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  • Caselist.RoundClass[2]
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Caselist.RoundClass[2]

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1		-2016-10-16 14:02:03.786
	1	+2016-10-16 14:02:03.0

Caselist.CitesClass[2]

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	1	+Framework
	2	+
	3	+The resolution is a question of state obligations since the state alone has the power to prohibit nuclear power – prefer actor specific obligations since they differ – police have a duty to arrest criminals but civilians don’t.
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	5	+This is different from individual morality – the state doesn’t have an intent since policymakers pass laws for different reasons, and doesn’t have the reflexive capacity of individuals so it can’t be valued intrinsically. Policymakers have to use util. Goodin
	6	+Robert Goodin 90, professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences, “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142
	7	+
	8	+My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.
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	10	+So the standard is minimizing suffering
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	12	+First, we should preserve our future ability to find moral truths. Bostrom 12
	13	+Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012. NS
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	15	+These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.
	16	+
	17	+Second, Role-playing as the government is key to real world education—3 unique reasons. Joyner 99
	18	+Joyner 99 (Christopher, Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, “TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW: VIEWS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLITICAL SCIENTIST,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring, lexis)
	19	+Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. *386 By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.
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	22	+Plan
	23	+Plan Text: Countries ought to prohibit the production of Russian state owned nuclear power. Blomme 15
	24	+Brian Blomme (Climate and energy communications manager for Greenpeace International), Count on the nuclear industry to have strange things happen, 7/7/15, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/nuclear-reaction/Rosatom-Finnish-nuclear-project/blog/53456/ VC
	25	+There's more. Mikhail Zhukov heads up Inteco, which used to be owned by the richest woman in Russia, Yelena Baturina. She happens to be married to Yuri Lužkov, the former mayor of Moscow. Baturina sold Inteco to 50 state-owned Sberbank and to billionaire Mihail Shishkanov. Sberbank is an essential financier of Rosatom. Given these unsettling findings, Greenpeace warned the Finnish government to carefully examine the license application by Fennovoima to ensure it meets ownership criteria and is in best interests of the country. But the concerns are bigger than Finland. As our Finnish program manager, Sini Harkki, said: "This game that Fennovoima and Rosatom appear to be playing should be a concern to any country that is in discussions with Rosatom regarding building nuclear reactors. If the state corporation is ready to play a game with something as simple as ownership rules, what else will it play games with in building a dangerous reactor?" Rosatom is actively pursuing nuclear contracts around the world. And this warning is something many other countries should heed. In October 2014, Greenpeace released a report on the problems with Rosatom and the Russian nuclear industry. This ownership game appears to be consistent with the kinds of problems that plague Rosatom and should be required reading for politicians in any country thinking of cutting a deal with Rosatom. Fennovoima and Rosatom looked for years for investors. Yet it only took a few days to expose what appears to be a hoax, and a front for Russian capital. That's not the end of nuclear problems in Finland. The country is suffering through a protracted mess with Areva, the French nuclear company, over the building the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear plant. The project is years late and billions over budget with no end to the problems in sight. With lessons like those from Rosatom and Areva's Finnish nuclear projects, it is no wonder that in Finland the public majority is against nuclear. In spite of the people's will, Finland's current energy strategy relies on nuclear. But with ample renewable resources to be developed and the usual mess with nuclear projects, it is time to reconsider that strategy, listen to the will of the Finnish citizens, and move into the nuclear-free clean-energy future.
	26	+
	27	+Rosatom’s nuclear empire is on the rise now. Kraev 16
	28	+Kamen Kraev. June 28, 2016. “Russia’s nuclear energy expansion – a geopolitical footprint?” http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/2040-russia-s-nuclear-energy-expansion-a-geopolitical-footprint LM
	29	+The background Russia has currently 35 nuclear reactor units in commercial operation, generating roughly 25 gigawatts (GW) of power annually. This covered about 19 per cent of Russia’s total electricity production in 2015, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The bulk of Russia’s reactor fleet in operation has been commissioned in the 1970s and 1980s and has already been through lifetime extensions beyond the initial 30 years of service. Russia’s traditional market for nuclear technologies and nuclear fuel has been in Central and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (at the time Czechoslovakia) have all built and commissioned a number of Soviet-designed pressurised water reactors of the VVER type while they were virtual satellites of the Soviet Union (USSR). Ukraine remains the second largest operator of Russian-designed rectors in the world with its fleet of 15 VVERs. Poland, Romania, and ex-Yugoslavia were the only “non-Western” European countries during the Cold War which did not use Russian reactor technology for power generation. Beyond Europe, Russian-designed nuclear reactors are being operated in India, Iran, and China. Nuclear ambitions Over the past decade state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom and its network of subsidiaries have made direct or indirect commitments to build nuclear power plants in a number of countries around the world. As stated by a Rosatom official in a recent interview, Russia has signed intergovernmental agreements for the possible construction of 36 nuclear reactors overseas and is holding “active and consistent” tendering negotiations about 21 others. It is apparent that Russia seems to be looking away from Europe and its traditional markets in search of new business opportunities for its nuclear industry. During the Russia – ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit held on 19 and 20 May in Sochi, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin said his country is ready to provide a Generation III nuclear reactor technology to countries in Southeast Asia. Another Rosatom official called for Africa to invest in nuclear energy during an annual energy forum in Johannesburg in February 2016.
	30	+
	31	+Rosatom is terrible – safety issues, environmental degradation, prolif, and massive corruption. Ulrich et al. 14
	32	+ Kendra Ulrich, Jehki Harkonen and Brian Blomme, ROSATOM RISKS: EXPOSING THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S STATE NUCLEAR CORPORATION, October 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/hungary/PageFiles/636986/rosatom_risks.pdf VC
