioned in the 1970s and 1980s and has already been through lifetime extensions beyond the initial 30 years of service. Russia’s traditional market for nuclear technologies and nuclear fuel has been in Central and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (at the time Czechoslovakia) have all built and commissioned a number of Soviet-designed pressurised water reactors of the VVER type while they were virtual satellites of the Soviet Union (USSR). Ukraine remains the second largest operator of Russian-designed rectors in the world with its fleet of 15 VVERs. Poland, Romania, and ex-Yugoslavia were the only “non-Western” European countries during the Cold War which did not use Russian reactor technology for power generation. Beyond Europe, Russian-designed nuclear reactors are being operated in India, Iran, and China. Nuclear ambitions Over the past decade state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom and its network of subsidiaries have made direct or indirect commitments to build nuclear power plants in a number of countries around the world. As stated by a Rosatom official in a recent interview, Russia has signed intergovernmental agreements for the possible construction of 36 nuclear reactors overseas and is holding “active and consistent” tendering negotiations about 21 others. It is apparent that Russia seems to be looking away from Europe and its traditional markets in search of new business opportunities for its nuclear industry. During the Russia – ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit held on 19 and 20 May in Sochi, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin said his country is ready to provide a Generation III nuclear reactor technology to countries in Southeast Asia. Another Rosatom official called for Africa to invest in nuclear energy during an annual energy forum in Johannesburg in February 2016.
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24		-Rosatom is terrible – safety issues, environmental degradation, prolif, and massive corruption. Ulrich et al. 14
25		- Kendra Ulrich, Jehki Harkonen and Brian Blomme, ROSATOM RISKS: EXPOSING THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S STATE NUCLEAR CORPORATION, October 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/hungary/PageFiles/636986/rosatom_risks.pdf VC
26		-As a Russian state-backed entity that oversees almost every aspect of Russia’s civil and military nuclear programmes, Rosatom is one of the largest nuclear vendors in the global market. Yet problems are rampant, due to its very size and the scale of its operations, its entrenchment within the Russian government and the revolving door between government officials and Rosatom top management, and the lack of truly independent oversight over the company. One of Rosatom’s predecessor entities oversaw the world’s worst nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. Although the corporation now says that it has learned from the catastrophe, its more recent safety record exposes that little has changed in terms of its safety culture – both within Russia and in other countries to which it exports nuclear technology. Plagued with safety violations and accidents, lacking an adequate skilled workforce, using the equivalent of low-skilled, forced labour on reactor sites, and having an absence of adequate quality controls, Rosatom’s reactors pose an unacceptable risk to the public both within Russia and abroad. The pervasive corruption within the company that has come to light in recent years not only reveals the inordinate potential for the siphoning of public funds – some of which were intended to promote nuclear safety – into wealthy private accounts, but also casts serious doubts on the ability of the Russian government to ensure such gross violations do not occur again. Rosatom has enormous ambitions to expand its nuclear programme globally. Fuelled by Russian federal money and income from oil and gas exports, the state corporation aims to vastly expand its global nuclear fleet via its “Build-Own-Operate” model. This ambition seems less focused on investing in smart economic ventures than on other potentially motivating factors. Yet, even with the funding of the Russian government behind Rosatom, analysts have still raised significant doubts as to whether it is possible for any one operator to adequately finance so many nuclear projects – as the financial burden would be enormous if not impossible to bear. Rosatom’s claims are inflated but their ambition remains unchecked. Further, both within Russia and in other countries, Rosatom’s nuclear construction projects have not only been characterised by a lack of proper quality control and safety concerns, but also by delays and cost overruns – like the nuclear industry everywhere else. In cases where investors have put in their own funds, rather than leaving financing up to Rosatom, potential customers are either waiting for energy they thought they would have years earlier, or are left with an enormously growing expense. Alternatively, as in the case of Bulgaria, they end up terminating the project after realising that the bill had more than doubled.239 Finally, Rosatom’s spent-fuel reprocessing leads to large-scale releases of radioactivity into the environment and increased health risks to the general population, as well as to a major risk of accidents and to an even greater spread of contamination. The proposal to take back spent-fuel waste from reactors supplied by Rosatom but operated overseas not only fails to remove the risk at a reactor site – since spent fuel must be cooled onsite prior to transport – but significantly increases the risks to the public, including during transportation. At the same time, Russia’s fast-breeder programme – used to justify continued reprocessing and plutonium stockpiling – experiences significant delays and other problems, as has happened with other countries that have attempted to develop such reactors. The one result has been a greater risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, as stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium have continued to increase in Russia. The on-going geopolitical crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of the nuclear industry to political developments. One major current problem arising from recent developments is that Rosatom could be prevented from transporting nuclear fuel through Ukraine. Rosatom presents major concerns as a business partner in every respect. From a financial, safety, political and security perspective, the company’s nuclear expansion ambitions both within Russia and abroad pose unnecessary and unacceptable risks to communities and potential customers alike.