	33	+As a Russian state-backed entity that oversees almost every aspect of Russia’s civil and military nuclear programmes, Rosatom is one of the largest nuclear vendors in the global market. Yet problems are rampant, due to its very size and the scale of its operations, its entrenchment within the Russian government and the revolving door between government officials and Rosatom top management, and the lack of truly independent oversight over the company. One of Rosatom’s predecessor entities oversaw the world’s worst nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. Although the corporation now says that it has learned from the catastrophe, its more recent safety record exposes that little has changed in terms of its safety culture – both within Russia and in other countries to which it exports nuclear technology. Plagued with safety violations and accidents, lacking an adequate skilled workforce, using the equivalent of low-skilled, forced labour on reactor sites, and having an absence of adequate quality controls, Rosatom’s reactors pose an unacceptable risk to the public both within Russia and abroad. The pervasive corruption within the company that has come to light in recent years not only reveals the inordinate potential for the siphoning of public funds – some of which were intended to promote nuclear safety – into wealthy private accounts, but also casts serious doubts on the ability of the Russian government to ensure such gross violations do not occur again. Rosatom has enormous ambitions to expand its nuclear programme globally. Fuelled by Russian federal money and income from oil and gas exports, the state corporation aims to vastly expand its global nuclear fleet via its “Build-Own-Operate” model. This ambition seems less focused on investing in smart economic ventures than on other potentially motivating factors. Yet, even with the funding of the Russian government behind Rosatom, analysts have still raised significant doubts as to whether it is possible for any one operator to adequately finance so many nuclear projects – as the financial burden would be enormous if not impossible to bear. Rosatom’s claims are inflated but their ambition remains unchecked. Further, both within Russia and in other countries, Rosatom’s nuclear construction projects have not only been characterised by a lack of proper quality control and safety concerns, but also by delays and cost overruns – like the nuclear industry everywhere else. In cases where investors have put in their own funds, rather than leaving financing up to Rosatom, potential customers are either waiting for energy they thought they would have years earlier, or are left with an enormously growing expense. Alternatively, as in the case of Bulgaria, they end up terminating the project after realising that the bill had more than doubled.239 Finally, Rosatom’s spent-fuel reprocessing leads to large-scale releases of radioactivity into the environment and increased health risks to the general population, as well as to a major risk of accidents and to an even greater spread of contamination. The proposal to take back spent-fuel waste from reactors supplied by Rosatom but operated overseas not only fails to remove the risk at a reactor site – since spent fuel must be cooled onsite prior to transport – but significantly increases the risks to the public, including during transportation. At the same time, Russia’s fast-breeder programme – used to justify continued reprocessing and plutonium stockpiling – experiences significant delays and other problems, as has happened with other countries that have attempted to develop such reactors. The one result has been a greater risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, as stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium have continued to increase in Russia. The on-going geopolitical crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of the nuclear industry to political developments. One major current problem arising from recent developments is that Rosatom could be prevented from transporting nuclear fuel through Ukraine. Rosatom presents major concerns as a business partner in every respect. From a financial, safety, political and security perspective, the company’s nuclear expansion ambitions both within Russia and abroad pose unnecessary and unacceptable risks to communities and potential customers alike.
	34	+
	35	+Accidents cause mass death and huge financial costs. Sovacool 08
	36	+Sovacool, Benjamin K. director of the Danish Center for Energy Technology at the Department of Business Technology and Development and a professor of social sciences at Aarhus University. , and Christopher Cooper. "Nuclear nonsense: Why nuclear power is no answer to climate change and the world's post-Kyoto energy challenges." Wm. and Mary Envtl. L. and Pol'y Rev. 33 (2008): 1.
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	38	+While the Chair of the Public Information Committee of the¶ American Nuclear Society has publicly stated that "the industry has¶ proven itself to be the safest major source of electricity in the Western¶ world,"" 9 the history of nuclear power proves otherwise. The safety record¶ of nuclear plants is lackluster at best. For one salient example, consider¶ that Ukraine still has a Ministry of Emergency, some twenty-two years¶ after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster warranted its creation."' No less¶ than seventy-six nuclear accidents, defined as incidents that either resulted¶ in the loss of human life or more than $50,000 of property damage,¶ totaling more than $19 billion in damages have occurred worldwide from¶ 1947 to 2008."' See Table B.¶ One survey of major energy accidents from 1907 to 2007 found that¶ nuclear plants ranked first in economic cost among all energy accidents,¶ accounting for 41 of all accident related property damage, or $16.6 billion¶ in property loss, even though nuclear power plants did not even begin¶ commercial operation until the 1950s. 442 These numbers translate to more¶ than one incident and $332 million in damages every year for the past¶ three decades. Forty-three accidents have occurred since the Chernobyl¶ disaster in 1986, and almost two-thirds of all nuclear accidents have occurred¶ in the U.S., refuting the notion that severe accidents are relegated¶ to the past or to countries without America's modern technologies or industry oversight." 3 Even the most conservative estimates find that¶ nuclear power accidents have killed 4100 people,' or more people than¶ have died in commercial U.S. airline accidents since 1982."' "Nuclear¶ power accidents have involved meltdowns, explosions, fires, and loss of¶ coolant, and have occurred during both normal operation and extreme,¶ emergency conditions such as droughts and earthquakes."4 6 One index¶ of nuclear power accidents that included costs beyond death and property¶ damage-such as injuring and irradiating workers and malfunctions that¶ did not result in shutdowns or leaks~-~-documented 956 incidents from 1942¶ to 2007." 7¶ Using some of the most advanced probabilistic risk assessment¶ tools available, an interdisciplinary team at MIT identified possible reactor¶ failures in the U.S. and predicted that the best estimate of core damage¶ frequency was around one every 10,000 reactor years." 8 In terms of the¶ expected growth scenario for nuclear power from 2005 to 2055, the MIT¶ team estimated that at least four serious core damage accidents will occur¶ and concluded that "both the historical and the PRA probabilistic risk¶ assessment data show an unacceptable accident frequency."" 9 Further,¶ "tihe potential impact on the public from safety or waste management¶ failure... make it impossible today to make a credible case for the immediate¶ expanded use of nuclear power."4 51¶ Another assessment conducted by the CEA in France tried to associate¶ nuclear plant design with human error such that technical innovation¶ could help eliminate the risk of human-induced accidents.45' Two types¶ of mistakes were deemed the most egregious: errors committed during field operations, such as maintenance and testing, that can cause an¶ accident, and human errors made during small accidents that cascade to¶ complete failure.452 There may be no feasible way to "design around" these¶ risks. For example, when another group of CEA researchers examined¶ the safety performance of advanced French Pressurized Water Reactors,¶ they concluded that human factors would contribute to about one-fourth¶ (twenty-three percent) of the likelihood of a major accident.453¶ Consider that the two most significant nuclear power accidents,¶ Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, were human caused and then exacerbated¶ by more human mistakes.
	39	+
	40	+US Heg
	41	+Russia and the US are breaking off ties in nuclear energy, each trying to prove their dominance and get an edge over the other. Kelly 10/5
	42	+Lidia Kelly. “Russia suspends nuclear agreement, ends uranium research pact with United States.” Reuters. October 5, 2016. http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN12521J JJN
	43	+Russia further curtailed its cooperation with the United States in nuclear energy on Wednesday, suspending a research agreement and terminating one on uranium conversion, two days after the Kremlin shelved a plutonium pact with Washington. The Russian government said that as counter-measures to the U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia over Ukraine, it was putting aside a nuclear and energy-related research pact with the United States. It also said it was terminating for the same reasons an agreement between its nuclear corporation Rosatom and the U.S. Department of Energy on feasibility studies into conversion of Russian research reactors to low-enriched uranium. On Monday, President Vladimir Putin suspended a treaty with Washington on cleaning up weapons grade plutonium, signaling he is willing to use nuclear disarmament as a new bargaining chip in disputes with the United States over Ukraine and Syria. "The regular renewal of sanctions against Russia, which include the suspension of Russian-American cooperation in the field of nuclear energy demands the adoption of countermeasures against the U.S. side," the Russian government said on its website. In Washington, a State Department spokesman said the United States had not received an official notification from Russia although he had seen media reports of the suspension of the research agreement. "If they're accurate, we would regret the Russian decision to unilaterally suspend cooperation on what we believe is a very important issue that's in the interest of both of our countries," spokesman Mark Toner said at a daily news briefing. "UNFRIENDLY ACTS" The Russian Foreign Ministry said the decisions were taken in response to "unfriendly acts" by Washington. They came two days after Washington said it was suspending talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria. The agreement on co-operation in nuclear and energy-related scientific research, signed in 2013, provided the legal framework necessary to expand work between U.S. and Russian nuclear research laboratories and institutes in nuclear technology and nonproliferation, among others. The uranium agreement, signed in 2010, provided for feasibility studies into the conversion of six Russian research reactors from dangerous highly enriched uranium to more secure low enriched uranium. "We can no longer trust Washington in such a sensitive area as the modernization and security of Russian nuclear facilities," the Russian Foreign Ministry said. It said that should Russia decide on the feasibility of the conversion of any research reactors to low-enriched uranium, it will carry the work itself. But it warned the conversion may not be "an end in itself." "In some cases, including in the production of medical isotopes, highly enriched uranium is the most effective and renouncing its would be technically and economically inexpedient," the ministry said. The West imposed economic sanctions on Russia over its annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula in 2014, followed by a pro-Russian insurrection in the east of the country. The breakdown of a ceasefire in Syria, where Russia backs government forces and the West supports rebel groups, has added to tensions.
	44	+US and Russia fight for influence in the Middle East is highly unstable with power capable of flipping for either side. Klapper 9/8
	45	+BRADLEY KLAPPER - Associated Press. “Russian Mideast push could hurt US influence, if talks occur.” US News. September 8, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-09-08/russian-mideast-push-could-hurt-us-influence-if-talks-occur JJN
	46	+WASHINGTON (AP) — American influence over the Middle East could slip a notch after Israel and the Palestinians agreed in principle to Russian-organized talks in Moscow. That is, if the negotiations ever happen. Russia has clamored unsuccessfully for years to host such a gathering and the Russian Foreign Ministry's announcement on Thursday included no date or agenda for the future get-together. Making the meeting even more uncertain: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' demands that Israel first halt all settlement construction in east Jerusalem and the West Bank, and release about two dozen Palestinian prisoners. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the preconditions. If the meeting occurs, it would surely rattle the region's tumultuous ground further. The United States has maintained a stranglehold over all Mideast peace processes since the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, seen by Israelis and Palestinians alike as the indispensable mediator and only power that could guarantee a two-state solution. But the Obama administration doesn't appear to enjoy that recognition any longer. The degradation of America's standing coincides with its difficulty projecting its vision across the Middle East. On Syria, Washington has pleaded with Russia for a ceasefire even as Moscow advances the position of the Russian-backed government over U.S.-supported rebels. In the war against the Islamic State, the U.S. has been unable to secure a quick victory and is challenged by fighting among allies such as Turkey and the Kurds. In Yemen, the U.S. has lost hope of ally Saudi Arabia pushing Iranian-backed Houthis out of the capital by force. State Department spokesman Mark Toner on Thursday rejected the notion that the U.S. is losing primacy in the region. But he appeared skeptical that it was the right time for such a meeting in Moscovow. "We need to make sure that any face-to-face talks have the right climate in which to succeed in," Toner told reporters. He specifically cited Israel's ongoing settlement activity and Palestinian glorification of violence as hindrances to a peace settlement. Abbas has been fishing for the last couple of years for an alternative peace process, frustrated with President Barack Obama's inability to make any progress on a peace deal. He has welcomed a new French initiative that foresees a separate Israeli-Palestinian peace conference before year-end, but involving more global powers like last year's Iran nuclear diplomacy. He also wants U.N. Security Council action. Netanyahu, too, is making a statement by tentatively accepting the overture from Russia, which has traditionally pitted itself as the strongest advocate of the Palestinians among the Quartet of Mideast peace mediators. Washington is Israel's champion. The United Nations and European Union are somewhere in between. Netanyahu, whose relationship with Obama has always been frosty, is fearful the U.S. president may try to initiate a new process in his last days in office, or seek to use his remaining clout to wring Israeli concessions, Western officials with knowledge of the private diplomatic discussions say. As a result, Netanyahu has been trying to beat back any new American initiative