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28		-Accidents cause mass death and huge financial costs. Sovacool 08
29		-Sovacool, Benjamin K. director of the Danish Center for Energy Technology at the Department of Business Technology and Development and a professor of social sciences at Aarhus University. , and Christopher Cooper. "Nuclear nonsense: Why nuclear power is no answer to climate change and the world's post-Kyoto energy challenges." Wm. and Mary Envtl. L. and Pol'y Rev. 33 (2008): 1.
30		-
31		-While the Chair of the Public Information Committee of the¶ American Nuclear Society has publicly stated that "the industry has¶ proven itself to be the safest major source of electricity in the Western¶ world,"" 9 the history of nuclear power proves otherwise. The safety record¶ of nuclear plants is lackluster at best. For one salient example, consider¶ that Ukraine still has a Ministry of Emergency, some twenty-two years¶ after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster warranted its creation."' No less¶ than seventy-six nuclear accidents, defined as incidents that either resulted¶ in the loss of human life or more than $50,000 of property damage,¶ totaling more than $19 billion in damages have occurred worldwide from¶ 1947 to 2008."' See Table B.¶ One survey of major energy accidents from 1907 to 2007 found that¶ nuclear plants ranked first in economic cost among all energy accidents,¶ accounting for 41 of all accident related property damage, or $16.6 billion¶ in property loss, even though nuclear power plants did not even begin¶ commercial operation until the 1950s. 442 These numbers translate to more¶ than one incident and $332 million in damages every year for the past¶ three decades. Forty-three accidents have occurred since the Chernobyl¶ disaster in 1986, and almost two-thirds of all nuclear accidents have occurred¶ in the U.S., refuting the notion that severe accidents are relegated¶ to the past or to countries without America's modern technologies or industry oversight." 3 Even the most conservative estimates find that¶ nuclear power accidents have killed 4100 people,' or more people than¶ have died in commercial U.S. airline accidents since 1982."' "Nuclear¶ power accidents have involved meltdowns, explosions, fires, and loss of¶ coolant, and have occurred during both normal operation and extreme,¶ emergency conditions such as droughts and earthquakes."4 6 One index¶ of nuclear power accidents that included costs beyond death and property¶ damage-such as injuring and irradiating workers and malfunctions that¶ did not result in shutdowns or leaks~-~-documented 956 incidents from 1942¶ to 2007." 7¶ Using some of the most advanced probabilistic risk assessment¶ tools available, an interdisciplinary team at MIT identified possible reactor¶ failures in the U.S. and predicted that the best estimate of core damage¶ frequency was around one every 10,000 reactor years." 8 In terms of the¶ expected growth scenario for nuclear power from 2005 to 2055, the MIT¶ team estimated that at least four serious core damage accidents will occur¶ and concluded that "both the historical and the PRA probabilistic risk¶ assessment data show an unacceptable accident frequency."" 9 Further,¶ "tihe potential impact on the public from safety or waste management¶ failure... make it impossible today to make a credible case for the immediate¶ expanded use of nuclear power."4 51¶ Another assessment conducted by the CEA in France tried to associate¶ nuclear plant design with human error such that technical innovation¶ could help eliminate the risk of human-induced accidents.45' Two types¶ of mistakes were deemed the most egregious: errors committed during field operations, such as maintenance and testing, that can cause an¶ accident, and human errors made during small accidents that cascade to¶ complete failure.452 There may be no feasible way to "design around" these¶ risks. For example, when another group of CEA researchers examined¶ the safety performance of advanced French Pressurized Water Reactors,¶ they concluded that human factors would contribute to about one-fourth¶ (twenty-three percent) of the likelihood of a major accident.453¶ Consider that the two most significant nuclear power accidents,¶ Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, were human caused and then exacerbated¶ by more human mistakes.
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33		-Russian Imperialism
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35		-Rosatom is expanding presence in Africa and is taking advantage of countries to further business oppurtunities. Macharia 16.
36		-James Macharia (writer for Reuters Africa), Russia's Rosatom seeks cooperation agreements for African nuclear expansion, 5/19/16, http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKCN0YA1CH?pageNumber=2andvirtualBrandChannel=0 VC
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38		-APE TOWN (Reuters) - Russia's state nuclear agency Rosatom plans to sign cooperation agreements with Kenya, Uganda and Zambia to lay the groundwork for an expanded presence in Sub-Saharan Africa beyond its planned bid to build nuclear power plants in South Africa. Rosatom has voiced confidence in its ability to see off competition from China, France and South Korea in a planned South African tender to build a 9,600 megawatts (MW) nuclear power fleet in the continent's most industrialised country. It sees scope, however, for more deals across the region, from the building of plants to supplying reactor fuel. The mooted framework cooperation agreements, adding to those already made with Nigeria and Ghana, would set out how the parties will cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear science in the medical, agricultural and energy fields, among others. This is the first step towards closer ties with Africa and closer cooperation with a view, of course, to some day building nuclear power plants," Victor Polikarpov, Rosatom’s regional vice-president for Sub-Saharan Africa, said on Thursday. "We want South Africa to become our springboard for the rest of Africa. We want to create a nuclear cluster, a group of companies here that can operate with us in Africa." President Jacob Zuma's government was checking the financial and commercial impact of its nuclear ambitions before it issues a tender. South Africa's 1,800 MW Koeberg station near Cape Town is the continent's only commercial nuclear power plant at present, though Rosatom is building a nuclear plant in Egypt that is expected to be completed by 2022. Meanwhile, South Africa's nuclear energy corporation Necsa is being encouraged by government to revive nuclear enrichment and conversion facilities to reduce dependence on imported reactor fuels. South Africa has some of the world's largest uranium deposits and the proposed nuclear fleet is likely to use 465 metric tonnes of enriched uranium a year by 2030, officials say. Rosatom's Polikarpov, however, said it might not be viable for South Africa to restart enrichment facilities dismantled before white minority rule ended in 1994. "Another solution is just to have fuel supplied from Russia. We can guarantee supply of fuel non-stop for the duration of operation of all power plants," he said. Nigeria, however, looks a more distant prospect as its economy contracts amid the global plunge in oil prices. "Given the extremely bad economic situation in Nigeria today, it might take a bit longer. But the government and the new president are still determined to go nuclear," Polikarpov said.