he might see as threatening by starting a separate process first, according to the officials, who weren't authorized to speak publicly on the matter and demanded anonymity. He has discussed a new track with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi and floated different ideas to European leaders. None of these endeavors has been clearly defined. Netanyahu "likes the idea of a counter-initiative," said David Makovsky at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, while Russian President Vladimir Putin gets another opportunity to "poke the U.S. in the eye." The Palestinians seek to establish an independent state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem — territories Israel captured in the 1967 Mideast war. Netanyahu refuses to accept Israel's pre-1967 lines as a basis for border talks. There have been no meaningful Israeli-Palestinian talks since Netanyahu took office in 2009. The last round broke down in 2014 after months of fruitless, primarily indirect negotiations brokered by Secretary of State John Kerry. If a Moscow meeting takes place, the chances for substantial progress would seem slim. And that also may explain why American officials are tempering their comments. Aaron David Miller, a former Mideast negotiator in Democratic and Republican administrations, questioned whether Putin's peacemaking offer was serious. Nevertheless, he said in a recent opinion piece, the U.S. should let the Russian leader try. "Putin would almost certainly fail, tarnishing his vaunted image and likely angering Israelis and Palestinians," Miller wrote. But he said if Russia can "insert itself in the middle of the game, it would only reinforce the impression that Moscow is a key player and has exploited successfully the vacuum the Obama administration has created through what its critics charge is an abdication of leadership."
	47	+
	48	+Rosatom acts in favor of increasing Russian influence over the Middle East. Eran et al 15
	49	+ODED ERAN - senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, served as director of INSS. YOEL GUZANSKY - a doctoral candidate in Internetional Relations. ZVI MAGEN - former deputy head of Nativ, Israeli ambassador to Ukraine in 1993, ambassador to Russia in 1998. “Analysis: Russian nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East.” The Jerusalem Post - This article originally appeared in INSS Insight No. 782. December 30, 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Russian-Nuclear-Diplomacy-in-the-Middle-East-438838 JJN
	50	+During a visit to Egypt by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2015, Egypt and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in building the first nuclear power station in El Dabaa in northwestern Egypt. On November 19, 2014, the two countries signed an agreement that Russia would build four nuclear power plants in Egypt with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts each. Indeed, the discovery of a substantial reservoir of natural gas in Egypt’s economic waters will diminish the incentive to switch to nuclear energy production, as will the improved relations between Washington and Cairo; recently a rapprochement between the two countries occurred, with the removal of some of the American restrictions on arms sales that had been imposed on the regime of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. However, after the agreement with Russia was signed, Sisi declared in a speech recorded on Egyptian television that, “This was a long dream for Egypt, to have a peaceful nuclear program to produce electricity. This dream was there for many years and today, God willing, we are taking the first step to make it happen.” The main stumbling block in the way of the project is the question of financing. Egypt’s economic situation does not enable it to carry out a venture of this size, and it is doubtful that Saudi Arabia, which economically supports the Sisi regime, can finance this ambitious project, given the considerable budgetary pressures it is experiencing due to the drop in oil prices. Sisi declared that Egypt would repay the loan by selling the electricity produced by the reactors after they begin operating in 2022. Moscow is supposed to lend Egypt the money needed to build the reactors as part of a comprehensive agreement, which includes the supply of fuel for the reactors, maintenance, training, and repairs. Against this background, and in addition to Russia’s efforts to end the war in Syria, it is imperative to look at the other Russian diplomatic track in the Middle East – plans to build civilian nuclear reactors. Russia is not a new player in the civilian nuclear market in the Middle East, but the desire of Moscow and countries in the region to cooperate in this sphere clearly has become more acute, as reflected in growing Russian involvement in the sale of nuclear know-how and facilities in the region. This mode of action fits in with the overall Russian efforts to rehabilitate and strengthen its ties with countries in the region, following the freeze in relations during the “Arab Spring.” This effort is intended to serve Russia’s array of objectives in the region as well as in the global theater as they pertain to its rivalry with the United States. Russia’s military intervention in Syria is conducted within the framework of a coalition with President Bashar Assad’s army and Iran and its satellites, as part of its efforts to preempt the West in establishing diplomatic and economic cooperation with Iran. Russia’s actions in Syria are designed to combat Islamic terrorism, especially the Islamic State, in order to reduce the threat of extremist Islamic groups that are attempting to expand their influence within Russia’s territory. Russia’s major objective, however, is within the international sphere, and this includes influencing the future of Syria and taking a leading role in shaping the region. Indeed, Russia is interested in engaging in dialogue with the West, inter alia by obtaining bargaining chips for promoting a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East (Syria first) and eastern Europe. For Egypt, and for other countries as well, the Russian nuclear option is attractive because it does not present the demands and restrictions that are attached to the nuclear cooperation with the West. Relations between the United States and several of its traditional allies in the region have soured in the past five years; it appears that these allies are signaling to the American administration that they have other options, including nuclear ones. Egypt’s desire to develop a nuclear program is also linked to its determination to find long-term solutions for growing energy needs, such as building a civilian nuclear capacity like the one Iran is building, following its nuclear agreement with the major powers. Nuclear cooperation with these countries is a vital interest for Russia, which seeks to use this cooperation to overcome its budgetary distress, which has been aggravated by plunging oil prices. Russia also may fear that the nuclear agreement signed between the major powers and Iran is liable to open up Iran for competition with other western players with relevant capabilities and drive Russia out of the Iranian market. Turning to alternative markets could be one of the Russian responses to the new conditions that are liable to emerge in the region with the ratification of the agreement with Iran. Russia is therefore increasing its cooperation in this area not only with Egypt, but also with Iran.
	51	+Every nuclear reactor that goes up further sinks US influence in the region. Stratfor 15
	52	+Stratfor provides global awareness and guidance to individuals, governments and businesses around the world, We use a unique, intel-based approach to analyze world affairs. “Russia: Exporting Influence, One Nuclear Reactor at a Time.” Stratfor. October 7, 2015. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-exporting-influence-one-nuclear-reactor-time JJN