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40		-Rosatom creates a monopoly on energy that is worse than Gazprom’s, and makes countries that don’t need nuclear power dependent on Russia – lack of other resources means Russia functionally controls them. Sharkov 15
41		-Damien Sharkov (Reporter for Newsweek Europe based in London), NUCLEAR POWER IS RUSSIA'S NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE, 4/28/15, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/01/nuclear-power-russias-new-weapon-choice-326198.html VC
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43		-Russia is using cut-price nuclear energy deals as leverage to influence EU states and shore up long-term alliances in the Middle and Far East, according to energy analysts. Analysis of recent deals secured by Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom reveals a costly drive by Moscow to lock countries including Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Argentina into arrangements that will mean they rely on a supply of nuclear fuel from Russia for decades. Russia recently agreed a €10 billion loan deal to expand and supply Hungary’s Paks nuclear power plant, one of several ongoing nuclear energy projects Russia has its sights on in Eastern Europe. Besides the 10-year Hungarian deal, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Ukraine rely on Russian nuclear fuel to function. These five countries with a collective population of 80 million are reliant on Russian nuclear co-operation for some 42 of their electricity supply. Try Newsweek for only $1.25 per week Lili Bayer, Eurasia analyst for global intelligence firm Stratfor, argues that the Hungarian plant is one example of Russia’s distinct strategy to maintain energy dependence in Europe on Russia. “This is both a commercial and political strategy,” Bayer says. “Russia is really pushing for projects like the one in Hungary because they will be providing 80 of the financing and it gives the Kremlin long-term leverage until Hungary pays the money back.” According to Bayer, lucrative deals such as the one in Hungary show that Russia is willing to spend big to retain its monopoly in the former Soviet-bloc though Russia's economic crisis will make this strategy more difficult. Russia used to supply these plants with fuel exclusively but now Western companies such as Westinghouse have developed fuel compatible for the Soviet-style reactors. Petr Topychkanov, analyst at the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow, says Rosatom is also developing nuclear projects outside Europe in the Near and Far East to similar political ends. Elsewhere Rosatom subsidiaries are currently developing nuclear projects in India, Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey and Jordan, while also currently bidding to build plants in Egypt and Vietnam. A deal to build a new plant in Argentina was agreed at the end of April. “For this purpose Russia is ready to offer very lucrative conditions for contracts including financial support,” says Topychkanov. “Moscow understands that if relations break down and Russia decides to stop supply, it is extremely difficult to find alternative sources for host countries. It believes it has a good chance to have predictable relations with that country if it is the one providing them with nuclear fuel,” he says. “This is a part of Rosatom’s big strategy and of course this big strategy is supported by the Russian government,” Topychkanov adds. Nuclear expert John Large says he sees alarming parallels between European over-dependence on Russian gas and Russian nuclear fuel. “Gazprom cutting Ukraine’s energy just goes to show you that there is a political need for fuel diversity away from Russia,” Large says. “If Putin had the valve on nuclear fuel as well, although the effect would be slightly longer term, it can get incredibly uncomfortable.”
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45		-2 Impacts
46		-1. This energy dependency gives Russia colonialist power – destroys countries pursuits of liberal democracy. Balockaite 12
47		-RASA BALOČKAITĖ. 2012. “RUSSIAN ENERGY IMPERIALISM: THE WORLD MAPPED ALONG THE GAS PIPELINES.” http://eltalpykla.vdu.lt:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/31679/2335-7185_2012_V_12.PG_85_96.pdf?sequence=1
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49		-Keith Smith in his book “Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism?”17 argues that Russia is using its energy resources as the means of control in the foreign politics. Trying to maintain the sphere of influence over its former satellite states, Russia is interested in energy dependency of these countries. The energy dependency prevents, according to the author, normal development of free markets and liberal democracies in CEE. The author openly calls it Russian neo-colonial politics, or energy imperialism, in former socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe. In his later book, “European Energy Security: Divide and Dominate. Center for Strategic and International Studies”18, Keith Smith makes a step further – he argues that Russia’s energy imperialism has expended far beyond the limits of former Soviet Block. Now, he says, even EU is strongly dependant on Russia on energy supply, and EU leaders are inclined to the political compromises. According to K. Smith, Russia, due to aggressive energy politics, has more power than “Brussels, Berlin and Paris” altogether.
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51		-2. Russian colonialism is gendered and ROOTED in patriarchal conceptions of the colonized – Ukrainian colonization proves this results in massive oppression and rights abuses. Lutsyshyna 06
52		-“Postcolonial Herstory: The Novels of Assia Djebar¶ (Algeria) and Oksana Zabuzhko (Ukraine): A¶ Comparative Analysis,” Oksana Lutsyshyna, University of South Florida, 2006.
53		-The equating of a colonized land with a woman is very characteristic for¶ European colonial discourse. This discourse shows itself in many domains, from art to¶ science: for instance, the long tradition of European painting depicted the continents of¶ Asia, Africa and America as women “available for plunder, possession, discovery and¶ conquest” (Loomba 151). America, discovered by Vespucci, was presented as a beautiful¶ naked woman (ibid.). Female bodies “symbolized conquered land” (Loomba 152), full¶ of treasures and rich splendor. According to the gendered vision of colonial projects, the¶ colonizer was bestowed with maleness, and the colonized - with femaleness. In 1899 a¶ Dutch journalist Charles Boissevain even “proclaimed …that…the Occident and the¶ Orient belong…together as man and woman” (Gouda and Clancy-Smith, “Introduction”¶ 7). Yaël Simpson Fletcher mentions that “France was often portrayed as a powerful¶ masculine figure, despite its traditionally female representations” (194), - and Algeria, of¶ course, was its female counterpart, as well as its “Other.” The Algerian woman was¶ exoticized, as was the whole “Orient” constructed by the Europeans as a place of “dirt,¶ smell, and disease” as well as the tantalizing “obscure mystery” (Fletcher 201). For¶ example, the Casbah, the Arab quarter of Algiers, was often depicted by European¶ travelers as a dangerous, though attractive place, a “fantastic network of tortuous streets”¶ full of available prostitutes and a certain “Oriental” mystique (Fletcher 201-202).¶ The “women question” was always at the center of European colonial discourse.¶ Both societies, the colonizers and the colonized, “came to evaluate each other’s cultural¶ worth in terms of the female question” (Clancy Smith, “Islam, Gender, and Identities in¶ the Making of French Algeria” 156). The fact that Islamic law regulated marriage and allowed men to have more than one wife was perceived by the French as characteristic of¶ a “barbaric,” uncivilized society, and as a justification of the colonial “mission¶ civilisatrice.” Those Alge”rians who practiced polygamy, for example, were discouraged¶ from obtaining French citizenship, which was reserved for the more dignified, less¶ “savage” individuals (Bowlan 110). A Muslim practice, polygamy was viewed as¶ incompatible with French customs and French “civilization” (Lorcin 63). However, the¶ “liberation” of women was done only in talk, and not in reality. As Patricia Lorcin¶ contends, “though a lot of indignation was expressed by the French officials over the¶ condition of women and polygamy in particular, no action was ever taken to prevent such¶ practices. This “indignation was used as a moral stick with which to beat Islam and the¶ Arabs” (66). allowed men to have more than one wife was perceived by the French as characteristic of¶ a “barbaric,” uncivilized society, and as a justification of the colonial “mission¶ civilisatrice.” Those Algerians who practiced polygamy, for example, were discouraged¶ from obtaining French citizenship, which was reserved for the more dignified, less¶ “savage” individuals (Bowlan 110). A Muslim practice, polygamy was viewed as¶ incompatible with French customs and French “civilization” (Lorcin 63). However, the¶ “liberation” of women was done only in talk, and not in reality. As Patricia Lorcin¶ contends, “though a lot of indignation was expressed by the French officials over the¶ condition of women and polygamy in particular, no action was ever taken to prevent such¶ practices. This “indignation was used as a moral stick with which to beat Islam and the¶ Arabs” (66). Algerian women were regarded by the colonial discourse as oppressed by¶ Islamic law. However, the condition of women in France was also far from ideal.¶ According to the Napoleonic Code, the French civil law code, women were “destined to¶ be men’s property, to obey them, and to procreate on their behalf” (Bell and Offen 37).