	53	+Russia's Nuclear Ambitions Rosatom's stated, if not intangible, goals in 2010 have gained traction over the past several years. At the end of 2013, Rosatom's foreign orders totaled $74 billion. In September 2015, Rosatom estimated the value of export orders reached $300 billion with 30 plants in 12 counties. In addition, Russia has memorandums of cooperation and deals at various stages of negotiation across the globe. From South Africa to Argentina to Vietnam to Hungary to Saudi Arabia, there appears to be no region where Russia does not seek to send its nuclear exports. Russia is no novice when it comes to using energy exports for political gain — see Russian natural gas exports to Europe. But as the game of pipelines continues in Europe, Russia is in a bitter standoff with the United States. In Russia's political chess strategy, numerous pieces are currently in motion. Economic pressure to lift sanctions seems to be hastening de-escalation in the Ukraine conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow is strengthening its presence in Syria through its more aggressive military stance. With hydrocarbon exports vulnerable, especially at times of low oil prices, exporting nuclear technology can provide Russia with another means of exerting influence. Nuclear power may never become as important as hydrocarbons, but it does provide a measure of political insurance as Russia attempts to maintain its global heft. Russia's nuclear sector did not face the same cutbacks that other energy sectors did because of sanctions. And throughout 2014 and 2015, Rosatom blazed a path toward several agreements favorable to expanding its nuclear power interests. Many of these areas of possible expansion are in geopolitically important countries, from Moscow's perspective. Middle East: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran In March 2015, the Jordanian government signed a $10 billion agreement that will allow Russia to build two nuclear reactors in the country by 2022. Unlike Syria, Jordan cannot provide Russia with a Mediterranean port. Still, a solid relationship with Jordan through nuclear power cooperation helps Russia keep a foothold in the Levant, regardless of the outcome of the Syrian civil war. Furthermore, as the world anticipates Iran's return to the global community once Western sanctions are lifted, the region is also preparing for the continued development of Tehran's civilian nuclear program. Russia consequently signed a framework deal in June 2015 with Saudi Arabia, Tehran's regional rival. Riyadh is eager to grow its nuclear sector, which is now only in the early stages, to 16 reactors over the course of the next 20 years. And Russia, naturally, is more than willing to help meet this goal. Yet despite emerging cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Russia also wants to maintain a presence in Iran. Iran signed a construction contract with Russia to expand its Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in 2014, and Moscow will not eliminate nuclear cooperation it has already established. Iran, however, could become the first battleground between China and Russia in terms of nuclear exports because Beijing has agreed to construct two plants in the southern Iran. Europe: Hungary and Finland One of Moscow's geopolitical imperatives is to have clout in Eastern Europe to ensure the security of the Russian core, a strategy especially evident during the Cold War. Hungary, once behind the Iron Curtain, is now part of the European Union. But growing anti-European sentiment in the country could provide Russia the opportunity to gain a better foothold there. Rosatom was selected to expand Hungary's Paks Nuclear Power Plant facility despite European objections. Finland, on Russia's northern border, also ignored EU objections and agreed to have Rosatom come in to build a nuclear power plant in the north. Given last year's rumblings about Sweden and Finland possibly joining NATO and how close Finland's borders are to St. Petersburg, Russia will remain vigilant in maintaining its influence in Helsinki. Rest of the World Moscow's nuclear export campaign has also touched the rest of the world. South Africa has a non-binding memorandum of understanding with Russia. Rosatom is believed to be one of the leading candidates, along with China, to build a new nuclear plant in the country, which has seen recent blackouts due to insufficient power. Elsewhere on the African continent, Ghana and Nigeria are also potential sites for future Russian-built nuclear power plants. Russia's push east for energy exports is not limited to hydrocarbons to China. Rather, several Southeast Asian countries — Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Indonesia — have signed either agreements for construction of plants or at least memorandums of cooperation for nuclear power. Finally, the export of nuclear power facilities follows Russia's broader plan of investing in Latin America. Moscow could potentially cooperate with countries for the mutual goal of countering U.S. influence in the region. Still, Russia and China could compete directly to bring nuclear power to the continent, undermining that goal. Russia's Secret Weapon Plans and ambitions are all well and good, but as Russia moves from the planning stages into actual construction and operation, we will see the true success of the scheme. Russia's economic downturn has made Western experts skeptical of Moscow's ability to finance all of these contracts. But Russia has beaten out Western firms because of more attractive financing in the past. U.S.-based firms have been further disadvantaged by the suspension of the Export-Import Bank's charter on June 30. While reinstating the Export-Import bank could come to a vote later this month, Russia's financial flexibility should continue to give it an edge. Some countries such as China and Iran pay for Russian power plants directly. Others such as Belarus, Bangladesh and Hungary depend on favorable loans. Jordan brought in Chinese banks to finance roughly 30 percent of its project in addition to the Rosatom's 35 percent share, and India has certainly benefited from Russian finance. High initial capital requirements are often a deterrent to adopting nuclear power, but Rosatom and its subsidiaries claim to have brought down development costs substantially. Requirements of a nuclear facility are site specific, meaning that each facility is unique. Repetitive production could drive down cost and while Rosatom does not exactly construct identical nuclear power plants, they do claim that the use of 3-D smart models has significantly increased speed of work, driving down their initial costs. Ultimately, it is a new business model that gives Russia the edge, one in which Russia builds, owns and operates the facility, as well as provides training and education. This alone could see Rosatom winning more bids, especially in countries with no previous nuclear experience. Turkey, poised to be an important transit state for Russian natural gas, will serve as a proving ground for the build, own, operate model. The geopolitical implications are obvious, as the model gives Russia a more permanent foothold in the country than just building the facility or importing the material would. Russia's desire for a global nuclear presence, however, will have to overcome several hurdles. Russian firms will continue to compete with Western ones in the near future, as well as Chinese producers in the coming years. South Africa is also an example of a country in which the build, own, operate model could fail, the big question being who will pay. While the Russian model may be attractive for Pretoria, which is not able to independently provide the capital for such facilities up front, it still requires the potential for a return on investment for Rosatom. South Africa has a poor track record of having consumers pay and that could prove a sticking point for its Russian partnership. Russia's own financial situation, while it has not yet hurt Rosatom, could eventually limit Moscow's ability to offer attractive financing options. But even with these obstacles, much like natural gas before it, nuclear power is only poised to augment Russia's global influence.