¶ Women had no property of their own: “A wife…cannot give, convey, mortgage, or¶ acquire property…without her husband joining in the instrument or giving his written¶ consent” (“The Napoleonic Code” 39). Thus, the calls to liberate Algerian women and to¶ reform the imperfect system of civil laws and domestic customs came in the context of a¶ situation in which French women were also lacking many basic rights, such as divorce,¶ the right to possess property and to file paternity suits. Obviously, the issue of freeing¶ women was but a pretext for justifying the colonial enterprise, but not at all its goal.¶ While Algerian men were constructed as “aggressive,” but also “weak, lazy, and insincere” (Fletcher 207) and ove rall inferior to French men and their masculinity, the¶ Algerian women were seen as exotic, passive, and helpless, in need of the Europeans to¶ “liberate” them. In a broader context, they represented Algeria itself, a land that the¶ French intended to “civilize.” As Helen Carr states,¶ In the language of colonialism, non-Europeans occupy the same symbolic space¶ as women. Both are seen as part of nature, not culture, and with the same¶ ambivalence: either they are ripe for government, passive, child- like,¶ unsophisticated, needing leadership and guidance…or… they are outside society,¶ dangerous, treacherous, emotional, inconstant, wild,…sexually¶ aberrant,…disruptive,…evil. (Carr, qtd. in Loomba 159-160)¶ A woman and a country (Algeria) thus became one – a sexual object to be, paradoxically,¶ “tamed,” penetrated, “civilized” and liberated at the same time.¶ Ukraine and its colonial status were symbolically embodied in literary images of¶ girls seduced by the colonizers. This topic was extensively covered by the greatest¶ Ukrainian poet of the 19th century, Taras Shevchenko. Taras Shevchenko is considered¶ by many to be one of the “founding fathers” of the Ukrainian nation. As his¶ contemporary Borys Hrinchenko contends, “We are sure that Ukrainian literature will¶ have many more writers whose talent will equal that of Shevchenko’s, but nobody will¶ equal him in terms of his dedication to the cause of national renaissance” (qtd. in¶ Zabuzhko, Shevchenko’s Myth of Ukraine: an Attempt of Philosophical Analysis 11).¶ Shevchenko, born a serf, was bought out of serfdom by several influential Russian¶ painters in 1838. He was imprisoned and then exiled in 1847 for his patriotic poems¶ about Ukraine and satirical ones about the Russian Tsars. Shevchenko, whom critics have¶ called “an ethical genius” capable of understanding tragedies of national scale¶ (Zabuzhko, “A Woman-Author in a Colonial Culture” 167), wrote a poem “Kateryna,” the heroine of which fell in love with a Russian who got her pregnant and ran off without¶ marrying her, leaving the girl at the mercy of a very patriarchal Ukrainian village¶ community. Kateryna became a widely used metaphor for all Ukraine, seduced and¶ deceived by Russia. Oksana Zabuzhko states that it was in the 19th century that the¶ phenomenon described by Taras Shevchenko (Ukrainian girls’ being “picked up” and¶ then left behind) became especially widespread. Ukraine’s colonial status meant that the¶ women of the colonized country were available and submissive, and this state of affairs¶ resembles the situation of French colonial politics in Algeria.¶ During the Soviet period, the “gendering” of Ukraine, though still present, took a¶ different form. Oksana Zabuzhko, when analyzing the gender structure of the former¶ Soviet Union, suggests that “gender,” under the totalitarian regime, “stopped being an¶ individual characteristic: …it was the whole country that became a Woman ~-~- a classical¶ sexual object, prone to passive eroticism, lying readily under the … Supreme Power,¶ which kept the country subjugated thanks to the constant erection of its military organs”¶ (“Woman Author in Colonial Culture” 159). The citizens of the country, men or women,¶ were “stripped” of any sexual characteristics in the puritanical atmosphere of the Soviet¶ state, and became no more than “bacterial flora in the …open uterus of the country”¶ (“Woman Author in Colonial Culture” 160). Women (whether Russian, Ukrainian, or of¶ any other Soviet nation), with rare exceptions 2, were no longer “sexual” objects, but¶ “muscle strength,” as were men (159). When analyzing Zabuzhko’s novel Field Work in¶ Ukrainian Sex, in which she depicts relations between the sexes in the (post)totalitarian¶ environment, Madina Tlostanova states: “Zabuzhko emphasizes the …castrating role of the empire, the fact that the empire strips the individuals of their femaleness and¶ maleness, producing a kind of “subhumans”, like Oksana’s father; sadists, like her lover;¶ and frigid women, “black window panes deflecting all light”, like Oksana’s mother,¶ women without any erotic drive” (Tlostanova 181).