	54	+US leadership in the Middle East solidifies international peace – loss of influence causes war across the globe – leads to extinction. Bresler 15
	55	+Robert J. Bresler, Obama-led US withdrawal has destabilized the world, 6/24/15, http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html VC
	56	+American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with political stability and economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and assist in economic development. These initiatives prevented another great power war, achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without strong and persistent American leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression, that also eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East, the Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker, assisting in the negotiation of peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there has been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective. Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of American support. Hence, China, Russia and Iran are asserting hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa; the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military swallows the country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. When the Obama administration made concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won devices by Obama’s withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling abandoned by Obama’s rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet. Warlordism and radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A combination of devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America provided that force with persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S. to slip into the shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.
	57	+Belarus/Lithuania
	58	+Belarus-Lithuania relations rocky now – time is running out before Lithuania lashes out against the Russian built power plant. Sputnik 8/29
	59	+Sputnik News, Belarus's Russian-Built Nuclear Reactor Driving Lithuanian Officials Insane, 8/29/16, https://sputniknews.com/europe/20160829/1044745037/belarus-lithuania-nuclear-plant-conflict.html VC
	60	+Hinting that physical security and environmental concerns aren't really the central issues on her mind, Grybauskaite noted in a separate interview that the Belarusian NPP "is one of the tools which could be use used in an unconventional method against the Baltic countries." Instead of clarifying what she meant, the president vowed instead to discuss the issue in meetings with Baltic leaders, and with US Vice President Joe Biden, who visited the region last Tuesday. Vytautas Landsbergis, the veteran Lithuanian politician who became Lithuania's first head of state after the country declared its independence from the USSR, is no less hostile to the Belarusians' efforts, recently suggesting that the Belarusian NPP's construction amounts to "nuclear terrorism." Emphasizing that the European Union "and perhaps even NATO" must reach "a clear and tough position" against the plant, the MEP also hinted the real reason for Vilnius's concerns, saying that the Belarusian project harms Lithuania's prospects for economic development. Since Ignalina's closure, Vilnius has been looking for investors for the creation a new plant (called the Visaginas NPP), to be built using non-Russian technology and contractors. That project has since been described as frozen, if not dead. In 2011, Vilnius reached an agreement with Japan's Hitachi corporation to be a strategic investor in the plant; a year later, the project failed to garner the necessary support in a non-binding referendum, and has been deemed economically non-viable. Accordingly, as a commentary in Russia's Vzglyad online newspaper recently explained, Vilnius officials' hysterical commentary about safety and environmental concerns, along with their threats to bring Brussels and even NATO into the debate about the Belarusian NPP's construction, really appears to be a cover for their own failed NPP venture. Meanwhile, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency, nor the UN agency charged with observing trans-border environmental impact assessments, have supported Lithuania's claims. Accordingly, independent journalist Evgeny Radugin suggested that this combination of factors has to driven Lithuanian leaders into a panic. Earlier this month, the country's foreign minister, Linas Linkevicius, warned that Belarus "would not have the required trust, and should not hope for the sale of electricity from their unsafe nuclear power plant," presumably to Lithuania. "However, the realization of this goal is problematic," the journalist noted. "The Belarusian NPP will obviously go into operation before Visaginas." Russia has even offered Minsk the option of bringing the plant online earlier than planned. What's more, Radugin noted, the Lithuanian plant, if it's ever built, will not be able to compete with the Belarusian plant's prices for electricity. The Russian plant being built in Belarus features Generation 'Three Plus' power units. "Such stations are already operating around the world and have proven to be reliable and cost-effective." For this reason, Vilnius is attempting to act independently, introducing draft laws meant to prohibit Lithuania from purchasing Belarusian electricity, or allowing its transit through Lithuanian territory. Unfortunately, Radugin noted, having been outmaneuvered by Minsk and Moscow, all that's left for Lithuanian officials is "to engage in hysterics toward Russia and its partners."
	61	+
	62	+
	63	+Belarus is a critical country in Russia’s plans – they’re a key security asset in Eastern Europe. Lacroix 16.
	64	+Rejeanne Lacroix, Belarus’ Balancing Act, 7/28/16, http://natoassociation.ca/belarus-balancing-act/ VC
	65	+Belarus is an example of a state developing its geopolitical distinctiveness into a position as an important regional contributor. It occupies a discernible midpoint between ongoing fears of Russian aggression and NATO’s expanded involvement in Eastern Europe. Though small and relatively underdeveloped, Belarus’ unique history, strategic location and political leanings make it an indispensable component in the European security framework. Greater attention should be devoted to messages emerging out of Minsk as they offer a unique perspective on the concerns of Russian aggression. Closer examination of these memos reveals how a small state can relatively engage in both sides of a dispute and in doing so, increase their political capital. A simple glance at a map of Central and Eastern Europe reveals that Belarus is bordered by NATO members (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia), a conflict hotspot (Ukraine) and the main aggressor to European insecurity (Russia). Anyone with a keen interest geopolitics understands that such a strategic location offers both opportunity and danger. Official statements from the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assert that the state does not feel threatened by NATO expansion or the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. In a step further, Minsk reaffirmed that it is willing to engage with the military partnership and hopes to act as a mediator. There is a clear understanding in Belarus that an intensification of conflict between Western powers and Russia is detrimental to its own stability. On