54		-
55		-Belarus/Lithuania
56		-Belarus-Lithuania relations rocky now – time is running out before Lithuania lashes out against the Russian built power plant. Sputnik 8/29
57		-Sputnik News, Belarus's Russian-Built Nuclear Reactor Driving Lithuanian Officials Insane, 8/29/16, https://sputniknews.com/europe/20160829/1044745037/belarus-lithuania-nuclear-plant-conflict.html VC
58		-Hinting that physical security and environmental concerns aren't really the central issues on her mind, Grybauskaite noted in a separate interview that the Belarusian NPP "is one of the tools which could be use used in an unconventional method against the Baltic countries." Instead of clarifying what she meant, the president vowed instead to discuss the issue in meetings with Baltic leaders, and with US Vice President Joe Biden, who visited the region last Tuesday. Vytautas Landsbergis, the veteran Lithuanian politician who became Lithuania's first head of state after the country declared its independence from the USSR, is no less hostile to the Belarusians' efforts, recently suggesting that the Belarusian NPP's construction amounts to "nuclear terrorism." Emphasizing that the European Union "and perhaps even NATO" must reach "a clear and tough position" against the plant, the MEP also hinted the real reason for Vilnius's concerns, saying that the Belarusian project harms Lithuania's prospects for economic development. Since Ignalina's closure, Vilnius has been looking for investors for the creation a new plant (called the Visaginas NPP), to be built using non-Russian technology and contractors. That project has since been described as frozen, if not dead. In 2011, Vilnius reached an agreement with Japan's Hitachi corporation to be a strategic investor in the plant; a year later, the project failed to garner the necessary support in a non-binding referendum, and has been deemed economically non-viable. Accordingly, as a commentary in Russia's Vzglyad online newspaper recently explained, Vilnius officials' hysterical commentary about safety and environmental concerns, along with their threats to bring Brussels and even NATO into the debate about the Belarusian NPP's construction, really appears to be a cover for their own failed NPP venture. Meanwhile, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency, nor the UN agency charged with observing trans-border environmental impact assessments, have supported Lithuania's claims. Accordingly, independent journalist Evgeny Radugin suggested that this combination of factors has to driven Lithuanian leaders into a panic. Earlier this month, the country's foreign minister, Linas Linkevicius, warned that Belarus "would not have the required trust, and should not hope for the sale of electricity from their unsafe nuclear power plant," presumably to Lithuania. "However, the realization of this goal is problematic," the journalist noted. "The Belarusian NPP will obviously go into operation before Visaginas." Russia has even offered Minsk the option of bringing the plant online earlier than planned. What's more, Radugin noted, the Lithuanian plant, if it's ever built, will not be able to compete with the Belarusian plant's prices for electricity. The Russian plant being built in Belarus features Generation 'Three Plus' power units. "Such stations are already operating around the world and have proven to be reliable and cost-effective." For this reason, Vilnius is attempting to act independently, introducing draft laws meant to prohibit Lithuania from purchasing Belarusian electricity, or allowing its transit through Lithuanian territory. Unfortunately, Radugin noted, having been outmaneuvered by Minsk and Moscow, all that's left for Lithuanian officials is "to engage in hysterics toward Russia and its partners."
59		-
60		-
61		-Belarus is a critical country in Russia’s plans – they’re a key security asset in Eastern Europe. Lacroix 16.
62		-Rejeanne Lacroix, Belarus’ Balancing Act, 7/28/16, http://natoassociation.ca/belarus-balancing-act/ VC
63		-Belarus is an example of a state developing its geopolitical distinctiveness into a position as an important regional contributor. It occupies a discernible midpoint between ongoing fears of Russian aggression and NATO’s expanded involvement in Eastern Europe. Though small and relatively underdeveloped, Belarus’ unique history, strategic location and political leanings make it an indispensable component in the European security framework. Greater attention should be devoted to messages emerging out of Minsk as they offer a unique perspective on the concerns of Russian aggression. Closer examination of these memos reveals how a small state can relatively engage in both sides of a dispute and in doing so, increase their political capital. A simple glance at a map of Central and Eastern Europe reveals that Belarus is bordered by NATO members (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia), a conflict hotspot (Ukraine) and the main aggressor to European insecurity (Russia). Anyone with a keen interest geopolitics understands that such a strategic location offers both opportunity and danger. Official statements from the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assert that the state does not feel threatened by NATO expansion or the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. In a step further, Minsk reaffirmed that it is willing to engage with the military partnership and hopes to act as a mediator. There is a clear understanding in Belarus that an intensification of conflict between Western powers and Russia is detrimental to its own stability. On the other hand, Belarus is vital to Russia’s national security strategy on its Western frontiers. Shared histories, Russian installations on Belarusian territory and the 1996 Union State agreement to harmonize relations between the two former Soviet states translates into a close relationship that Russia cannot bear to lose. Consequently, it is indisputable that the Belarusian military is inherently linked to the Russian Armed Forces. Belarus’ location and the nearby Kaliningrad Oblast extend Russian reach closer to their NATO adversaries and Europe in general. Russian military bases and radar systems in Belarus are even more important now to their security strategy as Western forces rotate in and out of the region as part of the Eastern Flank. As Belarus is a member of the Russian-organized Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it represents the proximity of Eurasian security to European concerns as well. Dividing lines between the two adversaries have thus been blurred but this obscurity offers Belarus the prospect to shift relations in their favour. The political games between West and East extend into the economic realm as well. Belarus continues to seek and negotiate a normalization of relations with the European Union. When the EU lifted most sanctions on the post-Soviet republic in early 2016, President Alexander Lukashenko ordered that the regularization of banking and investment procedures with the supranational organization take precedence. A rapprochement between the two would result in a partnership agreement and a subsequent trade deal. Belarus is an important exporter of a variety of agricultural goods, machinery and other finished industrial products therefore their entrance into European markets would result in enhanced domestic economic stability. European Union member states, such as Slovakia, have offered their support in favor of the Belarusian lobby while Germany urges greater cooperation between Belarus and Europe. Nevertheless, full membership in the EU is a seemingly impractical pursuit. The democratization process inherent in the Copenhagen Criteria does not align with Lukashenko’s political principles. Besides this obstacle, it is apparent that Belarus is open to courting Western interests just as the West has its attention on a possible new market.