the other hand, Belarus is vital to Russia’s national security strategy on its Western frontiers. Shared histories, Russian installations on Belarusian territory and the 1996 Union State agreement to harmonize relations between the two former Soviet states translates into a close relationship that Russia cannot bear to lose. Consequently, it is indisputable that the Belarusian military is inherently linked to the Russian Armed Forces. Belarus’ location and the nearby Kaliningrad Oblast extend Russian reach closer to their NATO adversaries and Europe in general. Russian military bases and radar systems in Belarus are even more important now to their security strategy as Western forces rotate in and out of the region as part of the Eastern Flank. As Belarus is a member of the Russian-organized Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it represents the proximity of Eurasian security to European concerns as well. Dividing lines between the two adversaries have thus been blurred but this obscurity offers Belarus the prospect to shift relations in their favour. The political games between West and East extend into the economic realm as well. Belarus continues to seek and negotiate a normalization of relations with the European Union. When the EU lifted most sanctions on the post-Soviet republic in early 2016, President Alexander Lukashenko ordered that the regularization of banking and investment procedures with the supranational organization take precedence. A rapprochement between the two would result in a partnership agreement and a subsequent trade deal. Belarus is an important exporter of a variety of agricultural goods, machinery and other finished industrial products therefore their entrance into European markets would result in enhanced domestic economic stability. European Union member states, such as Slovakia, have offered their support in favor of the Belarusian lobby while Germany urges greater cooperation between Belarus and Europe. Nevertheless, full membership in the EU is a seemingly impractical pursuit. The democratization process inherent in the Copenhagen Criteria does not align with Lukashenko’s political principles. Besides this obstacle, it is apparent that Belarus is open to courting Western interests just as the West has its attention on a possible new market.
	66	+
	67	+Increased Belarus-Lithuania tensions and Russian owned reactor completion both independently causes conflict and Russian annexation of Belarus – risks escalation into full scale war. Rekeda 16
	68	+Sergey Rekeda (Writer for Eurasian Chronicle), Lithuania Starts Nuclear Information War against Belarus, 8/1/16, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/eurasian-chronicle/?id_4=2627 VC
	69	+Lithuania sees the Ostrovets NPP primarily as a geopolitical rather than an environmental threat. Had this not been the case, why isn’t Vilnius worried about the critical safety situation at Ukrainian NPPs? Accordingly, the consequences of the Lithuanian struggle against the Ostrovets NPP could be geopolitical, rather than environmental. Of course, one could envision a positive scenario when the attacks on the power plant cease simultaneously with the parliamentary elections in Belarus and Lithuania this autumn. Implementation of the Ostrovets project will be depoliticised as much as possible and, after Grybauskaitė steps down as President, Lithuania and other Baltic states could become interested in the power produced at the Ostrovets NPP (thus far, the Lithuanian leadership is seeking to organise a “regional boycott” of the project). Yet the negative scenario is more likely. Lithuania will increasingly politicise the Belorusian nuclear plant construction. Vilnius will traditionally try to deliver a blow against Russia by calling the construction unsafe and Rosatom incompetent, and dubbing the project another of the “Kremlin’s tentacles” squeezing Europe. In the very near future, we might expect “expert reports” explaining that the Ostrovets NPP is intended to play a role in the “impending Russian annexation of Belarus.” There could be options, but the main goal will be to blame Moscow for its attempts to use the NPP to embroil Belarus in confrontation with the West, although the picture we see so far is the direct opposite. But, in its attempts to “teach a lesson” to Russia, Lithuania will inevitably tread on Belarus’ toes. The thing is that, today, the Ostrovets NPP is one of Minsk’s top priority economic projects. And Minsk is unlikely to look kindly at the attempts to interfere with its implementation. Moreover, the Belarus leadership has enough instruments to retaliate against Vilnius, up to and including re-routing its transit shipments from Klaipeda to Russian ports. Lithuanian attacks on the Ostrovets NPP could result in failure of the “engagement policy” the European Union has been attempting to pursue over recent years toward Belarus; these attacks could also lead to Lithuania losing another regional partner (following Poland and Russia) and incurring economic losses owing to Minsk’s retaliation. The Baltic politicians will hardly succeed in pulling the plug on the Ostrovets project. As paradoxical as it sounds, the Republic of Lithuania itself might suffer the greatest losses in this story.
	70	+
	71	+
	72	+Conflict in the Baltics goes nuclear before NATO even gets involved and spills over into the rest of Europe. Goldmanis 16
	73	+Maris Goldmanis (Master’s Degree in History, currently getting PhD, Russian Invasion in the Baltic States: Nightmare or Reality? 7/09/16, https://latvianhistory.com/2016/07/09/russian-invasion-in-the-baltic-states-nightmare-or-reality/ VC
	74	+There are two possible scenarios for invasion. First: full-scale invasion. Second: limited, non-direct like it’s happening in Eastern Ukraine. Full scale invasion would require much use of land, sea and air force. The main Russian objectives would be securing control over the air and blockade the Baltic Sea. Kaliningrad region would be used to blockade the land route trough Suwalki, Poland to Vilnius and Riga. Russia would not necessarily need to assault Suwalki itself, but rather secure control over Lithuanian towns of Kybartai, Marijumpole, Kalvarija and Druskinskai. First cities to fall would be Narva, Tartu, Balvi, Kārsava, Rēzekne, Krāslava and Daugavpils. Since Vilnius is close to Belarusian border it would be first Baltic capital to be attacked. The question of further advance will determined in the skies over Baltic, in the sea and the Suwalki gap zone. If Russia manages to secure access points to Baltic States it has chance to overrun the NATO forces trapped in encirclement. NATO forces in every way has technical and numeric advantage over Russia and using it NATO would eventually break the blockade and force Russia to retreat. So NATO objective is to prevent the Baltic blockade and cut off Russia from Kaliningrad. Air, Naval and tactical superiority is in need. A logical question then arises what about nuclear weapons? First no country has ever had experience of using nuclear weapon against country that also have them. However, the common sense and most military doctrines is to use nuclear weapons after the warring country has exceeded all conventional means. Their forces are defeated and are on rout and country is on breakdown. That is one of the actions Russia would possibly choose. However, Russia has far-fetched doctrine of using nuclear detonation to prevent NATO for acting further. A scenario in mind that Russia would use tactical nuke against military unit or city and then in fear of nuclear war would try to impose ceasefire advantageous for them. However, such strategy is a gamble. One country might possibly not respond and seek solution while other fires tactical nuke in response, creating response after response leading to ultimate nuclear annihilation. So using or not using nuclear weapons it’s a question of