64		-
65		-Increased Belarus-Lithuania tensions and Russian owned reactor completion both independently causes conflict and Russian annexation of Belarus – risks escalation into full scale war. Rekeda 16
66		-Sergey Rekeda (Writer for Eurasian Chronicle), Lithuania Starts Nuclear Information War against Belarus, 8/1/16, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/eurasian-chronicle/?id_4=2627 VC
67		-Lithuania sees the Ostrovets NPP primarily as a geopolitical rather than an environmental threat. Had this not been the case, why isn’t Vilnius worried about the critical safety situation at Ukrainian NPPs? Accordingly, the consequences of the Lithuanian struggle against the Ostrovets NPP could be geopolitical, rather than environmental. Of course, one could envision a positive scenario when the attacks on the power plant cease simultaneously with the parliamentary elections in Belarus and Lithuania this autumn. Implementation of the Ostrovets project will be depoliticised as much as possible and, after Grybauskaitė steps down as President, Lithuania and other Baltic states could become interested in the power produced at the Ostrovets NPP (thus far, the Lithuanian leadership is seeking to organise a “regional boycott” of the project). Yet the negative scenario is more likely. Lithuania will increasingly politicise the Belorusian nuclear plant construction. Vilnius will traditionally try to deliver a blow against Russia by calling the construction unsafe and Rosatom incompetent, and dubbing the project another of the “Kremlin’s tentacles” squeezing Europe. In the very near future, we might expect “expert reports” explaining that the Ostrovets NPP is intended to play a role in the “impending Russian annexation of Belarus.” There could be options, but the main goal will be to blame Moscow for its attempts to use the NPP to embroil Belarus in confrontation with the West, although the picture we see so far is the direct opposite. But, in its attempts to “teach a lesson” to Russia, Lithuania will inevitably tread on Belarus’ toes. The thing is that, today, the Ostrovets NPP is one of Minsk’s top priority economic projects. And Minsk is unlikely to look kindly at the attempts to interfere with its implementation. Moreover, the Belarus leadership has enough instruments to retaliate against Vilnius, up to and including re-routing its transit shipments from Klaipeda to Russian ports. Lithuanian attacks on the Ostrovets NPP could result in failure of the “engagement policy” the European Union has been attempting to pursue over recent years toward Belarus; these attacks could also lead to Lithuania losing another regional partner (following Poland and Russia) and incurring economic losses owing to Minsk’s retaliation. The Baltic politicians will hardly succeed in pulling the plug on the Ostrovets project. As paradoxical as it sounds, the Republic of Lithuania itself might suffer the greatest losses in this story.
68		-
69		-
70		-Conflict in the Baltics goes nuclear before NATO even gets involved and spills over into the rest of Europe. Goldmanis 16
71		-Maris Goldmanis (Master’s Degree in History, currently getting PhD, Russian Invasion in the Baltic States: Nightmare or Reality? 7/09/16, https://latvianhistory.com/2016/07/09/russian-invasion-in-the-baltic-states-nightmare-or-reality/ VC
72		-There are two possible scenarios for invasion. First: full-scale invasion. Second: limited, non-direct like it’s happening in Eastern Ukraine. Full scale invasion would require much use of land, sea and air force. The main Russian objectives would be securing control over the air and blockade the Baltic Sea. Kaliningrad region would be used to blockade the land route trough Suwalki, Poland to Vilnius and Riga. Russia would not necessarily need to assault Suwalki itself, but rather secure control over Lithuanian towns of Kybartai, Marijumpole, Kalvarija and Druskinskai. First cities to fall would be Narva, Tartu, Balvi, Kārsava, Rēzekne, Krāslava and Daugavpils. Since Vilnius is close to Belarusian border it would be first Baltic capital to be attacked. The question of further advance will determined in the skies over Baltic, in the sea and the Suwalki gap zone. If Russia manages to secure access points to Baltic States it has chance to overrun the NATO forces trapped in encirclement. NATO forces in every way has technical and numeric advantage over Russia and using it NATO would eventually break the blockade and force Russia to retreat. So NATO objective is to prevent the Baltic blockade and cut off Russia from Kaliningrad. Air, Naval and tactical superiority is in need. A logical question then arises what about nuclear weapons? First no country has ever had experience of using nuclear weapon against country that also have them. However, the common sense and most military doctrines is to use nuclear weapons after the warring country has exceeded all conventional means. Their forces are defeated and are on rout and country is on breakdown. That is one of the actions Russia would possibly choose. However, Russia has far-fetched doctrine of using nuclear detonation to prevent NATO for acting further. A scenario in mind that Russia would use tactical nuke against military unit or city and then in fear of nuclear war would try to impose ceasefire advantageous for them. However, such strategy is a gamble. One country might possibly not respond and seek solution while other fires tactical nuke in response, creating response after response leading to ultimate nuclear annihilation. So using or not using nuclear weapons it’s a question of common sense. Second scenario is limited invasion like the one that takes place in Ukraine. Russia could try to form Russian peoples republics in Narva, Daugavpils and Rēzekne and try to instigate revolts in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. Same as in Ukraine Russia has large Russian speaking population to use for their goals, many of them including some Latvians would support pro-Russian revolt. Russia might still try to blockade Baltic sea and Suwalki gap, but it will refrain from taking all countries completely. Border areas would fall for Russian control and there Russia would try to create environment for frozen conflict that would bleed out three Baltic States and NATO trying to help them. Such scenario may avoid discussion of using nuclear weapons, however, Russia would have hard time to prove that there are no Russian troops in Latgale. The Consequences In both case of full and limited invasion Russia would fall under tougher sanctions and isolation. Russian populace at first would support the invasion., however basing on military success or failures it would change drastically. Victory if such is possible would lead to Russia as totalitarian fortress in opposition against western block for times to come. Defeat would cause an unpredictable series of events, like state breakdown, civil war and foreign intervention. Limited frozen conflict in Baltic states will lead to same Russian totalitarianism and isolation only to hope find agreement over the conflict. Failure and loss of national prestige will leave its regime vulnerable. For Baltic States its means great loses of lives, destruction of infrastructure and economical breakdown. In some ways the limited invasion and frozen conflict would be more crucial as it would be a constant bleed out. For the world it would mean the danger of WW3. Not to mention fear of use of nuclear weapon, the conflict might spread to Poland, Caucasus, Moldovo everywhere where NATO and Russian troops might encounter each other. This would be major political and economical disruption for EU countries and US and UK that are already plagued by social disturbances. By all means such conflict would be highly disadvantageous for both sides.