common sense. Second scenario is limited invasion like the one that takes place in Ukraine. Russia could try to form Russian peoples republics in Narva, Daugavpils and Rēzekne and try to instigate revolts in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. Same as in Ukraine Russia has large Russian speaking population to use for their goals, many of them including some Latvians would support pro-Russian revolt. Russia might still try to blockade Baltic sea and Suwalki gap, but it will refrain from taking all countries completely. Border areas would fall for Russian control and there Russia would try to create environment for frozen conflict that would bleed out three Baltic States and NATO trying to help them. Such scenario may avoid discussion of using nuclear weapons, however, Russia would have hard time to prove that there are no Russian troops in Latgale. The Consequences In both case of full and limited invasion Russia would fall under tougher sanctions and isolation. Russian populace at first would support the invasion., however basing on military success or failures it would change drastically. Victory if such is possible would lead to Russia as totalitarian fortress in opposition against western block for times to come. Defeat would cause an unpredictable series of events, like state breakdown, civil war and foreign intervention. Limited frozen conflict in Baltic states will lead to same Russian totalitarianism and isolation only to hope find agreement over the conflict. Failure and loss of national prestige will leave its regime vulnerable. For Baltic States its means great loses of lives, destruction of infrastructure and economical breakdown. In some ways the limited invasion and frozen conflict would be more crucial as it would be a constant bleed out. For the world it would mean the danger of WW3. Not to mention fear of use of nuclear weapon, the conflict might spread to Poland, Caucasus, Moldovo everywhere where NATO and Russian troops might encounter each other. This would be major political and economical disruption for EU countries and US and UK that are already plagued by social disturbances. By all means such conflict would be highly disadvantageous for both sides.
	75	+
	76	+Belarusian annexation leads to Russia cutting the Baltic States off from the rest of Western Europe – causes conflict with NATO. Goldmanis 16
	77	+Maris Goldmanis (Master’s Degree in History, currently getting PhD, Russian Invasion in the Baltic States: Nightmare or Reality? 7/09/16, https://latvianhistory.com/2016/07/09/russian-invasion-in-the-baltic-states-nightmare-or-reality/ VC
	78	+Another point of argument is Belarus. Belarus is one of the most loyal allied states to Russia, not to mention Armenia. It has force of 62,000 active men and woman, sizable tank and air force. Whats more to add to importance is that Belarus hosts Russian troops and probably will host more as answer to NATO buildup. While Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko officially seeks a partnership with EU countries he has stated many times that in case of Russian conflict with NATO Belarus will side with Russia and take direct part. That means Belarusian army is a threat to Latvian eastern region of Latgale and to Lithuania particularly to Lazdijai and Druskinkai municipalities along the Polish border that have Belarusian border on the east and Russian border on the east. Presumably both forces could attempt to take the region to cut off Baltic States from Poland and Western Europe. So far there has been insignificant opposition towards Russian military presence among Belarusian society. That could change if economic difficulties deepen for Belarus. Two nearby Scandinavian countries Sweden and Finland with sizable military, but are not NATO members are concerned over worsening security issues in the region. There are many in both countries who advice to join NATO or at least expand the cooperation with NATO. Sweden that has maintained long history of neutrality and now it as the crossroads. Russia knows this and ha begun campaign of intimidation against Sweden to weaken their will to join NATO. Finland has very long border with Russia and historical policy of keeping neutrality with Russia, however that may change at some point and how Finland would react to the assault against ethnically close Estonia? So involvement of these two countries remains a question. Russia’s reasons for invasion. For and against. Baltic States provides almost no valuable natural resources for Russia to plunder. Financial gains might be the worth, however Russia already gains from Baltic States by trade, transit and gas supplies. Baltic States are trying to shake off reliance on Russian energy export, most successful in this matter is Lithuania. That’s way as same in Ukraine, Russia’s goal is to prevent Baltic States independence on energy sources and that can be done by multiple means. One of the main reason for invasions are political and emotional. Baltic States was possession of Russian Empire and was under Soviet occupation for most of XX century. Moscow highly regarded the European cultured territory and invested much in their industrialization and militarization. Now what is left is mostly empty carcasses of abandoned factories and war bases but what was left as inheritance was large numbers of Russian speaking immigrants in Latvia and Estonia. Both countries in early nighties did crucial and disputable actions to deny citizenship for most of these people creating a massive disappointment towards Latvian and Estonian ethnic population. The creation of large non-citizen community had political reason – Latvian national parties feared that Russian speaking voters could elect anti-western political force that would disrupt Latvian and Estonian path to NATO and US. In last 20 years the naturalization laws have allowed non citizens to obtain citizenship and indeed most of them vote for parties supporting Russia. While still significant size of non citizens remain and they are material for Russian special foreign policy to support Russian speakers outside Russia.
	79	+
	80	+Russia-NATO war due to Baltic annexation is the most likely scenario for extinction – it spirals out of control and no one knows what’s going on. Thompson 16
	81	+Loren B. Thompson (Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government), Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin, 7/20/16, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044?page=2 VC
	82	+However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic states ~-~- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country ~-~- Russia ~-~- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations. While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons. First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles ~-~- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland. Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond. Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly. Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments. Sixth, both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments. Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours. Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers. The bottom line is that all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-16 14:02:05.217

Judge

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	1	+Chris Castillo

Opponent

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	1	+Lynbrook SZ

ParentRound

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	1	+2

Round

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	1	+6

Team

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	1	+Harvard Westlake Engel Aff

Title

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	1	+SEPT-OCT - AC - Rosatom

Tournament

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	1	+St Marks