73		-
74		-Belarusian annexation leads to Russia cutting the Baltic States off from the rest of Western Europe – causes conflict with NATO. Goldmanis 16
75		-Maris Goldmanis (Master’s Degree in History, currently getting PhD, Russian Invasion in the Baltic States: Nightmare or Reality? 7/09/16, https://latvianhistory.com/2016/07/09/russian-invasion-in-the-baltic-states-nightmare-or-reality/ VC
76		-Another point of argument is Belarus. Belarus is one of the most loyal allied states to Russia, not to mention Armenia. It has force of 62,000 active men and woman, sizable tank and air force. Whats more to add to importance is that Belarus hosts Russian troops and probably will host more as answer to NATO buildup. While Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko officially seeks a partnership with EU countries he has stated many times that in case of Russian conflict with NATO Belarus will side with Russia and take direct part. That means Belarusian army is a threat to Latvian eastern region of Latgale and to Lithuania particularly to Lazdijai and Druskinkai municipalities along the Polish border that have Belarusian border on the east and Russian border on the east. Presumably both forces could attempt to take the region to cut off Baltic States from Poland and Western Europe. So far there has been insignificant opposition towards Russian military presence among Belarusian society. That could change if economic difficulties deepen for Belarus. Two nearby Scandinavian countries Sweden and Finland with sizable military, but are not NATO members are concerned over worsening security issues in the region. There are many in both countries who advice to join NATO or at least expand the cooperation with NATO. Sweden that has maintained long history of neutrality and now it as the crossroads. Russia knows this and ha begun campaign of intimidation against Sweden to weaken their will to join NATO. Finland has very long border with Russia and historical policy of keeping neutrality with Russia, however that may change at some point and how Finland would react to the assault against ethnically close Estonia? So involvement of these two countries remains a question. Russia’s reasons for invasion. For and against. Baltic States provides almost no valuable natural resources for Russia to plunder. Financial gains might be the worth, however Russia already gains from Baltic States by trade, transit and gas supplies. Baltic States are trying to shake off reliance on Russian energy export, most successful in this matter is Lithuania. That’s way as same in Ukraine, Russia’s goal is to prevent Baltic States independence on energy sources and that can be done by multiple means. One of the main reason for invasions are political and emotional. Baltic States was possession of Russian Empire and was under Soviet occupation for most of XX century. Moscow highly regarded the European cultured territory and invested much in their industrialization and militarization. Now what is left is mostly empty carcasses of abandoned factories and war bases but what was left as inheritance was large numbers of Russian speaking immigrants in Latvia and Estonia. Both countries in early nighties did crucial and disputable actions to deny citizenship for most of these people creating a massive disappointment towards Latvian and Estonian ethnic population. The creation of large non-citizen community had political reason – Latvian national parties feared that Russian speaking voters could elect anti-western political force that would disrupt Latvian and Estonian path to NATO and US. In last 20 years the naturalization laws have allowed non citizens to obtain citizenship and indeed most of them vote for parties supporting Russia. While still significant size of non citizens remain and they are material for Russian special foreign policy to support Russian speakers outside Russia.
77		-
78		-Russia-NATO war due to Baltic annexation is the most likely scenario for extinction – it spirals out of control and no one knows what’s going on. Thompson 16
79		-Loren B. Thompson (Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government), Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin, 7/20/16, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044?page=2 VC
80		-However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic states ~-~- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country ~-~- Russia ~-~- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations. While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons. First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles ~-~- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland. Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond. Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly. Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments. Sixth, both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments. Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours. Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers. The bottom line is that all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.

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1		-2016-10-18 19:48:13.0

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1		-Panel

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1		-Marlborough GK

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1		-3

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1		-Doubles

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1		-Harvard Westlake Engel Aff

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1		-SEPT-OCT - AC - ROSATOM V2

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1		-St Marks